| Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Security Lecture Series
"The Viscosity of Global Governance"
Friday, Jan. 19, 2007
Mershon Center for International Security Studies
1501 Neil Ave.
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Daniel Drezner is associate professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author of All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press, forthcoming), U.S. Trade Policy: Free Versus Fair (Council on Foreign Relations, forthcoming), and The Sanctions Paradox (Cambridge University Press, 1999). He is the editor of Locating the Proper Authorities (Michigan University Press, 2003).
Drezner has published articles in numerous scholarly journals as well as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Reason, and Slate. He has provided expert commentary on U.S. foreign policy and the global political economy for C-SPAN, CNNfn, CNN International, and ABC's World News Tonight.
Drezner has previously held positions at the University of Chicago, University of Colorado at Boulder's Civic Education Project, RAND Corporation, and Treasury Department. He has also received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. From 2003-04 he was a monthly contributor to The New Republic Online.
Drezner received his B.A. from Williams College and his Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. He keeps a daily weblog at www.danieldrezner.com.
In recent years there has been a proliferation of international institutions, as well as renewed attention to the role that forum-shopping, nested and overlapping institutions, and regime complexes play in shaping the patterns of global governance.
This paper argues that institutional proliferation has a paradoxical effect on global governance. Proliferation shifts global governance structures from rule-based outcomes to power-based outcomes - because proliferation enhances the ability of the great powers to engage in forum-shopping.
This leads to another question -- under what conditions will great power governments be constrained from forum-shopping? Most of the factors suggested in the international regimes literature do not pose either a consistent or persistent constraint to forum-shopping.
After examining one example of where forum-shopping was temporarily constrained -- the 2001 Doha Declaration on intellectual property rights and public health -- this paper suggests that issue linkage and organizational reputation can increase the viscosity of global governance in the short run. The barriers to forum-shopping are not constant over time, however; in the long run, there is little viscosity in global governance structures.
Download "The Viscosity of Global Governance" (pdf)