The mission of the Mershon Center is to advance the understanding of national security in a global context. The Center does this by fostering the scholarly study of diplomacy and the use of force in the past and present, political and economic decision-making on security issues, and the roles culture, law, and institutions play in war and peace.
The Mershon Center is the fulfillment of a bequest by Colonel Ralph Mershon to The Ohio State University for the exploration of matters pertaining to National Security.

Ralph D. Mershon was a man of action in public life. He organized the American engineers for service in World War I and led a public effort to create the legislation that was the forerunner of the Reserve Officer Training Corps in the United States. He also was a contemplative and inventive individual who held a number of important patents for his work in electrical engineering. Col. Mershon died February 14, 1952 and is buried in Zanesville, Ohio.

The Center is also supported by community gifts and grant money. The mission of the Mershon Center is to advance the scholarly study and intellectual understanding of national security in a global context. The Center does this by fostering research on diplomatic and military history, contemporary political and economic decision-making, as well as the role culture and institutions play in war and peace.

The Mershon Center encourages collaborative, interdisciplinary research projects within the University and with other institutions around the world. Current projects include a comprehensive history and analysis of the foundations of international terrorism, the cultural politics of homeland security, and the global history of war. Faculty from many departments and from across the university participate in these unique projects.

Mershon supports multidisciplinary teams and individual faculty research. The Center proudly hosts visiting scholars, outstanding post-doctoral fellows and supports student research. Mershon also organizes conferences, symposia, and workshops that bring together academics, government officials, and business leaders from around the world to discuss the latest research in national and international security affairs.
With the United States engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and Americans aware that violence may strike the homeland, national security remains at the top of the Mershon Center’s agenda. The war on terrorism has both increased the salience of national security and expanded the understanding of what is involved in defending the country. The military is asked to fight wars as well as engage in peacekeeping, policing and even nation-building. The importance of intelligence and the need to coordinate the activities of multiple agencies both at home and with allies abroad is clear. So is the need to understand the motive forces and calculations that drive violent conflict and the methods for defusing and defeating them.

The national security agenda is broad and the Mershon Center can make a distinctive impact by focusing on topics that the faculty expertise at Ohio State is especially well equipped to address. In light of changes in the world and at strengths identified in selective investment decisions at the University, a new five-year plan for the Center was approved by the Provost this year. It charts a course for the Center that emphasizes four substantive foci. The first of these is the use of force and diplomacy in world affairs, using the study of military and diplomatic history to draw lessons for the contemporary scene. The second is the decision processes involved in making defense and foreign policies, with an effort to discover ways to improve these. Third, is the role culture plays in diplomacy and conflict as it shapes national, religious and ethnic identities. The fourth foci is the role law and institutions play in managing disputes that can lead to armed conflict.

The substantive questions the Mershon Center focuses on are not dealt adequately from any single disciplinary perspective. The Center serves as a catalyst for interdisciplinary cooperation relying heavily on faculty members from multiple departments in the Colleges of the Humanities, the Social and Behavioral Sciences and Law. The Center also serves as a bridge between the academy and the policy making world. The Center does this primarily by emphasizing the scholarly study of central historical and causal claims that serve as assumptions underpinning national security strategies and policies. This annual report highlights the recent publications resulting from this work, introduces some of the people that have played key roles in producing this scholarship and gives a flavor of the content and variety of the seminars and lectures the Mershon Center has sponsored over the past year.

Richard K. Herrmann
Director, Mershon Center
Professor of Political Science
September 2003

Richard K. Herrmann has written widely on international security and psychological perspectives on international relations. He is the author of Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy and has more recently coedited Ending the Cold War and Europeans Becoming European. His articles on the role images and norms play in conflict as well as on mass-public thinking about war have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly and World Politics. Dr. Herrmann has been a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and the coeditor of International Studies Quarterly. Dr. Herrmann holds a Ph.D. and MPIA from the University of Pittsburgh (1981) and a BA from Miami University (1974) in Oxford, Ohio.

The Mershon Center for the Study of International Security at The Ohio State University
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- **Identity Matters...and How**: An Interdisciplinary Conference
- **Cultural Diplomacy and the Image of the United States Abroad**: A Symposium, with Richard Celeste, Colorado College, and Cynthia Schneider, Georgetown University

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Recent Books By Mershon Center Scholars

Mark Grimsley, Associate Professor of History, released (with Clifford J. Rogers) Civilians in the Path of War (2002: University of Nebraska Press), which emerged from a conference held by the Mershon Center in 1993. The book compiles articles written by historians and traces the devastation experienced by civilians during wars from the last twenty-five hundred years. Grimsley is now working on a project about the history of war in a global perspective.

Richard Gunther, Professor of Political Science, released (with P. Nikiforos Diamandouros) Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (2001: Johns Hopkins University Press). It is the second of five volumes in the series on “The New Southern Europe” published with the support of the Mershon Center, the Social Science Research Foundation, and the Volkswagen Stiftung. Gunther also published (with Larry Diamond), Political Parties and Democracy (2002: Johns Hopkins University Press) and (with Jose Ramon Montero and Juan J. Linz), Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges (2002: Oxford University Press).

Richard Hamilton, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, published (with Holger L. Herwig) The Origins of World War I (2003: Cambridge University Press). This edited volume takes a fresh look at the existing theories that explain World War I, and offers new commentary on these ideas. He is currently working on a project about President McKinley and the origins and outcomes of the Spanish American War.

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Peter Hahn, Associate Professor of History, released (with Mary Ann Heiss), Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945 (2001: Ohio State University Press). The book compiles essays that survey ten singular episodes in U.S. interaction with the Third World since 1945. He continues to lead the Diplomatic History Lecture Series.

David Hoffmann, Professor of History, released Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (2003: Cornell University Press), which sprang from research funded by the Mershon Center in 2001. In this book, Hoffmann researches the ways in which Stalin’s leadership promoted cultural and behavioral norms that actually extended Socialism and its values instead of hurrying its demise.

Mitchell Lerner, Assistant Professor of History, released The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (2001: University Press of Kansas), which won the John Lyman Book Award from the North American Society for Oceanic History. The book tells the complicated history of the Pueblo, a military ship captured by North Korean gunships in January 1968. He is currently working on the International History Project with Peter Hahn.


Allan Silverman, Professor of Philosophy, released *The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics* (2003: Princeton University Press). In it, he focuses on three fundamental facets of the metaphysics: the theory of Forms; the nature of particulars; and Plato’s understanding of the nature of metaphysical inquiry.

Brian Pollins, Associate Professor of Political Science, published (with Edward D. Mansfield) *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate* (2003: University of Michigan Press). The book examines the claim that open trade promotes peace, looking at foreign commerce and its impact on political-military relations and points to new avenues research must navigate for better understanding of this complex relationship. Mershon is currently funding his latest project, titled “Global Economic Change, International Conflict and Cooperation.”

Geoffrey Parker, Andreas Dorpalen Professor of History, released *Success is Never Final: Empire, War, and Faith in Early Modern Europe* (2002: Basic Books) in which he examines movements throughout fifteenth- through seventeenth-century Europe and discusses great failures: ideas or empires that showed initial success and great promise only to fizzle out. He specifically examines the Spanish Empire of Philip II, the Protestant Church in rural Europe and the failures of the military innovation in modern Europe. He also released the German language version of *The Great War and Modern Memory* (2002: Yale University Press), which was published in English in 2000. In it, he and coeditors Mary R. Habeck and J.M Winter illuminate some of the enduring debates about the causes and effects of World War I. In addition, Parker released the newest editions of *España, Europa y el Mundo Atlántico: Homenaje a John H. Elliott* (2001: Marcial Pons), *La Revolución Militar* (2002: Alianza) and *The Times Compact History of Europe* (2003: HarperCollins). His latest project studies “The World Crisis, 1681-1683.”


Dorothy Noyes, Associate Professor of English, published *Fire in la Plaça: Catalan Festival Politics After Franco* (2003: University of Pennsylvania Press). She looks at the Patum, an annual festival in Catalonia, Spain, and discusses how community events like these illustrate the predicament of provincial communities striving to overcome internal conflict and participate in a wider world.

Recent Articles by Mershon Center Scholars

Force and Diplomacy


Political and Economic Decision-Making


Recent Articles by Mershon Center Scholars


Culture and Identity


Photos (clockwise, from upper left): OSU graduate students before a Mershon Center lecture; Marilynn Brewer (r) with SIPP students; Richard F. Hamilton, Professor Emeritus of Sociology.


Allan R. Millett, Major General Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Professor of Military History


During the past decade, Professor Millett has become an internationally-known expert on the Korean War (1945-1954). His major work is a two-volume history of the conflict, Their War for Korea (University Press of Kansas). The first volume, A House Burning (1945-1950), is completed and will be published in 2004-2005. As part of this study, Millett has spent more than two years in residence in the Republic of Korea since 1991, most notably at the Korean National Defense University (1991) and Senior Fellow, Korea Foundation (1996), for language study at the Korean Language Institute. In addition to the twenty-five essays, articles, and named lectures Professor Millett has given on Korean War subjects, he has participated as an editor in two major translation projects: The Korean War (three volumes: Ministry of National Defense, 98-2001 ROK, 19) and Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (University Press of Kansas, 2001). His research on the Korean War has taken him to Europe, China, and Japan. In 2000 the ROK Minister of National Defense cited his contributions to the study of the Korean War.

Marilynn Brewer, Ohio Eminent Scholar and Professor of Psychology

Marilynn Brewer received her Ph.D. in social psychology from Northwestern University in 1968. She joined the psychology faculty at OSU in 1993 as an Ohio State Eminent Scholar in social psychology. Prior to coming to OSU, Dr. Brewer was Professor of Psychology and Director of the Institute for Social Science Research at UCLA.

Dr. Brewer’s primary research interests within the field of social psychology include (1) social cognition — the perception and cognitive representation of individual persons and person “types,” (2) intergroup relations, especially the study of ingroup loyalty, intergroup biases, and the effects of contact between groups on intergroup acceptance, and (3) social identities and the self concept.

During her career, Dr. Brewer has served as President of the American Psychological Society (1993-1995), and as President of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (1990-91) and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (1984-85). She is a recipient of the 1995 Kurt Lewin Award from SPSSI, and the Donald T. Campbell Award for Distinguished Research in Social Psychology in 1992, and is currently serving as editor of the journal Personality and Social Psychology Review.
John Mueller holds the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center and is Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, where he teaches courses in international relations.


Mueller is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow, and has received grants from the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. He has also received several teaching prizes.

Mary Ellen O’Connell is the William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law at Ohio State, where she teaches courses on international law, international dispute resolution, international environmental law, international law and the use of force. She holds a B.A. in history from Northwestern, an MSc. in international relations from the London School of Economics, an LL.B. in international law from Cambridge University, and a J.D. from Columbia Law School. Prior to joining the faculty at Ohio State, she was a visiting professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, the University of Munich, and the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. She has also been an associate professor on the faculties of Indiana University-Bloomington and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Prof. O’Connell’s books include: *International Dispute Settlement*, a volume in the *Library of Essays in International Law* series by Ashgate/Dartmouth Press. She is coauthor of *International Law and the Use of Force*, coeditor of *Politics, Values and Functions, International Law in the 21st Century, Essays in Honor of Professor Louis Henkin*. She is currently completing work on *Enforcement in International Law* and a student text on *International Dispute Resolution*.

Geoffrey Parker, Andreas Dornealen
Professor of History


In total, he has written, edited or coedited thirty books and has published eighty articles and over 160 book reviews. He has also given over 200 lectures at universities and conferences in America (North and South), Europe and Japan. He was recently honored as commencement speaker at The Ohio State University, where he delivered an address titled “The Greatest Gift An Education Gives is Perspective.” In 1984 he became a Fellow of the British Academy, the highest honor open to scholars in the Humanities in Great Britain, and in 1992 the King of Spain made him a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella the Catholic in recognition of his work on Spanish history. In 1999 he won the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize from the Society of Military History in recognition of his work in military history. In 2001 Geoffrey Parker won a John Simon Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship to support his next book, a narrative and analytical history entitled The World Crisis, 1635-1665, concerning the climatically induced crisis that created acute political, economic, intellectual and social upheaval in most parts of the globe in the mid-17th century. Although not the first such worldwide crisis, it is both the most recent and the only one for which plentiful records survive. He hopes that his study will help inform the current debate on the consequences for human society of sudden climatic change.

Alexander Stephan, Ohio Eminent Scholar and Professor of Germanic Languages and Literatures

Alexander Stephan is Professor of Germanic Languages and Literatures and Ohio Eminent Scholar at The Ohio State University. Stephan has authored or edited some twenty books, eighty-five articles, and eighty book reviews. Among his numerous contributions to radio and television in Germany and the USA are a documentary film titled Im Visier des FBI: Deutsche Autoren im US-Exil [FBI: German Exile Authors in the Files of U.S. Secret Services] (ARD, 1995) and shorter pieces on the surveillance of Bertolt Brecht, Marlene Dietrich, Anna Seghers, and Thomas Mann by the FBI and the OSS.


Currently, Stephan is working at the Mershon Center on the topic of cultural Americanization and anti-Americanism in Europe and the world. In addition to the conferences and books mentioned above he is hosting, together with the Rothermere American Institute, a conference at Oxford University on the topic American Culture in Europe: Americanisation & Anti-Americanism Since 1945 (September 2003). The twelve comparative country studies presented at this event will appear in book form. With the Institute for Culture Studies in Essen, Germany, Stephan produced in 2001 to 2004 three conferences on the impact of American culture on Germany, a volume with essays on the same topic, and an international lecture series. At OSU he initiated with the Area Studies Centers of the Office of International Affairs a series of five symposia on American culture and anti-Americanism in the world. The first of these meetings, Cultural Diplomacy and the Image of the United States Abroad, took place in May 2003, featuring the former two-term governor of Ohio, Richard Celeste, and a former U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands, Cynthia Schneider. A second conference is scheduled in cooperation with the Middle East Studies Center for November 20, 2003 on the topic of Cultural Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The Image of the United States in the Middle East, to be followed in February 2004 by an event organized in conjunction with the Center for Slavic and East European Studies at OSU.
Mark Grimsley's first book, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, shared the 1996 Lincoln Prize as the best book on the Civil War published in 1995. Other works include *Civilians in the Path of War* (2002), an edited volume that sprang from a conference sponsored by the Mershon Center. Professor Grimsley has won three teaching awards, including the Alumni Distinguished Teaching Award, Ohio State's highest award for excellence in the classroom.

Peter Hahn specializes in United States diplomatic history in the Middle East since 1940. He has won research grants from the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Truman Library Institute, the John F. Kennedy Library, the Lyndon Johnson Foundation, the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, the Office of United States Air Force History, and the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Prof. Hahn's publications include *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (1991), and *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945* (2001), as well as essays in *Diplomatic History*, *Reviews in American History*, *International History Review*, and other journals and books. He is currently the associate editor of *Diplomatic History*. Prof. Hahn is completing a monograph examining United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1945 to 1961.

**Ellen Deason, Professor of Law**

Ellen Deason is Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law, where she is an expert in the fields of comparative dispute resolution and civil process. Professor Deason was editor-in-chief of the *Michigan Law Review* and served as a law clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, as well as in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and in the U.S.-Iran War Claims Tribunal in The Hague. She also practiced in the field of corporate law. Her publications in dispute resolution provide strong background for her leadership in building the new field of comparative dispute resolution, one that will seek constructive insights into the institutionalization of methods to resolve community-wide conflicts involving race, ethnicity, religion, and public policy.

**Carole Fink, Professor of History**

Carole Fink joined the faculty of the OSU History Department in September 1991. She had previously taught at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington, the State University of New York at Binghamton, Canisius College, Albertus Magnus College, and Connecticut College. Professor Fink, a specialist in European international history and historiography, has published two monographs, five edited volumes, one translation, and numerous articles and chapters. These works include *Marc Bloch: A Life in History* (Cambridge, 1989), the first biography of France’s soldier-patriot-historian, which has been translated into five languages; *The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921-22* (Chapel Hill, 1984; Syracuse paperback edition, 1993), which was awarded the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association for the best book in European International History; and an introduction to and translation of *Bloch’s Memoirs of War, 1914-15* (Cornell, 1980; Cambridge, 1988); as well as collections of essays on German Nationalism, European Reconstruction in 1921-1922, Genoa, Rapallo, and the Reconstruction of Europe, The Establishment of Frontiers in Europe after the two World Wars, and Human Rights in Europe since 1946. She has just completed a book, entitled *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, The Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938*, which will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2004.

**Timothy Frye, Associate Professor of Political Science**

Timothy Frye’s first book, *Brokers and Bureaucrats: Building Market Institutions in Russia* (2000: University of Michigan Press), won the 2001 Hewett Prize for outstanding publication in political economy given by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. His primary field of study is political economy in post-communist countries, and he has been the recipient of grants from the Harriman Institute and the Olin Foundation, as well as the National Council on East European and Eurasian Research. He is currently working on a projects relating government and political economy in several East European countries.

**Mark Grimsley, Associate Professor of History**

Mark Grimsley’s first book, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, shared the 1996 Lincoln Prize as the best book on the Civil War published in 1995. Other works include *Civilians in the Path of War* (2002), an edited volume that sprang from a conference sponsored by the Mershon Center. Professor Grimsley has won three teaching awards, including the Alumni Distinguished Teaching Award, Ohio State's highest award for excellence in the classroom.

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Prof. Hahn’s publications include *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (1991), and *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945* (2001), as well as essays in *Diplomatic History*, *Reviews in American History*, *International History Review*, and other journals and books. He is currently the associate editor of *Diplomatic History*. Prof. Hahn is completing a monograph examining United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1945 to 1961.
2002-2003 Visiting Scholars

Suranjan Das

Suranjan Das is Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at the University of Calcutta. He is also a University Professor in the Department of History at the University of Calcutta and has written extensively on ethnic relations and communal violence in South Asia. His last two books were entitled Kashmir and Sindh: Ethnicity, Nation-Building and Regional Politics in South Asia and Electoral Politics in South Asia. Prof. Das received his D. Phil form Oxford University in 1987 and published his first book Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947 with Oxford University Press in 1991. While at Mershon, Professor Das worked on two projects, one entitled “Ethnic Identities and regional history: Trends in postcolonial South Asia” and the other entitled “Regional and Subregional Cooperation in South Asia.”

Colonel Douglas Hine

Colonel Douglas Hine was the 2003-2003 Air Force Research Fellow at Mershon, where he explored security issues in Northeast Korea. He is a graduate of Penn State University and was commissioned as an Air Force Officer in 1982.

As a space operations and acquisition officer, he held various engineering positions at the Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory, Air Force Astronautics Laboratory, and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. His space operations experience includes the Global Positioning System, Defense Satellite Communications Systems, Milstar, Fleet Satellite Communications System and launch operations for the Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on system.

Col. Hine has served as a satellite operations crew member and crew commander, squadron operations officer, chief of space operations for the Republic of Korea, current operations chief for 14th Air Force and as a squadron commander.

Charles Lewis Taylor

Charles Lewis Taylor is Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic and State University and Recurring Research Professor, Wissenschaftzentrum-Berlin (WZB). He is coauthor of The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (2nd & 3rd editions), as well as numerous articles on the construction of social indicators, methods of constructing international event data, and the sources of democratization and public sector growth. While at Mershon, he continued his work with Mershon Fellow Craig Jenkins on The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators IV. In addition to this project, Lewis and Jenkins are working on a project called “Conflict Carrying Capacity and the Early Warning of Civil Violence.”

If you are interested in becoming a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center, please log on to our website, www.mershon.ohio-state.edu, for more information about the fellowship competition.
Michael Colaresi received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University. His dissertation, “Overkill: The Effect of Dynamic Two-Level Pressure on Rivalry Escalation and De-Escalation,” analyzed the interaction between domestic and international causes of war. The project found that wars were more likely when states are faced with high expected costs and characterized by rivalry outbidding between elites. While at the Mershon Center, he prepared his dissertation for publication and worked on additional projects, including ones that looked at external threat and democratization, the perpetuation of rivalries, and selection bias corrections for hazard models.

Amy Horowitz

Amy Horowitz’s project, “Mediterranean Israeli Music: Cultures in Disputed Territory,” traces the cultural, aesthetic, and political dimensions of a contemporary Israeli music genre, Mediterranean Israeli Music created by Mizrahi (Israeli Jews from Islamic countries). She received her M.A. in Jewish Studies from New York University and her Ph.D. in Folklore at the University of Pennsylvania. Before coming to OSU, she was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Judaic Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, and served as Acting Director of the Smithsonian Institution’s Folkways Recordings project. She received a Grammy Award for that, and also initiated and continues to direct the Jerusalem Project under the auspices of the Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage. This project examines the multiple roles of music traditions shared by enemies in conflict zones. The particular case study is a contemporary genre created by Israeli Jews from Islamic countries. During her year at Mershon, she furthered her research on musical transgression among Palestinian and Israeli musicians and its relationship to cultural identity.

Jacques Hymans received his Ph.D. in November 2001 from the Department of Government at Harvard University. His dissertation focused on the links between national identity, emotions and nuclear proliferation, drawing on in-depth primary research on the nuclear histories of Argentina, Australia, France, and India. He has published articles on nuclear proliferation in Security Studies, The Nonproliferation Review, and other American and international academic journals, as well as in Indian newspapers.

During his year at Mershon, Hymans continued work on a book that will further his dissertation research and specifically on the links between identity and foreign policy, including a major focus on identity measurement. In addition to his scholarly research, he was repeatedly consulted by Columbus’ network television news affiliates for his insightful commentary on the War with Iraq.

Qiong Li received her Ph.D. in social psychology from Hong Kong University of Science & Technology in 2001. Her primary research interests include social identity and intergroup relations. Her dissertation is titled “Self-group relationships under positiveness and distinctiveness threats: The role of ingroup identification and cultural variations.” At Mershon, she focused her research on the relationships among patriotism, nationalism, and American national identity. She also examined how essentialist views of race are related to implicit and explicit racial attitudes. This included an investigation into how education intervenes to change lay theories about the essentialist nature of race and in turn reduces prejudice toward other groups.

Brian Rathbun completed his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley in July 2002. His dissertation, “Contesting the National Interest: The Partisan Politics of Humanitarian Intervention in Britain, France, and Germany,” demonstrates that the ideology that drives parties in the domestic political arena also leads them to define the national interest in ways that shape international outcomes. His case studies of the domestic politics of the humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the creation of a European Union systematically analyze the role political parties play in security affairs. During his time at Mershon, Rathbun performed a quantitative analysis of elite foreign policy attitudes to complement his case studies and prepare his book manuscript. Rathbun has received fellowships from the Macarthur Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation.

If you are interested in becoming a post-doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center, please log on to our website, www.mershon.ohio-state.edu, for more information about the fellowship competition.
2002-2003 Mershon Center Student Research

Each year, the Mershon Center holds a competition for outstanding undergraduate and graduate students at The Ohio State University who seek funding for travel to support their research. The following students are a sample of some of those who have benefitted from this funding.

Roland Coloma is a graduate student in Educational Policy and Leadership. With the help of Mershon funds, he traveled to the Philippines to study issues of nationalism, colonialism, and education within the context of the Philippines-United States security relationship.

Veronica Crossna is a graduate student in Geography who went to Mexico City to study contemporary urban policy and its political, cultural, and economic impact on public spaces and the linkage between these policies and security.

Yucel Demirer, A.B.D. in Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, traveled to Turkey to study the interactions between political science, folklore, and linguistics, and specifically Kurdish language and cultural survival. He studied the Newroz Festival as an example of national memory and identity.

Brian C. Etheridge, who is working on his dissertation in Political Science, traveled to Berlin to study the city’s symbolic role in American perceptions of the Third Reich, World War II, and the Cold War. He sought to examine the role of Germans in American culture from the beginning of Adolf Hitler’s regime until the end of the twentieth century.

Daniel Douce traveled to Latin America to research political policy of managing disease and security. His research will be used for his Undergraduate Honors Thesis.

Alistair Fraser went to South Africa to conduct pre-dissertation research and explore contemporary land reform policy in the post-Apartheid regime and the connectivity between these policies and conflict.

Natalie Kistner, a Ph.D. student in Political Science, went to Poland for her dissertation research, where she studied in a language-intensive program and studied the transition to democracy in Poland.

Josh Klimas is studying the role of the Senate Armed Services Committee between 1955 and 1965 and the ways that congressional committees influence public policy.

Selina Lim is working on a project called “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” in which she researches the nuances of Albert O. Hirschman’s theories about international migration and “brain drain.” Her dissertation will focus, in part, on Singapore.

Jin Lu, a Ph.D. student in Sociology, traveled to China to conduct research for her dissertation, which will explore social welfare reform and its impact on Chinese firms during times of economic transition. She is interested in how the success of transition in China will affect China’s stability and relationship with the United States.

Andrew Mitchell received Mershon Center funds to support his travel to Catalonia, where he researched the role of Catholic clergy in the region’s revolt against Spain in the seventeenth century.

Michael Pavelec, a graduate student in History, traveled to Germany for his pre-dissertation research, where he explored the development of aeronautical engineering and military developments in the years between World Wars I and II.

Emre Sencer is a graduate student in history who is examining the civil and military policies of the officer cadres in, and the connections between, Germany and Turkey in the interwar period.

Tanisha Wilburn, an OSU undergraduate, traveled to Segovia for language acquisition and research relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Force and Diplomacy

Mershon Center Funded Projects Studying Force and Diplomacy

- Substantive and Methodological Innovations for the Study of Temporal and Spatial Dynamics in International Conflict
  Principal Investigator(s): Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Department of Political Science, with Dan Reiter and Christopher J.W. Zorn, Emory University

- Democratization, Internal War, and the Impact of Globalization: An Empirical Assessment
  Principal Investigator(s): Edward Crenshaw, Department of Sociology and Pamela Paxton, Department of Sociology

- International History Project
  Principal Investigator(s): Peter L. Hahn, Department of History, and Mitchell Lerner, Department of History (Newark)

- World War I: The Origins
  Principal Investigator(s): Richard F. Hamilton, Department of Sociology, and Holger H. Herwig, University of Calgary

  Principal Investigator(s): J. Craig Jenkins, Department of Sociology, Charles Lewis Taylor, Virginia Polytechnic University, Doug Bond, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and Joe Bond, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University

- The Dimensions of International Interaction
  Principal Investigator(s): J. Craig Jenkins, Department of Sociology, Charles Lewis Taylor, Virginia Polytechnic University, Doug Bond, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, Joe Bond, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University

- Religious and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century and World Security: Identity, Deprivation, and Violence in the Contemporary World
  Principal Investigator(s): Jerry Ladman, Office of International Affairs, Alam Payind, Middle East Studies Center, Brad Richardson, East Asian Studies Center, Ahmad Sikainga, Africa Studies Center, Halina Stephan, Center for Slavic and East European Studies, and Fernando Unzueta, Center for Latin America Studies

- Protecting the National Utility Infrastructure
  Principal Investigator(s): Raymond Lawton, National Regulatory Research Institute

- Democratization and War
  Principal Investigator(s): Edward D. Mansfield, Department of Political Science

- Redefining Sovereignty, the Use of Force after the End of the Cold War and after September 11: Legality and Legitimacy
  Principal Investigator(s): Mary Ellen O’Connell, Moritz College of Law and Michael Bothe, J.W. Goethe University

- Contemporary Armed Conflict: A Speaker Series on Contemporary Civil Wars and Armed Predation
  Principal Investigator(s): John Mueller, Mershon Center and Department of Political Science, and J. Craig Jenkins, Department of Sociology

- The World Crisis 1635-1665
  Principal Investigator(s): Geoffrey Parker, Department of History

- The English Empire in the Americas During the Revolution of 1640-1661
  Principal Investigator(s): Carla Pestana, Department of History
On April 1, 2003, the Mershon Center and the Moritz College of Law sponsored a panel featuring Mershon Center fellows, each of whom offered a different perspective on the War in Iraq.

Allan Millett, Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History, and General Todd Stewart (Ret.) were primarily concerned with the way people in the United States were looking at the war. For Stewart, it was necessary to remember that this is war with Iraq, not war in Iraq, and that it could be dangerous for people to complacently believe that the conflict would be contained within the borders of Iraq. Terrorism is a real threat during any war, and attacks on American soil are a viable target, he said.

Further, he added, it is important to realize that in war or in peace, part of protecting the nation is protecting American interests, people, and infrastructure. This extends beyond U.S. borders, so part of the best strategy for homeland security is to protect American interests, sometimes preemptively, as was the argument for action in Iraq.

Drawing on his own experience in the U.S. Marines, Millett added his commentary on the American perspective of the war. Like Stewart, Millett feared that the average U.S. viewer was not truly seeing “the whole picture” of the conflict. For many, he said, watching the action at home does not give an accurate picture of combat.

While much attention has been given to the use of smart bombs and air campaigns, Millett said that wars are “won and lost” by the success of ground troops. Because the media has reporters embedded in the action, people in the United States can get a sense of this action, but Millett advised viewers to watch these reports with an understanding of how combat works. He said that it is common military practice for large units to travel slowly and have strategic operational pauses. Millett warned that some viewers may watch the war and not fully comprehend that the U.S. troop movement is strategic, planned, and methodical. He feared that up-to-the-minute coverage may sensationalize commonplace military maneuvering.

Millett and Stewart offered the military perspective on the campaign; Mary Ellen O’Connell, William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, spoke on the legal complications of the conflict.

She said that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was unlawful. But, because a war was nevertheless being fought, some legal discussions were shifting to the problems with the way this war was being fought. In any combat, even if the conflict itself is unlawful, parties are expected to follow the rules of war established by the Geneva Convention and the Hague.

She was alarmed by some of the clear violations of the rules of war, such as the abuse of the white flag, parading prisoners of war, and most specifically by Iraq’s abuse of civilian protection. The use of human shields clearly jeopardizes civilian lives, but so did the Iraqi Army’s decision to install weapons or military outposts in places like hospitals or apartment complexes. This turns those civilian spaces into military targets, endangering the lives of civilians who live or work inside them. While an attack on a hospital would normally be unlawful, when an army decides to use it as an active military post, it becomes a viable combat target.

O’Connell said that many countries have looked unfavorably upon Washington’s decision to unilaterally attack Iraq, but the conduct of the Iraqi armed forces is creating a negative perception of them.

The legal questions surrounding this conflict will preoccupy international legal scholars for some time, said O’Connell. The situation is entirely new: a superpower acting alone to overthrow another country’s government, an unlawful war that yields gross violations of human rights and rules of war—these are situations unique to the war in Iraq and will likely force a revision of contemporary international law. She anticipated that the war will possibly result in international tribunals, truth commissions, and traditional war crimes trials.

Richard Herrmann, Director of the Mershon Center and Professor of Political Science, described the challenges faced by American troops attempting to dismantle Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime.

He described the Ba’ath party as a “nervous system,” it had tentacles in every community within Iraq. Herrmann said that decapitating the system by removing its head—Saddam Hussein—would not be fully effective. The only way to truly remove the party would be to pull the nervous system out whole, which would be a bloody affair.

He said that it is also essential for Washington to look back to the first Gulf War to inform the perspective the world should take on the second war.

In the early 1990s, a U.S. invasion of Iraq was supported by a contingent of other Arab countries and Washington thought that the Ba’ath party would collapse after the invasion. Washington immediately pulled out American troops after the fighting stopped, thinking there would be internal violence resulting from the overthrow of Hussein’s government.

This did not happen, and the United States learned about the resiliency of Hussein’s regime. The experience also proved that Iraq’s indigenous people do not want to be controlled or manipulated by Western forces: when the Shia people had the option of leaving Iraq, they did not. The Kurds, while openly allied with the aims of the United States, are nevertheless skittish and distrustful, since they were encouraged by Washington to rise up and fight Hussein only to be abandoned by the West and punished by their Iraqi leader.

Herrmann said that the United States faces some serious challenges in this part of the world: fifty years ago, America was wildly popular in the Arab world. Now, the United States is the least popular country, at precisely the same time as Washington attempts to act in this corner of the globe.

John Mueller, Wayne Woodrow Hayes Chair of National Security Studies was even more concerned about the pitfalls resulting from this conflict, which he called “the biggest foreign policy debacle of the last century.” He pointed out that despite President George W. Bush’s expectations, Iraqis did not welcome American troops and Saddam Hussein’s regime did fight back. That Washington persisted, despite some vigilant opposition by Iraqis, could turn any postwar occupation into a long-term, deeply resented, “West Bank” style occupation, said Mueller.

Mueller said a violent occupation of Iraq may result for several reasons. The first is that there is a tangible fear among many Iraqis that the United States wants to impose Western culture on the country. Also, in many Middle Eastern countries, there is well-documented resentment about the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv which could ignite an increasingly bitter debate among other countries around the world about the relationship between the two nations and Washington’s true motivation in the region.

Further, he added, when Washington thumbed its nose at world opinion, they risked alienating other countries who may be unwilling to side with the United States in future international policy.

Worse, countries like Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt could view themselves as on Bush’s “hit list” and acquire nuclear weapons simply to have bargaining power. Mueller said that this war will likely be a very lonely and deeply divisive war for the United States, one that will not only bring to the surface existing problems of U.S. diplomacy, but ignite new ones and create a situation where Washington is unable to extract themselves from the region.

He concluded by saying that the only possible way to salvage this debacle is to get out…now. He cited Vietnam as a situation where Washington finally realized the only solution was to abandon the mission, but, unfortunately, only after massive suffering and casualties.

The panel illustrated the enormous complexity of the war, from the confusion about combat itself to the complications of rebuilding, from legal precedents that do not neatly fit this war to the uncertainty about what comes next.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, scholars, politicians and businesspeople were all forced to confront new threats to national security. This was especially true for the leaders of American utility companies, which faced uncertainties about their basic ability to provide electricity, phone service, and clean water to their consumers.

Despite the national focus on Homeland Security and despite individual companies and government entities each working to protect consumers, this new frontier leaves much to be explored. The National Regulatory Institute (NRRI) and the Mershon Center collectively sponsored a workshop that allowed public utility commissioners, business leaders, and academic experts to convene and explore the diverse intersections of their interests to best address issues of homeland security.

Hosted by Battelle Memorial Institute, the workshop brought together a select group of executives in charge of state utility commissions, private business leaders from several of America’s largest utility companies, government officials working on homeland security initiatives, and academic experts on utility infrastructure. Their backgrounds were largely different, but their concerns were much the same: ensuring that public utilities are protected from diverse threats in twenty-first century America. Their data will be published in a forthcoming policy paper.

During the workshop, participants brainstormed an answer to the following question: what will be the most likely role of the state public utility commissions (PUCs) in the context of Homeland Security by the year 2006?

There is clear concern from all parties that attention must be paid to the ways in which America’s utility infrastructure may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. The problem, as this group saw it, was that it is unclear who is responsible for protecting the integrity of the infrastructure. Are state public utility commissions responsible? Will the federal government assume responsibility and fund programs to protect infrastructure? Or will corporations be required to defend and protect their own infrastructure assets?

To answer these questions, conference participants began by identifying the trends and issues that will be most important in the coming five years. Their responses included everything from communication with the public, cohesive policy among the various branches of private, state, and federal sectors, upgrades of existing facilities, and costs associated with protecting infrastructure. The group agreed that the penultimate concern was deciding who of the interested parties will be ultimately responsible for this task; without determining who will lead the charge, the later details were thought to be largely inconsequential.

Many participants agreed that because of their current oversight role, PUCs would likely be a strong leader in strategies to protect American utilities. To further elaborate the role they envisioned, workshop leader Steve Millett, of Battelle, posed different scenarios, from limited PUC involvement to control by PUCs, to gather the group’s opinions and attitudes.

The data collected from this workshop is being analyzed, and the conclusions will be published by the National Regulatory Research Institute.
The Bush Administration’s Guiding Theory of International Politics
John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

John Mearsheimer dissected the intricacies of the Bush administration’s plans in foreign affairs and explored the administration’s security policy, identifying how it defines national threats and interests.

Mearsheimer described the personality of the administration, which he believed to be fundamental to Bush foreign policy. First, he identified a division within the administration between the Hawks (identified with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney) and the Moderates (like Secretary of State Colin Powell). Mearsheimer said that there was a second division among the Hawks, between the NeoConservatives like Wolfowitz and the Old Line Conservatives like Cheney. Both segments of the Hawk group have many allies within the administration, and Mearsheimer believed that by the time of the Iraq war, Hawks had largely defeated Moderate voices.

After the terrorist attacks in 2001, most Americans, politicians and Joe Public alike, supported the idea that the administration should protect American security, but there was—and still is—debate over what constitutes a threat to national security, where it is located, and how to deal with it. Mearsheimer identified what he thinks the Bush administration sees as threats.

The first is the “great Power” threat. He said that the Bush Administration will go to great lengths to keep America as the only superpower, adding that Russia and China are the closest to being an equivalent superpower but that they are currently so far behind the U.S. that they do not currently pose a threat. He called powerful countries like Italy, France, Britain, Germany and Japan, “Stepford Wives” because they continue to wield a certain degree of international power but essentially do as Washington instructs.

Mearsheimer said that Bush’s foreign policy doctrine indicates that they perceive another threat to national security to be in nuclear proliferation among rogue states; Iran, North Korea, and Iraq are included in this category, as are possibly Syria and Libya. What is interesting, Mearsheimer said, is that the governments of nations like these have not recently changed. Since 9/11, however, the United States sees them differently. Bush Administration advisors argue that rogue regimes might blackmail Washington or give nuclear weapons to terrorists.

Mearsheimer suggested that the Bush Administration is not prepared to engage in multilateral cooperation if it entails significant compromise. Although Mearsheimer was not persuaded international organizations were terribly important, he argued that the Bush Administration acted as if it felt international organizations were powerful and could seriously constrain American action and had decided to therefore avoid participating in these multilateral organizations.

As an example of preference for going it alone, Mearsheimer said that on September 12, 2001, George Robertson, NATO’s Secretary General, sought to invoke NATO’s Article 5, which commits members to consider an attack on one NATO member to be an attack on all. This would commit all NATO countries to work with the United States to fight the terrorist attack. The Bush Administration, however, did not support Robertson’s action because it would mean that American armed forces would have to work with other countries to fight an American enemy and involve European governments in the planning of the appropriate strategic response. Bush preferred unilateral action and forging international involvement if it might jeopardize the United States’ ability to act as it pleases.

Mearsheimer added that Bush, unlike Powell, espouses “Big Stick” Diplomacy, a style of international relations that complements unilateralism. The core of big stick diplomacy was, for him, bandwagoning, a concept that is enhanced by a unilateral display of military power. Bush and his advisors seem to believe, Mearsheimer said, that friends and foes alike will join the American side simply to keep in good graces, but that it only works effectively when a government can use its powerful military at its will, without constraint.

Mearsheimer rejected this approach and argued that recent history has proven that states do not often bandwagon. Longtime U.S. allies are falling away quickly from support of international initiatives. He pointed out that the leaders of South Korea and Germany were elected because of their stance against the United States, proving that relationships with other countries are not certain.

Mearsheimer disagreed with a second theory that he said governs Bush policy, that is that rogue states cannot be deterred the way other states have been. Mearsheimer said that this is an unnecessary rejection of containment and deterrence. How, he asked, could the United States contain the Soviet Union but not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? He argued that Iraq had been contained for more than a decade and that there was little to no evidence that it was about to breakout from this situation.

He added that the Bush administration seems fearful of the power held by international institutions that could possibly interfere with the Bush agenda, like the United Nations or the International Criminal Court. By refusing to participate in such institutions, Mearsheimer argued that it appears that the Bush Administration believes these institutions are much more powerful than they are. Selectively participating in international institutions, as Washington has a reputation for doing, may prove to be dangerous for the United States. When the United States uses its power to write the rules that supposedly govern nations and then only selectively applies these rules to itself, it alienates other countries and makes it harder to generate cooperation with the United States.

John Mearsheimer is the R. Wendall Harrison Distinguished Service Professor and the Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of several acclaimed books, including The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History and Conventional Deterrence, which won the Edgar S. Furniss Book Award from the Mershon Center in 1984.
When Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor came to the Mershon Center in January 2003, Washington had recently deployed troops and combat ships to the Persian Gulf. Although war had not yet been declared, Trainor argued that such military movement made war not only likely, but inevitable.

An authority on the subject of U.S. military involvement in the region—he is a former Marine commander and a military correspondent of NBC News and The New York Times—Trainor compared the situation in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War to the situation in January of 2003.

In 1991, Iraq reportedly had an army of “a million men,” strong and experienced soldiers coming off a war with Iran. Trainor said, however, that at any given point during the Gulf War, the Iraqi fighting army was rarely more than half that number due to a liberal leave policy. Postwar interviews with Iraqi commanders revealed that few believed their forces would actually confront American troops, so many commanded their troops to go home and not come back.

Nevertheless, the Iraqis were strategically prepared for an invasion by U.S. forces. During the Gulf War, Iraqi troops were concentrated along the Southern border, near Kuwait. They believed, Trainor said, that by concentrating their forces, they could draw American troops to attack these heavily reinforced areas. This would cause massive casualties on both sides and among innocent bystanders, which, they hoped, would cause the American public to turn against the Gulf War, said Trainor.

Iraq had limited naval capabilities and a small air force in the early 1990s, both of which were virtually wiped out during the Gulf War. These have not been rebuilt. Trainor joked that the worst words an Iraqi Air Force pilot could hear in 2003 are “ready for takeoff.”

By 2003, the Iraqi army was a smaller group of conscripted soldiers who were ill-fed and poorly trained and suffering from low morale, according to Trainor. Saddam Hussein’s regime supported this sparse army and a highly trained and experienced regiment called the Republican Guard. Trainor’s research shows that these troops were spread throughout the country. Army regiments were stationed along the northern border near Turkey and the southern border near Kuwait. The Republican Guard regiments hovered between these troops and Baghdad, and the Special Republican Guard, an elite group of Hussein’s most trusted soldiers, protected the capital, he said.

Despite a power disparity between Iraq’s troops and America’s armed forces, Trainor said that the Iraqis had made two smart, strategic moves to prepare for conflict in 2003: supporting the research of first-rate combat engineers and contacting the Serbs to learn about “low tech” maneuvers that successfully diverted America’s air attacks in Bosnia.

A 2003 invasion of Iraq would still be dangerous for American troops, despite the overall weakness of the Iraqi army. In 1991, the primary dangers were of massive American casualties and Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Twelve years later, the dangers were greater for the U.S.: Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction, there could be bloody urban warfare, and if victorious, Americans might encounter national resistance from Iraq’s populace.

Trainor said that the U.S. should be primarily concerned with what will happen “the day after” Hussein’s regime topples. An overthrow of this government could result in anarchy or civil war, violent retribution against members of Hussein’s regime, or a rejection of a new government implemented by the U.S.. Trainor believed that a war could be won easily, and that Hussein could be ousted quickly, but that rebuilding a government could be dangerous and costly for both the U.S. and Iraq.

Trainor articulated an ideal outcome for U.S. military action in Iraq: Iraqi troops recognize that they are outnumbered and lay down their arms, or better yet, defect. A neutralized army could then be used to maintain a decentralized country without a government. As an example of this system, Trainor pointed to Japan, where defeated Japanese troops were used to maintain order in their country after World War II.

For Trainor, the question was not if the U.S. will go to war with Iraq, but when. By analyzing the situation in Iraq in 1991 compared to the circumstances in 2003, he argued that Americans could better understand how the situation in the Persian Gulf in 2003 was not the same situation as it was in 1991.
Jeremy Black argued the importance of studying wars with an emphasis on the military role in warfare. For him, scholarship that focuses only on the political side of wars does not tell the complete history of these conflicts. Publications that are fascinated by war are equally misleading, Black says, and he argued for a more balanced and complete study of military history as it relates to wars.

Black encouraged modern scholars to re-examine commonly-held assumptions about World War II. He dismissed those who say that Hitler's intervention on the Eastern front caused Germany to ultimately lose the war. Some argue that the German Blitzkrieg was so all-powerful that only Hitler's ill-conceived command caused the Axis powers to lose.

Black said that this is not accurate. He admits that Blitzkrieg was an effective war tool, but that it also had some serious drawbacks. As a system, it was completely vulnerable to fighting a “deep enemy,” one with deeply fortified lines of infantry that continually confront Germany's front lines. Blitzkrieg moves so quickly, Black said, that infantry cannot keep up, ultimately making the leading lines vulnerable to a deep concentration of enemy forces.

Black encourages scholars to be skeptical about those who interpret military strength based solely on military resources. He said that numbers can be extremely misleading: artillery killed more soldiers than any other weapon, but the machine gun is credited with winning the war. German fighters killed more of their enemy than any other nation, and yet they ultimately lost the war.

According to Black, weapons are only as good as the soldier who uses them and by the country willing to employ them. A small number of well-trained soldiers can beat a larger army of lesser-trained combatants. Likewise, powerful weapons are only powerful if they are used. For example, Black looked to air power, which played a big role in WW II. Black said that, despite technological advancements, air power was more important and more effective back then than it is now.

Black said that the United States' flexible economy played an important role in the Allied success. In the span of a few years, American industry responded to Germany's occupation of France: U.S. engineers and factories were able to manufacture effective landing craft, without which the Normandy invasion would have been impossible.

Black emphasized that war is not a numbers game, it is one that is won with flexibility, ingenuity, and the ability to use resources effectively. War is won, and should be studied, with a focus on how the many variables—including military power, politics, and the uncertainty of combat—affect the final outcome, he concluded.

Jeremy Black is Professor of History at University of Exeter and author of numerous acclaimed books, including Western Warfare: 1775-1882, Warfare in the Western World: 1882-1975, Nineteenth Century Britain, A History of the British Isles, European International Relations: 1648-1815, and many others. One of his most recent books is The Politics of James Bond.
Ted Robert Gurr delivered a talk in which he presented data that supported a historical analysis of the world’s emerging democracies, why they have been successful, and difficulties that appear to threaten this successful trend.

According to Gurr, the world appears to be becoming a more peaceful place. Between the years 2000 and 2002, nine world conflicts were contained, more than in any five-year period in history. In the early 1990s, there were over fifty serious armed conflicts throughout the world. Between 1995 and 2000, nineteen of those conflicts were suspended; during the subsequent two years, eighteen of those remained suspended, and nine more reached a tentative resolution.

As Gurr noted, these numbers indicate peace, yet there are some serious conflicts that have become more challenging: an impasse in the negotiations in Northern Ireland, simmering tensions between India and Pakistan, a violent stalemate in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, North Korea asserting its presence as a global nuclear power, and U.S. military action in Iraq. Gurr admitted that the strength of the latter conflicts could be devastating enough to reverse the recent historical push towards peace.

Despite this, he said there are generally positive trends in world security. Most of the democratic regimes created in the 1980s and 1990s continue to become stronger democracies. Autocracy is becoming less common. Nations who tried a mix of the two found them to be unstable and are moving towards more democratic government. Singapore is a noted exception.

According to Gurr, the reason for this positive trend is the adoption of a new set of “practices” that have supported successful democratic experiments.

The first of these is that states recognize the rights of all minorities and that regional and cultural minorities deserve some autonomy in existing states. Rather than forcibly assimilate such groups or expel them from a state, successful democracies employ negotiation and compromise to maintain minority rights within the emerging, dominant infrastructure, said Gurr.

The second practice is that emerging democracies focus on using democracy to maintain their rights. As these new governments grow, they must be committed to using the tenets of a democratic system when difficulties arise, rather than fall back on autocratic or militaristic approaches to problem-solving.

Gurr added that the world community must actively support new democracies in many ways. While a peaceful transition to democratic rule may be ideal, Gurr said that the use of force is still sometimes required, especially in cases of human rights violations. The key, he said, is that international players must be proactive in using military force in support of negotiated agreements, and in some cases, act as enforcers of the democratic goals new governments set for themselves.

He added that it is not adequate for any powerful country to assist weakened nations and support military action, only to leave when a tentative peace is achieved. Stronger nations must use their resources to support and guide these countries in order to encourage survival without aid and protection from larger nations. When first-world countries are able to actively support emerging democratic nations, the latter have greater chances of success.

Another problem is that settlement of world conflict often does not cause fighting men to put down their arms, it simply forces them to find new battlefields, said Gurr. His research shows that such fighters merely take their guns with them, and in between conflicts, they tend to resort to crime, often smuggling drugs, women, and luxury goods.

There is a danger that citizens of new countries will lash out against American hegemony, which can cause them to either resist the new democracy “imposed” by the United States or become violently anti-American, he said.

Gurr also identified some other ideological dangers that may make it even more difficult to resolve conflict. There is a growing perception that negotiation and mediation are not viable means for conflict resolution, he said. Another threat to this democratic trend is that repression can be justified under the guise of fighting terrorism. He pointed to several examples of minority groups being treated violently because of the alleged terrorist threat they pose: the Chechens in Russia, the Kashmir in India, Islamists in Uzbekistan and the Western provinces in China.

Gurr’s evidence indicated that over the past twenty years, the world has appeared to become more peaceful; his research also indicates that while this has been the trend, the high potential for conflict in 2003 may reverse this trend.

Robert Ted Gurr is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and a Senior Faculty Member of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management. He is the author of many books, including Why Men Rebel and Violence in America, and The State and the City.
Military Space Power: The Ultimate High Ground

Colonel Douglas Hine spent the 2002-03 academic year as the Air Force Research Fellow in residence at Mershon. As a member of the Air Force Space Command, Hine has worked on several space defense projects, including Global Positioning System, Defense Satellite Communication Systems, Milstar, Fleet Satellite Communications System and launch operations for the Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on system. He was, he joked, an actual rocket scientist.

At the culmination of his stay, Hine presented a talk that gave an overview of U.S. Strategic Command, an agency created after September 11, 2001 that combines Air Force, Army, and Navy space and nuclear programs.

First, Hine explained that Air Force Space Command is a large agency, comprised of over 37,000 men and women. In the early days of the space program, only highly-trained engineers worked on all aspects of space projects, but as the plans and projects became both more sophisticated and user-friendly, it has expanded to include all strata of military personnel. Where engineers were once exclusively responsible for the maintenance and design of space tools, enlisted men and women now run baselevel operations. Another benefit of the growing and restructured program is that Air Force Space Command now houses all aspects of the program—design, construction, and operations—under one command in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Hine said that space is a very important strategic asset for the United States because it is truly the ultimate high ground, allowing for global coverage and, unlike other air operations, has no overflight restrictions. Planes may be unable to fly over certain territories, but satellites cannot only survey those restricted zones, but take enough pictures in one fly-by than any plane ever could. Hine said that during the Cold War, the Corona satellite photographed more Soviet territory in one day than U-2 missions did during four years.

Another advantage of these tools, said Hine, is the longevity of the weapons they design: once a satellite is in orbit, it stays in orbit. He said that one satellite on which he worked was designed to last for seven years...twenty-one years later, it is still functional.

Hine emphasized that like other territories on earth, space is very much a place that can be conquered and used for strategic planning.

Space missions are typically used for force enhancement to support other war fighters, for space support in launching and operating other systems, and for counterspace measures that negate systems designed to interfere with U.S. military programs.

Traditional ground troops benefit from space command because satellites are used in communications that allow messages to travel from one spot in the world to another. Hine called this a “bent pipe system,” in which a message is sent up, bounced off of a satellite, and sent back down to another spot on the globe. Satellites are also an integral part of any missile defense system and are the technology that allows for the use of weapons like precision-guided missiles and bombs.

While these missions are helpful for active fighting forces, their applications are equally beneficial to the civilian population: weather forecasts would be impossible without the capabilities afforded by military satellite technology that monitors weather phenomena around the world.

In addition, one of the space program’s satellites has a timing signal that allows for technology like GPS (Global Positioning System), a tool that essentially gives every spot on the globe a unique address and allows users to pinpoint such locations. This technology is incorporated into modern cars, tractors, boats, cell phones, and other electronics. Currently, this application is not restricted—anyone with a GPS monitor from their local store has access to the signal emitted by this satellite, which is launched and maintained by Air Force Space Command.

Hine talked about the current projects used by Air Force Space Command, but he emphasized that the applications and possibilities are truly limitless...restricted only by the limits of technology and space.

Colonel Douglas Hine is an active member of the U.S. Air Force’s Military Space Command. He was the Mershon Center’s Air Force Fellow in residence during the 2002-2003 academic year, during which time he worked specifically on the politics of North Korea.
Col. David Gray presented his perspective on Operation Enduring Freedom and remarked that this operation was complicated for several reasons: multiple motivations, the split-based operations, the integration of diverse units, the need for a “deep bench,” focusing on firepower as well as maneuvering, and the location of the initiative.

In general, he said, managing troops was difficult for all in the upper echelons of the U.S. Armed Forces because there were several initiatives throughout the world that were manned with active military forces, from Kosovo to the Sinai Peninsula to humanitarian missions related to natural disaster. Gray said that an initial challenge during Operation Enduring Freedom was managing troop movement during this split-based offensive. He added that this offensive provided other challenges for him because it involved merging the efforts of Army Special Operations units, Joint and Coalition Forces, as well as units from other nations, like Australia and France. All of these differently-trained troops, as well as the diverse personnel involved in offensive planning, development, support and stability, were forced to navigate this operation together.

Each piece of the collective brought with it unique strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. In order to value each of these objectives, Gray said, operation leaders continually asked themselves “what does the country expect?” This unifying question and the overall desire to conquer the enemy allowed all parties to focus on a united objective.

According to Gray, personality was the key to this complex interpersonal puzzle. Many of the operation’s leaders had previously worked together, and their shared histories and complimentary personalities were, he said, absolutely essential to integrating and synchronizing these troops.

Gray said that the need for such a successful cooperative effort was especially important because Operation Enduring Freedom’s success relied on a “deep bench.” This meant that each unit was adequately supported not only by other units, but by the systems and support staff that were vital to ensure a complete operation. All of these geographically disparate groups needed to mesh and merge as a cohesive unit to support each initiative.

Once those personnel systems were in place, Gray said the focus was then put on the challenge posed by the initiative, which required innovative strategy to address issues of terrain, as well as creative use of U.S. fire power.

The mountainous terrain of central Afghanistan posed unique challenges for the strategists working on Operation Anaconda in the Hindu Kush mountains. As was the case in Tora Bora, the mountains provided untold possible hiding places for enemy troops. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahi Kot valley, an area where Soviet troops had failed miserably in the 1980s. The altitude also posed challenges to troops and weapons alike.

Troops, some of whom had been trained for high-altitude missions and many who had not, nevertheless had to move slowly to avoid altitude sickness. The thin air also prevented the use of conventional weapons, like Blackhawk helicopters that simply could not fly in such conditions. The helicopters that could fly were challenged because there was no safe, level area in which to land to deliver supplies or troops. Gray showed one photo of a rocky crag onto which he had descended from a helicopter.

Gray presented many maps and photos to illustrate how the difficult terrain in the Shahi Kot valley made strategic plans difficult. Fog set in at one point during the battle, halting a flank of Afghan fighters approaching the from the northwest, around a mountain range called “the whale” around which three small Afghan villages were located. These villages were thought to house many Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

The terrain was not the only difficulty Gray and his troops faced in Afghanistan. He said that it was very difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. He said that for U.S. soldiers, Afghan citizens look alike and that virtually all Afghans are armed, making any contact between troops and civilians potentially dangerous. In addition, the relationship U.S. Armed Forces forged with Afghan warlords extended this amicable uncertainty further. Gray said that these warlords are notoriously fickle and they constantly oscillate between sides.

Gray acknowledged that he had studied the failed Soviet attack in the region. During Operation Anaconda, the first days of the fighting closely resembled the Soviet attack, and when U.S. forces faced bad weather, the Taliban fighters thought the American troops had made the same mistakes as the Soviets twenty years before. The wildly variant weather—a forty degree Fahrenheit difference during the day and night—was also an initial problem. When the fog lifted, however, Gray said that the reinforcements were able to cover the flanks on the open ends of the valley, a strategy the Soviets had not employed.

At the end of the battle in the Shahi Kot valley, Gray said they had killed or captured over one hundred trained fighters; U.S. troops had destroyed training camps, critical equipment, and the base of operations used by the enemy.

Gray said the mission was successful in that it has bought time—the destruction of troops and assets would force Al Qaeda and the Taliban to retrain soldiers for any future battle. The goal for 2003, said Gray, was to use U.S. support for humanitarian goals and to implement a workable political system lead by Afghans. He added that because of the massive flight of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, army strategists must focus differently. As he put it, “if you can’t find the enemy, destroy his sanctuary.” Gray added that constant pressure would force Al Qaeda to respond differently each time, thus using up additional time and resources.

While he declared Operation Anaconda to have been successful, Gray also pointed out areas in which U.S. forces need to improve. He said they need to have better integration on the battlefields, improved quickness and flexibility to respond to changing conditions, and improved cross-cultural understanding, among allies and among those in war-torn lands.
Political and Economic Decision-Making

Mershon Center Funded Projects Studying Political and Economic Decision-Making

- International Political Economy
  Principal Investigator(s): Stephen G. Cecchetti, Department of Economics
- Economic, Geography, Trade and War
  Principal Investigator(s): Eric O’N. Fisher, Department of Economics
- Cashing In: The Political Economy of Constitutional Stability in the Post-Communist World
  Principal Investigator(s): Timothy Frye, Department of Political Science
- Forecasting the Future on the Korean Peninsula: Avenues to Reconciliation
  Principal Investigator(s): Richard Herrmann, Department of Political Science and Mershon Center and Tae Hyun Kim
- Economic Stability and Security in China: The Emergence of a Competitive Industrial Structure
  Principal Investigator(s): Lisa Keister, Department of Sociology and Randy Hodson, Department of Sociology
- Anti-Immigrant Prejudice and Its Democratic Consequences
  Principal Investigator(s): Anthony Mughan, Department of Political Science and Pamela Paxton, Department of Sociology
- Symmetry and Human Aggression: A Life Course Analysis
  Principal Investigator(s): Randy J. Nelson, Department of Psychology, Paul Sciulli, Department of Anthropology, and Zeynep Benderlioglu, Department of Sociology
- Political, Tolerance in Eastern Europe and Western Europe
  Principal Investigator(s): Pamela Paxton, Department of Sociology
- Global Economic Change, Political Order, and International Cooperation
  Principal Investigator(s): Brian Pollins, Department of Political Science
- Will Japan’s Economy Recover?
  Principal Investigator(s): Bradley Richardson, Department of Political Science
- Problem Representation and the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland Conflicts
  Principal Investigator(s): Donald Sylvan, Department of Political Science and Andrea Grove, Westminster College
In an event cosponsored with the Moritz College of Law, Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha came to Ohio State to present two complementary talks: he on “Why the War in Iraq is Just” and she on “Blueprint for a Democratic Iraq.” By this date, the world had seen video of soldiers and civilians in Baghdad toppling statues of Saddam Hussein. According to American leaders, the war was effectively over. Because the controversy over the war itself lingered and because the audience was peppered with future lawyers interested in the illegality of the war itself, A. Dawisha argued that despite opposition, the war in Iraq was a morally just action for the U.S. to have taken.

Adeed Dawisha argued that for nations to act in their own best interests transcends the constraints placed by international organizations like the United Nations. He added that sometimes there are issues larger than a state’s sovereignty, such as human rights. A U.S. invasion of Iraq is an example of this, he said: the United States had a moral obligation to go to war with Iraq, even if it did not have a legal right to do so.

He added that Iraq’s diverse population will benefit from the United States’ assistance in overthrowing Saddam Hussein and ultimately developing a new Iraq. Because of the disparate groups—The Kurds, Shi’ites, and Sunni Muslims all have large populations within Iraq’s borders—there would be a risk of bloody civil war following the elimination of the Ba’ath party, said Adeed Dawisha. The presence of American troops can support the transition to a new government with less bloodshed than would otherwise be possible.

Karen Dawisha then took over to discuss what a post-Saddam government should look like. Referring to a paper this team published in Foreign Affairs, she argued that Iraq needs U.S. assistance in designing a secular and effective democracy.

Before the creation of a standing government, there are several issues that must be addressed, said Karen Dawisha. First, within the first month after the end of war, the U.S. must oversee the rebuilding of necessary infrastructure, like electricity and water supplies, as well as a free flow of humanitarian aid in the form of food and medical supplies. This, the Dawishas agreed, will help the United States to “win the hearts of the Iraqis.”

In the midterm, efforts need to focus on the rebuilding of roads and, most importantly, the oil industry. Karen Dawisha said that not only does the industry need to begin pumping oil again, it needs to increase output. She acknowledged that some would see this is proof that the United States was only interested in Iraq’s oil, but she said that because there are no taxes in the country, oil revenues are the only way to fund a new government.

Both Dawishas argued that because Iraq has a very capable and educated middle class, transition to democracy was possible and not as difficult as some skeptics believe. After the Gulf War ended in March of 1991, Iraqis rebuilt the country themselves, without outside aid. This would again be possible, said Karen Dawisha, and would be made easier by the support of industrialized nations.

Karen Dawisha said, drawing from her expertise as a Russian scholar, that post-Soviet countries chose democracy when they were at a similar juncture in the late 1980s, and that despite the problems faced by countries like Poland, Hungary, Russia and the Czech Republic, they have made it work. Iraq, she argued, can succeed as well.

The Dawishas argued against a federalist arrangement in Iraq, fearing it would reward each of the disparate groups—the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds—and reinforce the divisions, rather uniting Iraqis under one constitution. They argued that a new government should take the existing eighteen units, which are already recognized by the people of Iraq, and create a centralized government. Within their plan, the governing body would amass all of the revenues from the oil fields and distribute it throughout Iraq.

They felt that restoring the monarch could be a viable option, if it were modeled after the British system. A single president, they decided, would likely fail because of the strong cultural divides in Iraq, but they believed that a central, although weak, president or prime minister would deal with concerns that a leader may refuse to leave office. For the Dawishas, a successful plan would necessarily include an effective voting system that included the voices of women and all minorities within Iraq.

Adeed Dawisha is Professor of Political Science at Miami University. He is the author of Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, and Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State.

Karen Dawisha is the Walter E. Havighurst Professor of Political Science and Director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies at Miami University. She is the author of many books, including Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge, and The Kremlin and the Prague Spring.
Seminars and Speakers on Political and Economic Decision-Making

March 7, 2003

Don’t mistake the methods of diplomacy and miscommunication for the end of history. When the Bush administration creates a functional equivalence, they make the United States confront today.

The first myth of empire Snyder identified was the myth of preventative self-defense. Throughout history, and presently in the United States, countries have mistakenly believed that preemptively attacking their aggressors can deter aggression. The problem with this thinking, said Snyder, is that there is then always a new frontier even further away to defend.

He also said that many nations mistakenly believe that “a good offense is the best defense,” but history has proven that it is easier to defend than to aggress. In the early 1990s, the United States was able to attack Iraq in the context of defending Kuwait; in 2003, a U.S. invasion would not be a in a defensive context, said Snyder. “Preventative war” has been tried by former superpowers and proven ineffective.

Snyder said that empires have erroneously viewed some of their enemies as “paper tigers.” Empires often believed that a show of strength would make their enemies retreat and concede. Snyder said that the Japanese succumbed to this myth during WWII, when they believed that the United States would be scared off by an attack on Pearl Harbor. Washington did not recoil in fear, as the Japanese anticipated.

As the world braced for war in the Middle East, Snyder said that the United States may be particularly vulnerable to this myth. Many believed that Iraq would cave quickly; history has shown that such underestimation can be deadly.

President Bush’s use of the “big stick theory of diplomacy” has proven that either he does not care to have allies, or he prefers cooperation through coercion. Snyder pointed to pre-WWII Germany as an example of how this type of diplomacy can backfire. Germany’s aggression in the early twentieth century had forced England, France and the Soviet Union into a loose alliance. The Germans thought that they could break up this group by making a claim on Morocco. They mistakenly thought that Britain would refuse to get involved, which would prove to the French that London was unreliable. Instead, Britain did side with France, further alienating Germany and increasing tension in the region.

Just as it can be difficult to estimate the strength of alliances, it is equally problematic to rely on what Snyder calls the bandwagon approach to international politics. He said that during the Gulf War, President George Bush Sr. was motivated to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait because he feared that other Arab nations would jump aboard Saddam Hussein’s bandwagon and aggress against other nations.

Snyder posited that Bush Jr. currently believes that once the United States has taken a stand in the Middle East, other nations will join America’s side. Believing too strongly that an empire can predict or force other nations to act in specific ways has been one myth that proved to undo superpowers in the past.

Once a nation has imperial status, as Snyder believes the United States does, it is difficult for it to back down. This is because its leaders will fear a domino effect: if they were to retreat on one issue, they would be challenged on others and eventually the empire would collapse.

Snyder said that this myth could be detrimental to the United States, whose threats are considered to be too credible. He cited the Bush Administration’s threats in North Korea. Snyder believed that North Korea was building its nuclear weapons because it feared that when Washington concluded with Iraq, the United States would turn its attention to P’yongyang. When this happened, North Korea wanted to have a nuclear deterrent for bargaining purposes.

Snyder added that Washington is dangerously close to believing in its own manifest destiny in thinking that the United States is the guardian and necessary promoter of democracy. He feared that Washington’s commitment to the ideological promotion of democracy could lead it to believe in the myths of empire.

Jack Snyder is the Robert and Renée Balfour Professor of International Relations in the Political Science department and the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He is the author of several books, including The Ideology and the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, and From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict.
William Wohlforth’s talk evaluated the arguments made by his International Relations colleagues against the Bush Administration’s foreign policy initiatives.

There has been much critical focus on what he called “New U.S. Unilateralism” and a near-universal rejection of Bush Foreign Policy, which espouses it. Wohlforth joked that in his analysis of IR research, he discovered one thing: international relations scholars disagree about everything…except their universal dislike of Bush foreign policy. He admitted that the schism between scholarship and actual policy prompted him to explore two main questions: does the current intellectual climate simply reflect a liberal disposition that is at odds with a conservative government? Or are those who make policy not listening to those who make arguments about policy?

Wohlforth identified three different arguments in the current body of IR scholarship. First is that there is a brusque new U.S. unilateralism. Second, that Bush’s unilateralism will corrode international institutions that the United States needs. And third, that unilateralism will delegitimize the international order.

Wohlforth said that there is a theory called the “Balance of Power,” which supposes that unilateralism will spark other nations to form a coalition to protect their own power and balance against U.S. displays of power. He said that both policy makers and scholars believe Balance of Power theory will result from U.S. unilateralism. If other nations form a coalition to resist U.S. unilateralism, Wohlforth said, it will prove that scholarship impacts policy, because this theory has existed without being proven in actual international politics.

Wohlforth argued that when there are shifts in international political alliances, it is not evidence of Balance of Power. Rather, he believed that it is either alliance building or concentrating power in one particular location by pooling the resources of the collective. Wohlforth was critical of those who suggest that power balancing is happening any time nations make moves to protect or increase their own security and power.

He said that power balancing behavior is largely irrelevant in twenty-first century international politics because it applies to rising, aggressive nations. Even when conditions were ripe for a display of balancing behavior, for example the rise of Nazi Europe, countries did not respond as the theory suggests they would have. The United States is an established, powerful country and other industrialized nations are too closely aligned with Washington and have a history of problems when trying to organize collective action without the United States. They are not likely, according to Wohlforth, to balance against the United States.

Other scholars argue that deterrence is an effective hedge against global conflict. If Washington sought to send a lesson to future mili­taristic dictators, destroying Saddam Hussein would be an effective way to do it. Wohlforth said that international institutions have the ability to slow this process tremendously, a likely result if Bush continues to flaunt American power by acting unilaterally. Wohlforth rejected this idea because he said there is simply not enough data to support it.

Some scholars argue that U.S. unilateralism will ultimately destroy the international systems the United States needs. There are certain global issues that are too big for Washington to handle alone, and these scholars believe that the United States cannot afford to alienate international institutions if it wants to address issues like global warming or infectious diseases.

The third main argument Wohlforth found in extant literature was that unilateral action calls into question Washington’s reputation and reliability in dealing with other nations. Unilateralism creates a situation where the U.S. vehemently protects those initiatives it supports, and flaunts its own strength by rejecting others. Wohlforth thinks such inconsistent behavior related to international cooperation could likely have a negative effect on Washington’s role in future international initiatives.

International institutionalist literature argues that the United States will only benefit and succeed in international politics if it establishes a reputation as a world partner, a team player. Over the long run, they argue, if the U.S. appears to be mostly multilateralist, the occasional unilateral indiscretion could be forgiven.

For Wohlforth, this argument is the most politically persuasive in arguing the pitfalls of unilateralism. Wohlforth said that legitimacy—the ability to work with others, a reputation as a cooperative entity of the whole—is important. It is great benefit for a nation to have a strong international reputation, but countries have to earn it and maintain it through their international cooperation. He said that this is where the Bush administration has strayed.

Wohlforth said that Washington has a long history of doing what it pleases, often against the wishes of other nations. But, he added, the norm is that the U.S. consults with other nations. Even if opposition is ignored, the tradition is that Washington politely hears other viewpoints. The problem with the current administration, he said, is they do not even pretend to listen to other nations and their concerns. International travel among the administration is extremely low, he said, an indication that the current administration is largely uninterested in relationships with other governments.

As Wohlforth carefully unpacked the arguments found in existing literature about the new unilateralism, he said that there is one argument that has not been made. He suggested the new unilateralism is a direct result of increasing multilateralism, and that if the U.S. joined the crowd, it would lose power. He cited the International Criminal Court as an example. When Washington refused to sign the treaty, it earned the reputation as a singular, solitary—unilateral—player. But, Wohlforth said, this also maintained the full strength of American power. In the ICC, as with other international initiatives, the United States is the only country that would lose power by joining the collective, according to Wohlforth. Unilateralism may be unpopular, but it may also be the best way to support U.S. initiatives without sacrificing some of its power.

Wohlforth concluded by saying that there is a large body of scholarship that explains the dangers of Bush administration’s foreign policy. But until the schism between scholarship and policy is bridged and intellectuals are able to come up with theories that truly address the concerns of neocorporative policy makers, the debate over the future of unilateralism will continue. Scholars will continue to argue amongst themselves about why action is bad, and the Bush administration will continue to act.

William Wohlforth is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth and author of books such as Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates.
Based in part on his recent article in *International Security*, Alex Cooley’s talk took an innovative look at the role Non-Government Organizations (NGO) play in world politics. According to Cooley, NGOs are typically driven by liberal, democratic values, and are increasingly active players in the international community. Many governments, notably the United States, allow NGOs to compete against the private sector for government contracts to manage international humanitarian matters. This is a result of government cost-cutting, when countries like the United States began paying private companies and public NGOs to perform what once were governmental responsibilities. These private contractors then competitively bid for these contracts.

Because of this increased role, he added that the number of NGOs active in the international marketplace has climbed, as has major growth in what Cooley described as “humanitarian hotspots.”

This is problematic for three reasons, according to Cooley. First, more NGOs does not mean better NGOs. He said that just because there are more organizations fighting for government funding does not mean that the service is ultimately better. Secondly, motivation for NGOs is becoming increasingly fiscal—concerned with maintaining funding and prolonging contracts—and less focused on the normative role that had driven the groups in the past. The third potential problem Cooley said, is that forcing NGOs to compete for contracts distracts them from their humanitarian goals.

As an example of how NGOs are increasingly reliant on government contracts, Cooley cited UNHCR, whose budget is 60%-reliant on government contracts. In the European Union, over 640 billion Euros are spent among over 200 NGOs working on humanitarian goals. Cooley explained that this contract situation makes the entire process ineffective and inefficient. According to his interpretation, there is a linear relationship between the Donor, the Contractor, and the Recipient. The Donor (usually governments) has the money for a specific project, and seeks a Contractor (an NGO) to monitor the implementation of that project. The Contractor then takes the money and attempts to design and implement the goals of the Donors by working with the Recipient (usually smaller or emerging governments). One resulting problem is that the Contractor is then preoccupied with continually renewing the contract and will conceal errors and inflate the record in an attempt to secure this funding. The Recipient is frequently too concerned about maintaining the status quo and simply functioning, Cooley said, that they are unwilling to speak out about errors and shortcomings. Thus, the project fails to varying degrees because problems are hidden by the Contractor and masked by a silent Recipient, each of whom wants to make the other look good.

Cooley argued that better monitoring of these relationships is not a viable solution. The uncertainty of the situations in which NGOs perform their services (often war-torn lands or within newly established governments), the difficulty in disseminating accurate information, and geographic distance between the Donor, the Contractor, and the Recipient: all make constant monitoring difficult.

These unfortunate trends appear to be continuing, according to Cooley. More NGOs are appearing on the horizon, and each is competing for the limited funds offered by world governments. Increased competition has resulted in less effective organizational structures, staff poaching among organizations, and situations like the one in Goma, Congo, where money was being siphoned away from humanitarian goals to fund a renegade army. In that situation, the real use of the funds was common knowledge, but the principal players—the Contractor and the Recipient—were powerless to do much about it, said Cooley.

The relationship between governments and NGOs could play a major role in Iraq. Cooley predicted that once the conflict is resolved and the United States turns to rebuilding the country, there will be flood of NGOs competing to work on things like civil service, legal reform, rebuilding infrastructure, and humanitarian aid. There are other serious problems in addition to the ones Cooley pointed out. He cautioned that there has been a recent trend in conflating NGOs and the military, as evidenced by Washington having removed Army soldiers from protecting Hamid Karzai and contracting a private security company to protect him.

The other danger is, he said, that the power and status of NGOs make them appear as parallel governments to a nation’s population. As NGOs focus on keeping power and funding, aid to citizens in devastated lands becomes less important. Cooley suggested that eliminating short-term renewable contracts could alleviate some of these dangers. He said long-term contracts, with a length of four to five years, could allow NGOs enough time to experiment with their programs without constantly worrying about renewing their primary funding source.
Khrushchev’s Greatest Gamble
Timothy Naftali, University of Virginia

Timothy Naftali presented his research about the years of Nikita Khrushchev’s rule viewed through the lens of international diplomatic history. According to Naftali, archives indicate that Khrushchev was manipulating international politics through calculated planning to achieve very specific and ambitious goals. Ultimately, his “house of cards” crumbled and Khrushchev’s carefully designed plan failed.

Naftali said that the Soviet leader had three primary objectives: to demilitarize the Cold War and improve the Soviet economy, to close the prestige gap between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and to protect emerging socialist states and those friendly to such states.

Naftali said Khrushchev was constantly preoccupied with Berlin. Since 1955, Moscow had been tinkering with the situation in Germany, and Khrushchev believed that a unified Germany would be a socialist Germany. Naftali argued that East German leader Walter Ulbricht had long sought a wall between East and West Berlin, but that the Soviets initially resisted, afraid it would weaken U.S.-Soviet relations. At that time, Khrushchev chose tension as a tool to both control the situation in Berlin and to manipulate Washington into dealing with Moscow.

By 1961, however, Moscow realized this tactic was not working. Naftali said that Khrushchev wanted the world to believe that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would compromise in Berlin and solve the crisis, but instead the Soviet leader heard that he was being blamed for the tension in central Europe. By this time, Ulbricht was urging his Soviet allies to sign a treaty with NATO, but Moscow decided that a wall was more appropriate. Naftali added that Khrushchev did this nervously, fearing a U.S. blockade of East Germany; simultaneously, the United States feared being denied access to West Berlin.

Throughout this tense period, Naftali said that Khrushchev still believed that he could force a “holy grail,” a diplomatic plan that would accomplish all three of his primary objectives. In 1959, he thought diplomacy was the best way to accomplish this, and began to reduce the Soviet army’s supply of conventional weapons. Washington responded by declaring that such a reduction was an unconditional concession since there was no reduction of nuclear arms. Naftali said that Khrushchev disarmed in a sincere move towards diplomacy. No one believed him.

By 1960 and 1961, Khrushchev rejected diplomacy as the means to his end, and used confrontation as his political tool, said Naftali. He introduced the “meniscus concept” of tension: he would keep U.S./Soviet relations at such high levels of tension and uncertainty that one unpredictable event or one drop of political tension would erupt in international conflict. According to Naftali, Khrushchev wanted to maintain this very high level of tension to both deter and compel U.S. actions. Khrushchev sought to focus this tension in one place—Cuba—to distract from other places like the Congo, Laos, and Berlin. While Germany was very much at the front of Khrushchev’s mind, politically he focused the tension on Cuba. Naftali said that Khrushchev believed that Cuba was such an enormous domestic political problem for President Kennedy that there would be no U.S. invasion of Cuba, and certainly no action in Berlin.

Khrushchev responded by putting missiles in Cuba. Naftali said that he had originally planned on installing only defensive missiles in Cuba, but that Khrushchev changed his mind and decided to implement offensive missiles as well. U.S. Marines positioned in Laos, the failed discussions around Berlin, and U.S. atmospheric testing—all of which happened in May of 1962—caused Khrushchev to make his plan for Cuba more aggressive.

Naftali claims Khrushchev thought one of his goals would be met if he was able to convince Cuba to accept offensive missiles on their soil: this action would close the prestige gap between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Believing he had conquered this, Khrushchev then refocused his efforts on Berlin, said Naftali.

Khrushchev drafted a July 1962 letter to Kennedy demanding that NATO troops be removed from Berlin not in two years, as had previously been proposed, but one year. Kennedy refused and insisted that the United States would not “retreat.” Khrushchev responded by secretly planning a fall confrontation over Berlin, in which the U.S. would have to choose between war and Berlin.

Naftali said that this planning, including worldwide intelligence work to organize a standoff, preoccupied Khrushchev. He was so consumed by it that he brazenly told two people about this offensive: Prince Souphanouvong of the Pathet Lao, and Hans Kroll, the West German Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The latter was a man Khrushchev trusted, despite the West German’s affiliation with the United States. Naftali said that Kroll later told both the Americans and the Canadians about the Soviet plan but that no one heeded this warning because Kroll was generally disliked by the U.S. and was considered unreliable.

The planning for this showdown, this great gamble, was disrupted when Raoul Castro, the Cuban foreign minister, demanded that the Soviets reverse the order in which they sent the missiles to their island: Havana wanted the defensive missiles installed first, and then reinforced with offensive missiles. This disrupted the Soviet offensive plan. When U.S. intelligence discovered the implementation of the offensive weapons, this began the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Khrushchev’s plan for Berlin was derailed and rejected.

As OSU Professor of History Peter Hahn (left) looked on, Timothy Naftali responded to a question.

Timothy Naftali is associate professor at the University of Virginia and director of the Presidential Recordings Program and Kremlin Decision-Making Project. He is the author of John F. Kennedy: The Great Crisis, Khrushchev’s Cold War and The X-2 Solution: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism from WWII to Sept. 11th.
For Daryl Press, reputation and credibility are not synonymous: reputation or the perception held by others based on actions that a country has taken in the past, is different than credibility, or the perceived likelihood that a country will carry out its threats. At the Mershon Center he argued that there are two different hypotheses that affect the ways in which a country’s past actions may or may not affect the way they are perceived in the future. These are first, the Reputation hypothesis, which supposes that a country’s credibility depends on its history of breaking or fulfilling its promises, and second the Power/Interests hypothesis, which suggests that a country’s credibility is based on its current power and interests, regardless of its history of breaking or keeping promises.

Despite America repeatedly justifying military action by saying that it must be forceful now to preserve respect and credibility for the future, Press’ research indicates that previous behavior, or Reputation, has historically not determined the credibility of a country’s threats in the future. According to Press, America’s attempt to secure a strong “persona” for the future based on military action today in places like Serbia or Somalia may be misguided. The demonstration of strength today does not necessarily insure a perception of strength in the minds of others in the future, nor does a failure to act today necessarily lead others to doubt America’s willingness to act in the future.

As an historical example of the failure of the Reputation Hypothesis, Press analyzed the Soviet Union’s actions in the Berlin Crises of the late 1950s and 1961 and how they did little to affect the way American leaders perceived Soviet threats to Berlin during the standoff in the subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

In 1958 and 1961, the Soviet Union’s Nikita Khrushchev twice issued threats regarding the Allied presence in West Berlin, which included military personnel from France, Great Britain, and the United States. Khrushchev threatened that the USSR would sign a treaty with East Germany (GDR) and allow the East Germans to control all access to Berlin. Any attempt to cross over GDR land, by land or by air, without prior approval from the GDR (and thus, a tacit acknowledgment of the GDR government) would be interpreted as an attack on a member of the Warsaw Pact. This, Khrushchev threatened, would provoke the Red Army to defend its ally. Twice the U.S. weighed their options and ultimately ignored this ultimatum; twice Khrushchev did nothing and backed down.

Despite this history of backing down, when the U.S. discovered Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles and launch sites in Cuba in 1962, they worried that in retaliation for American moves against Cuba, Khrushchev would move against Berlin. According to Press, nearly all of Kennedy’s advisors in the Ex-Comm were convinced Moscow was likely to move against Berlin despite its previous history of backing down. The reputation Khrushchev had established by twice backing down from his threats did not undermine the credibility of Moscow’s threat to Berlin during the Cuban Missile Crisis, at least not in the minds of the Kennedy Administration. American leaders were more concerned with Khrushchev’s ability and will to utilize force in that particular situation than his record in previous episodes.

Press concludes from his study that putting too much attention on the building of reputation for resolve is a mistake. According to this test case, creating and supporting a national reputation does not determine the way a nation is perceived by other countries; rather, in a time of crisis, nations predict another’s reaction based more on the relative power and related interests of that country at the moment and rely less on their memory of that country’s behavior in earlier cases.

The Mershon Workshop in Diplomatic History arose from the International History Project, which was designed to generate interdisciplinary research and discussion in international relations and U.S. security policy. It seeks to encourage the study of archival research and publications in diplomatic history, analysis of foreign policy on the basis of theoretical models and discussion of and reflection on new analytical approaches.
Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky received his doctoral degree from the Moscow Institute for Political Affairs and, in 1957, he began forty years of service in the Soviet/Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a political advisor and speechwriter for several of his country’s leaders, he was a consultant to Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Mikhail Gorbachev.

He was a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Special Group, Director of the Middle East Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and worked on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Afghan War. In 1984, Grinevsky was head of the Soviet Delegation to the CSCE Stockholm Conference, where he helped negotiate the 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures. He was Gorbachev’s Ambassador-at-Large and worked with prominent leaders of the era, including Margaret Thatcher, Franz Vranitzky, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Al-Qadhafi.

In 1989, he headed the U.S.S.R. delegation to the Vienna Conference on Conventional Armed Forces Reduction in Europe (CFE) and the European Conference on CSBM’s.

From 1991 through 1997, Grinevsky served as the Russian Ambassador to Sweden. Grinevsky has been a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, a diplomat in residence at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center.

During a three-part lecture series cosponsored by OSU’s Center for Slavic and East European Studies, Ambassador Grinevsky presented contemporary political issues as they related to his work in twentieth-century Soviet and Russian foreign policy.

The first of Grinevsky’s talks was titled “Scenario for World War III,” and in it, he revisited the mid-1980s. At the height of the Cold War, he was a high-level Soviet advisor, and he recalled that the Soviet Union and the United States truly were on the brink of nuclear war.

The reasons were many, he said, but in retrospect they resulted from the conflict being a “war of the blind.” Faulty intelligence, heighted skittishness, and propagandistic speeches spewing from both sides of the conflict made it difficult for either country to accurately determine the true motives of the other.

This uncertainty came to a head in 1982-83 in the Middle East, he said. When Israel invaded Syria, the Soviet Union stepped in to assist Syria and to counterbalance Washington’s alliance with Israel and its strategic presence in the area. Grinevsky said that the Soviets were not entirely focused on the conflict between Tel Aviv and Damascus, and were more concerned with the geographic advantage the U.S.S.R. could have by gaining a toehold in this key region.

As tensions in the region rose, however, Grinevsky said it became clear that if large-scale war had broken out, the weaker Middle Eastern countries would have been forced out by the military strength of the United States and Soviet Union. The result would be a war between Washington and Moscow on Middle Eastern soil. Grinevsky said that they had always considered themselves in a position to respond to aggression, but the threat of war forced them to realize that their presence in Syria could be interpreted as an act of aggression. The outcome could only be nuclear war, said Grinevsky, and they ultimately concluded that the only way to avoid this would be to back down from confrontation in the Middle East.

His second talk, “Iraqi Nuclear Capabilities,” was especially timely: it was days before United Nations inspectors were to present their findings about Iraq’s weapons program.

As part of his duties in the Soviet administration, Grinevsky was Chief of the Middle East bureau and had met with Saddam Hussein in 1989. Grinevsky was skeptical that they would find any weapons of mass destruction.

Grinevsky said that it was extremely unlikely that Iraq could have any nuclear weapons: it simply did not have the technology to support it. In 1968, the Soviets had built a low-powered nuclear reactor, strong enough only to provide power. Hussein had convinced the French to build a much stronger reactor—likely strong enough to yield adequate power for weapons—but that reactor was destroyed in 1981. The ambassador said it would be nearly impossible for the Iraqis to have developed weapons technology at this point.

He said that it is also unlikely that Iraq has amassed a large quantity of chemical weapons. A simple accounting of the number of weapons Iraq obtained during the past thirty or so years and the number that was deployed during the Iran/Iraq and Gulf Wars indicates that Hussein is not likely to have a large arsenal.

Biological weapons, he concluded, are the most viable threat. Because they can be hidden in small, but deadly, amounts, they are easily hidden and relatively easily delivered, causing massive casualties. Grinevsky concluded by saying Hussein’s ruthless willingness to kill his own people makes it even more likely that biological weapons pose the biggest threat to Hussein’s foes.

In Grinevsky’s final talk, titled “Russian and Soviet Attitudes Towards U.S. Foreign Policy,” he explored the history of Washington and Moscow in their relations with various Middle Eastern nations. As the former Chief of the Middle East Bureau, Grinevsky referred back to his involvement in foreign policy in the area.

He had met with Jordan’s King Hussein and Yassar Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization during the days when each of these leaders were negotiating their role in the Reagan plan. When the plan failed, Grinevsky said the Soviets were thrilled, because it allowed them the opportunity to further their geopolitical and ideological goals, namely to stretch their sphere of political influence and promote their socialist ideals.

By the twenty-first century, much has changed. Russians are predominantly concerned with their own economy, and secondarily with the crisis in the Middle East. Moscow’s views are more moderate, supporting neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian side, but promoting compromise. Grinevsky said that during the Cold War, the Soviet attitude was often driven by a desire to oppose U.S. intentions, but after the Cold War, Moscow seeks to play a role in resolving conflict between nations and being part of the post-Cold War world community.
Filling in the Folk Theorem: How do States Actually Get to International Cooperation?
Duncan Snidal, University of Chicago

Whereas history books frequently tell stories of international cooperation, of who did what to whom and why, for Duncan Snidal, there is much research to be done on the processes of international cooperation. His research explores the mechanisms that allow for international cooperation, and in this talk, he specifically focused on the 1997 Anti-Bribery Convention to show how nations work together to achieve specific goals.

During Jimmy Carter’s administration, the United States passed a bill that made it illegal for companies to pay bribes for political favors. This turned out to be problematic for several reasons, Snidal said, since it was still legal for non-U.S. countries to pay bribes. This put American companies at a disadvantage in the global marketplace. The U.S. government rejected appeals to alter this legislation.

In 1997, General Electric approached the Clinton Administration and asked for their help: according to their research, they could account for over $13 billion dollars annually being paid as bribes by some of the world’s largest companies. The U.S. law constrained companies like G.E. and they complained that they were unable to compete internationally because they could not pay bribes while their foreign competitors could.

The administration welcomed this opportunity to propose international legislation that was advantageous to both U.S. and foreign companies. When Washington approached other nations to fight bribery collectively, the Americans anticipated a difficult battle. Surprisingly, the process surrounding the Anti-Bribery convention occurred smoothly and quickly.

Snidal said that by looking at this case, it is necessary to move beyond explanations offered by the “Folk Theory,” which suggests that if you create a new frontier (law, regulation, treaty, etc.), parties will come to that frontier for negotiations because all parties value the future enough to recognize that cooperation is necessary for continued growth. Implicit in such an analysis, Snidal said, is the Big Bang theory of International Relations, whereby international cooperation suddenly happens: at moment A, there was no cooperation; at moment B, there is consensus.

For him, however, there are serious flaws in this thinking. Cooperation, as he proposed it, is a gradual process. He was careful to point out that gradualism does not mean slowness: the Anti-Bribery Treaty is an example of how gradualism can actually inspire rapid change. Rather, he said, gradualism encourages careful steps between actions.

Focusing on the process rather than the outcomes, Snidal illustrated how he sees gradualism working. He said that between cooperation and noncooperation, there are several points, each representing a decision, an option, or a circumstance. He called these “focal points.” The different actors and different agendas involved in the decision-making process each begin on a different focal point and seek equilibrium among the many points.

Snidal said that this is incredibly complex because there are infinite equilibriums in any exchange. There is uncertainty involved in moving between focal points, and the information being offered to each actor will affect their stance and their willingness to move from that spot. Snidal acknowledged that for these reasons, the status quo is appealing.

Other uncertainties inspire inaction. Uncertainty about technology and how it could impact the problem being negotiated can cause stasis, as can uncertainty about others and their true intentions or uncertainty about self and how change can actually be negotiated without sacrificing domestic power.

This relates to the Anti-Bribery convention in many ways. The United States not only introduced the bill but was already on the hook, so to speak, since it had domestic legislation against bribery. Germany, on the other hand, had a system where companies could deduct bribery fees on their income taxes. If they decided to sign the treaty, there was no assurance that it would benefit its domestic situation, or even that other nations would sign the agreement and actually work to end international bribery, then putting them in the same situation as the Americans. In this situation, it is clear that moving from their focal point towards the point occupied by the United States involved some risk for the Germans. Ultimately, Germany was the one of the first countries to agree to the treaty, said Snidal.

There are tangible advantages to gradualism, he said. Parties can order the processes, prioritizing those with the highest cost/benefit ratio, looking for those with the fewest distributional problems, or first implementing the least controversial steps or those that are logically and necessarily first. He believed that mapping out various focal points encourages an analysis of the “big picture” and facilitates smooth transitions.

Another advantage is that gradualism allows for parties to slowly add additional actors, beginning with those who have the most resources available for problem-solving. Snidal said that this aspect was particularly essential to the gradual formation of the European Union.

Snidal acknowledged that there are some disadvantages to gradualism. It might be easy to stagnate at any specific point or for those parties who have control in the design at the beginning to force the process toward their own benefit. He said that it would be relatively simple to overcome these problems by recognizing that a gradual process is all about learning, that moving backwards is a possibility, and that moving through each step would reveal the costs and benefits afforded by the “best” decision.

He concluded by reviewing the very specific process of creating the Anti-Bribery treaty in 1997 to show how a commitment to gradualism not only yielded beneficial and complete legislation, but it also carefully considered various factors before arriving at its logical end. Despite a focus on process, this test case proved to Snidal that his theory is not only effective, but efficient as well.

Duncan Snidal is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and has published articles in leading journals such as Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Theoretical Politics and the American Political Science Review.
Bert Rockman spent a month in Israel as a Visiting Senior Professor at Hebrew University. Upon his return to OSU just before the 2003 Israeli election, he shared his observations about the state of Israeli politics.

Rockman remarked that the Israeli political system is one preoccupied with “politics of identity,” a place where labels mattered: the party to which one belongs, whether or not one is religious, and the cultural allegiance one feels all impact Israeli lives and politics. Rockman identified three categories that are at the forefront of political concern: the divide between religious and secular parties, the divide between left and right, and the divide between cultural affiliations.

Rockman asserted that Israel is a “party-o-cracy” because it is easier and cheaper to form a political party and fight for elected seats than it is to form an interest group to lobby for issues. While the Knesset has historically been dominated by two large parties—Likud and the Labor coalition—it has been influenced by a cacophony of voices representing smaller parties that reflect complex cleavages in Israeli society. This has historically resulted in weak political leadership.

The fragmentary nature of the Knesset system has also resulted in a divide between secular and religious Israelis. Some parties represent the interests of the religious: those who practice Orthodoxy and Ultra-Orthodox Judaism support their own parties based on whether they are European-derived (Ashkenazim) or Middle Eastern/North African derived (Sephardim). The Orthodox tend to be nationalistic; the ultra-Orthodox (Charadim) tend to be other-worldly. The Charedim do not serve in the military but they do receive significant state subventions, all of which raises the ire of many Israelis. Thus, the single biggest winner in the 2003 election in terms of increasing its representation in the Knesset was a single-platform party, Shinui, which is simply vehemently antireligious. According to Rockman, the divide between religious and secular sectors of Israeli society is growing.

For Rockman, another major schism is caused by cultural allegiance. Ever since the creation of the Israeli state, there has been a clash between the Sephardic Jews of the Middle East and the Ashkenazi Jews of Europe, he said. This ancestral divide lingers in contemporary Israel and is reflected in a class divide between the working class, many of whom are Sephardim, and the elite, dominated by Ashkenazi Jews. This cultural divide mirrors each group’s historical voting preferences. In general, he said, the working class tends to be more conservative and the professional classes tend to be more liberal.

Partially outside of this divide, but affecting it deeply, are Arabs living in Jewish lands. First, Druse Arabs live inside Israel proper, are citizens of the Israeli state and are loyal to it, and serve in Israeli security forces. Second is a larger proportion of Israeli Arabs, also Israeli citizens, but who have become increasingly removed from the political system of Israel and are increasingly sympathetic to the Palestinians. They do not have to serve in the Israeli defense forces, and few do.

Third, Jerusalem Arabs, fall neither within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority nor, strictly speaking, the Israeli authority. As part of the municipality of Jerusalem, however, they do fall under the province of the unified government there which is part of the Israeli state. The last group includes Arabs who live in Gaza and the West Bank presently occupied by Israeli defense forces in an effort to choke off terrorism. If one includes the West Bank and Gaza, the Arab populations are approximately equivalent in size to the Jewish population. Much of this population would fall under the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo accords, but since the second Intifada, Israeli Defense Forces have reoccupied many of these territories and have exercised ultimate control over them.

The third divide that characterizes a shifting Israeli political system, Rockman said, is that parties are gradually growing more conservative, but that the divide between left-leaning parties and right-leaning parties is growing wider. The middle ground is disappearing, which may make future negotiations and compromise within the Knesset difficult, Rockman said.

The Knesset is filled with different parties, different interests, and differing opinions about what the country needs reflecting a hyper-pluralized society. There is confusion and contradiction among the voting public, said Rockman. He said that recent studies show that 60% of Israelis want peace that includes a separate Palestinian state, yet in the 2003 election they relected Sharon and the Likud party. They did not vote for the Labor party, which is a party that promotes a peace process based on the Oslo accords, because this party is perceived as not tough enough during a time when the public has come to believe in the necessity of a clenched fist.

Rockman said that historically, when the Labor party is in power, evidence, ironically, indicates that there is a higher fatality rate among Israeli citizens. When Sharon’s Likud party has been in power, there are fewer Israeli fatalities because Likud is more inclined to use the military. And yet, according to Rockman, many Israelis disagree with the use of the military to occupy the West Bank, but support using it to prevent violence towards Israelis.

All of these politics, contradictions, and political schisms are not easily resolved within the Knesset or in the debate over what to do about the Palestinian conflict. Rockman said the Oslo process and Israeli-Palestinian agreements were promising, but ultimately rejected, as were the Clinton efforts to reach a final accord between Israel and the PLO in 2000. He added that without major U.S. involvement and pressure, there is little chance of a viable agreement.

Bert Rockman is Director of OSU’s Public Policy Institute and has published in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, and numerous others.
Each summer for the past twelve years, Ohio State has been home to the Summer Institute in Political Psychology (SIPP), a unique, three-week summer program that introduces graduate students and faculty members to the foundations of political psychology. The institute is co-directed by Marilynn Brewer, Professor of Psychology, and Richard Herrmann, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Mershon Center. SIPP is designed for graduate students, junior faculty, and others interested in the unique intersections of these two fields. Each session is co-sponsored by the Mershon Center, the Departments of Political Science and Psychology at The Ohio State University, and the International Society of Political Science.

In 2002, over fifty participants from ten countries attended SIPP. Their backgrounds were equally diverse and included scholars of political science and psychology, as well as sociology and other disciplines. Some participants were professionals from the federal government whose work was enhanced by training in the field. The following year, fifty-six participants arrived at SIPP from nine foreign countries, including Croatia, New Zealand, and Denmark, and from universities across the U.S.

SIPP faculty from the 2002 and 2003 sessions included:
- **Paul Beck**, Ohio State, “Socialization and Political Cleavages in the United States”
- **Joe Bond**, Harvard, “Research with Events Data”
- **Marilynn Brewer**, Ohio State, “Social Identity Theory”
- **Martha Crenshaw**, Wesleyan, “Discussions of Terrorism”
- **Emanuele Castano**, New School University, “Terror Management Theory”
- **Faye Crosby**, UC Santa Cruz, “Justice and Affirmative Action”
- **Joshua Goldstein**, American, “War and Gender”
- **Margaret Herman**, Maxwell School at Syracuse, “Group Decision-Making”
- **Jon Krosnick**, Ohio State, “Surveys, Public Opinion, and Political Psychology”
- **Jack Levy**, Rutgers, “Prospect Theory and International Conflict”
- **Arthur “Skip” Lupia**, University of Michigan, “Civic Competence”
- **Kathleen McGraw**, Ohio State, “Political Cognition”
- **George Marcus**, Williams, “Emotions in Politics”
- **Barry O’Neill**, UCLA, “Honor, Symbols, and War”
- **Jim Sidanius**, UCLA, “Social Dominance Theory”
- **Paul Sniderman**, Stanford, “Race, Ideology, and Politics”
- **Don Sylvan**, Ohio State, “Problem Representation”
- **Philip Tetlock**, UC-Berkeley, “Good Judgment in World Politics”
- **David Winter**, Michigan, “Personality Factors and Political Choice”

**For more information about SIPP, please see our website, www.mershon.ohio-state.edu**
Culture and Identity

Mershon Center Funded Projects Studying Culture and Identity

- Citizenship Project
  Principal Investigator(s): David E. Hahm, Department of Greek and Latin

- National Identity and Foreign Policy: How Identities Affect Decisions to Use Force and/or Cooperate with Other Countries
  Principal Investigator(s): Richard Herrmann, Department of Political Science and Mershon Center

- Unleashing Identity
  Principal Investigator(s): Ted Hopf, Department of Political Science

- Persecution and Conflict in Ancient Mediterranean Religions
  Principal Investigator(s): Sarah Iles Johnston, Department of Greek and Latin Religious Studies Program

- Discourses of Asylum: Negotiating Identities in the INS Process
  Principal Investigator(s): Amy Shuman, Department of English and Folklore

- An American Century: The “Americanization” of German Culture Since World War I
  Principal Investigator(s): Alexander Stephan, Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures

- Rock, Jeans, & Vietnam: American Culture in Western Europe
  Principal Investigator(s): Alexander Stephan, Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures, Therese Hörnigk, Literaturforum (Berlin), Jochen Vogt, Essen University, and Jorn Rusen, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut (Essen)

- Exile Literature and the Nazi State: Expatriation and Surveillance of German Intellectuals by the Third Reich
  Principal Investigator(s): Alexander Stephan, Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures
One of Mershon’s four main substantive concerns is the role culture and identity plays in international security. Alexander Stephan, Ohio Eminent Scholar in Germanic Languages and Literatures and Mershon Center Senior Fellow, is leading a project pursuing this theme in different regions of the world. He is particularly interested in the study of Cultural Diplomacy before and after the events of September 11, the impact of American culture abroad, and cultural anti-Americanism. The project’s key premise is that in an era of globalization international security and international relations are influenced not only by political and economic factors, but also by our understanding of cultural differences. Insights gained from the study of intercultural relations can and should have a major impact on the international policies developed by the United States government.

The project on Culture, Conflict and Security is centered around a series of conferences at The Ohio State University and in various European countries as well as a lecture series at the Mershon Center. Two of these conferences took place in 2002. They were Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The Impact of American Culture on Germany After 1945 (Mershon Center) and Rock, Jeans & Vietnam. American Culture in the German Democratic Republic (Mershon Center and Literaturforum, Berlin, Germany).

The international conference at the Mershon Center looked at Germany as a case study and model for the role American culture can play in stabilizing an area of the world unsettled by totalitarian systems, two unusually destructive wars, massive ethnic cleansing and economic disaster. Key note speakers were Karsten D. Voigt, the Coordinator for German-American Cooperation in the German government, and Bowman Miller, the Director of the Office of Analysis for Europe in the U.S. Department of State. Graduate students from OSU were invited to organize their own international symposium on a similar topic. The proceedings of the conference held in Berlin on the impact of American culture on the German Democratic Republic recently appeared in print. That event was supported by, among others, the U.S. Embassy. Two additional symposia on the image of America in German media and on the transfer of American popular culture to Germany are planned for December 2003 and April 2004 as collaboration between the Mershon Center and the Institute for Culture Studies in Essen, Germany. These meetings are supported by substantial grants from the Transocean program of the Humboldt Foundation and a fellowship from the German Program for Transatlantic Cooperation sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Building on the insights gained by these country studies, the project on “Culture, Conflict and Security” is now expanding its scope to a comparison between the cultures of Europe and the United States and the impact of American culture and cultural anti-Americanism in other parts of the world. Two events have inaugurated this series: Cultural Diplomacy and the Image of the United States Abroad (Mershon Center, May 2003) and Americanization and Anti-Americanism. The Impact of American Culture on Europe Since 1945 (Mershon Center and Rothermere American Institute at Oxford University, September 2003).

The May symposium was the first in a series of six conferences planned for 2003 and 2004 with the OSU Area Studies Centers and the Office of International Affairs which will deal with the reception and rejection of American culture in Latin America, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Africa. The symposium at Oxford investigates in a comparative way the impact of American culture and attitudes toward the United States in twelve European countries.

Stephan has made plans to publish the papers presented at the various Mershon Center conferences in a series of four books appearing in Europe and in the United States.

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Israelis and Palestinians: What Does the Future Hold?

Giora Becher

Giora Becher, Israeli General Consul, talked on March 3, 2003 about his government’s view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He claims the long-simmering tensions between the groups escalated after the failure of the Camp David Accords, but that the Israeli delegations was sincere when they agreed to the accords.

Now, said Becher, the Israelis will not resume peace talks until the Palestinians halt the violence. He added that the Palestinians are mistaken if they believe that violence makes them more credible or that it will get them what they want. He said that from his perspective, the reason there has not been a treaty between Arafat and Sharon is because the Palestinians are completely unwilling to compromise. Becher believes that any resolution will be possible only when Arafat is removed from power and replaced with someone more “reasonable” who is opposed to violence and able to lead his or her own people. He added that most Palestinians recognize that supporting groups like Hamas only ensures their continued suffering. Becher criticized the Palestinian leadership, saying their actions have simply resulted in the suffering of the general Palestinian population.

Right of return, the belief that displaced or fleeing Palestinians should have the right to return to their homes, is a source of contention. Becher said that for those Palestinians whose homes are located in what is now Israeli territory, they will never be permitted to return. He also said that those who blame Israel for the plight of the Palestinian are simply incorrect. “We didn’t start the war,” he said.

Despite the schism between the two viewpoints, Becher is optimistic that a resolution is possible. “Anyone who lives in the Middle East has to be optimistic,” he added.

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The Mershon Center for the Study of International Security at The Ohio State University
“These are conversations I haven’t had in fifteen years,” said one participant to Ted Hopf, Ohio State professor and convener of the “Identity Matters...and How” conference.

The role of identity has long been important in International Relations theory and, for some, determining perspective has become a basic premise of any theoretical IR work. Others, like Hopf, are convinced that there are still some unresolved issues about identity politics in political theory.

To explore these issues, Hopf brought together scholars from around the world and across disciplines for a workshop that analyzed the divergent ways in which these researchers apply identity to their work and the political ramifications of its treatment.

Their conclusions were as diverse as their research, and for every voice that demanded identity be afforded one spot in their field, an equally vociferous opponent resisted. Whereas some scholars believed that words like “identity” and “discourse” were universally defined and consistently employed in contemporary political science, this workshop proved the opposite. The panel was entirely interdisciplinary, but among the political scientists in the crowd, there was debate about how their own academic and philosophical stances impact the ways in which they evaluate identity in their research: the constructivists, the neorealists, and the structuralists argued their perspective against the premises of the others.

One of the first controversies that arose was the question of who determines identity. For many of the conference attendees, who determines identity is a question of power and they believe that only those with power have the ability to define themselves or others. The subservient subject positions are voiceless in determining or defining who they are. Others disagreed, suggesting the cultural and national identity is not controlled by the political or power elite, but the larger collective masses within a nation. For Doug Blum, national identity can be found within the collective adolescent population. Jutta Weldes agreed with this premise, and called for her fellow social scientists to expand their analyses of power structures to include vestiges of popular culture.

For those who agreed that the masses truly hold the key to defining an identity, others pointed out that they are still nevertheless interpreted by traditional power structures. Researchers whose own educations arose from the accepted standards of the academy interpret their work from the same dominant philosophies as the power elite. When researchers like Weldes and Blum argue that pop culture is the primary locus of identity and how it is defined, they filter their observations through the lens of the dominant elite.

And that is how we talk about identity, said one participant. The educations they experienced mold them to approach their work in one particular way, and deviating from this would likely result in career failure. The language used by researchers to define and locate identity is the same used by the power elite, reaffirming the theory that the dominant few do overtly and historically control the ways in which people or groups are defined.

Many of the participants in the “Identity Matters...and How” conference made the argument that institutions control much of identity formation. Be it schools, governments, nations, or cultural affiliations, several of these researchers focused their work on the ways in which tangible institutions directly manipulate group identity. For folk theorist Dorothy Noyes, the institution is a cultural festival in Spain; for political economists like Jennifer Sterling-Folker, institutions like monetary policy and economic groups control national identity.

Institutions, interests, psychology, methods, discourse: all of these categories can be considered in order to fully understand where individual researchers find their identity foundations. For fifteen years, perhaps, scholars have worked under the assumption that everyone factors in (or perhaps ignores) the role of identity in their work. As this conference proved, talking about identity and employing it in theoretical work can be as slippery as, well, identity itself.

Conference Participants included:

- Rawi Abdelal, Harvard Business School
- Doug Blum, Providence
- Roxanne Lynn Doty, Arizona State
- Karin Fierke, Queen’s University Belfast
- Yoshiko Herrera, Harvard
- Ted Hopf, Ohio State
- Audie Klotz, University of Illinois-Chicago
- Paul Kowert, Florida International
- Deborah Larson, UCLA
- Iver Neumann, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
- Dorothy Noyes, Ohio State
- Ido Oren, Florida
- Jim Richter, Bates College
- Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Connecticut
- Ron Suny, University of Chicago
- Don Sylvan, Ohio State
- Jutta Weldes, University of Bristol
Cultural Diplomacy and the Image of the United States Abroad: A Symposium

Richard Celeste, Colorado College and Cynthia Schneider, Georgetown University

One of the focus areas of the Mershon Center is to analyze the role culture plays in international security. To explore this topic further, the Center hosted two former U.S. ambassadors, Cynthia Schneider and Richard Celeste, for a symposium on cultural diplomacy.

Celeste is a former two-time Ohio governor who was also ambassador to India for four years during the 1990s. His political resume is a long one, as is his work with cultural exchange, including a stint as director of the Peace Corps. For him, the Bush administration has done a particularly poor job of using cultural tools in international politics, especially compared to John F. Kennedy, who Celeste viewed as a highly successful cultural diplomat.

The comparison between Kennedy and Bush is a valid one, said Celeste. In both the early 1960s and the early 2000s, the United States suffered a very negative image in the international arena.

After Kennedy’s election, the image put forth by the young president and his wife changed that: he was an educated, articulate man who had once lived abroad; she had good taste and was a fashionable woman who spoke perfect French. Their images, lifestyles, and experiences were indeed global, and Celeste said that for the people of the world, John and Jacqueline Kennedy exemplified the best characteristics of America.

As an example of how respected Kennedy was in India, Celeste told an anecdote about Bob Greene, an American who was spending his vacation in a secluded hut in the mountains of India. Removed from television and radio, Greene did not hear of Kennedy’s assassination and was surprised to emerge from his hut one morning to find nearly one hundred Indians kneeling in front of his hut.

Greene found one person among the crowd who spoke some English. The man said, “We came to pay our respects. We heard there was an American in this hut, and we honor the death of your president.” For Greene, this experience was a memorable one because of the pride and the tragedy he felt at that moment. For Celeste, this vignette proves how beloved Kennedy was to the people of the world and how that honor extended to all Americans.

Celeste said that much of the world does feel such a deep respect for Bush. He then identified why he believes that Bush has not ingratiated himself into the hearts and minds of other cultures. While Kennedy employed a global viewpoint in all of his actions, it was especially evident in the way he spoke, using rhetoric that reached out to the whole world. His words were careful and clear and could be translated into comprehensible meanings in other languages.

Celeste said that Bush speaks in colloquialisms and uses a language that really only speaks to some Americans, specifically those voters that respond to bravado and Bush’s public “outlaw” persona. When the President said that he wanted his adversaries “Dead or Alive,” he expressed an extreme viewpoint, an “us versus them” rhetoric that is offensive to many. Worse, colloquial expressions like this cannot easily be translated into foreign languages, and when they are, they often appear simply as loathsome grandstanding. Celeste pointed out that Bush speaks Spanish and that he presumably understands the challenges of speaking in a way that the world can understand. He could communicate in an entirely different way, one that is more palatable to an international audience. Celeste concluded that he chooses not to. Unlike Kennedy, who focused his rhetoric outward, Bush focuses his speech inward.

Speech is not the only vehicle through which the United States can project a strong image. There are other institutions that can successfully promote cultural understanding. He cited the Peace Corps as a particularly appropriate example, since it was conceived by Kennedy and at risk under the Bush Administration.

In 1966, Josef Stalin’s daughter unexpectedly arrived at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi and announced that she wanted to defect. According to Celeste, few government agents believed her identity or her intentions, because surely the CIA would have known that Stalin’s daughter was in India.

A few weeks later, Celeste was at a pool party in India, where several Peace Corps volunteers were lounging by the pool. They asked him, “Hey...whatever happened to Stalin’s daughter? She was on her way to the embassy when we last saw her in the village.” These individual Americans were in India to participate and learn about Indian society, work to better the communities in which they stayed, and promote the best America can offer other countries. They were not there as agents of the government, and yet they had better communication between their host country and their homeland. Celeste saw this as example of the ways in which individual relationships benefit the U.S. goals in international relationships better than government initiatives.

Celeste said that, unfortunately, the spirit of cultural diplomacy in India had disintegrated by 1997. He said that moving from aid to trade shifted the burden of cultural understanding to the shoulders of the private sector, which was more concerned with the bottom line.
than understanding. The tools of global cultural diplomacy, as limited as they are under the current administration, he said, are further restricted by globalism in the world marketplace. No longer does Voice of America export American ideals and beliefs; the world gets its impressions of U.S. society through MTV, Global CNN, and other outlets that do not reflect positive American values.

He also expressed frustration about the U.S.’ limited public relations efforts, which he described as minimal, obvious, and offensive. Celeste pointed to the recent, five million dollar campaign that featured prominent Muslim Americans like Muhammed Ali discussing life in America for Arabs. Celeste said such efforts are laughable, not only because of the clear artifice, but also because they were timed to compete with other American exports, like the Victoria’s Secret fashion show. Celeste asked the audience, “Which do you think sends a more powerful message about American ideals and lifestyles?”

The former ambassador concluded by articulating his fears that Washington’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 may expand the divide between nations. He argued that cultural exchanges are the most effective way to share American society, but tightening visa regulations have made it difficult for many people to come to the United States. By refusing them entry to the United States, Celeste argued that they will then have no choice but to look abroad. By refusing them entry to the United States, Celeste argued that they will then have no choice but to look abroad. The government has made it plain that terrorism dwells in places with vehement anti-American sentiments, so it would follow that Washington would be concerned about the America’s reputation abroad and be driven to correct misinformation about U.S. cultures and values. Demonstrating democracy solely through the heavy-handed use of the military is the wrong approach, she said.

In the Middle East, where there are vocal anti-American groups who fear that Bush is forcing western values on Arabs, this is especially important but is curiously ignored, said Schneider.

She cited music as a particularly effective way to convey the most positive aspect of American culture; its openness, freedom of expression and democracy convey many of the foundations of the United States. Jazz is wildly popular in many foreign countries, said Schneider, and in the Soviet Union, jazz was a way to communicate ideals like freedom of speech in an understandable way. In totalitarian regime, words like “freedom” or “democracy” were too abstract, but the emotion of the music was able to cross boundaries. She added that one person she met told her that during the most oppressive times, jazz kept hopes of democracy alive in Czechoslovakia. She also said that many Russians, even in 2003, remember seeing productions of “Porgy and Bess” and being moved by the story and the fact that America is the kind of nation that can make art out of its own troubled past. These kinds of cultural vehicles are especially potent tools for winning the “hearts and minds” of the world’s population.

Schneider said that since the government appears to be less and less willing to positively promote the United States through cultural diplomacy, ambassadors are in an especially important role. They can, she concluded, sponsor events and activities that encourage diplomacy and dialogue through culture, not conflict. She, like Celeste, said that these kinds of commitment to message and meaning through diplomacy are absolutely essential to promote and maintain international relationships.
In 1992 William Roger Louis began the process of editing a volume on the history of the British Empire for Oxford University Press. It was a project that had been proposed by Ian Sproat, the U.K.’s Minister of State in the Department of Heritage, who sought a good volume “worthy of the empire itself.”

Editing such a work proved to be long and difficult, said Louis. During this talk at the Mershon Center, he elaborated on the many political decisions that he was forced to confront, and also articulated the ways in which he thinks the volume falls short.

Louis is a preeminent historian of British history, and when Oxford tapped him as editor-in-chief, many thought it a logical choice. Some opponents, however, thought it inappropriate for an American to lead the project, a viewpoint Louis and most historians dismissed.

One of the initial challenges Louis and his editorial staff were forced to confront was the politics that surround the project. Writing the history of one nation is complicated; writing the history of a nation that was so inexorably linked with the history of so many other nations makes it even more so. The historians involved were aware of the complications and that people are often sensitive to the way their histories are captured. Louis said he and his staff were constantly evaluating the politics of the project to ensure that the many diverse voices from British colonial history were represented as fairly and completely as possible.

Because there are certain “controversial” topics (Louis cited the role of gender, the black experience in the empire, the environment, and Ireland, India, Australia and Canada as examples) that were not fully explored within the official Oxford history, they decided that there would be follow-up volumes dedicated to these specific topics.

Louis said that gender politics was a particularly daunting challenge in writing the history of the British Empire. In this encyclopedic form, editors had considered including a single article on the topic. Historian Judith Brown, one of the project’s contributors, argued that this would be unnecessary. She was optimistic that individual areas would include this topic, that an article about Hong Kong would include the role of women in the colony, for example. In the end, this did not happen, and they decided to add an additional volume in order to address the gap.

Louis also said he wished he could have included more native voices, such as African historians writing about Africa. When the reviewers requested more women and minority viewpoints, the editorial board was unable to find a sufficient body of historians working in nineteenth and twentieth century history. Louis said that in retrospect, a way to resolve this problem would have been to contact universities within specific territories rather than rely on the network of historians used by Oxford. This would also broaden the generational diversity of contributors, because it would have allowed for younger, promising historians to participate in the project.

Louis and his editors were preoccupied with several major problems, he said. Those editors responsible for the nineteenth century portion of the volume were unwilling to include Ireland in the volume for that time period because they argued that it was not a colony at that point. This, then, raises the question of how to treat the “Irish question” in the twentieth century.

Another issue that persisted was the role of informal colonies. Iran, for example, was never a colony in the British Empire, but was very much influenced and under the control of London. Some editors thought that including such informal empire was entirely inappropriate in a series about the British Empire; equally vocal opponents thought the opposite. He described this conflict with an Iceberg metaphor: formal British colonies are the iceberg visible from above the water, supported by a larger, invisible cluster of countries that were essentially informal colonies.

Another fundamental problem Louis was forced to confront was how to divide up the volumes chronologically. Historians usually do not concur about when a period began or ended, and some believe the periodization of history creates unnecessary artificial constraints. Partially because of this debate, the final volume includes events that transcend the centuries—19th century volumes may include events from the 1700s, for example—because it would be otherwise impossible to offer a full account of the event.

Louis also said that he was constantly monitoring the “ethics” of this project, concerned with both the “ethics” of stewardship in trying to tell the complete story of the British Empire and the “ethics” of trying to tell one story through different eyes. As he explained, a native Indian or African would examine the historical record with a very different set of eyes and draw different conclusions about the role of the English in these colonies. The limited number of “native” historians only exacerbated this problem, said Louis.

Louis said that he is proud of many aspects of the five-volume set—its completeness, its historical accuracy, for example—but he acknowledges that certain areas of British colonial history were not represented as thoroughly as he would have liked. As a result, he said, despite this project being completed, it is not complete, and they are still adding individual volumes about gender, Ireland, and other complicated aspects of British Empirical history.

William Roger Louis is the Kerr Chair in English History and Culture at the University of Texas at Austin. In addition to editing The Oxford History of the British Empire, he is the author of The Transfers of Power in Africa, Suez 1956, The Iraqi Revolution, and Churchill.
Orientalism: American Style
Douglas Little, Clark University


Little explored the often-dangerous ways in which nations propagate stereotypes of their adversaries, who are, in turn, stereotyping them. His primary focus was on Arab nations and the way their culture is portrayed in America and Israel. He also, however, examined the way in which Arabs depict Americans and Israelis. Using examples from popular culture, Little argued that the stereotypes one nation has about its adversary are often similar to the stereotype the adversary has of them.

In America, an increasing dependence on oil and a unique relationship with Israel has firmly entrenched American stereotypes about the Middle Eastern mind and culture. At the same time, stereotypes about Middle Eastern culture increasingly fill Western minds. America’s collective misconceptions about this “exotic” culture are evident in the public sphere: in political cartoons, in news reports from the media, even in children’s animated movies. Little’s inspiration for this subject matter was his shock at the way Arab culture was portrayed for young Westerners. The original lyrics of the opening song in the 1992 release *Aladdin* described Arabia as a place where horrific corporal punishment was commonplace. These lyrics were changed for the video release of the film, said Little.

In analyzing the stereotypes that prevail on both sides of American-Arab relations, it is impossible to determine who began the demonization. It is easier, however, to tease out how leaders on both sides use such images for their own political gain: public perception can be affected through many popular media outlets, and Little documents the prevalence of such stereotypes.

Little offered political cartoons as one popular example of political stereotyping. His samples from both Arab and Western newspapers show common themes and mutual stereotypes, and the proliferation of such images increases during times of international conflict. One example showed a drawing from an Arab newspaper of the “Israeli mind:” a brain that is controlled by violence, nationalism, and vengeance. An Israeli newspaper showed the reverse: an Arab mind consumed by violence, nationalism, and vengeance. Both cultures use the same language in describing the other.

Little says that while it may be possible to trace a path between images like these and the foreign policy of a country, demonstrating that a causal link exists between the stereotype and government policy is difficult. Little did not believe, for instance, that stereotypes of Arabs commonly held by Americans leads in any direct way to U.S. government decisions.

Little encouraged historians to study briefing books and expert testimony as a way to identify the role stereotypes played in policy decision-making. Evidence that stereotypical images were common in top-level discussion would be, according to Little, at least suggestive of a causal relationship. Little also argued that popular images can be said to matter because it is not likely that policy is made in a bubble entirely insulated from common stereotypical assumptions. Those who write policy read the newspaper, watch television, or talk to their constituents, and if a stereotype exists in the public mind, it is likely to be evident somewhere in the mind of a nation’s leaders.

In cultures today, either American or Arab, analyzing stereotypes that exist in the public mind may be a fruitful way to understand the mindsets that affect the uneasy relationship between Americans and Arabs. Little called for more studies of how images prevalent in popular culture are related to the foreign policy of states.

Douglas Little is Professor of History at Clark University and recently released *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*.

The Mershon Center is a proud supporter of Women In Development (WID), an organization coordinated by Ohio State Professor of Rural Sociology and Women’s Studies, Cathy Rakowski. WID is concerned with cutting-edge research, policy making, peace and security, and activism on gender issues in social and economic development and globalization.

**Women in Development**

This past year, Mershon hosted several WID events including:

- **Kate Cloud**, *University of Illinois Champaign*, “Globalization and the Employment of Poor Rural Women: Lessons Learned from the Gender and Agribusiness Project”
- **Somali Immigrant Women** in Columbus, Ohio, “A Panel
- **Leti Volpp**, *American University*, “Women, Culture and Difference: Beyond the Discourse of Feminism Versus Multiculturalism”
- **Sonia Alvarez**, UC Santa Cruz, “Looking for Feminism ‘In Movement’: Views from Latin America”
In his Mershon Center talk, Lahouari Addi explained why Arab countries have not been swept up in the democratic movements in South America and Eastern Europe.

He argued that it is simplistic to suggest that Islam prohibits democracy. Addi claims that the Koran can be interpreted to support both political pluralism and democracy as easily as it can be interpreted to argue for authoritarianism. It is not truly the religion that is at the root of the antidemocratic governments in most Arab countries; the reasons are much more complicated.

Addi explained that although religious beliefs are compatible with democracy, religion is used as a political tool by leaders to argue against democracy. According to Addi, the populations of Arab countries thus often find it difficult to reconcile their religious and social beliefs with the tenets of a democratic government. These leaders use an interpretation of the Koran that allows them to use Islam as a justification for maintaining power: they govern because Allah deemed it to be so.

Religious justification is one tool, Addi said, but he points out that it is not the only way for governments to mobilize support for their regimes. Powerful armies, ancestral claims to the throne of power, and nationalist sentiments are all tools used by both those with power and those who aspire to take it. Because there is no single criteria that legitimizes claims to power and because each tool has some impact, Addi concluded that competition for control will result in violence between power-seeking groups.

Democracy and the diversity of voices in a pluralist society are, Addi said, foreign to the average “man on the street” in an Arab country. In many cases, they are simply unconcerned about the actions of their government, except as it relates to the reputation a country has in foreign relations. Addi argued that the reason for their lack of concern is that Muslims believe that man does not make rules and law: Allah determines the natural order of things and imposes them on mankind, regardless of who actually governs.

Since man does not make the rules or laws, the average man also sees no value in the collective power to facilitate political change. For them, said Addi, neither the majority population can determine the rules of his country, nor can those in power; only Allah can. It would be shocking to the average Muslim to suggest that his voice could or should impact the government of their nation, he added. Criticism of the state is viewed as criticism of religious sovereign will.

Addi argued that the government’s sacred status makes them all powerful, and many citizens think it is their responsibility to accommodate state will. The state is not a public entity; it is a sacred one whose power is given by God, and a private one, benefiting those who maintain control. The average citizen is then forced to accommodate this power by buying political favors or seeking favors. Under a system where the right to govern is not questioned, corruption is the norm, said Addi.

He claimed that Arabs see little value in using the collective voice to mandate change within their government and they often fight fervently to maintain the status quo, Addi said. Contemporary Arab societies are caught between a traditional history (where the prince embodies the political unity) and a tentative contemporary, democratic history (that encourages wider participation in state affairs). The hand of history dominates, and existing regimes use all of their military, religious, and propagandistic strength to keep the power, which is often not questioned by the masses. Addi said that this authoritarianism is supported by Western nations that, he said, are generally nervous about uprisings and change in the Arab world. Pluralism is both denigrated by many Arab governments and questioned by the majority, who fear that differing opinions would sap the strength and unity of the collective, something Arab society values, Addi said.

The government has two responsibilities from which it draws legitimacy: to protect the community from foreign threats and to equitably distribute national goods and services. Uprisings, said Addi, usually result when the government fails at the latter.

For Arab nations to move towards democracy, Addi said they must move away from their attitude of submission and build institutions that guard the public’s authority to be managed within the system. They need to reject a utopic ideal of harmony and realize the value of multiple viewpoints. Despite the unique challenges faced by Arab countries, Addi is optimistic that a move from radical nationalism and Islamism to pluralism and democracy is possible.

Lahouari Addi is a member of the social science faculty at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. He has also published many book chapters and numerous articles in prestigious journals like the Journal of Democracy and Foreign Affairs.
A Palestinian professor and the editor of Jerusalem Quarterly, Salim Tamari presented his research exploring Palestinian nativism and its relationship to the Israeli state.

Nativism attempts to define the fundamental, innate traits that identify a cultural group. It is often considered to be the opposite of acculturation. In Tamari’s research, he explored the evidence used by Palestinians defining their own cultural heritage.

Tamari was inspired to explore this theme by ethnographic research done in the 1940s on lepers. When Israel was in its national infancy, the Israeli government tore apart a leper colony, expelling the non-Jewish lepers. They fled the country under the leadership of the former colony director and went to neighboring Arab countries.

According to Tamari, the creation of the Israeli state also inspired a nativist movement among Palestinians, who sought to define what it means to be “truly Palestinian.”

In many mid-Eastern countries, peasants are considered to be the cradle of national identity, the locus of cultural knowledge. Nativist movements and ethnographers like Tamari study the history and culture of peasant groups for this reason. Tamari said that a peasant group’s beliefs often hearken back to biblical stories. Looking back toward these marginalized groups may be a logical way to find a “true identity” since much of peasant culture was not largely altered by Zionism, said Tamari, but it can also be jarring because it does not reconcile well with twentieth-century perceptions of Palestine, which has integrated aspects of Ottoman and European modernity. Thus, the nativist movement the arose after the creation of the Israeli state struggles to merge the ancient history of the peasantry and other marginalized colonies, with a modern-day Palestine that was influenced by a variety of other cultures.

To help illuminate this tension, Tamari looked at three aspects of the nativist movement in Palestine: the work of other ethnographers working on Palestinian constructs, the role of lunacy in the field, and the demonology of Canaan.

Instead, in his analysis of Palestinian nativism, Tamari looked at extant literature that tells the stories of the lepers, since in the Palestinian tradition of folklore, madness is considered to be divine. It was widely believed that poets and small children, being the vehicle for a divine message, are afforded a bit more “lunacy,” and that insanity is the key to the true tradition. Madness, leprosy, and other traits that marginalize certain populations make them somehow mystical, holding the key to the ancient secrets of this culture. By following the literature that deals with madness, Tamari said ethnographers can more easily trace how identity is thought to be formed.

He said that while an examination of extant critical work and analysis of nativist literature is an effective way to approach Palestinian folklore, it is much more effective to explore the religious fundamentals of the culture because culture and religion are so intertwined.

Palestine has two kinds of saints, said Tamari, the first being the national saints and holy figures and the second being localized deities, which were usually local figures who were elevated to saint status after death. The latter group was enshrined in small communities and was formerly the locus of daily worship. Tamari said that mosques were the site of more serious divine intervention, but that the commonplace religious observation was directed at localized deities. In contemporary Palestinian communities, however, only very old people still used local shrines as a holy site worthy of prayer and the prevalence of mosques in communities of all sizes makes them the focus of a community’s religious observance.

That is not to suggest that the national saints are not important, he emphasized. Rather, the national saints—Elijah, St. George, and Ruben—are extremely important to Palestinians. They are especially important to ethnographers because these are the very same saints that are prominently celebrated by Jews, Arabs, and Christians alike.

Tamari said that all of these factors may hold some promise for reconciliation in the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. A resurgence in Palestinian nativism is seeking to find the “true” Palestinian roots in the artifacts thought to be uniquely Palestinian: the madness on the fringes of society, biblical fundamentals, and in the localized and unique worship practices of peasant cultures. But, Tamari said, despite these attempts to focus on what is unique in these cultures, historical research suggests that the fundamental commonalities, as evidenced most strongly by the mutual saint worship, mean that not very long ago, Christians and Jews and Muslims also worshiped in similar ways.

Israeli nativism is trying to find its roots in the Middle East by rejecting its European cultural history, just as Palestinians are trying to establish themselves as primitively Canaanite. The fact that there is so much fundamentally the same about the cultures, who they are and where they come from, despite geographical differences, shows promise for the future of the conflict, Tamari concluded.

Salim Tamari is the Director of the Institute of Jerusalem Studies and a Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Birzeit University near Ramallah. He is editor of the Jerusalem Quarterly File and Majallat ad-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya.
David Frankfurter spoke at the Mershon Center on March 6, 2003, and explored the ways in which evil is a social construction that is identified by a “seer” who then mobilizes communities by making groups witness an evil and eradicate it, often violently.

Throughout history, societies from around the world have experienced the intersection of ritual and violence. Outsiders, or groups whose beliefs have been rejected by the mainstream, often get ascribed certain characteristics: Frankfurter identified these as the most vivid fears of the mainstream and often include barbaric rituals, infanticide, cannibalism, and sexual violence against children.

As long ago as 2 B.C., fears of the “Cult of Bacchus” caused pandemonium in Rome, whose citizens believed this group was practicing drunken orgies and human sacrifice. In 1 A.D., the “Cult of Christians” were thought to be involved in incest and other moral depravity, resulting in the execution of many Christians. In the twelfth century, Jews were thought to have stolen children to reenact Christ’s crucifixion, and frightened mobs rose up and murdered Jews. Other people thought to be witches, heretics, and heathens suffered similar fates.

In the 1980s there was a similar phenomenon in the United States, during what Frankfurter called the Satanic Cult Ritual Panic. Many parents in different communities throughout the United States accused their daycare providers and others of systematic child sexual abuse and performing satanic cult rituals.

Frankfurter identified certain characteristics of societies in which all of these incidents have occurred. He said that social groups are vulnerable when in their societies there is a shared sense of apocalypse and a shared belief in evangelical religious ideals. A fascination with perversion and porography of the most monstrous acts, Frankfurter said, lead people to ascribe to “others” the most deeply-rooted and feared psychosexual perversions of the majority.

Motive Matters: Liberalism and Insincerity
Michael Neblo, Ohio State

On February 14, 2003, Michael Neblo presented his reading of John Rawls’ cultural pluralism theories to argue that, for political liberalism, private motives are as important as public motives. Of Rawls’ three main tenets of political liberalism, Neblo focuses on the value of public deliberation in a liberal state, because it increases personal reflection on one’s own theories and it widens the “overlapping consensus,” or the middle ground between disparate viewpoints.

According to Neblo, it is important to foster debate; the open exchange of ideas is necessary in a liberal democratic state because the most successful policy can survive the rigors of public debate. This allows all participants to express their viewpoints and represent their own cultural and intellectual experience. For Rawls, and for Neblo, an important characteristic of a liberal state is that it recognizes the multiculturalism of a society and seeks to create policy in “overlapping consensus.”

However, Neblo said, true public debate is more complicated because it does not account for insincerity in this debate. It is possible for someone to insincerely offer a “public” reason to justify his stance on a topic but to be more motivated by a “private” reason. For example, Neblo said that a racist may claim to be opposed to affirmative action because it is “unfair,” but that he is truly, although privately, opposed to affirmative action because he hates minorities. Rawlsian theory rejects all far left or far right viewpoints; therefore, an opinion based on extreme racism would also be rejected. But this racist’s public stance of “unfairness” is viewed as less extreme, and therefore a viable part of the conversation encouraged in the creation of a liberal democracy. For Neblo, Rawls falls a bit short by neglecting the influence of “private” arguments, or what he described as insincerity.

Frankfurter said that violence results when a “seer” or a self-proclaimed expert identifies those believed to be committing these ritual atrocities. Individual targets of such accusations are normal, functioning members of the group until they are proclaimed to be evil. The “experts” transform group members from a “normal” to “evil” target who becomes the embodiment of the group’s real fears. Frankfurter said that in the Satanic Ritual Abuse Scandals of the 1980s, those fears resulted, in part, from parents who were confronting their own anxiety about putting their children in full-time daycare centers.

In the 1980s, daycare providers, members of the larger community, were targeted as practitioners of satanic cult ritual. Resulting from recovered memory therapy, children who “remembered” witnessing or being part of evil ritual, or being identified by “experts,” childcare providers were targeted, jailed, and harassed by members of the community. Because these “Satanists” were otherwise active members of their communities, the fears are especially potent. When groups feel that evil has crept into their close proximity, they are much more likely to use violence to purge the evil from their midst, said Frankfurter.

Frankfurter said that charismatic experts have the ability to mobilize large groups to commit violence against individuals. They identify those who are “evil,” situate the anxiety, spread the word to bolster their own authority, and call for the collective to purify their community, often through violent means.

Frankfurter concluded by saying that the Satanic Ritual Cult Abuse Scandals of the 1980s were part of a long history of “witch hunts” and fears of “other” that resulted in violence against members of a community. Frankfurter added that fears of the demonic are commonplace in most cultures, but it takes a charismatic leader to motivate groups to violently purify their community.

David Frankfurter is Professor of History at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches Christianization of local religions in antiquity; Magic and Ritual; Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism. He is the author of Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance.

Mike Neblo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Ohio State.
Compassion and Terror
Martha Craven Nussbaum, University of Chicago

According to Martha Craven Nussbaum, tragedies and horror, like those experienced in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, can motivate individual citizens and public entities alike to explore issues of human suffering and make a claim for the moral value of compassionate imagining, a compassion which can cross lines of time, place, and nation, and also, sometimes, the line of sex. It also allows people to make real to themselves the moral sufferings of others about whom they seldom think.

Rooting her work in a classical philosophical tradition, Nussbaum asked whether compassion, with its obvious propensity for self-serving narrowness and other faults, is our best hope as we attempt to educate citizens about relations both inside the nation and across national boundaries. She noted that many thinkers, e.g., the Stoics, Plato and Kant, have found compassion too slippery and anthropocentric a notion on which to build a political morality. They contend that human dignity and respect is a more secure foundation. For example, the Stoic tradition believes that all people have an inherent dignity and worth, regardless of factors like abuse, economics, or illness. The value in human life is universal and immeasurable, unique to humankind and linking all men and women.

Nussbaum rejected the idea that an inherent dignity in all men and women should be the base for public choice and action. Rather, she made the case for compassion, which she believed to be a better motivator for true understanding and a whole response to individual needs and situations. She also addressed how we might ‘educate compassion’ so as to overcome its tendency to stop at the border of our familiarity with those who are suffering.

She said that compassion is a tool to awaken civic awareness, inspire human goodness, and bring about concern for people and their suffering in other parts of the world.

Historically, philosophers have rejected compassion as a fundamental human necessity because there is much uncertainty about it—unlike the strict certainty of all humans having inherent dignity. Instead, compassion is an emotion directed at another person’s suffering or lack of well-being and thus requires a judgment held by the individual who perceives some suffering in another. This is the judgment of seriousness.

There is also the judgment of non-desert, made by the “compassionate one,” who determines whether or not an individual is deserving of such empathy. This judgment concerns how much the misery exceeds the sufferer’s faults or goes beyond the sufferer’s culpability.

And then there is the judgment of similar possibilities, which suggests the compassionate agent must believe that the suffering person shares vulnerabilities and possibilities with himself.

Finally, there is what Nussbaum called the eudaimonistic judgment, which is the aspect of compassion that results when the suffering person becomes an important part of the life of the individual feeling compassionate. The potential problem with this is that once this kind of suffering is no longer in an individual’s immediate circle of concern, it is often forgotten and therefore becomes ineffective for long-term motivation.

Nussbaum acknowledges that there are many ways in which compassion can go wrong: human suffering can be thought to be too far removed, too serious or not serious enough, or justly deserved. But, she added, despite these pitfalls, compassion, together with a belief in a universal human dignity, can mobilize people to act against human suffering.
Barbara Herman gave a talk in which she explored what she described as an underappreciated feature of Kant’s ethics and politics. She argued for “obligatory ends,” the moral foundations that are required for any individual’s pursuit of rational perfection and which require a conscious awareness of how individual choice impacts others. She saw obligatory ends as essential for both an individual’s transition between reason and action and for simple day-to-day living in a socialized environment.

Her work focuses on an individual’s morality within a social world. For her, morality in the individual must be studied with an eye on its effect on the social. Herman emphasized that even in becoming fully “ourselves,” a self operates in a society with rational, moral, and accepted norms.

As part of this study, she discussed the importance of all basic morality, those norms that are invariably entrenched in the human mind. Without basic morals—such as not lying, not killing, or not stealing—daily living would be impossible. People could not function if they had to fully evaluate the moral implication of every action; basic morality defines the rules for existing in a social world.

Still, even these commonly-held morals can be problematic, said Herman, because aspects of social relationships strain basic assumptions about morality. Relationships with other people are important and enjoyable, a necessary component to living a happy life, but they also expose individuals to different interpretations of morality. Thus, relationships with others constantly challenge and mold an individual’s understanding of morality.

Situations and relationships also test people, so individuals must weigh the impact of their actions on others. Even commonly-held beliefs (like the belief that lying is bad, for example) can be questioned and rejected when the rejection yields a rational good. As Herman explained, this can happen in parenting, when parents have to suspend their own morals to further the moral development of their children. While a parent may want to give the child everything she wants and the parent may believe this to be good, he may also ultimately decide that suspending this desire will ultimately benefit the child’s social and moral development. In this example, and in much of life, moral foundations are constantly shifting to respond to the challenges of interpersonal situations, said Herman.

She added that cruelty often results when people do not fully consider the impact of their actions. However, it is even possible for cruelty to result when an individual does pay mind to consequence: even those people who believe they acted after considering every possible outcome could still see an unthinkable result. They are, just like someone who acts without consideration, “on the hook.” In assessing the construction of morality, ends, means, action, intended and unintended consequences are all considered.

Herman argued that experiences in a social world teach individuals to become moral beings, and that once mature moral-
For Malcolm Schofield, any discussion of citizenship must consider the Greeks, whose concept of citizenship provides the fundamental basis for contemporary discussions of it. In his talk as part of the Citizenship Speaker series, Malcolm Schofield focused specifically on Aristotle’s definition of citizenship in the *Politics*.

Aristotle emphasized the role of the individual in citizenship and Schofield pointed to parts of the text that made important distinctions between master and slave. While the philosopher argued that all people needed to share in the *polis*, he referred only to citizens of equal birth, meaning those who were born free. On the opposite extreme were slaves, who had no freedom and no duty to take part in governing their city-state. Aristotle also said that workers, who were not specifically slaves but of an inferior class than free men, should also not be expected to participate in the management of government because they would be too busy and tired from their working tasks to devote time and thought to the task of leading a nation. Thus, when he says that all men must take part in governing the state, he refers only to those men who are neither workers nor slaves, according to Schofield’s reading of Aristotle.

And he specifically did mean men. Aristotle believed that only men could effectively run a city and thus be true citizens. Like slaves and workers, women were excluded from this group because, said Schofield, they were considered by Aristotle to be too emotional to run a state or participate as citizens. They were, however, responsible for raising the children (especially male children) to be effective and responsible participants in state affairs.

Schofield pointed out that for Aristotle, the concept of citizenship was divided into two primary modes, the ideology behind citizenship and the practical guidelines for how citizenship looks in a society. In addition to his careful analysis of the relationships between the social strata of society, a large portion of the *Politics* deals with the semantics of his system. Schofield described these details as uncharacteristic of Aristotle’s work.

Schofield said that this ancient philosopher lamented the need for a divide between ruled and ruler, because therein lies a subtle distinction between inferior and superior. Aristotle thought this class distinction to be necessary, but disallowed a distinction between otherwise equal men. So as to avoid dominance by any one faction, Schofield said, Aristotle emphasized that all able men must take turns controlling the functions of the state.

Schofield added that philosophers frequently look back to Aristotle in discussions of classical citizenship because he was the first to theoretically explore this notion. He added that within the *Politics* and the discourse around it, citizenship as a concept is highly contested since Aristotle explored different categories of it that many find contradictory. Nevertheless, his core understanding of this institution has a natural propensity towards democracy, despite the class divisions it espouses. Since he argued that the state is best served by sharing power among all equal citizens, he supported a pluralist rule that is entirely compatible with our present-day conceptions of democracy, said Schofield.

Further, in a passage in which Aristotle described the kind of participation required to earn or maintain the status of a citizen in a society, he was the first to say that participation in a jury—that is, participation in the society itself—constitutes citizenship, said Schofield. Power and control, then, does not rest only in the hands of the old men who determine an agenda, but in the jury, the collective, that votes on it. In Aristotle’s view, being part of the jury is being part of the entity that rules: being a citizen was a public office in its own right.

This reading of the *Politics* proved to Schofield that Aristotle himself recognized the foundations of democracy. Schofield highlighted certain selections from the text to show how Aristotle believed democracy to be an inevitable outcome for any society, that a critical mass of working or slave classes would force the creation of an egalitarian government.

Schofield thought it strange that Aristotle repeatedly argued that he is not a democrat and that, like his teacher Plato, does not want to be a democrat, despite his continual argument and ultimate conclusion that democracy is not only inevitable but good. Despite Aristotle’s resistance, Schofield found it incredibly forward-thinking for Aristotle to recognize a value in the collective and the threat to power of any government that devalues the whole strength of the larger, lower classes.

Despite its limitations, its restrictions on class, and its differences from a twenty-first century understanding of democracy and participation, Schofield argued that it is important for all scholars to look back at the very creative and innovative Aristotelian prescription for the basics of a successful citizenry.

Malcolm Schofield is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Cambridge University and has authored numerous books, including *The Stoic Idea of the City* and *Saving the City*. 
Elizabeth Kiss analyzed the value of restorative and retributive justice and specifically looked at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa to show how it impacts the broad political, social, cultural and legal context of justice.

Comparing retributive and restorative justice is especially significant today, she said. The twentieth century saw improved racial equality and rising rates of literacy and democracy, but it was also marked by bloody violence, oppression and repression. This mixed history of the recent past is an ideal case study when examining issues of justice and injustice.

Kiss said the TRC in South Africa suggests that there is a real need for restorative justice, despite the cultural entrenchment of retributive justice in many world societies. In this dominant system, punishment is primary instrument for doing justice. A long cultural and moral history makes lex talionis the only option for true justice, for many. She said despite this, her analysis of injustice indicates that there is a very real need for restorative justice as well.

Kiss illustrated this point by identifying the triangular relationship between parties of any conflict: the victim, the perpetrator, and society. Justice was once simply an “eye for an eye,” whereby the victim could repay his violence by punishing the perpetrator. As societies became more civilized, society took responsibility for punishment by creating systems to punish perpetrators and other systems to protect the victims.

Kiss said that those who designed the TRC recognized that despite these different treatments, all three parties do live in a common society and that the society may be best served by seeking justice that restores the strength of the collective. Rather than separate a perpetrator from the group as part of his punishment, they sought alternative methods of reintegrating perpetrators into the larger society. In a place like South Africa, where atrocities were so rampant, retributive punishment would be too unwieldy and devastating to the collective. Rather, by focusing on the restoration of a civil society, the TRC sought alternative methods of responding to violence and injustice.

Kiss was eager to point out that unjust acts are not ignored or excused. Rather, justice could be found in a forum that hears from those who committed horrible atrocities and those who were victims of crime. The truth became part of the formal public record. Perpetrators had to publicly describe their acts and their culpability, admitting a political motive to their violent actions, and based on their whole and truthful testimony, were granted immunity against prosecution for their crimes.

Many argue that this is not justice. Many say that the violence committed by these individuals should not be pardoned in any way by a government and that the horrors experienced by their victims cannot be undone by words alone.

Kiss admitted this argument does have weight, but only because it is coming out of a tradition of retributive justice, and if one believes that one who punishes must in turn be punished, then restorative justice is a consummate failure. It is important, she said, not to evaluate them on the same terms, since restorative justice does not seek the same aims as retributive justice. Unlike the latter, which tries to punish the perpetrator because of the punishment he caused his victim, restorative justice tries to bridge the gap between perpetrator and victim, which is especially effective in a divided society like post-Apartheid South Africa, contended Kiss.

Kiss argued strongly in favor of the power of words, saying that there is some justice in allowing victims to share their story as part of their national history. Their suffering becomes public, as does the names and identities of those people who caused the suffering. This catharsis makes real a painful history, and forces actions in front of a critical public.

Kiss also acknowledged that South Africa may have had unique conditions—poverty, a shaky transition from Apartheid to democracy, horrible atrocities committed by both sides of the debate, and incredible moral guidance by its leaders—that made it possible for the TRC to work.

Trials would have been so long and expensive that it would likely have eaten up most of South Africa’s national resources. Many perpetrators would likely have not only been freed, but would have ended up free without ever confronting or admitting their part in the violent history of the nation. The TRC was much less expensive and while many of those who committed crimes still went free, it was only after a full account of their participation in violence.

Kiss admitted it did not always work. For example, some, like Winnie Mandela, stonewalled and refused to divulge participation in crimes. Sometimes the truth did not come out, sometimes people implicated over and over by various testimonials refused to apply for amnesty and refused to divulge their participation in criminal activity. Kiss sees value in this process for finding the truth, but she admits that parts of the truth remained hidden.

Nevertheless, despite its own admission that the TRC failed at retributive justice, the transitional government recognized that building a new society in South Africa was better served by redressing the moral wrongs committed under Apartheid by amassing a collective history. To move through a period of intense violence, repression and oppression toward the creation of a unified country, South Africans needed to confront their past and move forward, rather than commit huge resources and time looking back.

Kiss admits that moving past the binary logic of guilty/not-guilty in discussions of justice and injustice is very difficult because of the political, social, cultural and legal conditions—poverty, a shaky transition from Apartheid to democracy, horrible atrocities committed by both sides of the debate, and incredible moral guidance by its leaders—that made it possible for the TRC to work.

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Ohio in the World Lecture Series

To celebrate Ohio’s bicentennial, Geoffrey Parker, Andreas Dorpalen Professor of History, and Richard Sisson, Professor of Political Science, organized a lecture called “Ohio in the World,” which explored the state’s role in the history of America.

The talks spanned two centuries of Ohio history, from its pre-colonial history to a forecast of what the state may become. Each talk was featured at OSU’s main campus in Columbus and at various locations around the state.

The scholars all discussed Ohio’s unique position in the country as a crossroads for many periods and movements. Politically, geographically, architecturally, culturally…Ohio has been left with an imprint of many periods and people.

It was, as R.W. Apple of The New York Times said, the first truly American state, the first to be carved out of land that was never part of the thirteen original colonies. It had, and continues to have as some other speakers pointed out, very strong regional divisions: the southern part of the state is different from the eastern and western parts of the state. The legacies of former inhabitants lingers in these divides, since each region was settled by emigrants from different areas, including New England (settling in the Western Reserve in the eastern part of the state), the South (in the areas just north of the Ohio River) and the west, largely comprised of Pennsylvania Dutch. These areas continue to reflect the culture and architecture of their former settlers.

This all happened after Christopher Columbus came to the New World. R. David Edmunds, Watson Professor of American History at the University of Texas, Dallas, talked about the important role the land had in pre-Columbian times. It was, he said, a rich and fertile holy land for many Native American tribes and its waterways were pivotal for trade routes.

When European settlers moved into the area, Ohio’s native population was in a strategically important spot between French and British colonies, and the tribal people were trapped between these battling colonial factions, a position Edmunds said the savvy tribal leaders used to their advantage. Unfortunately, however, after the British victory in the French and Indian War and the American victory in the Revolutionary War, native inhabitants of the Ohio region lost their bargaining power between rival factions and ultimately lost their land.

That was not the end to the racial tensions in the area. James O. Horton, Benjamin Banneker Prof. of American Studies and History at George Washington University, talked about the unique position Ohio was in during the debate over slavery. Just north of slave-reliant states like Kentucky and Virginia, just south of Canada, Horton said Ohio’s settlers were deeply divided on the issue of slavery. Settlers in the north, who were predominantly from philosophically liberal New England families were vehement abolitionists; settlers in the south, many of whom either had their own slaves or whose lives were dependent on trade with the south, supported slavery, sparking debates about whether or not Ohio would be a free state upon its entrance in the union.

According to Horton, only by a narrow margin did Ohio declare itself a free state. Its state constitution reflected some of its bias, and its policies made it clear that state leaders did not want slavery, but did not want a large free black settlement either. Ohio’s infamous Black Laws, which included a provision requiring free blacks to prove their freedom and provide a $500 bond, arose from these conflicting politics.

Politics have always had a strong hold on Ohio, yielding a disproportionate share of U.S. Presidents, and was a seedbed of postwar reform.

Before and during the Civil War, as Eric Foner, DeWitt Clinton Prof. of History at Columbia University discussed, Ohio played a significant role in the early creation of the Republican party. During the war, it was the crossroads for conflicting ideologies, some citizens sympathetic to the Union cause, some the Confederates. It was a state that gave rise to a very strong abolitionist movement, and was home to Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. It was a state that was active on the Underground Railroad and is home to Oberlin College, the first college in the United States that admitted both black and white students on an equal basis to a coeducational institution. But, as a largely agricultural state, it had some sympathies with the South.

After the war, as Foner discussed, Ohio exemplified some of the schisms in a changing country because it was still an active farming state (Cincinnati was the primary port for much of the country’s pork products) due to its fertile soil, but it was changing into an industrialized place as well, as Cleveland and Cincinnati embraced the technology of the industrial age. As it was so many times before, Ohio was caught in the middle of a rapidly changing society.

Kathryn Kish Sklar, Distinguished Prof. of History and Co-director of the Center for the Historical Study of Women and Gender at the State University of New York at Binghamton, gave a talk titled “Ohio: Heartland of Progressive Reform,” where she discussed how the vibrant local politics throughout the state yielded larger groups to deal with the challenges the state confronted in the early 1900s. Massive migration and widespread urbanization and industrialization grew throughout the state, and Ohio had developed successful strategies for managing these shifts. She said that Ohio politicians left the more philosophical national politics to their colleagues in larger cities like New York, Chicago and Washington D.C. but yielded some of the most effective pragmatic reforms of the era, which then generated models for national reform.

Half a century later, as James Patterson, Ford Foundation Prof. of History at Brown University, discussed, Ohio reflected the challenges faced by much of the country. Some of the problems Sklar identified came to a head in the mid-twentieth century: rapid industrialization lead to environmental problems, including fires on the Cuyahoga River in 1952 and 1969. Cleveland was the first large city to elect a black mayor, but its de facto segregationist school policies shook Cleveland.

The decisions made by conservative politicians like John Bricker and James Rhodes lead to the disaster at Kent State in 1970 and conservative leaders created their own un-American Activities investigation, threatening the civil liberties of state employees and professors, said Patterson. These turbulent times were not unique to Ohio, but its role as the crossroads of the nation makes it a microcosm of American struggles. Ohio was both progressive and behind-the-times, stuck in the middle of battling ideologies.

By 2003, the very traits that allowed the state to thrive fifty years prior have left Ohio a shell of its former self, said Herb Asher, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Ohio State. Once an industrial leader and political powerhouse, the state now confronts obsolete and environmentally dangerous industrial sites. The Ohio Republican Party, which once dominated state and national politics, is much more fragile in its power. Statistics point to population decline and falling economic prosperity. Asher argued that Ohio has the choice to move forward in the new economy, as said its neighboring states have successfully done—or continue a decline that puts additional pressures on the political and economic structures of the state.

Brit Kirwan, former President of Ohio State, agreed, arguing that if the current labor leaders and policymakers do not actively pursue businesses in the technology sector, the state’s labor strength will decline further. He described it as a battle between brains and brawn: the new economy relies on ingenuity and invention, the latter more suited for the service sector or the industrialized companies of Ohio’s former glory days.

The series pointed out one thing: Ohio’s geographic location and its role in history has meant that at the point of any large-scale national change, the state has been at the center of controversy, ingenuity and change. This has resulted in strong regional affiliations throughout the state and brought a diversity of ideas and histories that is unique to the state. But, as the final speakers cautioned, if state leaders do not reign in the state’s promise and move into the twenty-first century, the best of Ohio may have already been.

This lecture series was sponsored by The Ohio Bicentennial Commission, The Ohio Humanities Council and, at The Ohio State University, The Office of the Provost, The Mershon Center, The College of Humanities, The Humanities Institute, The Department of History, and The Department of Political Science.

Mershon Center Report 2002-2003
Laws and Institutions

Mershon Center Funded Projects Studying Laws and Institutions

- Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Politics in Comparative Perspective: Phase II
  Principal Investigator(s): Richard Gunther, Department of Political Science

- Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Practice
  Principal Investigator(s): Mary Ellen O’Connell, Moritz College of Law

- Review of the Antarctic Treaty System
  Principal Investigator(s): Paul Arthur Berkman, Byrd Polar Research Center

- Population Management and National Security: The Soviet Case in Comparative Perspective
  Principal Investigator(s): David Hoffmann, Ohio State University and Peter Holquist, Cornell University

- Carbon Policy in an Uncertain Climate
  Principal Investigator(s): Ratan Lal, School of Natural Resources and Brent Sohngen, Department of Food, Agricultural and Environmental Economics

- The Construction of Party Systems in Post-Communist Europe
  Principal Investigator(s): Goldie Shabad, Department of Political Science, Kazimierz Macick Slomczynski, Department of Political Science, and Jakub Zielinski, Department of Political Science

  Principal Investigator(s): Herb Weisberg, Department of Political Science, Herb Asher, Department of Political Science, and Clyde Wilcox, Georgetown University

- The State in Economic Transformation in Latin America and the Post-Communist World
  Principal Investigator(s): Marcus Kurtz, Department of Political Science and Timothy Frye, Department of Political Science

- Human Elements of Global Warming in International Context
  Principal Investigator(s): Joseph Arvai, School of Natural Resources, Tomas Koontz, School of Natural Resources, Ratan Lal, School of Natural Resources, Paul Robbins, Department of Geography, Brent Sohngen, Agricultural, Developmental and Environmental Economics, and Alexander Thompson, Department of Political Science

- Organized Labor and the Struggle for Democracy in Contemporary Sudan
  Principal Investigator(s): Ahmad Sikainga, Department of History

- Channeling Statecraft: Economic Coercion through International Organizations
  Principal Investigator(s): Alexander Thompson, Department of Political Science
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created a world that puts new political and social pressures on international legal institutions. It is a world dominated by one enormous—and arguably growing—superpower. International disputes have largely shifted from formal battles with conventional armies to more subversive attacks by underground or loosely connected groups. And the terrorist attacks on the United States in the fall of 2001 and the subsequent military action in Afghanistan and Iraq put further pressure on existing structures of international law.

For those in this field, there has been dissent about how the law can effectively respond to this changing world. Since much of conventional international law concerns the sovereignty of independent nations, what does it mean to be a “sovereign nation?” And how do international laws, agreements, treaties, and protocol affect the changing perception about what nations can and cannot do to one another in protecting, or exploiting, their own sovereignty?

To answer this fundamental question, Mary Ellen O’Connell, William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of International Law at the Moritz College of Law and research fellow at the Mershon Center, convened a group of the world’s preeminent legal scholars to share their views on sovereignty.

For the participants in this conference, the War with Iraq was a timely and potential focal point in a debate about contemporary interpretations of “sovereignty.” As was evidenced by the diversity of opinions proffered by conference attendees, the world’s legal community had not yet resolved whether or not the war was legal or illegal, whether it was punishable or not punishable, whether the United States was an uncontrollable and dangerous hegemon or a superpower attempting to use its power for global good.

Each speaker articulated variant conclusions about the state of international law in this changing world. There was but one point of agreement: conventional international law is ill equipped to deal with the issue of sovereignty in a post-Cold-War-world.

Political Scientist John Mueller argued that international laws are outdated as they apply to contemporary conflict because the majority of the violent armed conflicts in the post-Cold-War world are not disputes over territories, but civil wars over religious and cultural affiliations or are bloodshed under vicious regimes.

Sovereignty, he said, is primarily concerned with geographic boundary disputes. That is why, he said, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait during the first Gulf War was such a clear-cut example of one country violating the sovereign rights of another that it sparked little debate among lawyers.

In Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq, however, there was no clear-cut violation of sovereignty to justify U.S. armed intervention. For Mueller, given the contemporary history of armed conflict, international laws must be updated to reflect a new world, where blood is shed not over land, but over less tangible ideas like cultural superiority, government ruthlessness, and religion.

Michael Bothe, Professor of Law at Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität in Frankfurt, agreed. He thought that the only way change can be effective is to look at events to which these laws and resolutions apply instead of applying the laws in a philosophical or theoretical way. For him, the problems inherent in the current system are exemplified by the 2003 invasion of Iraq: the debate was not truly concentrated on the Security Council resolutions, but an argument within a system in which people fundamentally disagree about the function of the group. People who attempt to apply existing laws to contemporary actions do not appear to be working with the same definitions of sovereignty, preemptive self-defense, or humanitarian intervention. For some, all of these are a question of military security, for others they are the domain of humanitarian missions.

Only when institutions like the United Nations start looking specifically at contemporaneous action and seek to rethink the laws that apply to them can these institutions be fully effective. It was his perspective that Washington’s sometimes flagrant unwillingness to participate in international institutions has made collectives like NATO or the UN ineffective.

Dino Kritsiotis of the University of Michigan also agreed that the structures designed to enforce international laws are woefully inadequate. He saw these institutions as occupying a murky legal position between superior governing agency and a collective of peers acting together for their mutual good. This becomes a fundamental problem for international lawyers as they attempt to decode this conflict, since he said that the UN suffers from an air of illegiti-
Assessing the Vitality of Electoral Democracy in the U.S.: The 2000 Elections

Even before the outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential election resulted in a vote total that was too close to call, there were serious challenges to the health of America’s electoral democracy. Low voter turnout and increased polarization were potential challenges to government legitimacy. Increased political independence, stronger third-party movements, and “divided government” with neither party controlling both the executive and legislative branches could make it more difficult for either party to govern effectively. Thus, recent trends in the U.S. could potentially threaten the legitimacy and governability that are essential to successful electoral democracy.

America’s national security depends centrally on the maintenance of its democracy, and the health of America’s democracy depends directly on the continued vitality of its electoral democracy. The past two decades have witnessed a wave of democratization across the world, but at the same time there have been threats to the health of American democracy. Countries as diverse as Spain, Russia, and Chile now use free and meaningful elections to determine their leaders, while the electoral health of the United States has become weaker.

After being postponed from its original September, 2001 date because of September 11, the conference began with keynote comments by Herb Weisberg, Herb Asher, and Paul Beck of Ohio State University and Clyde Wilcox of Georgetown University. Weisberg emphasized how the closeness of the outcome could have delegitimized the 2000 election but surveys show that did not occur. The public did not view the post-election situation as a crisis, and they felt that the president should go ahead with his plans for the country regardless of the small margin of victory. Even though surveys found that many people felt that Bush had not won the election fairly, the overwhelming majority of the public accepted him as the legitimate President, and September 11 certainly erased lingering doubts to that effect.

Asher focused on the impact of local election administration on the outcome of U.S. elections, as was vividly witnessed after the 2000 election. Beck emphasized how even supporters of losing candidates are not too troubled by election outcomes because the business of most Americans is not politics. Therefore even the polarizing effect of an election gets dissipated quickly afterwards, and post-election events (such as Jim Jeffords’s switch of parties, the recession, September 11, and the Enron scandal) have proven more influential in setting the agenda of American politics than the 2000 election. Beck pointed out that these considerations raise serious questions about how vital electoral democracy is in the U.S. and how important elections are for governance. Recently returned from a conference in Hungary, Wilcox provided insightful perspectives on how the election was viewed from abroad. Together these keynote comments framed the papers that followed within the broader context of the vitality of American electoral democracy.

The papers at the conference showed how careful survey research on voting behavior can provide understanding of the public opinion underpinnings of electoral democracy, with emphasis on the presidential contest. Michael Hagen (Annenberg School of the University of Pennsylvania) reported on the yearlong Annenberg study of campaign dynamics emphasizing a collapse in views of Gore’s honesty in the middle of the campaign, while Sunshine Hillygus (Stanford University) gave results from the large-scale Internet panel survey conducted by Knowledge Networks showing that Gore benefited from the conventions while Bush benefited from the debates. Jon Krosnick (Ohio State) challenged usual studies of the causal determinants vote intentions, using a combination of specially commissioned telephone and Internet surveys.

Professor Morris Fiorina (Stanford University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, as well as a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) argued that Gore obtained fewer votes than forecasted because of Clinton fatigue combined with weak influence of economic good times. By contrast, Merrill Shanks (University of California, Berkeley and co-author of The New American Voter) found that retrospective evaluations of Clinton helped Gore, regardless of Gore’s attempt to distance himself from Clinton. Helmut Norpoth (State University of New York at Stony Brook) demonstrated that economic models did not predict the 2000 election outcome because they apply only with an incumbent president in the race. Herb Weisberg and Timothy Hill (Ohio State University) explained some of these differences by Gore benefiting from the economic legacy of the Clinton administration while being weakened by its moral legacy.

A variety of other specific topics relating to the 2000 election were covered. William Jacoby (University of South Carolina and editor of the Journal of Politics) pointed to the contrast between the lack of liberal-conservative influence on the vote in an election in which people understood where the candidates stood on ideology. Janet Box-Steffensmeier (Ohio State) dealt with the campaign finance issue, Dean Lacy (Ohio State) looked at the effects of federal spending, and Ken Goldstein (University of Wisconsin) contributed a focus on television advertising. Barbara Norrander (University of Arizona and president of the Western Political Science Association 2004-5) established that the gender gap in voting in 2000 was due to differences in evaluations of the government’s role in society. Richard Niemi (Watson Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester) highlighted trends in social group support for political parties, with an emphasis on the Republican Party’s new strong base in the South and among regular churchgoers and the Democratic Party’s not gaining support from significant new social groups.

A final set of papers moved past the two-party presidential vote. Barry Burden (Harvard University) showed that the Nader and Buchanan campaigns turned out many voters who would not have otherwise voted. Paul Freeman (University of Virginia) demonstrated that voter indifference toward the presidential candidates overrode conditions that otherwise should have led to an increase in voter turnout. David Kimball (University of Missouri, St. Louis) explained the low level of ticket-splitting between presidential and congressional voting by party polarization leading to heightened impact of mass partisanship.

Discussants included Herb Asher, Paul Beck, Gregory Caldeira, Rich Timpone, and Kira Sanbonmatsu, all of The Ohio State University, and Steve Mockabee of the University of Cincinnati.

A book, edited by Weisberg and Wilcox, will come out of the conference. It will focus on Models of Voting as applied to the 2000 election. Chapters will analyze several key aspects of the election, with an introduction placing the election in a broader theoretical framework and discussing the implications of the election for America’s electoral democracy.
Jon Krosnick recently published an article (co-written with OSU Postdoctoral Researcher Sowmya Anand) exploring the impact of foreign policy preferences on American citizens’ voting in the 2000 Presidential election. During a presentation at the Mershon Center, he said that while political scientists often claim to know what motivates people to vote for particular candidate, causality—what makes people vote the way they do—has yet to be convincingly documented.

Conventional voting research has suggested there is a small group of people who are informed about foreign policy and a large group of the population that is ignorant about foreign policy. Foreign policy is thought to be like any other issue: it is carefully tracked by a small, informed group of citizens who pay attention to all of political affairs, domestic and international (called the “attentive public”), whereas most Americans pay little or no attention to foreign policy at all.

Using data from his Mershon Center sponsored national surveys, Krosnick argued for a different view, one positing that each specific foreign policy issue attracts its own idiosyncratic “issue public,” a small group of citizens especially concerned about that issue and attentive to information about it.

Unlike nearly all past surveys, Krosnick’s asked respondents to evaluate the broad and abstract goals of foreign policy, rather than evaluating specific implementation strategies. His argument was that if researchers ask a respondent about implementation (i.e. “Should we fight communism by doing this...”) and he or she says “no,” it is impossible to know whether that person endorses the goal or objects to the implementation strategy or opposes pursuit of the goal altogether (as in, “should we fight communism?”).

Krosnick analyzed speeches and debates involving Albert Gore, Jr. and George W. Bush during the 2000 campaign to determine their stances toward foreign policy goals. He determined that Gore was in favor of making immigration easier, assisting the poor, protecting the environment, and preventing violence. Krosnick said that while political scientists might have become extremely supportive of President George W. Bush and all that he supported, especially the President’s goals related to foreign policy.

In their analysis, Krosnick and his team separated goals that were directly related to terrorism—increased military spending, for example—from those tangentially related, like immigration. They also identified policy issues thought to be unrelated, including the environment, capital punishment, and gun control.

Their results indicated that prior to September, 2001, support for goals such as fighting terrorism was relatively stable, but support rose sharply after the terrorist attacks. By October, 2001, however, support for goals closely related to the September 11 attacks experienced a small backslide, toward their previous levels. The data indicated that foreign policy goals that were more distantly related to security in the U.S. experienced a brief surge in support after the attacks as well, only to fall back to the pre-9/11 levels shortly thereafter.

Attitudes toward policy goals that were completely unrelated to the terrorist attacks changed little between the first surveys in July 2000 and the last survey in October 2001.

In sum, Krosnick concluded that the evidence he observed showed Americans to be attentive to foreign policy both before and after September 11, but not as conventional theories of public opinion would have guessed. Thinking of the American public as divided into small “issue publics,” each focused on a particular foreign policy goal, and responsive to dramatic international events in ways driven by the particular content of the events seems to be a more fruitful and accurate way to characterize the public’s views of its nation’s place in the world.
**Watching Washington: Perspectives on the American Media and American Politics**  
**John Kasich**

Former U.S. Representative from the state of Ohio John Kasich came to the Mershon Center on May 13, 2003 as part of our Undergraduate Government Series. He shared the lessons he has drawn from his experience in Congress and now as the host of Fox News’ *From the Heartland* with Ohio State undergraduate students.

Kasich said that, as much as he enjoyed his time as an elected official, he eventually tired of the constant politicking: he said that life as a Congressman means that you are constantly trying to get people to do what you want, even if it’s not what they want to do. For him, leaving Congress and becoming a television personality for Fox News allows him to still be involved in government because he can ask question from the other side.

He said that he enjoys the challenge of transitioning from his role in government to his new role in the media. Kasich said that the American media is, as it is reputed to be, largely liberal and as a Republican congressman, he enjoyed the challenge of translating his conservative views to the American public through the liberal-leaning media. When he joined Fox News, he was pleased that he had a forum that welcomed conservative viewpoints. While he admitted that Fox has been criticized for being too conservative, he joked that they really are the most equal because, he said, “at least we show both sides.”

He added that he sees a value in what he described as the “Fox Factor,” by which he means that other networks are now scrambling to find newsmen who espouse conservative ideas in light of the success of Fox News.

Kasich emphasized that his experience is important for students because they should recognize the importance of the media and politics therein. He said that he sees the media as a light to find truth, but that students must be willing to question the information they get and also how they get that information. Just as he was critical about the one-sidedness of mainstream media, he encouraged these undergraduates to actively seek out all sides of a political issue.

Through an extensive conversation with these Ohio State undergraduates, Kasich emphasized the essentials for these young citizens. He encouraged them to take an active role in their own education and in the government and to constantly question the information they get. Having been in two unique positions, once being a government official who needed to explain and defend his position to the media and now being a media figure seeking out this information, Kasich used his unique position to encourage students to explore and participate actively in shaping their careers and national politics.

John Kasich is a former U.S. Representative from the State of Ohio. He is now a political commentator for Fox News.

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**Covering the Pentagon and America at War**  
**Tom Gjelten, NPR**

Together with OSU’s Melton Center, Mershon invited Tom Gjelten, National Security Correspondent with National Public Radio, to address the campus community and reflect on his experience in journalism. The May 15, 2003 talk was titled “Covering the Pentagon and America at War,” and in it, Gjelten drew from his experience covering world events and his current post, as the chief Pentagon correspondent.

His experience covering war is long and diverse. Earlier in his career, he was NPR’s Latin America correspondent and reported from wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Columbia. He also covered the social upheaval in Panama, Chile, and Mexico in the late 1980s.

In the 1990s, Gjelten witnessed war in the Persian Gulf, the shift to democracy in Eastern Europe, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. He then reported on the war in Bosnia and the Serb-Croat conflict, an experience he turned into a book, *Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege* (1996).

He has won numerous awards for his outstanding journalism, including the Overseas Press Club’s Lowell Thomas Award. He has been successful, he explained, because he brings a genuine interest to the topics he covers. The key, he said, was for journalists to bring their “eyes and ears” to the story, and understand the history and context of any issue. Without understanding these elements it is impossible to understand a conflict or a war.

Tom Gjelten is National Security Correspondent for National Public Radio.
Alvin Tillery's work explores issues of diaspora affiliations with a focus on African Americans in the U.S. Congress. During a talk at Mershon, he focused on African American interest in foreign policy.

Unlike other diaspora research that examines American politics since only 1965, Tillery took a longer view of history to explore how African American politicians mobilize diaspora feelings to push a domestic agenda. Tillery claims that African American politicians get involved in international politics primarily as an attempt to influence domestic politics, and that in each situation, these initiatives followed the same steps: the introduction of an international initiative, an unexpected volatile element that confronts this initiative, and the abandonment of the initiative.

Tillery began his research with an examination of 19th-century shipping magnate Paul Cuffe, the first free black man to be invited to Congress to perform government business. Tillery said that Cuffe was primarily concerned with fighting slavery, but that he petitioned congress to build a colony in Africa where ex-American slaves could live. Unexpectedly, a white congressman began to support the initiative, and Cuffe abandoned the plan since he did not support sending slaves back to Africa, he just wanted to draw attention to the domestic problem.

In the 20th century, Charles Diggs, one of the founding members of the Congressional Black Caucus, introduced bills that followed the same steps as Cuffe's bill had a century before. Diggs was appointed head of the House Subcommittee on Africa to prevent Ghana from becoming an ally of the Soviet Union. Through his diplomacy in international affairs, Diggs earned the respect of his fellow congressmen, and began to push for other African American leaders to take the lead in international affairs in order to make a name for themselves and then push domestic initiatives.

Tillery showed how this resulted in the presentation of a flurry of bills regarding apartheid in South Africa. The volatile element, in this case, was the lack of support from the majority congressmen, which caused members like Diggs to abandon the international arena to concentrate on a domestic agenda.

Tillery took issue with another aspect of conventional diaspora literature, which claims that all African American diaspora groups work together in pursuit of a goal. His research indicates that, like other loosely affiliated groups, diaspora groups jump on the successful political bandwagons, regardless of cultural affiliation. Tillery said that many publications suggest that cultural identity is necessary and sufficient to inspire diaspora groups to mobilize, but Tillery said that identity is only one motivating factor.
Workshop on Adaptive Research and Governance in Climate Change

The Mershon Center hosted a workshop in the fall of 2002 called Adaptive Research and Governance in Climate Change. The researchers leading this project will explore the human dimensions of global climate change and study all aspects of the phenomenon: the political policies that impact it, the economic drivers that affect it, and the scientific causes of it. Together, this interdisciplinary research team will host a conference in the fall of 2003 to continue this exploration.

To organize the conference, the head researchers organized this workshop to brainstorm the ways in which their sometimes disparate fields intersect to inform understanding of this complex problem and design a multi-scale approach that analyzes all aspects of the problem.

Adaptive management has varying definitions, although it typically means the human intervention (management) and experimentation on natural environmental systems. Adaptive policies are designed to test an ecosystem's ability to respond to changes caused by human use of natural resources.

As evidenced by the workshop, there is a diversity of scholarship that studies this. University of Michigan political scientist Robert Franzese discussed the reasons why nations have not mobilized to fight global warming in the way that they have to fight a global war on terrorism.

For Ohio State political scientist Alexander Thompson, a look at the Kyoto regime, the 1997 United Nations Conference on Climate Change, illustrates the political aspect of adaptive management. He thinks Kyoto shows promise for success because, unlike many supranational treaties, it built-in flexibilities that allow a country to adapt to the provisions over time, according to a nation's ability to conform to the standards.

Paul Robbins, Ohio State associate professor of Geography, cautioned that sometimes these flexibilities can mask potential dangers. Kyoto allows countries to amass “credits,” which can be traded or sold to other nations. In India, for example, this has proved problematic, because they have forested large regions of the country with nuisance trees to amass sellable credits. Robbins said, however, that this land could be used for better purposes. Brent Sohngen, Ohio State Department of Agriculture, Environmental and Developmental Economics discussed the science to anticipate how forests like these may be impacted.

Kenneth Richards, and Economist from Indiana University, sought to articulate ways in which governments could effectively design programs that are beneficial to their domestic situation and to the larger world. Through analysis of different kinds of programs, he suggested that the most efficient and cost-effective carbon sequestration program would be one that is funded and controlled by the government.

For other participants, the changes need to come from more grass-roots, community movements. Tomas Koontz, from Ohio State's School of Natural Resources, smaller projects are not only cheaper and easier to manage, they are designed and monitored by individuals who have a stake in the success of the project. Those who live in an area are more likely to actively manage improvement of the local environment.

James Tansey, University of British Columbia, said that local input and a certain degree of control is absolutely imperative in the design of any programs. Governments simply do not have all of the first-hand information to design a project for an area without input from locals. He added that if locals feel that they were involved in the design of a program, they are more likely to support it and influence it in a positive way.

University of Oklahoma's Gavin Bridge agreed. While he said that local community groups tend to be reactive and governments tend to be proactive in addressing problems like global warming, unless governments seek local input, a program is likely to fail.

Katrina Smith Korfmeracher (University of Rochester) agreed with Bridge and Tansey, but cautioned that involving community groups sometimes means that the way one measures success must be rethought. Where scientists and social scientists see success in findings that are 95% “true,” in community experiments, success means simply “more true than not.” She acknowledged that, despite its benefits and importance, it can be difficult for scientists to modify their scientific approach.

Joseph Arvai, of Ohio State's School of Natural Resources, used his research to explore ways in which such group work can be improved. Through an analysis of how groups come to make the decisions they do, he thinks that community groups and government agencies, when given appropriate parameters, can resolve their differences to create effective change.

Tackling a problem as complex as global climate change is challenging, as evidenced by the disparate, but complementary, research of the ARGCC workshop. This conversation will be continued at the ARGCC conference in the fall of 2003.

Photo: (Back Row): Gavin Bridge, Kenneth Richards, James Tansey, Alexander Cooley, Paul Robbins. Front Row: April Luginbuhl (Ohio State), Nives Dolsak (U of Washington), Katrina Smith Korfmeracher, Brent Sohngen (Ohio State), Robert Franzese, Joseph Arvai, Tomas Koontz
State provision of a social safety net benefits communities by ensuring that everyone has the means to participate in society thus contributing to its social cohesion, stability and internal security. Research into welfare politics addresses issues of relevance to maintaining social cohesiveness in society by examining the distributive politics surrounding social provision. Jacob Hacker argued that the welfare state needs to be rethought in order to understand how the pervasive policies affecting it can be measured fully.

Hacker said he agrees with much extant literature that identifies problems with the existing welfare state and examines how despite external pressures, social policy frameworks have changed remarkably little since their inception. For Hacker, however, there has been remarkably little research into what has changed. Whereas existing works effectively determine what is or what is not happening in social systems, Hacker seeks to explore why and how changes have been effected.

Hacker argued that change has been a direct outgrowth of transformations within and pressures exerted by changing family and employment structures. Hacker admitted that there has been a marked lack of reform in the formal structures of social policy, but retrenchment has not fully characterized a system confronted with changing employment and family roles.

He pointed to two major social changes that have directly impacted social policy programs: first, a growing schism between low-paying service sector jobs and high-paying white collar jobs, and second, the dramatic increase of women in the work force.

Each of these has affected social programs differently. Hacker cited statistics that illustrate that conditions for uneducated, less skilled American workers have dropped dramatically, resulting in higher levels of unemployment, lower wages, and an increasing reliance on (often part-time) service sector jobs without benefits.

This change happened simultaneously with a period in which more women joined the workforce. The reasons for this are well-documented and include a dramatic increase in divorce rates creating more and more single-parent (usually headed by mothers) households, increased educational opportunities for women, and national economic conditions that make a middle-class lifestyle largely accessible only to two-income families.

Whatever their cause, these shifts in economic and workplace situations affect economic hardship. According to Hacker, one of the most commonly accepted tenets of the social welfare system is that they, in part, buffer individual risk of financial devastation. An increasing reliance on two-paycheck lifestyles means that divorce, death, or unemployment has an increasingly devastating effect on American families. Furthermore, he said, an increase in the privatization of social welfare programs make it increasingly impossible for the existing structures to aid citizens in need.

Hacker argued that the traditional welfare system cannot respond to this increased risk. Public cash assistance—what some people incorrectly perceive as the primary welfare program—is available only to the poorest citizens. The bulk of social programs is devoted to other areas of social insurance, including health insurance and pensions. There has been a noted increase in reliance on private subsidies of these programs.

Hacker argued that it is important to consider publicly-subsidized but privately-funded programs of health insurance and pensions. Employer-paid, or partially paid, insurance is often overlooked as a part of public welfare programs, but the large government support that enables employers to offer such benefits makes this a major part of the American welfare state. Truly public insurance systems like Medicare and Medicaid are available only to very specific populations in the United States, but workers who have insurance through their employers still benefit from government support of their job-related plans.

Increased privatization of health insurance is one part of a changing welfare state; changing pensions is another. Traditional defined-benefit plans are becoming increasingly rare, and programs like the 401(k) have replaced many traditional retirement plans. This is another aspect in which private benefits, afforded by changes in government regulation or outright support, are changing social insurance programs in the United States.

In Hacker’s view this is problematic, said Hacker, because privatized social insurance mechanisms are increasingly shifting the risk onto individual workers rather than sharing risk across larger populations. Privatized health insurance and income are directly linked to employment, so job loss is doubly devastating to all families, be they single or double paycheck families.

A decrease in defined-benefit pensions puts the risk squarely on the shoulder of the investor/worker, whose retirement is no longer secure. The recent rocky times in the stock market have proven how dangerous this can be for many American workers. An increase in privatization of social benefits further endangers the financial futures of many Americans, an outcome social insurance is in part designed to avoid.

Hacker illustrated the ways in which social insurance has changed to respond to the changing social landscape. This change is remarkable to him because it has happened within the existing structures of social insurance institutions, which have changed very little. Hacker calls this type of change “policy drift,” when policy changes occur within the confines of existing institutions.

He explained that drift is possible and prevalent because it is the only outcome that does not have enormous political and/or economic costs. Despite the famed enormity of its problems, it would have been politically and economically impossible to eliminate Social Security, for example. It has, however, been possible to subtly alter the application of this social insurance program without fundamentally altering its function.

Hacker concluded that for those who believe that the welfare state is absolutely essential to any just society, retrenchment literature has done an effective, albeit alarming, job at pointing out the shortcomings of the American system. Looking at the totality of social insurance found throughout different strata of American society, he argued that the current welfare state, despite the risks, may ultimately yield more resilient policies resulting from trenchant institutions.
Reforming Public Pensions: Lessons from the Advanced Industrial Countries
Kent Weaver, Brookings Institution

Kent Weaver discussed the current debate over U.S. pension reform by analyzing the plans used by other industrialized nations.

Weaver looked specifically at New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden because their systems all have either an individual account system or savings that include equities outside of government securities; both are options proposed by those seeking to guide U.S. pension reform. He outlined five main pension systems used by governments around the world.

The first system, which he calls “Bismarkian,” links retirement benefits to earnings and has a high replacement rate; this system is used by countries like Austria, France, Sweden, Italy and Germany. A second similar plan he called “Bismarkian Lite,” meaning that it is also based on earnings, but has a low replacement rate. Canada and the United States fall into this category. The third is a “Universal” flat-rate pension, used by Ireland and New Zealand. Fourth, the “Residual” plan, is an income or means-tested pension that is not currently used by any country in his sample. The last, a “Mixed” pension, allows for either a mandatory or opt-out private tier, integrated with a universal pension. “Mixed” pensions are used by Australia, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K.

Different systems require different solutions to a funding crisis, said Weaver. One possibility is retrenchment, reducing pension fund deficits caused by population aging through a combination of measures that reduce the cost of providing pensions (and hence the value of old age benefits). This may involve raising retirement ages, taxing high incomes, or raising the number of years used to determine an average wage from the last ten years worked to the last forty, thus lowering the average wage base over which pension benefits are determined. Countries can also seek new sources of funding for their pension programs, or they can restructure their programs by adding incentives for the older workers to retire (to open up jobs for younger workers) or make a universal payment plan.

His data showed that among the OECD countries in his sample, when a financial crisis threatens public pensions, retrenchment and refinancing are the most common remedies. The motivation for this decision is unique to each country. Germany and Sweden, for example, cannot raise their payroll taxes because their income tax rate is already high. They must look elsewhere to plug the gap, said Weaver.

Economic models can be helpful analytic tools, but they show part of the problem with pension reform. It is a slow process, said Weaver, and the reasons why are almost entirely political. One is that the implementation of a new system would force a generation of workers to pay twice—to fund the current system as well as a new system of individual accounts. Supporting such a plan would likely be political suicide.

In addition, Weaver said that politicians have an incentive to avoid blame for pension problems. While the pressures to change are many—including budgetary issues, demographic pressures, competitive pressures, conservative critiques and supranational pressures—politicians trying to avoid blame simply do not push for reform.

They avoid action by using highly technical formulas that most voters cannot understand and long legislative changes, such as tax hikes that will take place several years in the future to make future generations of politicians pay for fallout from past legislation. Old programs are hard to dismantle, said Weaver, and politicians able to instigate change are unlikely to do so if it threatens their own political stability.

Nevertheless, some politicians are rethinking Social Security in the United States. Weaver said that comparing the U.S. plans to the current system in Sweden is an essential exercise.

Sweden created a pension that combined a publicly-run pension system, funded by a 16% payroll contribution support from the state and a privately-managed individual retirement accounts financed by a payroll deduction of 2.5% of wages. Contributions for both accounts were collected by the government, which also regulated the individual account scheme. For the public tier of the system, benefits were determined based on lifetime contributions.

In the second-tier individual scheme, Swedish workers could select from any investment portfolio equity option that fit criteria set by the federal government, and could choose which pension fund company would manage their account from a field of competing public and private institutions. During the first year of this plan, there were 400 funds that satisfied the government’s requirements and could be selected by workers investing their 2.5%. There were 500 in year two, and 600 in year three. If workers did not select their own fund, their money defaulted into a government fund.

Weaver said that in the first year, 67% of workers actively selected their own investments. As the number of options increased, however, activity slowed: during the second year, only 17.6% made their own decision (the rest defaulted into the government-selected fund). Year three, only 14.1% of eligible workers actively selected a fund. Weaver said that the decline was attributed to the young age of the working population, who didn't have a lot of money to manage or experience managing it, and workers of all ages lamented being overwhelmed by the choices.

Of those who did pick, most chose equities, most chose funds dominated by Swedish companies, and most picked highly risky sectors, like IT. He also said that stock in the Swedish company Ericsson was popular for many investors, causing problems due to wildly variant stock prices during an uncertain economy.

Weaver said that the Swedes’ foray into pension reform has revealed many of the potential problems involved in privatizing social security and they are now considering age-related investment strategies. Weaver said the United States can learn from the Swedes that there is a long setup time, that the government must create barriers to entry so as to limit overwhelming the public with choices, and that there should be a requirement to diversify in order to weather a turbulent market. He added that there must be an age-related component, as well, since a single plan is not appropriate for every age group of the working public. Using the Swedish system as one example, and analyzing the choices made by other countries, is the only way that pension reform in the United States can avoid the same pitfalls.

Over the past decade or two almost all the formerly Communist states of Eurasia and most countries in Latin American have introduced free-market economic reforms. One emerging lesson from these efforts is the importance of a capable state both for managing economic transformation and for the political tensions that it can produce. Most studies of the role of the state in these regions, however, tend to focus on a small numbers of cases with very little interregional comparison. As countries in the two regions face many similar problems, and have had similarly mixed outcomes, there is likely much to be learned by comparing experiences across the two regions.

To help fill in this gap, Ohio State Professors of Political Science Timothy Frye and Marcus Kurtz coordinated a workshop at the Mershon Center and invited scholars who have recently published research on the topic in either Latin America or the postcommunist world. Over two-days, eight scholars presented papers focused on the ways in which states influenced economic reform in their respective regions. For example, Jana Kunicova of California Institute of Technology examined how political institutions influence levels of corruption (a principal cause of reform failure) in postcommunist and Latin American countries. Grigore Pop-Eleches of Princeton University explored how the International Monetary Fund has influenced economic decision-making across countries in both regions. Ken Shadlen of the London School of Economics explored how intellectual property rights affect economic development. Kurtz examined the proper way to measure the quality of governance by the state in Latin America. Other papers examined the role of the state in social spending and industrial policy.

While most of the presenters focused their attention on either postcommunist countries or Latin American countries, the structure of the workshop allowed for systematic cross-national analyses of the state’s activity in processes of free market reform: experts on Latin America commented on papers by experts on the postcommunist world and vice-versa. In addition, discussion following each paper sought to invite comparisons across the two regions. This had the advantage of frequently drawing attention to ideas or issues that were largely ignored.

Conference Participants Included:
- Sarah Brooks, Ohio State
- Timothy Frye, Ohio State
- Jana Kunicova, California Institute of Technology
- Marcus Kurtz, Ohio State
- Grigore Pop-Eleches, Princeton University
- Susan Rose-Ackerman, California Institute of Technology
- Andrew Schrank, Yale University
- Kenneth Shadlen, London School of Economics
- Jakub Zielinski, Ohio State

Political Economy and National Security Speaker Series

Economic well-being and financial stability underpin not only the ability of the U.S. to defend its security, but also affects the threats emanating from abroad. In an era of globalization, the economic aspects of world affairs are intricately interwoven with military activities and international security.

This global economy makes local policy global, and global policy local, thus putting equal emphasis on policies designed to control the domestic and international economies. The Political Economy and International Security Seminar Series brings to Mershon speakers from the academic and policy worlds to address topics related to global financial security, economic development, social security and public welfare policy, trade and commerce, as well as the use of economic instruments in diplomacy and foreign policy.
Consolidating Indonesian Democracy
Jakarta, Indonesia

The Mershon Center cosponsored an international conference on Islam and democracy, which was organized by Bill Liddle, professor of political science at Ohio State, and Professor Azyumardi Azra, Rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country: 85% of its citizens are Muslim and represent nearly one-fifth of the total world population of Muslims. Conference funding was also provided by the Ford Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the United States-Indonesia Society in Washington D.C.

The conference was opened by Rector Azyumardi, whose State Institute for Islamic Studies has been since the 1960s a fount of liberal Muslim values and discourse in Indonesia. A major address was given by the Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court, Professor Dr. Bagir Manan, who outlined the problems facing a new democracy intent on establishing a state based on the rule of law after four decades of dictatorship under former Presidents Sukarno and Suharto.

The central question addressed by the conference was the lack of democracy in Muslim-majority countries in a world that has become increasingly democratic in recent decades. According to a 2001 Freedom House report, of forty-seven Muslim-majority countries in the world, only eleven are democracies, while 110 of the 145 non-Muslim-majority countries are democracies. What accounts for this difference?

One popular hypothesis links Islamic piety to nondemocratic views: the more religious a Muslim, the less likely he or she is to hold pro-democratic values, beliefs, and attitudes. Others place the blame on cultural characteristics of the Arab countries at the core of the Islamic world, on level or rate of economic development (especially the development of modern secular educational systems), colonial legacies, the rent-seeking characteristics of states in the region, and on geo-strategic and international factors (such as the impact of more than half a century of conflict between Palestine and Israel in the heart of the Muslim world).

Many participants agreed that Islamic religion and Arab culture have little to do with democratic success or failure in the region. The more satisfactory explanations centered on the failures of governments across the Muslim world to respond to the demands of their people, to the impact of the foreign policies of outside actors, particularly the United States, and to the readiness of well-organized and dedicated Islamist movements and leaders to take advantage of the weaknesses and mistakes of others. (Scholars prefer the word “Islamist” to “fundamentalist,” which has Christian and other misleading connotations.)

Most of the papers focused on the experiences of specific Muslim-majority countries from westernmost Senegal, Mali, and Niger in Africa to Indonesia in southeast Asia, and included several countries of North Africa, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and several countries of south Asia. Others analyzed the results of surveys of voters in several Muslim-majority countries and the impact of the Cold War and post-Cold War international relations on the domestic politics of the region.

One of the highlights of the Jakarta conference was a panel at which leaders of several major Indonesian political parties, themselves all Muslims, presented their parties’ perspectives on the relationship between Islam and democracy. Most believed that there is no necessary conflict. The representative of the Islamist-leaning Crescent Moon and Star Party, however, said frankly that Western-style democracy is against Islamic values and should be rejected. At the same time, in order to achieve power he was willing to participate in the democratic process. This prompted several participants to reply that the Islamists’ program is “one man, one vote, one time.” That is, after the Islamists win there will be no more elections and no more democracy. Crescent Moon and Star received 3% of the vote in the last national election in 1999.

The Crescent Moon and Star Party leader’s sentiment was echoed by several speakers at the mini-conferences, held in Indonesian cities where there are currently significant movements to require the state to implement controversial provisions of Qur’anic law. These include prohibition of bank interest, discrimination in favor of sons and against daughters in inheritance, the requirement that women cover their heads in public, the stoning of adulterers, and the cutting off of the hands of thieves.

In the Indonesian case, as several local and foreign participants pointed out publicly during the mini-conferences, it is democracy itself that has made it possible for the voices of the Islamists to be heard. There were no such conferences or other opportunities to speak during the long years of dictatorship. The challenge for democratic governments in Indonesia and across the Muslim world, most participants concluded, is to find ways to include the Islamists in the political process while preventing them from undermining or overthrowing democratic institutions. But the road ahead is likely to be long, especially in the wake of the world-historic turn precipitated by the events of September 11, 2001.

Conference Participants included: Lahouari Addi, Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Lyon, France; Lisa Anderson, Columbia University; Daniel Bruemberg, Georgetown University; William Fierman, Indiana University; Richard Herrmann, Ohio State; Michael Hudson, Georgetown University; Bahgat Korany, University of Montreal; Bill Liddle and Saiful Mujani, Ohio State and State Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta; James Piscatori, Wadham College and Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies; Mark Tessler, University of Michigan; Binnaz Toprak, Bogazici University, Turkey; and Leonardo Villalon, University of Kansas.
2002-2003 Calendar of Events

March 2002

- Consolidating Indonesian Democracy, Jakarta, Indonesia, March 19-20, 2002

September 2002


October 2002

- Dino Kos, “In the Trenches of a Financial Crisis: The Aftermath of September 11” October 3, 2002
- Lawrence Keeley, “War Before Civilization” October 10, 2002
- Thomas Christensen, “Deterrence Challenges in the Taiwan Strait” October 11, 2002
- Charles Taylor, “Intrastate Conflict and Cooperation: The Role of Conflict Carrying Capacity” October 17, 2002

November 2002

- Operation Enduring Freedom: A Briefing, by Two Army Special Forces senior NCOs from Ft. Bragg, 3d Special Forces Group, November 19, 2002
- Culture, Conflict and Security: The Impact of American Culture on Europe and the World in the 20th Century
- William Reno, “Explaining the Course of Conflict: Why Some Fight While Others Do Not” November 1, 2002
- Peter Andreas, “Criminalized Conflict: The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia” November 7, 2002

December 2002

- ARGCC: Adaptive Research and Governance in Climate Change, December 16-17, 2002

January 2003

- A Lecture Series with Oleg Grinevsky:
  - “Scenario for WW III” January 23, 2003
  - “Iraqi Nuclear Capabilities” February 11, 2003
  - “Soviet Attitudes Towards U.S. Foreign Policy” February 18, 2003
- Ted Robert Gurr, “Predation is Irrelevant in Most Armed Conflict: Evidence from the Minorities at Risk Project” January 31, 2003

February 2003

- Michael Young, “Automated Text and Individual Assessment” February 20, 2003
- Timothy Naftali, “Khrushchev’s Greatest Gamble” February 28, 2003
March 2003

- Alvin Tillery, “Making Race and American Foreign Policy: Pan-African Politics from Paul Cuffe to the Congressional Black Caucus” March 6, 2003
- Jack Snyder, “Myths of Empire, Then and Now” March 7, 2003
- Holly Near, “It’s About Music” March 10, 2003
- Martha Craven Nussbaum, “Compassion and Terror” March 14, 2003
- William Roger Louis, “Writing the British Empire” March 31, 2003

April 2003

- War with Iraq: A Mershon Center Panel of Experts (cosponsored with the Moritz College of Law), April 1, 2003
- The State and Economic Transformation in Latin America and the Post-Communist World, April 11-12, 2003
- Adeed Dawisha, “Why the War in Iraq is Just” April 16, 2003 (cosponsored with the Moritz College of Law)
- Karen Dawisha, “Blueprint for a Democratic Iraq” April 16, 2003 (cosponsored with the Moritz College of Law)

May 2003

- Cultural Diplomacy and the Image of the United States Abroad, A Symposium with Richard Celeste and Cynthia Schneider, May 1, 2003
- Barbara Herman, “Making Morality Better and Making It Your Own” May 5, 2003

Summer

- “Protecting America’s National Utility Infrastructure” National Regulatory Research Institute Workshop June 11-12, 2003
- Summer Institute in Political Psychology, July 14-August 1, 2003