Understanding national security in a global context remained an urgent topic with a broad scope. This year, the Mershon Center funded sixty projects, involving more than seventy faculty members from more than fifteen departments. Four broad themes provided the collective focus for our endeavors and define the structure of this report: 1) diplomacy and the use of force, 2) political and economic decision-making, 3) culture and identity in security and 4) the role law and institutions play in war and peace. In addition to projects that address some of these themes, the Center also sponsored a year-long, multi-disciplinary effort to understand security in the Middle East.

Ohio State students are involved in most of the Mershon Center's activities and this year the Center funded twenty graduate students and ten undergraduate student fellows. These students worked with faculty members on research projects and in many cases pursued research topics on their own as well. My colleague at Mershon, Bill Liddle, also taught an Honors course that was integrated with our special focus on the Middle East. Both faculty and students are encouraged to apply to the Center for funding in our annual competitions. Information about these are available on our web-site www.mershon.ohio-state.edu.

Producing high quality scholarship is a principal aim of the Mershon Center. This annual report highlights some of the recent books and articles published by colleagues at the Center. It also reports on the conferences, workshops and seminars that have contributed to our research and made the Center an intellectually lively and exciting place to work. Although much of the work done at the Center has policy relevance, our primary aim is to produce scholarship that addresses fundamental claims about how the world works or the lessons that should be drawn from history that commonly underpin current debates. The ambition is to make contributions that retain their value as the daily headlines change.

To enhance its mission the Mershon Center relies heavily on the faculty at Ohio State and hopes to both help scholars already at the University be more productive and to help attract outstanding new colleagues to join the faculty at Ohio State. This year, the Center has been successful in both areas. I am particularly happy to report that Professor Alexander Wendt from the University of Chicago agreed to join us as a Distinguished Mershon Professor with tenure in Political Science starting in the Fall 2004 and Professor Robert McMahon agreed to join us as a Distinguished Mershon Professor with tenure in the History Department beginning in the Fall 2005. I look forward to having them as colleagues and I am certain that in future annual reports their accomplishments and contributions to Ohio State will feature prominently.

This report provides a glimpse into the year at the Mershon Center and identifies in brief some of the ideas and projects being pursued by my colleagues, faculty and students alike. It is working with them and riding on the wake they create as they seek to understand national security that is the best part of the being the Director of the Mershon Center.
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The Mershon Center is the fulfillment of a bequest by Colonel Ralph Mershon to The Ohio State University for the exploration of matters pertaining to National Security.

Ralph D. Mershon was a man of action in public life. He organized the American engineers for service in World War I and led a public effort to create the legislation that was the forerunner of the Reserve Officer Training Corps in the United States. He also was a contemplative and inventive individual who held a number of important patents for his work in electrical engineering. Col. Mershon died February 14, 1952 and is buried in Zanesville, Ohio.

The Center is also supported by community gifts and grant money. The mission of the Mershon Center is to advance the scholarly study and intellectual understanding of national security in a global context. The Center does this by fostering research on diplomatic and military history, contemporary political and economic decision-making, as well as the role culture and institutions play in war and peace.

The Mershon Center encourages collaborative, interdisciplinary research projects within the University and with other institutions around the world. Current projects include a comprehensive history and analysis of the foundations of international terrorism, the cultural politics of homeland security, and the global history of war. Faculty from many departments and from across the university participate in these unique projects.

Mershon supports multidisciplinary teams and individual faculty research. The Center proudly hosts visiting scholars, outstanding post-doctoral fellows and supports student research. Mershon also organizes conferences, symposia, and workshops that bring together academics, government officials, and business leaders from around the world to discuss the latest research in national and international security affairs.
### New Books by Faculty Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Remnants of War</td>
<td>John Mueller</td>
<td>Cornell UP</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible Missions: German Economic, Military, and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa</td>
<td>Nina Berman</td>
<td>U Nebraska Press</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU</td>
<td>Richard Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, Eds.</td>
<td>Rowman and Littlefield</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandants of the Marine Corps</td>
<td>Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson, Eds.</td>
<td>Naval Institute Press</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy in Modern Spain</td>
<td>Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Joan Botella</td>
<td>Yale UP</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
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Alexander Wendt Appointed Ralph D. Mershon Professor of International Security

Alexander Wendt (Ph.D., Minnesota, 1989), Professor, has research and teaching interests in international relations theory, global governance, political theory, and the philosophy of social science. His current research focuses on the inevitability of a world state, and on the idea of a quantum social science. He is the author of *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and articles in *International Organization, American Political Science Review, Review of International Studies, European Journal of International Relations, International Security*, and *Politics and Society*. Before coming to Ohio State, he taught at the University of Chicago, Dartmouth College, and Yale University.
J. Craig Jenkins, Sociology

Recent Articles:


J. Craig Jenkins (Ph.D. SUNY Stoneybrook) is Professor of Sociology at Ohio State, where he conducts research on Political Sociology and Social Movements and Social Conflict. His books include The Politics of Insurgency: Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s (Columbia University Press, 1985) and The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. (with Bert Klandermans, Eds. University of Minnesota Press, 1995).


Ted Hopf, Political Science


He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, taught at the University of Michigan, and was a Visiting Fulbright Professor in the Department of Sociology and Political Science at the European University in Saint Petersburg.

Recent Articles:


Hopf, Ted. “Constructivism All the Way Down,” International Politics 37:3 (September 2000), 369-78
Marilynn B. Brewer, Professor of Psychology and Ohio Eminent Scholar, was recently elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Recognized for her research in social psychology, Brewer’s work on social identity and intergroup relations has shown that discrimination and prejudice is often driven, not by hatred of outsiders, but by love of insiders.

Founded in 1780, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an international learned society composed of the world’s leading scientists, scholars, artists, business people, and public leaders.

Marilynn Brewer, an Ohio Eminent Scholar, conducts research in the field of social psychology with a focus on social cognition and the perception and cognitive representation of individual persons and person “types,” intergroup relations, especially the study of ingroup loyalty, intergroup biases, and the effects of contact between groups on intergroup acceptance, and social identities and the self-concept.

During her career, Brewer has served as President of the American Psychological Society (1993-1995), and as President of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (1990-91) and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (1984-85). She is a recipient of the 1995 Kurt Lewin Award from SPSSI, and the Donald T. Campbell Award for Distinguished Research in Social Psychology in 1992, and is currently serving as editor of the journal Personality and Social Psychology Review.

Edgar S. Furniss Book Award

This award commemorates the founding Director of the Mershon Center, Edgar S. Furniss, and is given annually to an author whose first book makes an exceptional contribution to the study of national and international security.

The 2003 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award was given to

**Timothy W. Crawford**
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Boston College

**Pivotal Statecraft: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace**
(2003, Cornell University Press)
Geoffrey Parker is Andreas Dorpalen Professor of History. He was recently awarded membership in La Real Academia Hispano Americana (below, left), and has received numerous other commendations for his work; in 1992 the King of Spain made him a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella the Catholic in recognition of his work on Spanish history. He is also a Fellow of the British Academy and won the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize from the Society of Military History, a John Simon Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship, as well as numerous other awards.


To commemorate the Ohio Bicentennial, Geoffrey Parker and numerous co-sponsors convened a lecture series entitled “Ohio and the World.” The series invited scholars from all over the country to define the state’s history at different dates. Parker is editing a book based on the speaker series, forthcoming from Ohio State University Press.

**Ohio and the World Lecture Series**

Inaugural Lecture  

Circa 1753  
R. David Edmunds, Watson Professor of American History University of Texas, Dallas, “Native Ohioans and European Conflict: Society and Culture Before European Settlement”

Circa 1803  

Circa 1853  
Eric Foner, DeWitt Clinton Professor of History, Columbia University “Prologue to War: Slavery, Social Conflict, and the Civil War”

Circa 1903  
Kathryn Kish Sklar, Distinguished Professor of History and Co-Director, Center for the Historical Study of Women and Gender, SUNY Binghamton, “Ohio, The Heartland of Progressive Reform”

Circa 1953  
James T. Patterson, Ford Foundation Professor of History, Brown University, “Beyond Main Street: The Passing of Agrarian Society, War, and Civil Rights”

Circa 2003  
Herbert B. Asher, Professor of Political Science Emeritus, The Ohio State University, “A Changing Society: The New World Economy, Energy, Globalization, and the Environment”

Circa 2053  
William E. Kirwan, Chancellor, University System of Maryland, “A Retrospective on Ohio’s Quality of Life: A Consideration of ‘Roads Taken and Roads not Taken’ for the 21st Century”
In this deeply researched book, Ted Hopf challenges contemporary theorizing about international relations. He advances what he believes is a commonsensical notion: a state’s domestic identity has an enormous effect on its international policies. Hopf argues that foreign policy elites are inextricably bound to their own societies; in order to understand other states, they must first understand themselves. To comprehend Russian and Soviet foreign policy, “it is just as important to read what is being consumed on the Moscow subway as it is to conduct research in the Foreign Ministry archives,” the author says.

Hopf recreates the major currents in Russian/Soviet identity, reconstructing the “identity topographies” of two profoundly important years, 1955 and 1999. To provide insights about how Russians made sense of themselves in the post-Stalinist and late Yeltsin periods, he not only uses daily newspapers and official discourse, but also delves into works intended for mass consumption—popular novels, film reviews, ethnographic journals, high school textbooks, and memoirs. He explains how the different identities expressed in these varied materials shaped the world views of Soviet and Russian decision makers. Hopf finds that continuous renegotiations and clashes among competing domestic visions of national identity had a profound effect on Soviet and Russian foreign policy. Broadly speaking, Hopf shows that all international politics begins at home. --Cornell UP
Each year, the Mershon Center holds a competition for Ohio State students whose research explores different issues of international security. Open to both graduate and undergraduate students, Mershon’s funding allows students to pursue their research interests at home or abroad and to attend conferences to present their work. Many of these students also work closely with Mershon Center faculty on a variety of Center projects.

Trevor Birkenholtz

Trevor Birkenholtz, a graduate student in Geography, spent three months in semi-arid Rajasthan, India conducting pre-dissertation research. His research focuses on trying to understand the relationship between traditional groundwater knowledge and new technical/modern knowledge systems. Specifically he is interested in how these two knowledge systems act synergistically to form groundwater management institutions (rules, management norms) and who the beneficiaries of these institutions become. Historically, water management institutions (rules) in the area have been formed by the most powerful landowners. These are the same landowners that have adopted water lifting technologies and reaped the benefits in terms increased irrigation and agricultural productivity. But now as groundwater resources are dwindling, non-adopters (traditionally marginalized and poor people) may be in a better ecological and economic position to avoid water and food insecurity because they are less dependent on the resource for their livelihood.

Tanisha Wilburn

Undergraduate Student
Tanisha Wilburn (second from right, with her teachers in Spain) traveled to Segovia, Spain to study how the country’s entrance into the European Union, and specifically in meeting the criteria for EU membership, changed Spanish culture and political attitudes. After graduating in 2004, Wilburn will attend law school at OSU’s Moritz College of Law.

Amanda Metskas

For the past year Amanda Metskas, a graduate student in Political Science, has been working with Don Sylvan and examined the impact of leaders’ problem representations on conflict and cooperation. Speeches made by leaders in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East were analyzed to determine where they fell on three problem representation variables – centrality of the enemy image, ingroup inclusivity, and outgroup inclusivity. Metskas and Sylvan also looked at whether there were audience effects by looking at the audience the speech was made to – leader’s own group, opposing group, or another audience like the international community. Their results so far have shown there is little effect of audience, which may be because with television and other media being so prevalent every speech reaches every audience no matter who it is presented to directly. The problem representation variables do have significant effects, especially in-group inclusivity.
Daniel Douce

Daniel Douce, an undergraduate student, traveled to Latin America to study health care systems for his undergraduate thesis, which was titled: “Stopping Tuberculosis in Latin America: comparisons between Ecuador and Peru.” In it, he researched different aspects of the tuberculosis epidemics in the countries of Ecuador and Peru to determine why Peru has a better program to treat tuberculosis than Ecuador even though both countries have very similar demographics and rates of tuberculosis. Douce interviewed several dozen government bureaucrats, physicians and nurses involved with the tuberculosis program in each country to get their opinions about the structures in place for treating tuberculosis. From the interviews and other documents, he concluded there were three important variables that separated the Peruvian and Ecuadorian programs during the 1990s: the Peruvian government was controlled by the Fujimori regime, and that even though there were human rights abuses during his time in power, the tuberculosis program benefited greatly from the support of his government and the stability that a strong regime often brings. Ecuador on the other hand had a string of six presidents during this time, which weakened the program. Second, the Peruvian tuberculosis treatment program was run by an able administrator who successfully secured resources and advice from various international NGOs. Thirdly, the Peruvian program was more centralized while the Ecuadorian program suffered from having the program administration split between two cities and by not having a specific budget of its own.

Brent Strathman

Political Science graduate student Brent Strathman did statistical analysis in his work with Tim Frye on a project dealing with economic development, rates of investment, and public perceptions of the economic system.

Serdar Poyraz

Political Science graduate student Serdar Poyraz received funding from the Mershon Center to support a project he was doing with Carter Findley on the history of nationalism in Turkey. Poyraz produced two research papers on two prominent Turkish intellectuals of the 19th and 20th centuries, Said Nursi and Cemil Meric, in which he discussed the importance of these thinkers for the development of nationalist and religious movements in modern Turkey.

Alistair Fraser

Geography graduate student Alistair Fraser’s research concerns land reform, a highly contentious and important political issue in South Africa. With Mershon funding, he was able to travel there for one month, where he explored the various aspects of land reform in detail, bouncing ideas off of scholars, workers in various land-related NGOs, and government officials. The overall objective of this survey was to find suitable locations for further research to be conducted next year as part of his dissertation research. Fraser traveled the length and breadth of the country, from Johannesburg to Cape Town, Durban to Polokwane (formerly Pietersburg) and found immense scope for research of the kind he hopes to conduct in the future.

Susan Dawson & Dustin Walcher

Susan Dawson and Dustin Walcher, graduate students in OSU’s Diplomatic History program, co-chaired the Mershon Diplomatic Speaker’s Series. Four times each year, they organize seminars featuring top historians in international diplomatic history. These visits include a popular breakfast for the speaker and graduate students to share their research with these guest speakers.
Robert Robinson is a third-year graduate student in history who traveled to Mexico City to study U.S.-Mexican relations and the two nations’ policies with respect to each other during the early Cold War (1946-1952). Robinson is studying the relationship between local issues, like immigration, and global issues, like containing the Soviet Union. The field of diplomatic history has lately been emphasizing the importance of creating international histories that provide multiple perspectives on important issues. Robinson spent a week at the Archivo General de la Nación and a week at the Acervo Historico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, where he looked at internal government memoranda and correspondence between Mexican officials and U.S. businessmen, government officials, and private citizens.

Josh Klimas

Josh Klimas, a doctoral student in History, researches congressional oversight of the Department of Defense (DoD) between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. He focuses specifically on the workings of the Senate Armed Services Committee to see how its members developed a relatively assertive approach to oversight even before the Congressional “resurgence” of the early 1970s. Klimas traveled to National Archives around the country to study papers from former Senators Richard Russell, John Stennis, and Lyndon Johnson. He was able to find one particularly valuable document in which Johnson provided policy and political advice on issues before the Armed Services committee, as well as descriptions of how the “behind-the-scenes” policy process functioned, as well as taped telephone recordings between President Johnson and individuals associated with the defense policy process, particularly Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

Albert Wolf

Undergraduate Political Science student Albert Wolf worked with Richard Herrmann on a research project about the Middle East in which he focused on the images of the United States held by Middle Eastern states during important events which had occurred since 1979. He focused specifically on identity perceptions of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. Looking closely at these states’ images of the United States, Wolf examined the following events: the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Palestinian Intifada of 1987, the first Gulf War, the Oslo Peace Accords, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Jin Lu

With her Mershon Center Grant, Jin Lu, a PhD. student in Sociology, traveled to China to study how welfare programs are impacting Chinese firms and how reform influenced the social, economic, and political stability in Chinese culture.

Through her travel, Lu gained access to extensive data on Chinese firms and was able to conduct interviews with both business leaders and architects of policy reform for her dissertation work.

Sarah Schafer and Stephanie Morgan

Undergraduate students Sarah Schafer and Stephanie Morgan assisted Alexander Stephan with a project on cultural anti-Americanism throughout the world, analyzing materials that look at the ways in which American culture is presented abroad. Their work complements a series of symposia Stephan has organized around this theme, which looks specifically at different areas of the world and discuss the impact of American culture. This year’s symposia focused on the Middle East and Russia.
Stephanie Taylor

As an undergraduate fellow, Stephanie Taylor assisted Richard Herrmann with a variety of projects pertaining to the current situations in the Middle East, including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the War in Iraq, and the current War on Terror. She also worked on a research project concerning support, sympathy, and membership of the Al Qaeda terror network throughout the Middle East, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The growing number of terror attacks in Iraq weighed heavily in her research focus.

Eric Samuels

Eric Samuels spent part of his sophomore year conducting research with Anthony Mughan, Professor of Political Science, on attitudes towards immigration after 9/11. Mughan is assembling a conference on the topic, and Samuels, a Political Science and International Studies major, assisted in identifying possible participants by analyzing the latest research on immigration issues. With his fellowship funding, Samuels took part in a summer research trip to the Pacific Rim.

Natalie Kistner

Natalie Kistner, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, spent several months in Warsaw, Poland where she conducted dissertation research. Her project examined the institutionalization of political parties in new democracies with a focus on the legislative context. More specifically, her research examines the evolution of both the norms and rules of behavior, as well as corresponding attitudes, which allow political parties in new democracies to develop into institutions. While in Poland, Kistner gained access to existing data from surveys of Polish Members of Parliament, as well as data on the roll call votes of legislators. In addition, she conducted in-depth interviews with Members of Parliament. Kistner spent six weeks this summer studying Polish language intensively at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, for which she received a Summer Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) award.

April Luginbuhl

April Luginbuhl, who is working on her Ph.D. in Geography, was part of the team who organized and hosted an international conference on the human dimensions of climate change for the ARGCC (Adaptive Research and Governance on Climate Change). She arranged keynote speakers and conference presenters, publicized the Call for Papers, and coordinated logistics for over 70 participants and observers, a special journal issue in the works, as well as fostering new collaboration within human dimensions of climate change. Her work with ARGCC and the conference itself provided the basis for her dissertation work on the influence of neo-liberal policies and carbon trading on the landscape.
This year, the Mershon Center sponsored a competitive fellowship competition to host two graduate students within one year of completing their dissertations on topics related to international security, to reside at the Center and complete their work.

**Amy Oakes**

Amy Oakes spent her final year at Ohio State working on her dissertation, titled “State Responses to Domestic Unrest.” In it, she examines the causal linkages between internal unrest and external aggression. The study’s analytic framework considers a range of policy options available to the state in response to domestic turmoil (e.g., enacting reform measures, waging diversionary war, initiating a campaign of internal repression, or seeking military aid from other states and international organizations) within a single theoretical model. By generating more precise predictions than past studies of when states choose certain policies to quell domestic unrest as opposed to others, the model reconciles many seemingly contradictory findings in the literature on domestic unrest and war. In particular, it explains why studies of “diversionary war” have found little empirical support for the hypothesis. She has also contributed a chapter entitled, “Gender Differences in Support for Democracy,” to Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, ed., *Social Structure: Changes and Linkages* (Warsaw: IFiS, 2002). She accepted a position as Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College, where she will teach courses on International and Comparative Politics.

**Yoram Haftel**

Yoram Z. Haftel is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and a Mershon Dissertation Fellow at Ohio State University. His research interests include international political economy, international security, and international organizations. In his dissertation, entitled “Political Conflict and Regional Institutionalization: A Virtuous Circle?,” he examines the relationships between regional violent conflict and the institutionalization of regional integration arrangements. Haftel has a forthcoming article in *International Studies Quarterly*, entitled “From the Outside Looking in: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO.” He also has a forthcoming coauthored article in the *Journal of Peace Research*, entitled “Forecasting Israeli-Palestinian Relations.” At Mershon, he continues to work on his dissertation and other ongoing projects.
In-Residence Visiting Scholars

The Mershon Center hosts visiting scholars and post-doctoral fellows, who spend the year in residence at the Center to work on research relating to national security studies. True to the Center’s interdisciplinary nature, past visitors have come from a variety of scholarly disciplines, including history, political science, folklore, sociology, or cultural studies.

Maria Fanis

Maria Fanis (Ph.D., Michigan) researches the role religion, public morality, and economic interests play in decisions to wage war or not during international crises. In her book, “Impossible Peaces, Unthinkable Wars,” (forthcoming from University of Michigan Press) she looks at the effects of religious beliefs, secular morality, and economic interests on foreign policy-making in the United States and Great Britain from the 1790s through 1812 to 1846. During her year at the Mershon Center, Fanis revised her manuscript for publication and extended this line of research to American and British foreign policies in the post Cold war era.

Fanis was awarded a John M. Olin Fellowship in National Security for next year, after which she will join the faculty at St. Olaf College.

Christopher Fettweis

Norma Kriger

Norma Kriger (Ph.D., MIT) was a visiting scholar this year at the Mershon Center. Her research on Zimbabwe reflects her interests in revolutionary war mobilization and post-war reconstruction. She is the author of *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (1992) and *Guerrilla Veterans: Symbolic and Violent Politics in Zimbabwe, 1980-1987* (2003), as well as numerous articles that have appeared in such publications as *African Studies Quarterly* and *Review of African Political Economy*.

Prior to coming to Ohio State, Kriger was a visiting fellow at Princeton University’s Center for International Studies, a Peace Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and was on the faculty of Johns Hopkins University. She has been the recipient of numerous fellowships, including one from the Lilly Foundation and from Yale University, as well as an individual research grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Recent Articles:


Mark Jacobson

Mark R. Jacobson researches on a broad range of U.S. national defense policy issues with a particular emphasis on special operations, counterterrorism, and political warfare/psychological operations.

Jacobson previously worked at the Department of Defense as the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Policy where he was responsible for the development and management of congressional and legislative activities across a broad range of Dept. of Defense programs.

He has authored journal articles and chapters on foreign affairs and national defense topics, including “War in the Information Age: International Law, Self-Defense, and the Problem of ‘Non-Armed’ Attacks,” published in the *Journal of Strategic Studies*.

Jacobson received a U.S. Army Center of Military History Fellowship, a Presidential Management Fellowship at the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Congress Achievement Award and Certificate of Special Congressional Recognition. He was given the Joint Civilian Service Achievement Award and was a finalist for the Partnership for Public Service’s Service to America Award. He was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 2003. He is a frequent commentator for television and print journalism on issues of national security.
Domestic Tierney


He is also interested in perceptions of victory and defeat in international crises. His article (with Dominic Johnson) ‘Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises’ is forthcoming in Security Studies. The article uses the case of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate that observers’ perceptions of victory and defeat in a crisis settlement can depend as much upon biased perceptions and framing effects as upon the settlement terms themselves.

In 2000-2001 Dr. Tierney was the Frank Knox Memorial Fellow at Harvard University, and next year he will return to Harvard as a John M. Olin Fellow in National Security.

Kenneth A. Osgood

Ken Osgood (Ph.D., UC, Santa Barbara) explores the relationship between propaganda, culture, and diplomacy. Osgood has written several articles on propaganda and psychological warfare, including "Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy," Diplomatic History (Summer 2001). He is also the co-editor (with Klaus Larres) of The Cold War After Stalin’s Death: A New International History, forthcoming in Rowman & Littlefield’s “Harvard Cold War Series.”

While at the Mershon Center, he worked on his book, Total Cold War: U.S. Propaganda in the Free World, 1953-1960, which will be published by the University Press of Kansas. The work analyzes how propaganda concerns permeated diverse aspects of U.S. foreign relations such as economic aid, space exploration, cultural and educational exchanges, tourism, disarmament negotiations, and diplomacy. Before coming to OSU, Osgood was an associate coordinator of the Center for Cold War Studies; he was a fellow of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; and he served on the council for the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. He is Assistant Professor of history at Florida Atlantic University.

Lt. Col. Michael DuPerier

Lt. Col. Michael DuPerier spent this year in residence at Mershon as the Air Force Fellow. DuPerier spent his year working on a policy paper examining the relationship between the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy and the War on Terror. He is a graduate of Southeast Missouri State University and was commissioned as an Air Force Officer in 1986. He earned a Master of Arts in History from the University of Alabama in 1999.

DuPerier is a command pilot with operations experience in Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Afghanistan. This fall, he was presented with the prestigious Bronze Star for heroic action in guiding AC-130H Spectre Gunships during battle in Afghanistan. After leaving Mershon, he assumed the position of Commander, 19th Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field Air Force Base in Florida.
The Use of Force and Diplomacy

New Books on the Use of Force and Diplomacy

18 John Mueller  The Remnants of War (2004, Cornell UP)

Special Events and Conferences

22 Sino-American Security Dialogue, June 5-6, 2004

Seminars and Guest Speakers

25 Azar Gat, “War in Human Civilization,” April 21, 2004
28 Mershon Workshop in Diplomatic History
   Mary Ann Heiss, “Queen Mary’s Carpet: One Object, Many Stories,” March 5, 2004
War is one of the great themes of human history and now, John Mueller believes, it clearly in decline.

Certain standard, indeed classic, varieties of war particularly wars among developed countries have come so rare and unlikely that they could well considered to be obsolescent, if not obsolete. This, he suggests, chiefly stems from way attitudes toward the value and efficacy of war have changed, particularly over the last century, not in broader social, economic, or technological developments or in the fabrication of institutions, trade, or patterns of interdependence that often seem to be more nearly a consequence or fortuitous correlate of peace and of rising war aversion than their cause.

What mostly remains of war are civil conflicts in the poorest countries. Sometimes labeled “new war,” “ethnic conflict,” or, most grandly, “clashes of civilizations,” these are not usually Hobbesian struggles of neighbor against neighbor, but more nearly opportunistic predation waged by packs often remarkably small ones of criminals and bullies. Thus, argues Mueller, warfare has been substantially reduced to its remnants or dregs and thugs are the residual combatants.

Since thugs tend to be cowardly and poorly disciplined, they can generally be policed by a capable army. However, despite a general consensus on how the post Cold War world should be ordered, developed countries are unlikely systematically to carry out such actions. Rather, it is the fabrication of competent domestic governments that is ultimately the most promising method for dealing with the problem. There are indications that governments are generally becoming more effective even in the poorest areas of the world, and thus that civil warfare may, like other forms, be in terminal decline. --John Mueller, Cornell UP, 2004
The Use of Force and Diplomacy

The Use of Force and Diplomacy

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The Use of Force and Diplomacy

The Use of Force and Diplomacy


Millett was a colonel in the U.S. Marine Reserve, was awarded the Legion of Merit in 1989, and served as the national president of the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association (1987-1988). He received his B.A. from DePauw University and his Ph.D. from The Ohio State University, where he has been celebrated for outstanding teaching and distinguished scholarship.
American postwar efforts to ameliorate Arab-Israeli relations entangled the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict in complex ways. Peter L. Hahn explores the diplomatic and cultural factors that influenced the policies of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower as they faced the escalation of one of the modern world's most intractable disputes.

Truman tended to make decisions in an ad hoc, reactive fashion. Eisenhower, in contrast, had a more proactive approach to the regional conflict, but strategic and domestic political factors prevented him from dramatically revising the basic tenets Truman had established.

American officials desired--in principle--to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the region. Yet Hahn shows how that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors.

During these critical years the United States began to supplant Britain as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, and U.S. leaders found themselves in two notable predicaments. They were unable to relinquish the responsibilities they had accepted with their new power--even as those responsibilities became increasingly difficult to fulfill. And they were caught in the middle of the Arab-Israeli conflict, unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come. --University of North Carolina Press

Peter L. Hahn, Professor of History at The Ohio State University, specializes in United States diplomatic history in the Middle East since 1940. He has won research grants from the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Truman Library Institute, the John F. Kennedy Library, the Lyndon Johnson Foundation, the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, the Office of United States Air Force History, and the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Hahn's other publications include The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (1991), and (co-edited with Mary Ann Heiss) Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945 (2001), as well as essays in Diplomatic History, Reviews in American History, International History Review, and other journals and books.

Professor Hahn currently serves as Executive Director of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. He received his Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University.
Selected Articles on the Use of Force and Diplomacy


Geoffrey Parker. “Military Revolution: a Forum” (with Jeremy Black, Dennis Showalter and Jeffrey Clarke), Historically Speaking, IV.4 (April 2003), 2-14


The Sino-American Security Dialogue was a project conceived by Peter Gries when he was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Mershon Center. The purpose of SASD is to create an opportunity for the next generation of American and Chinese security experts who study each others’ country to know one another and work together. The goal is to provide a forum for these scholars to frankly share their ideas before they move into positions of responsibility and to facilitate each other’s understanding of the other country’s security policy.

Sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Mershon Center, the dialogue group has met three times, most recently in Columbus. The first dialogue, held in 2002 in Boulder, Colorado, focused on “Assurance and Deterrence in US-China Relations.” In 2003, the group met in Beijing and discussed “China’s Rise and the 21st Century Asia-Pacific Rim.” The session held in June, 2004 at Mershon, focused on “Domestic Politics and U.S.-Chinese Relations.” Participants tackled this theme by looking closely at how U.S. domestic politics impacted Washington’s policy toward Beijing and vice versa. Other papers looked at the role of ideology and its impact on Sino-American relations, examining how liberalism and hegemony influence U.S. foreign policy and how communism and nationalism shaped Chinese policy.

SASD Participants:

Qingguo Jia, Peking University  
Canrong Jin, School of International Studies, Remin University  
Jun Niu, Peking University  
Jianyi Piao, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  
Zongze Ruan, China Institute of International Studies, MOF  
Shiping Tang, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  
Yiwei Wang, Fudan University, Shanghai  
Xinbo Wu, Fudan University, Shanghai  
Hui Xu, National Defense University and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  
Peng Yuan, CICIR  
Qingmin Zhang, China Foreign Affairs College  
Feng Zhu, Peking University

Allen Carlson, Cornell University  
Tom Christensen, Princeton University  
Evan Feigenbaum, U.S. Department of State  
Taylor Fravel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Peter Gries, University of Colorado  
Richard Herrmann, The Ohio State University  
Ted Hopf, The Ohio State University  
Evan Medeiros, RAND Corporation  
Derek Mitchell, Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Shelley Rigger, Davidson College  
Phillip Saunders, National Defense University  
Scot Tanner, RAND Corporation  
Chris Twomey, Naval Postgraduate School  
Bin Yu, Wittenberg College  
Jeremie Waterman, U.S.-China Business Council
James Morrow

The Use of Force and Diplomacy

James Morrow looked at the role of foreign policy and its impact on a politician's ability to retain domestic power. His model uses one simple premise: that politicians want to stay in power, and therefore must have a combination of a “winning coalition,” the group whose loyalty keeps leaders in power, and “selectorate,” people who could become members of the winning coalition, so they play an important role in the selection of leaders.

In a monarchy, the selectorate and winning coalition—the aristocracy—are relatively small. For an autocracy, the winning coalition is small and the selectorate is large. For example, in Communism, the party itself formed a relatively small winning coalition, but anyone could have become a member of the party, thus constituting a large selectorate. In a democracy, both selectorate and winning coalition are large.

This theory is especially interesting when applied to war, said Morrow. Winning a war can yield both public goods (like increased security or the spread of ideological goals) and private goods (like property). Some, like territory, could be considered both a public and private good: strategic territory gains would benefit the overall security of a nation and be a public good, or it could be economically advantageous and a private good.

Morrow hypothesized that leaders of systems with small winning coalitions focus on the gain of private goods, leaders of systems with large winning coalitions seek gains in public goods and are less likely to take territory from the vanquished.

When a state loses a war, if the vanquished has a system with a large winning coalition, Morrow said they are not likely to experience the installation of a puppet leader, since a powerfully large group is unlikely to follow the mandates of an externally appointed leader. If the vanquished has a relatively small winning coalition, however, Morrow suggested that the installation of a puppet leader was likely.

Morrow looked at the outcomes of wars with a special focus on two elements: the exchange of territory and the change of leadership. He concluded that leaders of systems with large winning coalitions want their foreign policy goals to enhance their status, so if they enter a conflict, they want to win massive public goods (such as ideological goals). Leaders of small winning coalitions are more likely to fight wars in hopes of gaining territory. While the former are likely to change leaders in conquered areas because it becomes easier to achieve a gain in public goods like new philosophies, small winning coalitions are not likely to seek a regime change.

Morrow concluded that in states with a large winning coalition, if a domestic dispute is resolved with the use of force, a leader will likely lose office. In international disputes, if force is used, there is only a twenty percent chance that a leader will lose office. He said that in systems with large winning coalitions the use of force puts their leader in political peril, so they are likely only to enter into war when they are confident of winning. In the case of systems that have small selectorates and small winning coalitions, the outcome will likely be different: if the leader enters war with the intent of gaining territory and wins, the leader will retain power. If they win but do not gain territory, there is a heightened risk of removal.

James Morrow is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. At Mershon, he discussed his new book, The Logic of Political Survival, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith and Randolph M. Siverson.
After 1560, the Papal States of central Italy were engulfed in violence, the result of soldiers returning from war to increased clan warfare and general rebellion against the central authority. To manage the violence, the state expanded its brigandage laws, and by 1570, eventually created a heavy-handed imposition of laws that actually inspired even more violence, said Robert Davis.

Brigandage laws began in the twelfth century and they stripped suspected criminals of their rights, exiled them from established communities. They frequently took refuge in forests outside towns and formed gangs of bandits, or brigands.

By the mid-sixteenth century, due to clan violence and rebellion against the state, nearly half the men in Perugia were living in the wilderness outside town, said Davis. The state blamed the violence on the proliferation of the wheel-lock musket, which was portable and easy to conceal. Eventually the state made it illegal for individuals to carry these guns.

This only exacerbated problems. The brigands were already at the political and geographic edges of society and angry at the state. They maintained their arsenal of wheel-lock muskets, but law-abiding citizens were forced to relinquish theirs.

When the government realized they could not even locate the brigands, let alone govern them, they turned to community members. As an example of how ineffective the state was, Davis described a program that essentially contracted out police activities by hiring locals to hunt the heavily-armed brigands. Widespread violence erupted, and local police forces were ill-equipped to handle the riots—they had been forced to give up their wheel-lock muskets.

The state turned to a sanctioned form of civilian violence, which allowed individual citizens to hunt down brigands, and if they managed to kill one, they would earn a “pardon,” which they could apply to a bandit they knew or sell to someone else. If a brigand turned in (or killed) a fellow bandit, they could use the pardon for themselves, provided they had been convicted of a lesser crime.

Davis said that outsourcing made sense to the state: locals had greater knowledge of the structures of their community, understanding of clan dynamics, and familiarity with geography. Further, they had been victimized by the very people sought by the state, so rewarding their revenge and offering cash inspired highly effective murderous sprees.

But the social impact of this policy was horrifying: the state explicitly encouraged brothers to kill their own brethren, thus destroying any sense of community and degrading human interaction. Human life came to be of little value except for the cash value of pardons, which inspired otherwise law-abiding citizens to commit violent acts.

Robert Davis is Professor of History at Ohio State and author of Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal (winner of the 1991 Marraro Prize for Italian Historical Studies) and The War of the Fists. The Mershon Center is currently funding his continued research on the state’s response to violence in early modern Italy.
Azar Gat is currently tackling a project he calls “War in Human Civilization,” in which he attempts to conduct a multi-disciplinary analysis of human fighting: how long humans have warred, how they fought, and why. Gat has nearly completed his new book on this subject.

Gat said that between a million and two million years ago, there was little fighting in hunter-gatherer societies because, with no concept of property, there was nothing to dispute. Simple survival against beast and nature was the primary goal for humans. As evidenced by global violence in the twenty-first century, at some point there was a shift. Could it be attributed to concepts of property? The answer is more complicated than that, but Gat said history has not yet been able to fully explain it.

Gat said that both Rousseau and Hobbes addressed human-on-human violence in a philosophical way: the former argued that structures of human society corrupted natural instincts of species survival; the latter wrote that property structures were a primary motivation for violence.

Archeological findings have been similarly inconclusive, said Gat. Digs have produced ancient artifacts like stone axes, spears and arrows, but he said it is impossible to know if those were for hunting animals or fighting other humans.

Other theories about human violence have suggested that intraspecies violence is largely ritualistic and that killings are asymmetrical, such as when strong members target weak or young prey.

Gat analyzed literature that describes tribal behavior from the perspective of an outsider, and he said the evidence is still inconclusive about the cause of human violence. Using these accounts can be problematic because the contact paradox acknowledges that an outside perspective usually distorts tribal behavior through the act of interpreting it, so accounts are likely to be biased, said Gat. Some scholars argue that the introduction of European society into tribal based cultures may have actually inspired intraspecies killings in isolated tribal communities, so European accounts can be problematic in this regard, as well.

Why do humans kill one another? Gat attempted to answer this complex query by citing research done in the South Pacific. He sees this as the best test case because there are scarce resources, ample competition among tribes, and a relatively recent introduction of foreign cultures. He found that there is evidence of long-time fighting in these cultures, usually over resources like food, although there was also fighting over reproductive capacity. Polygamy, rape, and kidnapping were found to be commonplace. Also, people sometimes battled over prestige objects that enhanced their bodies, presumably to attract attention from the most desirable of the opposite sex.

He also discovered other motivations for human violence, including tribal killings that arose from sorcery or playfulness and pugnacity. Other deaths could be attributed to fighting and hunting, sometimes in relation to preparing for a battle.

Azar Gat is Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University. He has authored numerous books, including most recently, British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm: Revising the Revisionists.
Documentary filmmaker and journalist Thomas Goltz recently published *Chechnya Diary: A War Correspondent’s Story of Surviving the War in Chechnya*, which describes his experience living in the region. Goltz read excerpts from this book, as well as showed video footage he filmed of his stay.

Goltz’s work focuses on the town of Samashki, and specifically on the family of a man named Hussein, a rebel fighter who alternates between heroic home-grown fighter and exiled traitor. The focal point of the book addressed the brutal 1999 massacre in this town, which was designed to crush the resistance movement in Chechnya. Goltz’s account of the Russian attack was a deeply personal one, the central conflict in a book that described his long-term relationships with the people of Samashki as he reported on the complicated dimensions of the conflict.

Goltz’s closest Chechyn guide was Hussein, who had been born and raised in Samashki. While Goltz described Hussein as a man sympathetic and active in the resistance movement, he said that he was not very nationalistic and not likely to resort to large-scale violence to support the movement. Goltz described him as the product of Samashki, which before the attacks was more concerned with the success of its potato crop than with the success of the independence movement. Many like Hussein, while proudly Chechyn and supportive of a secession from Russia, were not violently nationalistic, Goltz said.

Unfortunately, after the attacks in 1999, that changed, and it changed Hussein’s life dramatically. After Goltz fled the region, he came back several years later, looking for Hussein and his family. According to Goltz, the man was thought by his neighbors to have been allied with the Russian army and was exiled from his community. Goltz caught up with him in a remote area of Eastern Russia, actively seeking a way to support the Chechyn cause and awaiting an opportunity to return to his village.

Thomas Goltz is a freelance television and print journalist and author of *Chechnya Diary: A War Correspondent’s Story of Surviving the War in Chechnya*.
George Lowther Steer was a journalist who covered many of the world’s most significant events in the mid-twentieth century. Nicholas Rankin, said he should be remembered as the man whose work inspired one of the last century’s most influential and powerful works: Pablo Picasso’s Guernica. The massive painting was, said Rankin, an artistic reaction to Steer’s journalistic account of the bombing of the Spanish Basque town.

Steer lived during a time of enormous gains in aviation technology, which fascinated him. Born in South Africa but educated in England, Steer was influenced by his colonial roots, and as a journalist, he was attracted to assignments outside Europe.

He covered the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, where an enormous Italian air fleet unleashed 300 tons of mustard gas against an African nation that had only twelve planes, most broken. Rankin said that Steer was fascinated by the “mystique of the air” and its ability to physically and psychologically destroy. He learned the true extent of its power during an assignment covering the Spanish Civil War.

The fiercely-independent Basque people of northern Spain had been experiencing a state-supported level of independence, but in 1937, troops were sent to “squash the little republics,” said Rankin. Bilbao was bombed heavily and then hemmed in by the French border and a battle line of nationalist forces.

On April 20, fascist forces began a land fight in the Basque region, and on April 24, planes, under the direction of Franco’s government, began spraying the forests with incendiary devices to flush people out. On April 27, the town of Guernica was bombarded with incendiary bombs, fragmentary bombs, and massive blasts of air power.

Rankin explained that Franco, Hitler and Mussolini had entered into an informal alliance, but the latter two had also signed a non-interventionist treaty that precluded their formal involvement in Spain. Nevertheless, Hitler loaned Franco Germany’s Luftwaffe, which had technically been dissolved after the end of World War I but was still quite powerful. Although Germany officially denied involvement, Steer collected fragments of bombs which proved that on that day, German planes had dropped innumerable incendiary bombs on the largely-wooden, ancient Basque town.

When the bombing began, Steer was outside Guernica, dining with three other journalists. By the time they made it to the town, it was burning and they stumbled over dead bodies of people who had attempted to flee the fires only to be machine-gunned down as they fled.

Two days later, after interviewing many survivors and crafting his report, Steer’s account of the “Tragedy of Guernica” appeared on the front page of the New York Times. Even without the benefit of photos, the details in Steer’s story caused a worldwide fervor: a French translation of his article was read by Picasso and inspired Guernica.

For Rankin, Steer’s experience in Guernica emphasizes the importance of journalism. Without an outside account of action, governments can manipulate facts and history can be distorted, ignored, or forgotten. Rankin emphasized that reality, even at its most heinous, can inspire powerful art, and that through the telling and remembering of history, people are forced to confront atrocities.

“New Boundaries for the World: The Post-War Visions of Eight World War II Leaders”

Gerhard Weinberg

Gerhard Weinberg, a historian well-known for his work on World War II, discussed his work on the post-war visions of Allied and Axis leaders. He said there were disagreements between these leaders about most things during the war, and a post-war vision was no exception.

It was not surprising to Weinberg that Hitler had the most unique view of a post-war world. Hitler believed the war was simply a starting point for other wars, which would continue until the globe was entirely under German control. Unlike his allies, who envisioned a world that was carved up under German, Italian, and Japanese domination, Hitler planned to move German citizens into all states to increase Aryan influence.

Hitler planned to divide Africa in three parts: the northern part for Italy, the middle for Germany, the southern for an Afrikaner state sympathetic with Germany.

Asia was a source of contention between Germany and its allies, but also between German leaders. While some of his advisors disagreed, Hitler agreed with the Japanese that central Siberia and all points east would become Japanese territory, as would all of Germany’s former Pacific colonies. Germany would take control of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Weinberg said there was little archival evidence to explain Hitler’s vision for North America.

Mussolini intended for Italian control to stretch from Venice to the Aegean. He also wanted Corsica, part of France and Germany, and most of Yugoslavia, as well as North Africa, including Somalia, and Kenya.

Weinberg said Hideksi Tojo’s vision was the most complete because he was a “stickler for detail,” so abundant archival evidence describes the borders he envisioned. He foresaw a Japanese empire that included Australia, New Zealand, Alaska, Western Canada, parts of the western United States, central and South America, Indonesia, Burma, India, and eastern Russia.

Weinberg said that Allied leaders were generally more modest in their expectations: Chiang Kai Shek wanted the return of all Chinese and Manchurian lands taken by Japan, as well as Hong Kong. Weinberg added that there is some indication he wanted parts of Korea.

Weinberg said that the United States was unique in that it sought no additional land. He said Roosevelt anticipated an independent Philippines, the creation of “trust empires” in former European colonies, and the implementation of trusteeships for the islands under Japanese control.

In a larger project, Weinberg analyzed the documents that show how all world leaders envisioned new borders after the end of World War II. He said that while it is fascinating to see the sometimes remarkable differences between world leaders, he explained that it is important to study these documents to see how these visions impacted today’s borders.

Gerhard Weinberg, Professor of History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina, is author of The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany and A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II.
Mary Ann Heiss

“Queen Mary’s Carpet: One Object, Many Stories”

Mary Ann Heiss’ recent project focuses on Queen Mary’s Carpet, which she says allows for an insightful look at both women’s contributions to post-war reconstruction in England and how objects serve to unite feelings of empire.

Queen Mary, widow of King George V, created an ornate tapestry of over one million stitches that she donated to the Treasury of England for auction, in hopes that the proceeds would contribute to rebuilding after World War II by bringing in much-needed dollars. The carpet traveled extensively throughout North America, intended to attract high bids from Canada and the United States. The Queen also hoped to attract attention to traditional English needlework.

Heiss said this “footnote of post-war history” is significant because it highlighted the ways that English women sought to contribute to post-war economic efforts, largely via traditional women’s work, but she said the queen’s parting with the rug also modeled the values of sacrifice, devotion, and hard-work, values that were essential to a struggling post-war society in the midst of physical and economic devastation.

It also reaffirmed colonial ties: the winning bid was not the highest, but considered to be most appropriate, offered by the International Order of the Daughters of the Empire (IODE), a Canadian women’s group of which the queen herself was an honorary member. They saw the tapestry as a tangible link to the English throne. The tapestry, badly damaged due to years of hanging incorrectly, is now in the National Gallery in Ottowa.

Mary Ann Heiss is Associate Professor of History at Kent State University.

Carol Anderson

“The Formation of the U.N. and U.S. Race Relations”

The formation of the United Nations was a catalyst for the Soviet Union and the United States to battle over their domestic human rights issues, according to Carol Anderson. The horrors of human rights violations during World War II made those writing the charter explicitly focused on provisions to protect against future atrocities.

This was problematic for the United States, who tried to be the moral leadership in San Francisco only to be criticized for hypocrisy because of its own Jim Crow laws. Washington’s U.N. delegates, however, were high-ranking southern Democrats who were unwilling to change racial preferences within U.S. borders or bend under pressure from other nations. They attempted to shift attention to the Soviet Union by criticizing their human rights policies.

Eventually, this standoff resulted in policies that required the United Nations to compromise or risk failing altogether. They agreed to a domestic jurisdiction clause that prevented U.N. policies from interfering with a state’s domestic policy and the creation of a commission to study treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. Washington got around potential attacks on Jim Crow by filleting the rhetoric so that it applied to very few groups anywhere in the world.

Many in Washington were becoming nervous about how global entities like the U.N. would impact a state’s domestic business, and Southern politicians were especially concerned because of Jim Crow, said Anderson. This resulted in the near passing of the Bricker Amendment, which sought to restrict the president’s power in agreeing to international treaties, further isolating the United States from creeping globalism and further insulating itself from the scrutiny of others.
New Books and Articles on Political and Economic Decision-Making

31 Richard K. Herrmann & Richard Ned Lebow
   Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of
   International Relations (2004, Palgrave McMillan)

32 Carole Fink
   Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews,
   and International Minority Protections, 1878-1938 (2004, Cambridge UP)

Special Events and Conferences

34 Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa, April 16-17, 2004

Seminars and Guest Speakers

35 Robert Gallucci, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” May 24, 2004
36 Ho-Yeol Yoo, “Conflict on the Korean Peninsula? An Analysis of Inter-
   Korean Relations,” October 28, 2003
37 George Breslauer, “Reflections on the Study of Transformational
   Leadership,” May 5, 2004
38 Andrew Kydd, “The Honest Broker: Mediation and Mistrust,” March 5, 2004
39 Peter Haas, “Addressing the Global Governance Deficit,” April 22, 2004
40 Charles Doran, “Power Cycle Theory in International Relations,
   Management, and Finance: Absolute Change and the Non-
   Linearities of Competition,” November 7, 2003
41 Sean Kay, “NATO, the Kosovo War, and Neoliberal Theory,” October 2, 2003
Although in hindsight the end of the Cold War was inevitable, almost no one saw it coming and there is little consensus over why it ended. A popular interpretation is that the Soviet Union was unable to compete in terms of power, especially in the area of high technology. Another interpretation gives primacy to the new ideas Gorbachev brought to the Kremlin and to the importance of leaders and domestic considerations. In this volume, prominent experts on Soviet affairs and the Cold War interrogate competing interpretations in the context of five “turning points” in the end of the Cold War. Relying on new information gathered from oral history interviews and archival research, the authors draw into doubt triumphal interpretations that rely on a single variable like the superior power of the United States and call attention to the importance of how multiple factors combined and were sequenced historically. The volume closes with chapters drawing lessons from the end of the Cold War for both policy making and theory building. --Palgrave McMillan, 2004

Richard K. Herrmann is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. He has written widely on politics in the Middle East, international security, and American foreign policy in leading academic journals such as the American Political Science Review, International Organization, World Politics, International Security, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. He has also been a frequent consultant to the policy world and served on Secretary of State James Baker’s Policy Planning staff.

Richard Ned Lebow is currently James O. Freedman Professor of Government at Dartmouth. He is a former Director of the Mershon Center, and in recent years, his research is in the interstices of political science, psychology, classics and history. He is currently President of the International Society of Political Psychology. He has edited or authored numerous articles and books, including his most recent publication The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge UP).

## What Was the Cold War? When and Why Did it End?
Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow

### Part I: Turning Points and Causes

**Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War**
Archie Brown

**Regional Conflicts as Turning Points: The Soviet and American Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua**
Richard K. Herrmann

**The Emancipation of Eastern Europe**
Jacques Lévesque

### Part II: Comparing Turning Points and Causes

**Leadership and the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment**
George W. Breslauer and Richard Ned Lebow

**Understanding the End of the Cold War as a Non-Linear Confluence**
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein

**Learning from the End of the Cold War**
Richard K. Herrmann
Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protections, 1878-1938

by Carole Fink

When the Cold War ended between 1989 and 1991, statesmen and scholars reached back to the period after World War I when the victors devised minority treaties for the new and expanded states of Eastern Europe. This book is the first study of the entire period between 1878 and 1938, when the great powers established a system of external supervision to reduce the threats in Europe’s most volatile regions of irredentism, persecution, and uncontrolled waves of westward migration. It is a study of the strengths and weaknesses of an early state of international human rights diplomacy as practised by rival and often-uninformed Western political leaders, by ardent but divided Jewish advocates, and also by aggressive state minority champions, in the tumultuous age of nationalism and imperialism, bolshevism and fascism between Bismarck and Hitler.

Carole Fink is Professor of History and a specialist in European international history and historiography. She has published numerous articles and chapters, as well as several books, including *Marc Bloch: A Life in History* (1989), *The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921-22* (1984), which was awarded the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association for the best book in European International History; an introduction to and translation of *Bloch’s Memoirs of War*, 1914-15 (1980, 1988); and *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, The Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938*.

Fink is also executive director of the Mershon Network of International Historians. More information about this group can be found at www.mnih.org.

Mershon Network of International Historians (MNIH)

www.mnih.org

Project Description: Twentieth-century international history is being studied today with new comparative and theoretical perspectives. This research is happening in places all around the world, and it is often difficult for researchers to share their information with others who have similar interests. MNIH was created by Fink as a place where scholars who do research and write on international topics can share ideas, post papers for discussion, and communicate about ongoing research projects.
Selected Articles on Political and Economic Decision-Making


Bri...
There are very few African countries that have not experienced some form of violent conflict since independence. While several countries are still suffering from civil wars, many others have managed to overcome them and are facing the daunting tasks of maintaining peace and reconstruction. Ahmad Sikainga, Professor of History, used his Mershon faculty grant to convene a conference to study how African states are managing post-war reconstruction.

The conference brought together a variety of specialists, including scholars, activists, and professionals, to discuss the complexities of African reconstruction. The Center sponsored the conference as a way to promote conversations that share personal experiences, develop strategies of intervention, examine and discuss paradigms for the study of conflict resolution, reconciliation, democratization, and nation building. The conference also addressed themes such as political reconstruction, the economic, social and cultural bases of reconstruction, reconciliation and healing.

**Conference Presenters:**

- **Abdi Samatar**, University of Minnesota, “Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region”
- **Ousseina D. Alidou**, Rutgers University, “Rethinking the Nation in Post-War Reconstruction in Niger”
- **Antoinette Errante**, The Ohio State University, “Situating the ‘Education’ of War-Affected Children and Youth in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy”
- **Ismail Rashid**, Vassar College, “Silent Guns and Talking Drums: War, Community Radio, and Dynamics of Youth Social Healing in Sierra Leone”
- **Susan McKay**, University of Wyoming, “Reconstructing Fragile Lives: Girls’ Social Reintegration in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone”
- **Tatiana Carayannis**, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center, “The Challenge of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration to the Reconstruction of the Congo”
- **Norma Kriger**, Mershon Center, “The Politics of Recognition in South Africa and Zimbabwe”
- **Atta El-Battahani**, University of Khartoum, “Gravitating Between Pessimism of the Past and Optimism of the Future: Post-War Reconstruction and Development in Sudan”
- **Anthony Ngosi**, AFRICARE/Berundi, “The Voice of Civil Society in the Rebuilding of Berundi”
Robert Gallucci, who played a key role in negotiating the Agreed Framework with North Korea, said that the Bush Administration’s strategy is basically no strategy at all. He argued that a hardline posture that fails to negotiate seriously essentially allows North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. Because military options for disarming North Korea are limited and risky, a containment strategy might feature hardline rhetoric but in functional terms is a passive approach. Gallucci felt a more active posture was needed to deal with the threat.

Gallucci said that the Bush Administration has been hostile to Clinton-era policy toward P’yongyang, including the Agreed Framework, but has failed to design or implement a better approach. Rather than building on the previous foundations and working to effectively stop P’yongyang’s proliferation, the Bush Administration has in operational terms settled for containment.

The Bush Administration has been highly critical, even antagonistic, toward North Korea: in Bush’s State of the Union Address (where he called them part of the “Axis of Evil”), in his West Point address (where he called Kim Jong-Il an “unbalanced dictator” immune to containment), and in his National Security Strategy, in which Bush justified preemptive military action. Gallucci said these comments make the Bush Administration’s intentions clear: they are not willing to negotiate or seek any diplomatic resolution.

Gallucci reported that the conventional wisdom in Washington is that North Korea has enough material to build at least eight nuclear weapons and the United States cannot be sure where these are located. The U.S. military is spread too thin to intervene, and since Washington refuses to negotiate, containment is the only option. He described the roles other nations have played in acting as intermediaries between Washington and P’yongyang. He said Russia is too distracted by domestic issues and Japan has not been effective because they are more concerned about Japanese hostages in North Korea. Gallucci did think a Japanese offer of reparations could be a valuable part of a negotiation package.

Gallucci was surprised by China’s role. He said the Bush administration has successfully mobilized Chinese involvement, but questioned the long-term strategy of allowing China to gain power on the Korean peninsula. He argued it is the greatest security threat in Asia and the country best poised to become very powerful over the next half-century. The security implications of delegating North Korea to a potential adversary may be a serious mistake, said Gallucci.

Gallucci was opposed to ignoring P’yongyang, and not opposed to “paying off” the North Koreans by offering limited support to their energy program, which the Agreed Framework attempted to do.

Under the agreed framework, Washington was supposed to finance, via South Korea and Japan, two nuclear reactors, which could be used for energy production. In the interim, North Korea was to be given heavy fuel oil. Gallucci argued that for the most part, the United States had fulfilled these obligations. Where Washington fell short, he said, was in the normalization of relations. North Korea, he said, had failed to limit their nuclear program. Gallucci saw little prospect of North Korea returning to a non-nuclear state without a negotiated new agreement.

Robert Gallucci is the Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He is a leading expert on international efforts to stop weapons of mass destruction programs and U.S. foreign policy. His thirty-year career with the U.S. State Department included service on the first post-Gulf War arms inspection effort known as the UN Special Commission on Iraq. He was also the lead Ambassador responsible for the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which significantly impacted North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Ho Yeol Yoo, Professor of Political Science at Korea University in Seoul, is one of South Korea’s leading experts on North Korea. While spending the year as a visiting scholar at Mershon, he took advantage of two opportunities to visit North Korea when Kim Jong-Il allowed a select group of South Koreans to visit P’yongyang.

Drawing from his scholarly study of North Korea and sharing photos from recent trips, Yoo discussed the character of Korea and analyzed the ways in which people live their lives in the north, affected by the history and politics of the Communist regime.

According to Yoo, the power Communism holds in P’yongyang may be waning: there has been no party congress since 1980, and when Kim Jong-Il took control of the country after the end of his father’s forty-nine-year reign, he appointed many young technocrats to positions of power. He also changed his title from Chief of State, his father’s title, to Chairman of Defense Commission.

Yoo said that it is important to understand the personality of North Korea’s leader in order to understand life in contemporary North Korea. Yoo described Jong-Il as an unpredictable man who oscillates between Mad Tyrant and Enlightened Monarch. Yoo said he is both: once a socialite and bachelor, upon his father’s death, Jong-Il became more serious and used his toughness to lead the nation.

While much of the world sees North Korea as a totalitarian nation, Yoo said that there are cleavages among high-ranking officials, between conservative Red hardliners and the younger, pragmatic idealists.

Yoo added that the divides in the government also suggests a shift away from “Juche,” a philosophy of self-reliance, toward a more pragmatic philosophy of governance. There also seems to be less fear of the “Yellow Wind,” or outside influence, changing North Korean culture.

North Korea may be opening up slightly as a result of its economic problems, said Yoo. A failure in the centralized distribution system left the country short on food, energy, and foreign currency. This, coupled with a reduction of foreign aid, has left Kim Jong-Il’s administration with a difficult situation.

Perhaps because of the struggling economy or because of a more open philosophy among the Ministers, Yoo said that inter-Korean relations seem to be improving. He pointed to the increased frequency of ministerial-level talks, a plan that will unite the two nations by rail through the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and more frequent opportunities to reunite families separated by the border. His opportunity to travel north was also evidence that relations between the nations may be improving, he thought, but added that after this brief, but limited, opening of the border, North Korea returned to a closed border policy. Optimistic, Yoo said that they have plans to resume a program to give tourist visas to South Koreans.

Through anecdotes and photos, Yoo showed evidence of the daily struggles of many North Koreans, but he was optimistic that reform may be in the near future. Despite their weak economy, he said that government-approved farm markets and increasing of inter-Korean communications may yield better quality of life for North Koreans in general, and more opportunity for North-South dialogue.

Ho-Yeol Yoo was a visiting scholar this year at the Mershon Center, on sabbatical from his position as Professor of Political Science at Korea University. He worked for several years at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), where he worked extensively on the relationship between North and South Korea.
Studying leadership is essential to understanding political structure, according to George Breslauer, whose recent research looks specifically at transformational leadership.

He said it is misleading to ask, “What’s a leader like?” There are too many generalizations to describe a person’s character, too many traits to describe. It is more important to study the changes a leader wants to effect, the tasks they take on, the climate in which their leadership is tested (e.g., during war, transitional periods). Breslauer also said it is effective to look at what leaders have in common when identifying their leadership styles.

He said transformational leaders—and he looked specifically at Gorbachev and Yeltsin—are very high energy. Their leadership effects lasting change on the cultures of their nations. They often lead during periods of widespread and urgent demand for change and successful leaders are adept at articulating compelling new ways for a community to identify itself.

Transformational leaders must typically have multiple intelligences, giving them the authority among diverse crowds to renounce the old way and successfully lead the new. This change often comes about as part of a new “identity story,” in which leaders can persuasively describe the past, present and future of a community, redefining symbols that resonate and are salient in the community. These leaders are often persuasive orators.

Breslauer described how Gorbachev played upon the Soviet Union’s fears of the United States under the Reagan administration and its own domestic uncertainties to lead his nation into the future. Evoking its history—Lenin and Socialism, for example—Gorbachev lent a familiar ring to his ideas. Breslauer said his rhetoric was finely crafted to combine a repudiation and continuation of the past, which make his controversial proposals for change palatable to his constituency.

George Breslauer is Dean of the Social Sciences and Professor of Political Science at UC, Berkeley. He is author of *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders* (1982) and *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders* (Cambridge UP, 2002).
In mediation, many expect mediators to be completely unbiased and work diligently for a resolution. According to Andrew Kydd, the process is not that simple. He found that under certain circumstances, mediators might be encouraged to lie, encouraged to thwart cooperation, or benefit from biases.

Kydd developed a model that analyzed mistrust in the context of bargaining. As he explained, a mediator is likely to have information about the parties that makes him believe they are trustworthy or untrustworthy. How mediators use that information depends on the benefits mediators see for themselves. Trust is essential.

Trust is not the same as bias, a point Kydd emphasized. Mediator bias can actually be effective: if a party perceives mediators to be biased in his or her favor, the party may be inclined to believe mediators when they call for concessions or compromises. Kydd said that bias is also key when a mediators’ self-interest in a community is thought to make them more trustworthy and capable of negotiating between conflicting parties.

Kydd said that the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma does not effectively address the issues of trust in bargaining because it is a one-shot game where parties are motivated to be uncooperative to increase their own perceived benefit. They win by defecting. At the same time, mediators are unable to build trust during a one-shot game because they could be thought to be seeking reconciliation at any cost and could be thought to benefit from lying just to reach a compromise.

Kydd looks at mediator trust in repeated situations, where mediators may be inclined to tell the truth because they get something out of it, be it an opportunity to progress further in other mediations (building a reputation as an effective mediator) or increased compensation for remaining in the game the longest. In the situation of the repeated game, being biased may have a negative effect on the mediator, because they may be inclined to lie in favor of those to whom they are biased, but being caught in a lie would prevent them from continuing in the “game.”

In this game, he suggested that there is a greater possibility of a negative outcome: if mediators are only punished when caught in a lie, they will avoid lying at all costs. That disinclines them from vouching for the trustworthiness of either party, since if the party reneges and proves untrustworthy, then the mediator suffers. Therefore, this situation encourages mediators to hide information about a party’s untrustworthiness but risks a higher likelihood of an unsuccessful outcome. Even if one or both parties is, in fact, trustworthy, mediators would be less inclined to risk their own future payoffs by vouching for them.

Kydd said that to give mediators an incentive to be honest at all times, the game must call for the payoffs to be kept in check: no incentive for a successful outcome or continuing to the next round can be too great. In situations where the mediator is trying to build trust between the parties, the mediator will ideally be unbiased. Only if the long-term incentives for mediator honesty are kept in check can negotiations accommodate any degree of mediator bias. The incentives must be large enough for mediators to seek cooperation but not so large that they will avoid making a mistake. There must be an incentive for the mediator to develop a reputation for honesty.

Andrew Kydd is Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University, where he conducts research on game theory and international relations. He is an associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Peter Haas looks at institutions of global governance to identify ways in which international institutions can better address international issues, such as the environment, within existing institutions.

He called for better practices in governance, which he identified as the array of rules and functions that maintain order, perform administrative functions, and amass technical information to be disseminated among other groups. Organizations whose responsibility is global governance would not be explicitly involved in state politics but he said good global governance would impact all levels of government, including local politics.

Haas said that some notions which can render international institutions ineffective, include poor understanding of geopolitical realities, ignorance of existing facts and research emerging from other places, and weak networks to share information.

Haas looked specifically at UNEP, the United Nations Environment Programme, which has been a leader in social and scientific studies of the environment. He said they exemplify many of the theoretical problems he identified.

Over the last 150 years, global politics has become increasingly complicated and increasingly uncertain, said Haas. International institutions such as UNEP arose in an effort to fill gaps caused by problems, such as environmental crises, which are usually complex, expensive and transcend complicated state boundaries. UNEP devised a comprehensive, transnational plan for environmental initiatives that bypassed corporate and industrial opposition because it was internationally supported and largely autonomous. It served a variety of technical, administrative, and research functions.

Unfortunately, said Haas, it may have been too successful, which lead to its eventual insignificance. Its highly-trained staff was easily lured away by better pay, less travel, and better living conditions in more centralized locations. As it lost control, Haas said decentralized groups, like NGOS, became the norm. Many non-government organizations are good examples of groups that are better at tasks like research and humanitarian missions, but typically not as effective at administrative tasks or information-sharing.

He suggested there needed to be a central, coordinating body that can focus on these tasks, such as agenda setting, verification of research, and the management of technology and financial resources. A centralized body would also have a policing function and be responsible for identifying problems.

All of this should be done without the creation of new institutions, said Haas. Institutions responsible for global governance should be located in a geographically centralized location, since, he explained, it would facilitate easier sharing of information and less travel.

Peter M. Haas is Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. His recent work focuses on the interplay between international institutions and scientific involvement in the creation and enforcement of international regimes addressing transboundary and global environmental risks.
Charles Doran

Power Cycle Theory in International Relations, Management and Finance: Absolute Change and the Non-Lineairties of Competition

Charles Doran’s research on power cycle theory describes the ways in which countries gain and lose power and how this has historically translated into international conflict. Doran’s theory indicates that the key to examining change in power is to examine the change in relative power, to explore how many countries impact another state’s strength.

A nation’s relationship to power can be seen as a curve: a state climbing the curve is attempting to gain power, but there is eventually a lag, a peak of the curve, and then power declines. In all cases, the shift in power is impacted by both internal and external parties who may or may not want to see a country gain (or lose) power.

Doran said that there are “points of non-linearity,” a widespread shift in power, when “everything changes.” Between the fifteenth and twenty-first centuries, he identified six: all but one—the end of the Cold War—erupted in violence. World War I is an example of this. Germany experienced significant change in both absolute and relative power before, during, and after the war. He explained that Russia was climbing up its own curve, taking power away from Germany, which had heretofore been the most powerful state. When Germany responded to the decline of their power with violence, it erupted in global war.

Doran admitted that during the years leading up to the war, Germany’s capabilities in areas like energy and commodities were rising. But, and this is key, said Doran, relative to other nations, their growth was slow, ultimately causing them a loss in the “market share” of power.

Analyzing relative power in this way shows a direct impact on foreign policy. At a certain point, a country’s power may not change, but its ability to wield its strength within the larger global community does. Rapid change calls for an adjustment in the way a country deals with its peers, and when a state is rapidly losing power, it may be forced to make decisions quickly with incomplete information: for these reasons, said Doran, points of non-linearity likely result in war.

Currently, the United States is viewed as a hegemonic power, one whose military spending and economic force exceeds that of other nations. And yet, said Doran, the United States peaked during the 1970s and is on a downward trend. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which allowed the U.S. to seize power capital, and major changes in business reform and the technology sector, have contributed to the gradual decline of U.S. relative power.

Doran said that terrorist attacks may hasten the decline because they weakened American confidence in foreign policy, which had been enjoying a decade of strength and success, and caused Americans to rethink the advantages of worldwide power.

Power cycle theory thus forces political scientists to look at both the horizontal and vertical nature of power, the relative and absolute power held by individual states. Power in the international system is so intertwined that one cannot analyze only one piece of the cycle to determine a state’s absolute strength, concluded Doran.

Charles Doran is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations and on the faculty of the Paul W. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University where he is the Director of Center of Canadian Studies.
Sean Kay explored NATO’s role in Kosovo and said that neoliberal theory explains how NATO’s guiding theories effectively constrained it. He agreed with neoliberal theorists that “institutions matter,” but not always for the better; he found that the institutional character of NATO mattered in Kosovo because it constrained action, not because it helped to solve the problem.

Kay explained that NATO evolved from a military alliance between the United States and Europe designed to counterbalance Soviet power during the Cold War into an organization devoted to preserving and promoting normative values in Europe. Instead of dissolving at the end of the Cold War, it preserved much of its basic structure and procedures and revamped itself to promote democratic principles, enforce community values, and fight human rights violations.

When the conflict in Bosnia arose, NATO took several years to observe developments, and formulate a plan in response. In this case, the “war by committee” strategy, which is intrinsic to NATO because the organization insists on consensus before action, allowed for a reasonable degree of success, said Kay. Peacekeeping and limited involvement in the conflict allowed NATO members to promote the normative goals they collectively espoused and a longer time line afforded their careful, calculated collective action.

Kosovo was different. Despite earlier involvement in the Balkans, NATO was ill-equipped to deal with Slobodan Milosevic and the atrocities of his regime. NATO sought to extend its history of enforcing normative beliefs, but its inability to respond quickly ultimately made it ineffective. “War by committee” slowed the decision-making process. The fast combat situation in Kosovo showed that a slow response time could be debilitating and restrictive.

Kay said that NATO’s structure not only restricted their movements, it made it much easier for Milosevic to influence its decision-making process. Because NATO does not act without consensus and because voices within NATO are equally powerful, it was easy for the Serbs to affect policy by injecting their views through NATO member states. As Kay put it, Serbs were an active part of an institutional discussion on how to deal with Serbia.

Key pointed to the ease with which Milosevic was able to sway the sharing of information as evidence that institutional climates can negatively effect security provisions. He said that in NATO, security is compromised by the perceived need to have all information from all parties before acting.

Kay argued that the only way for NATO to be an effective force in the twenty-first century would be to reform its decision-making processes, which might actually be impossible because it would take a consensus to reform these practices. He predicted that NATO will become increasingly irrelevant due to its inability to agree or act on issues of international security.

Sean Kay is Associate Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan University. He is also a fellow at the Eisenhower Institute.
Culture and Identity

New Books and Articles on Culture and Identity

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    Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU
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Special Events and Conferences

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    American Culture in Europe: Americanisation and Anti-
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    Brands and Protests: How American Companies Confront Anti-
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    American Culture and Anti-Americanism in Russia,  May 7, 2004

49  Deprivation, Violence, and Identities: Mapping Contemporary World
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    Globalization,”  March 30, 2004
    Judith Butler, “Undoing Gender,”  March 29, 2004
Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU

Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, Marilynn B. Brewer, Eds.

This original work explores the increasingly important phenomenon of the formation of transnational identity. Considering the ongoing relevance of the European Union, the contributors ask a series of intriguing questions: Is a European identity possible? How are the various types of European identity formed and maintained? How are these identities linked to the process of European integration? Examining the psychological, institutional, and political mechanisms that encourage or impede identification with transnational groups, the book considers these theoretical questions in light of new evidence drawn from a rich body of primary research, including field experiments, in-depth interviews with elites, and public opinion surveys.

Brought together for the first time, social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, and ethnographers share their theoretical and methodological perspectives in tackling the common issues surrounding the emergence of “European” as a political identity. Paying special attention to the role of the institutions of the EU, the authors investigate the impact of neo-functionalist strategies and find that the processes of identity formation are far more complicated than can be explained by material and institutional factors alone. The authors engage in a fruitful dialogue about how much a European identity exists and how much it matters as they delve into the sources of disagreement and their implications. --Rowman & Littlefield, 2004
Selected Articles on Culture and Identity


The Mershon Center’s Alexander Stephan has been organizing a series of events as part of his research on Americanization and Anti-Americanism throughout the world. Each of these events focuses on one aspect of this phenomenon, including the effect it has on American businesses, how it is expressed in different countries and cultures, and how scholars explain the conflict. This project will continue in the coming year. Please log on to www.mershon.ohio-state.edu for more information about upcoming events.

**American Culture in Europe: Americanisation & Anti-Americanism Since 1945**

**Rothermere American Institute**  
**University of Oxford**

**September 27, 2003**

*Organized by Alexander Stephan and the Mershon Center*

**Conference Presenters:**

- **Richard Crockatt**, University of Norwich, East Anglia  
- **Mick Hume**, Spiked Online  
- **Rob Kroes**, University of Amsterdam  
- **Robert McGeehan**, Institute of United States Studies, University of London  
- **Ziauddin Sardar**, Journalist and Author of *Why Do People Hate America?*  
- **Alexander Stephan**, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University  
- **Polly Toynbee**, Journalist and Columnist at *The Guardian*
Alexander Stephan is Professor of Germanic Languages and Literatures and Ohio Eminent Scholar at The Ohio State University. Stephan has authored or edited over twenty books, many articles, book chapters, book reviews, and documentary films, including a documentary film titled *Im Visier des FBI: Deutsche Autoren im US-Exil* [FBI: German Exile Authors in the Files of U.S. Secret Services] (ARD, 1995).


Currently, Stephan is working at the Mershon Center on the topic of cultural Americanization and anti-Americanism in Europe and the world. The twelve comparative country studies presented at this event will appear in book form. With the Institute for Culture Studies in Essen, Germany, Stephan produced in 2001 to 2004 three conferences on the impact of American culture on Germany, a volume with essays on the same topic, and an international lecture series.

**Brands and Protest: How American Companies Confront Anti-Americanism**

Studies have shown that anti-American sentiment appears to be rising around the world, and American companies have begun to see how this impacts their bottom line: they find that as people protest the United States, they also protest its products.

Tim Love is an advertising executive with TBWA Worldwide and co-founder of Business for Diplomatic Action, a group that works with businesses to design strategies to overcome anti-American sentiment in marketing products overseas.

He said that globalization is over...everywhere except the United States, where citizens and businesses alike have been slow to become literate in other cultures. He called for a new perspective on advertising and marketing. Where it was once effective to take a global message and make it local, he said advertisers must first look at local culture and make their products relevant. Further, they need to understand the complexity and competition of a global marketplace that is not dominated by American wants, needs, and perspectives.

Love also said that companies should be aware of the very tech-savvy youth culture which he said was a very smart consumer of corporate messages, much more aware of cultures from around the world, and much more selective in preferences. Love said that business must shift toward understanding this globalized and trend-savvy market. One way to do this, he suggested, was to better study the cultures in which products are sold and to be proactive in diplomatic efforts among global businesses.
American Culture & Anti-Americanism in the Middle East

Dale Eickelman discussed how communications technologies have improved dramatically, allowing for cultural transmission to be faster, cheaper, and more common. Unfortunately, he said, gains in cultural knowledge have largely been one-sided, which he said contributes to Anti-American sentiment in the Arab world.

Cellular technology, the internet, and improvements in travel options make it easier for people to interact with other cultures, making them less reliant on the media for information about other countries. It also means that it is not possible for governments to send a message only to their domestic population: the whole world can hear it.

Unfortunately, said Eickelman, the United States frequently does not hear messages from abroad. Unlike people in the Middle East, who are often confronted with foreign cultures and especially U.S. media, Americans are generally insulated from foreign messages. Americans end up being insufficiently aware of and knowledgeable about other cultures, especially Arab culture.

Eickelman said that the Bin Laden recruitment tapes illustrate how effectively Al Qaeda could mobilize disenfranchised Arab youth against the United States by using messages drawn from the highly-produced images running in the American media. He said Americans are often ill-equipped to counter such messages because of a lack of understanding about Arab culture.

He called for increased contacts between Middle Eastern Arabs and Americans, through programs like the Peace Corps, teaching exchanges, or exchanges for business. He said many in the Arab world are anxious to learn English, and there is a lot of respect for American education. He felt taking advantage of this interest would be a good way to expose Arabs to American culture and increase awareness of Arab culture among Americans.

Jillian Schwedler’s research focuses primarily on Jordan, which she said is currently experiencing widespread protest of American culture that falls along economic lines, not just cultural or religious divisions.

She said that young people in the wealthy “Pro-Western Elite” have embraced several visible aspects of American culture, much to the dismay of more traditional or less wealthy Jordanians, including revealing dress, watching violent movies at theatres, and reading magazines that have ads for alcoholic beverages and society pages.

Schwedler said that images of American society are often used in protests, which she said are quite common in that country. Although protests typically target very specific grievances, such as secularism, foreign policy, or conspicuous consumption, Jordanians use American symbolism because it is powerful and widely recognized, not necessarily because they are protesting the people of the United States or American businesses. Jordanians understand this and do not conflate culture and people, but their protests are often interpreted as Anti-American simply because they use highly visible symbols of Western culture. She blames this for the belief that Anti-Americanism in Jordan is rampant.

Richard Herrmann said there is little understanding of what Middle Eastern Arabs think about the United States. There has been a focus on the extreme viewpoint, such as Al Qaeda, but little done on how the “average Arab” thinks.

Herrmann’s research indicated a widespread image of the United States as an imperial power that wants to exploit Arab nations and use their resources. This belief and the U.S. support for Israel generates more opposition to the United States than does Arab rejection of modern values or an Arab fear that Washington will foster democracy in the Middle East.
Georgi Derluguian and Vladislav Zubok described similar stories from their childhoods that illustrate the historically complicated relationship between the United States and Russia. Both recall the way members of their families remembered finding small gifts—a candy bar, a set of mittens—hidden in the glove boxes of Studebaker cars, purchased by the Russian army at the height of the Cold War. Derluguian and Zubok said these small gestures from Detroit’s auto workers resonate in the minds of many Russians.

Derluguian emphasized that talking about Russian anti-Americanism is somewhat myopic, since Russia is only one country in a world where Anti-Americanism is widespread. He said in only one country, Serbia, have negative feelings toward the United States improved, and that was only because starting with a 97% disapproval rating, there was no where to go but down.

In Russia, Anti-American sentiment is strongest among college-educated, urban, youth. He said that the best-informed citizens are usually the most anti-American.

Zubok explained Russian Anti-Americanism by looking at propaganda. He said that during the Cold War, anti-American propaganda succeeded in arousing hatred for the U.S. government, but it unintentionally aroused warm feelings toward the people of the United States. Many Russians were sympathetic to the American people, who were thought to be dominated by and toiling under a system of powerful fat cats. But they also saw the United States as an extreme utopia, even “further west than the actual country,” said Zubok. He added that this extreme pro-Americanism was at its height immediately following Stalin’s death.

This schizophrenic view of the United States lingered for many years, until the end of the Cold War. The shift towards Anti-Americanism was dramatic, he said, and under Putin, people began to believe the messages of old Communist propaganda.

John Brown, former Cultural Affairs Officer in Moscow, offered his take on why this schizophrenic attitude toward American culture runs so deep in the Russian public. He suggested that it may be something as simple as their perception that the United States simply does not have a culture.

He said that most Russians see American culture as vulgar. He added that many people remember the United States once being distant and appealing but saw it turn into a vulture after the end of the Cold War, and the popular culture that Russians saw coming across the ocean was seen as cheap. It may have simply been too much, too soon, said Brown.

Worse, said Brown, the American culture many Russians experience is widely considered a lack of culture. Brown explained that Russians are extremely proud of their people’s cultural contributions, and they define themselves as a people by evoking Dostoyevsky and Chekov. The government supports their own culture and cultural programming. Brown surmised that some Russians do not necessarily see the validity in American culture since it is highly commercial and not even supported by its own government.

Georgi Derluguian is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Northwestern University. His most recent book is Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A Sociological Biography in World-Systems Perspective.

Vladislav Zubok is Associate Professor of History at Temple University. His most recent book is Russian Anti-Americanism from Stalin to Putin (2000).

John Brown is an associate at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown and former U.S. Cultural Affairs Officer in Moscow.
Deprivation, Violence and Identities: Mapping Contemporary World Conflicts

Neil J. Smelser, University of California, Berkeley, “Uncertain Connections: Globalization, Localization, Identities, and Violence”

Leo Ching, Duke University, “The Musha Rebellion as the Unthinkable: Coloniality, Aboriginality, and the Epistemology of Colonial Difference”

Diane Nelson, Duke University, “Dispossession and Possession: The Maya, Duplicity, and ‘Post’ War Guatemala”

Aseel Sawalha, Pace University, “Inventing Authenticity: Reviving the Heritage and Preserving the Traditional in Post-War Beirut”

Robert Hislope, Union College, “States of Mind and the State of War: Public Attitudes and Ethnic Violence in Macedonia”

Norma Kriger, Mershon Center, “Recognizing Guerillas’ War Sacrifices in Post-Independence Zimbabwe: Law, Politics, and Justice”

Michael M. Gunter, Tennessee Technological University, “The Kurdish Question in Perspective”

Georgi Derluguian, Northwestern University, “Abkhasia: Can Social Theory Provide Therapy?”

Donna Lee Van Cott, University of Tennessee, “The Intercultural Construction of Public Authority in Latin America”

Kidane Mengisteab, Pennsylvania State University, “Factors in Africa’s Crisis of State Building”

Pori Park, “State Authority over Korean Buddhism during the ‘Purification Movement’”

Dru Gladney, University of Hawaii at Manoa, “Cyber-Separatism, Islam and the State in China”

M. Sani Umar, Arizona State University, “Ethnic/Religious Conflicts and Democratic Transitions in West Africa: A Nigerian Case-Study”

Karen Dawisha, Miami University, “The Twentieth Century’s Legacy to the Twenty-First: Is Communism Dead?”

Eduardo A. Gamarra, Florida International University, “Bolivia’s Vulnerability to Socio-Political Conflict”

Dale F. Eickelman, Dartmouth College, “Public Islam and the Common Good”

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many anticipated the advent of a “new world order” of global capitalism, some thought that conflicts based on ideology and competing national interests would lose their political relevance. Instead, the 1990s experienced ethnic and religious violence in locations as disparate as the former Yugoslavia, Central Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. Prior to the events of 9/11, the structure of international relations had made it possible to imagine that such conflicts had local roots but terrorism rendered undeniable the global significance of local ethnic and religious-based differences.

This conference explored how social identities are threatened from within by local and ethnic formations and transformed from without by the global flows of capital, popular culture, and transnational ideologies and populations. As features of the contemporary world, deprivation, violence, and identities are but the local manifestations of the conflict between global systems of thought, power, and authority. Sponsored by the Mershon Center with the Office of International Affairs, Area Studies Centers, and Clusters of Interdisciplinary Research on International Themes.
Protest Music as Responsible Citizenship

Project conceived and directed by Amy Horowitz

Protest Music As Responsible Citizenship was an event that studied how music helps to construct the political consciousness of a nation, how songs mobilize thousands of people around issues affecting American life, and how music addresses the role of America in the global context.

The event brought together Harry Belafonte, Holly Near, Bernice Johnson Reagon, and Pete Seeger, four musicians who have played key public roles in the past decades, to discuss how citizenship, music, and social change take on greater significance in this time of increasing polarization both at home and globally. Music and social change have been documented through autobiographies and biographies of performers, ethnographic studies of music and cultural performance, and ethnomusicology research on music and revolution. However, little has been documented about the role of public music performances in shaping citizen responses to political events.

The musicians participating in the event and conversation— Belafonte, Near, Johnson Reagon, and Seeger—have challenged the public to consider issues of national security and responsible citizenship. Through their songs, stories, and actions, these musicians have enacted their citizenship by voicing a challenging call. Protest Music as Responsible Citizenship explored how protest music and protest itself can be considered responsible citizenship.

The event, moderated by Amy Horowitz and the Smithsonian’s James Early, included a roundtable that brought together artists and a variety of scholars from Ohio State to discuss the complexities of protest music and other political art in a complicated global society. The event also included an evening performance for the public, where the artists performed songs and discussed their own political and performing histories. The entire two-day event was recorded and is being used as the basis for a documentary film. Horowitz produced a fifteen-minute “trailer” and is showing it around the country as she seeks support to produce the full-length film.

“Songs are funny things. They can slip across borders. Proliferate in prisons. Penetrate hard shells. I always believed that the right song at the right moment could change history.” - Pete Seeger

“I went to a mass meeting and I was hoarse because I sang all the time in the jail. I opened my mouth to sing... I never heard that voice before. It was very similar to the way people describe religious conversion. There is actually a song that says: ‘I looked at my hands, and my hands looked new. I looked at my feet, and they did, too. I started to talk, and I had a new talk. I started to walk, and I had a new walk.’ For the first time I really understood what was in that singing that I had heard all my life.”

-Bernice J. Reagon

“But what to me makes a brilliant political song is that it states what the problem is but it lifts people to some sort of vision of what might be, what they might do first and foremost to change themselves.” -Holly Near

“Paul Robeson said to me, in one of his earliest counsels, he said, ‘Harry the best that can happen to you is that you can get them to sing your song. And if you can get them, meaning people, the public, the world at large, if you can get them to sing your song, they will come to know who you are.’” - Harry Belafonte

"From left: Harry Belafonte, Holly Near, Bernice Johnson Reagon, and Pete Seeger. Photo by Sharon Farmer."
Why do some religious traditions insist that certain aspects of their beliefs and practices remain secret and closed to outsiders? Is secrecy a potentially dangerous force within religious traditions, either as a means of concealing immoral activities (such as pedophilia or other sexual crimes) or as a means of conducting subversive and violent activities (such as terrorism)? Conversely, how far should government agencies be allowed to go in order to monitor or infiltrate religious groups that may pose a threat to other individuals or to national security? And to what degree do such groups retain the rights to privacy and freedom from government surveillance?

This conference, conceived and organized by Hugh B. Urban, Associate Professor of Comparative Studies, explored these questions. Drawing from a variety of disciplines, including religious studies, sociology, history, and women’s studies, participants presented research that promotes better understanding of the connections between secrecy and religion and its relationship to issues of security.

These questions have become all the more critical in the wake of recent events within the United States. The spread of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda have generated a whole new wave of fears—not only the fear of infiltration by secretive and destructive religious movements, but also the fear that this will in turn lead to the loss of privacy and freedom for many alternative religious groups who now face ever intense government scrutiny within an increasingly “surveilled” society.

**Conference Presenters**


**Steven Wasserstrom**, Reed College, “Political Mysteries”

**Michael Barkun**, Syracuse University, “Sacred Secrets: Religious Privacy and National Security”

**Diane Bell**, George Washington University, “Secrecy: In Whose Interest?”

**Mark D. Jordan**, Emory University, “Negative Theory and Clerical Secrets”

**Paul Christopher Johnson**, Princeton University, “When Priests are Politicians: Papa Doc Duvalier and the Secret Police of Haiti”

**Hugh B. Urban**, Ohio State, “Fair Game: Secrecy, Security, and the Church of Scientology in Cold War America”


Persecution and Conflict in Ancient Mediterranean Religions

Conference convened by Sarah Iles Johnson, Professor of Greek and Latin

Religiously motivated violence is far from a new phenomenon, especially in the lands surrounding the Mediterranean. During and preceding the development of the three major monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), holy wars, persecution of heresies, and other forms of religiously motivated violence manifested themselves in diverse forms. Indeed, already in the 14th century BCE, the Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten imposed a new, fiercely monotheistic and intolerant religion (the so-called “Amarna religion”) upon his polytheistic countrymen—the first instance, to our knowledge, of religious persecution in the history of Mediterranean religions.

In contrast to widespread religious persecution in Israel and the Roman empire, some ancient Mediterranean cultures seem to have tolerated—even embraced—religious diversity. Greeks and Hittites both adopted the deities of peoples whom their empire incorporated when those gods seemed useful. Israelite religion, including early forms of Judaism, also tolerated diversity, as did early forms of Islam.

Sarah Iles Johnston coordinated the conference, which explored different Mediterranean cultures to see why some ancient groups tended toward religious tolerance and others toward persecution. She is anticipating an edited volume to emerge from the research.

John Collins, Yale University, “anti-Semitism in Antiquity: The Case of Alexandria”

Michael Swartz, Ohio State, “The Case of the Heretical High Priest: Remembering Internal Conflict in Rabbinic and Synagogue Literature”

David Frankfurter, University of New Hampshire, “Spaces of Crisis, Locations for Destruction: Violent Christianization in Late Antique Egypt”

Robin Osborne, King’s College, Cambridge, “Pluralism, Democracy, and the Limits of Tolerance in the Greek Polis”

Elizabeth Castelli, Barnard College, “Persecution and Spectacle: Cultural Appropriation in the Christian Commemoration of Martyrdom”

Steven Wasserstrom, Reed College, “Hermes the Monotheist”

Paul Heck, Princeton, “Eschatological Scripturalism and the End of Community”

Mary Beard, Newham College, “The Triumph of Persecution”

Fritz Graf, Ohio State, “Religious Transgression and Judicial Violence: The Cases of Alcibiades and Andocides”

Jason BeDuhn, Northern Arizona University, “Manichaeism and the Logic of Persecution”

Bruce Lincoln, University of Chicago, “Rebellion and Treatment of Rebels in the Achaemenian Empire”
Steve Levitt is known for his creative quantitative methods in the field of economics. Winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark Medal for an Economist under the age of forty, Levitt has made a name for himself among the staid practitioners of his field, the younger generation of his peers, and among society in general for his methodologically innovative approach to answering provocative social questions.

Brought to Ohio State by Mershon, the Department of Economics and the Criminal Justice Research Center, Levitt could have presented on a variety of topics. Corruption in sumo wrestling. The finances of drug gangs. The effectiveness of prisons for deterring or containing crime. Dishonesty and fraud in school teachers’ assessments of their students’ performances. During this talk, he discussed the causes and consequences of distinctively black names.

Extant literature, and specifically previous audits of resume research, indicates that the distinctively black names that have grown in popularity among certain segments of the African American population has a negative economic impact on individuals with such names. Levitt disagrees.

Through the analysis of birth data from the state of California, Levitt and his co-author Roland Fryer, traced demographic data from the 1970s through the year 2000. They found that there has been a marked increase in what they called distinctively black names, those likely to be given to African American children only, resulting from the popularity of the black movement in the 1970s.

He said that there was a bit of a splintering among the black population along demographic and economic lines in terms of naming: those African Americans who live in predominantly Black communities are more likely to select distinctively Black names for their children, as are African Americans of lower socioeconomic classes.

In comparison, Hispanic communities show naming trends that also fall along economic and community lines, although it is not as marked. This is also true, to an even lesser extent, in white and Asian communities, where naming can be linked to social standing, but not with as great a degree of contrast as in African American communities, said Levitt.

By tracing the life histories of women born in the early seventies (at the height of the Black Power movement in California, which inspired an increase in the use of distinctively black names), Levitt and Fryer statistically concluded that that audit information was incorrect. Women with unique names were likely to earn less, but only a very small amount. They were likely to have only statistically slightly less education. The only significant finding was that women with unique names were more likely to give unique names to their children.

Steven Levitt is Alvin H. Baum Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago.
Bruce Sacerdote and a former student designed a system that tracked email transmissions among students at Dartmouth College to determine the effect of location on relationships. In this case, he was specifically interested in how location impacts relationships by finding out how a student's freshman year dormitory assignment impacted their friendship during their years at Dartmouth.

His research informs other research that looks at the importance of peer groups and behavior, which argues that location is very important. He said that email transmissions are a highly effective way to study friendships, because his data indicates that students email one another more often when they are frequently seeing each other. When there is less face-to-face interaction, there are fewer emails. During vacations, emails between students fell off significantly.

Sacerdote analyzed the data along racial lines and gender lines and found that there is a 0.7% chance of two random white students interacting and a 0.4% chance for a random black student to interact with a random white student, confirming Sacerdote’s hypothesis that, despite the university’s efforts to deepen diversity, student relationships are influenced by race.

His research indicated that women tend to email each other far more often than men emailed their male friends. Men were far more likely to email women. He noted that male athletes emailed women far less frequently than their non-athletic male counterparts, but he surmised that the demands of student athletics also meant they had less time for electronic communications.

The data tracked students during their four years at Dartmouth and Sacerdote found that geography has a long-lasting impact on relationships.

Bruce Sacerdote is Associate Professor of Economics at Dartmouth University.
DISCIPLINA in CIVITATEM is the motto of The Ohio State University, and studying and promoting the principles of good citizenship were priorities Ralph. D. Mershon asked that his gift to Ohio State promote. To fulfill both the University’s mission and Mershon’s desire, the Center each year sponsors a Citizenship Speaker Series. This series is organized by Allan Silverman, Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State and faculty fellow of the Mershon Center. The Series brings scholars to Ohio State to discuss the principles of good citizenship from a variety of philosophical perspectives.

Mershon Center Citizenship Speaker Series 2003-2004

Democracy, Citizenship and Legitimacy:
A Citizenship Mini-Conference
Melissa Williams, Associate Professor of Political Science, The University of Toronto
David Estlund, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Brown University
John McCormick, Associate Professor of Political Science, The University of Chicago
October 24, 2003

Julia Annas
Regents Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona
November 21, 2003

Judith Butler
Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley
March 29, 2004
Cosponsored by the Departments of Women's Studies, Philosophy, English, and Comparative Studies

Philip Allott
Professor of International Public Law and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University
March 30, 2004

Mathias Risse
Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Philosophy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
April 16, 2004

Rob Kroes
Professor of American Studies, University of Amsterdam
April 23, 2003

For information about the 2004-2005 Citizenship Speaker Series, please log on to www.mershon.ohio-state.edu.
Phillip Allott thinks it is time to change the way we think about ourselves. He admits many think it is impossible to change, but he thinks we need to “constitutionalize the whole world,” inspire a global “revolution in the mind” and reinstitute humanity in human consciousness.

Allott thought that the twentieth century left humanity at a precipice, the result of a century that demonstrated the meaninglessness and cruelty of the human condition. He said the field of philosophy had become jibberish, attacking itself with meaningless “-isms” and skepticism about philosophy.

Allott added that this kind of “bad philosophy” coincided with terrible historical events: humans created a world intent on destroying itself by the millions in killing fields and gas chambers. He argued that “good” philosophy can undo historical trends and redeem humanity.

Philosophy’s self-destruction is a byproduct of its attempt to transform itself into a natural science, said Allott. The scientific study of humanness often treats the subject as not human, which he said renders philosophy worthless. It diminishes the need to “search for truth” and suggests that truth is only accessible through the scientific method. Philosophers need to get away from this, advised Allott.

He advocated changing the course of human history by returning to the tradition of philosophy on a global level. Increasing globalization means that our habitats are changing and being influenced by other cultures. Allot explained that because the human mind makes the human world, a change in habitat results in a change in view, which is essential for a globalized philosophy.

He called for a return to philosophy’s moral imperative, which allows a rational mind to think consciously of itself. Good philosophy is a form of good consciousness, ruled by a moral imperative and aware of the human world in which people live. Good philosophy is also universal, not just Western, said Allott. It is multicultural and encompasses a global, i.e. non-relative, conception of the human condition. Because he sees philosophy as a social activity, he thinks that it can afford more globalized, human-centered study.

Allott looked specifically at the structures of democracy and capitalism, which he said has made itself immune to philosophical analysis for a variety of reasons: it has naturalized itself into the minds of those who have internalized the philosophy of competition and market forces to such a degree that Allott calls it a “takeover” of human life and mind. It is a socializing ethic that is thought to produce an “ultimate good” even though it actually devalues individual human lives.

Philip Allot is Professor of Law and International Relations, Trinity College, Cambridge.
Judith Butler is widely known for her work on gender, and her current research addresses the legalization of gay marriage. Butler’s analysis looks specifically at state recognition.

She said that all relationships have different facets—emotional, physical, economic. The state interferes with kinship ties by authorizing who can marry and who can be a parent. She said that many who want to legalize gay marriage seek legitimacy for a variety of reasons, both symbolic and practical: recognition for a lifetime commitment; access to the concrete benefits, obligations, and responsibilities that come with a legal marriage; some seek the entitlements which accompany a legal marriage.

Butler disagreed with the idea that a relationship is illegitimate unless it is ratified by the state. This, she said, provides the state with a monopoly in determining who is recognizable and who is not. She argued that relationships existing outside of state’s regulation also need to be viewed as valid and legitimate.

Butler also disagreed with the idea that marriage should be a precondition to entitlements. The way the law is structured, marriage can supersede other kinship relationships in ways that are inappropriate, she said. She gave the example of someone who may prefer to bequeath land to a community or people other than one’s spouse, but where the law has mandated that, by default, a spouse is first in line. Unless it is explicitly otherwise stated, a spouse is the most “legitimate” person of the many relationships in which a person is involved.

She suggested that part of the motivation for the contemporary gay marriage movement arose from the post-AIDS era (although she emphasized that she does not believe that 21st century America is truly post-AIDS), and that many in the movement are seeking legalized marriages as a way to distance themselves from a “sexual anarchy” that is blamed for the AIDS pandemic. For Butler, the quest to make gay marriage the same as heterosexual marriage is an attempt to prove just how “normal”—or heterosexual—homosexual relationships can be. This diminishes the complexity of all relationships and presents them as idealized, and perhaps fictionalized, versions of marriage.

Butler finds efforts to essentialize gender and sexuality to be problematic. Evoking Hegel, she said that humans desire recognition and that legitimation of self arises from a self’s social viability. Therefore, the state has a powerful influence on the self by determining who is recognizable. When gender and sexuality do not fit neatly into the categories recognized by the state, then the self loses agency, recognition, and legitimacy. State recognition is intrinsic to validity of self, and Butler believed that the normative view of gender and sexuality must be broadened to encompass the complex nature of the human experience.

Judith Butler is Maxine Eliot Professor of Rhetoric & Comparative Literature University of California Berkeley.

Butler’s talk was co-sponsored by the Mershon Center and the Departments of English, Women’s Studies, Comparative Studies and Philosophy.
Though often criticized for being atheoretical or too much like self-help armchair psychology, the philosopher Julia Annas called for a revitalization of virtue ethics. The subject concerns the virtues of character, the attainment of character traits, e.g. honesty, bravery, and courage, that shape how one lives, or should live, a life.

Virtue is, she said, a disposition. But critics of virtue ethics claim that virtues are not dispositions in a global sense for people do not always act “according” to their character. A person may typically act in a way that is honest or brave, but in certain situations, she may, for instance, lie or run away. Therefore, situationists claim, a virtue is not a character trait because it is not something that describes a person’s every action.

Annas follows the centuries-old tradition of other ethicists who contend that virtues are global traits. The classical tradition she supports maintains that virtues are dispositions built up through a variety of experiences, resulting in the ability to make the right choice for the right reasons in a variety of circumstances. Even in situations that may be unpleasant, the virtuous person will act virtuously because it is the right thing to do.

For Annas, virtue is a skill that is learned and practiced throughout one’s life. She compared a virtuous person to a master plumber: he or she performs a task with an understanding of how plumbing works, with full knowledge of the problem. The master plumber does not simply follow a guidebook or the mandates of his or her instructor. Rather, in any situation, he or she attacks the problem with an understanding of circumstances and the appropriate response.

The same can be said for the virtuous person, who confronts different situations and analyzes the various factors that surround it and consciously decides to act with virtue, not because it is so ingrained that there is no other option and not because there is no other choice. Annas added that because it is a skill, it is constantly changing and being challenged by life’s situations. There are likely inconsistencies and gaps, but at every stage, the process requires that a person use his mind about what he is doing and must attempt to achieve an understanding of it.

Julia Annas is Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona.

Laws and Institutions

New Books and Articles on Laws and Institutions

60  Herb Weisberg & Clyde Wilcox, Eds.  
    Models of Voting in Presidential Elections: the 2000 Elections  
    (2004, Stanford UP)

61  Nina Berman  
    Impossible Missions?: German Economic, Military and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa  
    (2004, University of Nebraska Press)

62  Richard Gunther, José R. Montero, and Juan Botella, Eds.  
    Democracy in Modern Spain  
    (2004, Yale UP)

Special Events and Conferences

64  CNEP III: Democracy, Values, and Political Intermediation,  
    September 4-6, 2003

65  The Dark Side of Globalization: Trafficking in People,  
    May 13-14, 2004

66  Adaptive Research and Governance in Climate Change,  
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Seminars and Guest Speakers

67  Nina Berman,  
    “König von Jerusalem: German Claims to Sovereignty Over the Holy Land,”  
    April 27, 2004

68  R. William Liddle,  
    “2004 Indonesian Elections: Whither the World’s Largest Muslim Democracy?,”  
    May 21, 2004

69  Timothy Frye, Ted Hopf, Gerry Hudson,  
    “Russia’s Parliamentary Elections,”  
    December 5, 2003

70  Ekaterina Zhuravskaya,  
    “Opportunistic Policy Cycles: A Test in a New Democracy Setting,”  
    November 14, 2003

71  Alexander Domrin,  
    “Election Year in Russia: Results of Parliamentary Elections of 2004, and Options of Further Legal and Political Developments,”  
    February 27, 2004

72  Gillian Sorenson and Samuel Brock,  
    October 24-25, 2003

73  Women in Development

Herb Weisberg & Clyde Wilcox, Eds.

Models of Voting in Presidential Elections offers a comprehensive scholarly examination of the determinants of voter participation and vote choice at play in the 2000 presidential election. Unlike other books that focus exclusively on the drama and unusual circumstances of the 2000 election, this account examines larger issues surrounding the election and its outcome, asking why an election that traditional forecasting models predicted would provide a strong and clear victory for one side was ultimately so close.

Using a variety of models, the authors explore why the election was so close, what happened to the landslide that economic forecast models had predicted, and whether our traditional theories and approaches require reevaluation in light of the outcome.

This book analyzes a variety of matters fundamental to the 2000 election, including the influence of Bill Clinton, his dual legacy, and the economy. The authors detail changing voter coalitions and the influence of a gender gap. They also describe the role of divided government, how voter turnout affects election outcomes, the impact of minor-party candidates, and, more generally, the relative importance of partisanship, candidates, and issues. --Stanford UP, 2003

The Puzzle of the Missing Landslide

Clyde Wilcox and Herbert F. Weisberg

Part I: Attitudinal Models


Views of the Voters, John H. Kessel

The Effects of Campaign Finance Attitudes on Turnout and Vote Choice in the 2000 Elections, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, J. Tobin Grant, and Thomas J. Ruldoph

Ideology in the 2000 Election: A Study in Ambivalence, William G. Jacoby

Part II: Group Voting Models


The Enduring Gender Gap, Kristin Kanthak and Barbara Norrander

Part III: Beyond The Two-Party Presidential Vote

A Decline in Ticket Splitting and the Increasing Salience of Party Labels, David C. Kimball

The Half-Hearted Rise: Voter Turnout in the 2000 Election, Steven E. Finkel and Paul Freedman

Minor Parties in the 2000 Presidential Election, Barry C. Burden
Impossible Missions?: German Economic, Military, and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa

Nina Berman

This study of the German presence in Africa in the modern period exposes forms of cultural domination that derive from a philosophy of progress and “good intentions.” The humanitarian belief in development, however, can ultimately lead to the same structural imbalances that an overtly racist model of intervention produces. Berman examines five case studies involving German individuals and their respective “missions” in Africa: Max Eyth in Egypt, Albert Schweitzer in Gabon, Ernst Udet in East Africa, Bodo Kirchoff in Somalia, and modern-day tourists in Kenya. These engineers, doctors, pilots, soldiers, and tourists believed that their presence and actions would benefit the respective countries and their inhabitants. Nevertheless, their interventions created profound problems for Africans.

Nina Berman describes the structures of domination that date back to colonialism but did not disappear with decolonization and are, in fact, integral to today’s global economy. She also critiques the avoidance of African material reality in most of the analyses of European images of Africa, which has led to a perpetuation of the old model of Africanism. By highlighting patterns of domination that did not disappear with decolonization, Impossible Missions? disputes previous assumptions about why global inequality has not only persisted but increased.

-- University of Nebraska Press, 2004
Democracy in Modern Spain

by Richard Gunther, José R. Montero, Joan Botella

This book, written by three of the world’s leading experts on Spanish politics, is the first comprehensive study of the origins and basic character of Spain’s democratic political system. It analyzes the regime’s core political institutions, its political parties and party systems, patterns of electoral behavior, the evolution of Spain’s political culture, and the impact of these social and institutional changes on public policy processes and outputs.

The authors survey those aspects of Spanish society and politics that had contributed to the country’s inability to sustain a stable and democratic regime prior to the 1970s. They argue that the successful transition to and consolidation of democracy was made possible by socioeconomic modernization, cultural change, and by decisions made by political elites in the establishment of core democratic institutions and the conduct of electoral competition. This book is based on over 500 hours of interviews with Spanish political elites, extensive analyses of survey data, and other original research. -- Yale UP, 2004

Richard Gunther is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State and faculty fellow at the Mershon Center, where he teaches and researches comparative politics, with a special emphasis on Spanish politics. He has authored and edited numerous books, including Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges (with José Ramón Montero and Juan J. Linz, eds., Oxford UP, 2002), Political Parties and Democracy (with Larry Diamond, Johns Hopkins UP, 2001), Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (with P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Johns Hopkins UP, 2001), and Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective (with Anthony Mughan, Cambridge UP, 2000). His articles have appeared in publications such as Party Politics, Comparative Politics, and others.

Gunther has a long and distinguished record of outstanding research and teaching; he was recently awarded the 2004 Faculty Award for Distinguished University Service.

José Ramón Montero is Professor of Political Science at the Instituto Juan March, and at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

Joan Botella is Professor of Political Science at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
Selected Articles on Laws and Institutions


The Mershon Center hosted a conference as part of the project on Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Politics in Comparative Perspective (CNEP). At this conference, scholars reported the findings of cross-national comparative analyses of survey data collected over the past decade in the thirteen countries of the Comparative National Elections Project. These papers are currently being prepared for publication.

This conference also provided an opportunity to plan for the expansion of the CNEP to include new teams of scholars who will conduct surveys of political attitudes and behavior in Portugal, at least four countries in Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Ghana) and three in Asia (Taiwan, Nepal and the People’s Republic of China). This will broaden the scope of the CNEP to include eighteen countries on five continents, making the CNEP one of the most ambitious cross-national, interdisciplinary research projects in the world today. Its principal investigators include four OSU faculty (Paul Beck, William Liddle, Bradley Richardson, and Richard Gunther, the international coordinator of the project).

Initially, the CNEP focused on electoral behavior in four established democratic countries (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). But with the expansion of this project in the mid-1990s to include Spain, Chile Uruguay, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Hong Kong and Indonesia, its principal line of analysis shifted to include such crucial questions as support for democracy in newly democratized or substantially transformed systems, the processes translating cultural and social cleavages into lines of partisan conflict, the political impact of “traditional” vs. “modern” values in these societies, and the relationship between satisfaction with the economic situation of a country and support for newly established democratic regimes. Forthcoming surveys will prominently feature analyses of foreign policy and national security issues that have assumed great importance in recent years.

Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Mariano Torcal, “Attitudes Towards Democracy, Political Behavior, and Intermediation”


Bradley Richardson and Paul Beck, “The Power of Social Networks and Partisanship”


Diana C. Mutz, “Where in the World is the Public Sphere?”

Paolo Bellucci, Marco Maraffi, and Paolo Segatti, “Secondary Associations: The Organizational Context of Electoral Behavior”

Richard Gunther and H. C. Kuan, “Values, Ideologies, and Partisan Conflict”
The Dark Side of Globalization: Trafficking in People

This conference examined one of the most serious violations of human rights existing in the 21st century in the world—trafficking in people.

Trafficking is the recruitment, harboring, transporting, providing or obtaining, by any means, any person for labor or services involving forced labor, slavery or servitude in any industry, such as forced or coerced participation in agriculture, forced prostitution, manufacturing, or other industries or in domestic service or marriage.

The keynote presentation, delivered by Maria Tchomarova, of Animus Association in Bulgaria and an international expert of trafficking in people, offered a detailed analysis of the problem of trafficking. Tchomarova described the poor economic conditions as one factor that explains the trafficking of people from the countries from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Today about 75% of the people from the former communist countries live below the poverty level. Sixty-five percent of the long-term unemployed women are between 18 and 30 years. Lured by advertisements for seasonal work abroad many young people feel that this is their chance for a better life. When transported abroad, however, they become easy victims. Tchomarova detailed the mechanisms used by traffickers to target and recruit young people and discussed the psychological conditions of the experience: the victims are physically and mentally abused and manipulated until they become automatic profit producers. Victims who manage to escape usually suffer long-term psychological damage.

Conference Participants

Maria Tchomarova, Animus Association, “Trafficking in People: Q & A”


Wendy Hesford, Ohio State, “Geopolitical Rhetorics: Global Sex Work and Anti-Trafficking Campaigns”

Ara Wilson, Ohio State, “Remapping Trafficking: Conceptualizing Customer Demand”

Sandra Dickson, POPPY Project, “Trafficking into the UK: Providing Services and Who Misses Out”

Zarin Gupta, Save Our Sisters, India, “Problems and Efforts in Tackling Human Trafficking in India and the UK”

Sarah Stevenson, IREX, “Economic Empowerment as a Mechanism of Trafficking Prevention”

Sandra Claassen, Humanitas, “Social and Labor Inclusion of Women Affected by Trafficking in Human Beings”

Stana Buchowska, La Strada, “The Situation in Poland and Central East Europe in the Context of Poland’s Assesion into the EU”

Petra Burcikova, La Strada, “Trafficking in Persons in the Czech Republic and Activities of La Strada Czech Republic as Part of La Strada Network”
Scholars from a variety of disciplines, including Economics, Geography, Political Science, and others, came to Ohio State to discuss the human dimension of climate change during the Adaptive Research and Governance in Climate Change conference. With an eye on the policy-relevant, social scientific study of climate change and attacking the problem with an integrated approach, the conference convened scholars for two days to focus on one question: how to marry the diverse research on climate change to develop a policy to improve the environmental crisis.

The conference keynote address was given by Roger Kasperson of the Stockholm Environmental Institute, who discussed the challenges of determining markers of “success” in climate change. Because there are so many human dimensions that both contribute to the problem and result from it, understanding the problem is an ambitious project. For example, food scarcity is a very real and problematic outcome of climate change. But if one of the goals of policy would be to protect biodiversity, developing strategies to improve both requires a comprehensive multi-stress analysis of the human dimensions.

Keynote Addresses:

Roger Kasperson, Stockholm Environmental Institute
Hadi Dowlatabadi, Sustainable Development Research Institute
Robert Mendelsohn, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Science
Ronald Mitchell, Dept. of Political Science, University of Oregon
B.L. Turner, Dept. of Geography, Clark University

ARGCC Committee Members

Joseph Arvai, School of Natural Resources
Tomas Koontz, School of Natural Resources
April Luginbuhl, Dept. of Geography
Paul Robbins, Dept. of Geography
Brent Sohngen, Dept. of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Alexander Thompson, Dept. of Political Science
Nina Berman used a Mershon Center faculty grant to explore the historical relationship between Germany and the Middle East. By studying historic texts and personal travel accounts, Berman discovered that the German claim to the throne of Jerusalem was part of a German perception that the Holy Lands of the Middle East were very much part of Germany. She said that it was not “other,” it was part of the German “self.”

As early as 983 C.E., German travelers began taking pilgrimages from western Europe to the Middle East in such great numbers that a route eventually developed allowing travelers to stop each night at a hotel run by Germans that served German beer. It was as though they never left home. According to Berman’s interpretation of first-hand accounts of these Holy pilgrimages, these Germans did not feel they had.

Berman explained that for over 800 years, Palestine had been ruled by European states. Germans had physical contact with Muslims through their holy pilgrimages east; there was also a Muslim presence in Spain. Germans were intellectually tied with the Middle East through the study of Biblical texts. Alexander the Great’s writings, which describe his rule over Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, were widely read, and because Germans saw themselves as successors to the Roman and Greek empires, they identified themselves as rulers over the kingdoms of the Middle East.

Berman identified passages in the World Chronicles that indicated the widely-held belief that Germany and the Holy Lands were, in fact, of the same kingdom. The chronicles tell the story of creation through the histories of Roman and Greek empires, all culminating in Germany ruling these lands.

The title König von Jerusalem, a title still used by members of the Hapsburg family, was passed through the royal family starting with the crusades. To emphasize his family’s importance in the region, König Conrad listed this as his first title, which Berman sees as evidence not only that the family saw the Middle East as part of its kingdom and that it was a highly significant part of it.

Nina Berman is Associate Professor of Germanic Languages and Literatures. She is the author of several books, including her most recent, Impossible Missions: German Economic, Military, and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa.
R. William Liddle continued his study of Indonesia’s democratic elections as part of a project funded by the Mershon Center. He analyzed data from elections between 1955 and 2004, a time span that includes the overthrow of military dictator Suharto and a return to democratic elections. Liddle said that analysis of these elections indicates three primary trends: continuity, increased fragmentation in party politics, and democratic vitality.

Liddle explained that since 1955, there has been a strong relationship between religion and politics. Each of the three largest groups—syncretists, modernists, and traditionalist Muslims—had a party that reflected their religious preferences. There has been increased fragmentation as these main parties have changed in democratic Indonesia, and Liddle identified how certain parties, like GOLKAR (a secular nationalist party), have maintained their presence while others, like PNI, have morphed into other parties (PNI turned into PDI-P, also secular and nationalists, but synchrenist in its religiosity). The three original parties that existed under Suharto’s regime have splintered and regrouped over time: in 1955, Liddle identified four primary political parties. By 2004, there were eleven.

One of those is PKS, a party that has been gaining popularity in the two most recent elections, said Liddle. PKS is largely fundamentalist Muslim and arose from the secular university system. Its strategy is two-fold: to build a reputation of being highly technical as well as adherent to the Koran, and to build relationships with the wider world, largely by playing down its fundamentalism. It presents itself as a caring and non-corrupt party by sending its members to help in events like natural disasters and by making a big show in returning bribes, which Liddle said are commonplace in Indonesian politics.

Liddle anticipated that one candidate, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who most call SBY, would dominate the presidential election on July 5, 2004. His popularity spanned religious groups and many parties supported his election more than their own candidates. Liddle was cautiously optimistic about SBY’s ability to lead Indonesia, and he expressed concern that SBY’s party, Partie Demokrat, was new and loosely cobbled together to support his candidacy. Liddle was concerned that the party’s instability may make it difficult for them to work with other parties in the legislature.
Russia’s Parliamentary Elections

The day before the parliamentary elections in Russia, three of Mershon’s faculty members discussed the political situation surrounding the elections.

Gerry Hudson put them in the larger political context of the country, arguing that it is important to study these elections because they provide important indicators for the presidential elections.

Hudson reported on data indicates that during the years since 1989, participation in Russian elections had been mixed. While the presidential election consistently drew more voters, in 1989, almost 90% of Russians voted during the parliamentary elections. By 1993, that rate had fallen to 54%. Hudson said that this dropoff may seem dramatic, but in the context of other elections, the current turnout rate is actually quite normal: in 2002, German participation in the Bundestag election was approximately 80% and in French elections, participation was around 60%. In the United States, the 2002 elections for the House of Representatives had 39% voter participation. Hudson said that Russian turnout rates are “not bad,” compared with other industrialized nations; the maturation of Russian democracy has resulted in a falloff of voter participation and a consolidation of parties as people become more accustomed to representative government.

Timothy Frye said these elections are a good indicator of future elections, since the Duma has strong influence in Russian policy and the country’s laws require a majority to pass legislation. This year is especially important, said Frye, because if Putin is to be allowed a third term, his party will have to elect its legislative candidates in order to amend the constitution to allow a third term.

Frye said these elections provide a great window into the operation of Russian business, as well. The Russian parliament has strong and somewhat transparent ties to large Russian businesses, especially in the case of Union of Right Wing Forces. One Russian company—oil giant Yukos—dominates the party not only because it is so wealthy, but because its leader is such a high-profile media figure.

In contrast, United Russia, Putin’s party, is strategically weak because there are few dynamic leaders. Frye said that they have been in a somewhat unenviable position, trying to forge a party identity at the same time they are trying to legislate and ensure their own survival.

Ted Hopf’s recent work in Russia indicated that party identification is important to the masses, posing possible problems for Putin and his regime. He showed several examples of political party propaganda and discussed how the media, which is largely state-controlled, shows a notable bias against certain parties, like United Russia, and leans toward conservatism even though centrist parties tend to be growing more rapidly. Further, the media tends to cover Vladimir Zhiranovksy, Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), because his behavior tends to be quite bizarre and entertaining. Hopf said that it is important to recognize that the media plays an important, if biased, role in the elections.

Timothy Frye (l) is Associate Professor of Political Science and author of numerous articles on political economy about Russia and other former Soviet states.

Ted Hopf is Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State.

Gerry Hudson is Professor of Political Science at Wittenberg University. He spent this year as a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center.
Russian political economist Ekaterina Zhuravskaya’s research focuses on opportunistic political cycles in Russia. She said the existing literature on political cycle theory shows, at best, mixed results based on varied evidence, and at worst, weak findings based on thin empirical evidence. She suspects the inconclusive findings can be explained by the fact that most scholars look at the political cycles of developed countries. She claims focusing on Russia, which is both a developed country and a young democracy, yields better data and informs the contemporary debates on political cycle theory.

According to her findings, cross-country analysis and within-country studies of young democracies show significant and robust political cycles. Her data suggests that asymmetric information, irrationality, and the immaturity of democracy may amplify the size of opportunistic cycles. In Russia, this is especially true and observable because of the detailed data that is collected.

Opportunistic political cycles occur when politicians exploit growth and inflation in the face of an election and are helped by a naïve voting public, who believe gains that immediately precede an election will continue into the future. In Russia, where voter awareness is somewhat limited because of local control over the media, this is especially prevalent. Also, Zhuravskaya’s research indicates that the cycles in Russia are wildly varied.

Looking at detailed information available from Geskomstat, a Russian government agency that tracks statistics on elections, Zhuravskaya focused on government spending on social programs around election time. She said that even though spending tends to gradually increase nine months before the election, a large jump takes place in the month preceding it.

She said these cycles are very short and emphasized that without the detailed monthly data available from Geskomstat, the steep increase (and then steep decrease) in government spending would disappear in analyses that look at longer spans of time. Steeper cycles mean the government is less accountable than in cycles which are longer and smoother, according to Zhuravskaya.

Zhuravskaya said that government expenditures on health care and education peak about six months before an election and decline shortly thereafter. She found that regional wage arrears, wage levels, and incomes tend to spike just before an election and decline quickly after.

Her data from Russia and other new democracies shows that opportunistic political cycles decrease with increases in education, urbanization, computerization, freedom of media, maturity of democracy, and transparency of the government.

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya is Academic Director and Hans Rausing Assistant Professor of Economics at the Centre for Economic and Financial Research in Moscow.
Russian political scientist Alexander Domrin studied the 2003 Russian elections and analyzed why the American media described them as “free, but not fair.” He argued that this characterization of the outcome was incorrect and hypothesized that Western audiences thought the elections were unfair because Russia’s pro-Western candidates did not do well in the election. He said that during the 1995 and 1999 elections, the Western media declared the voting to be very “free” and “democratic;” Domrin argued that this was because U.S.-friendly candidates did well in these elections.

In 2001, he said that two parties, Yabloko and Union of Rightist Forces, benefited greatly from $17.4 million of American economic support. These were the only two parties that were able to cross the 5% threshold of popular support for a party to claim a seat in the Russian parliament. Domrin said that the United States was frustrated by the parties’ failure to have more influence in the government in light of strong economic support from Washington in the 2003 election.

The only party that has the right to cry unfairness is the Russian Communist party, said Domrin. Of the four primary television stations in Russia, only one attempted to be objective in their reporting on the views of Communist candidates. Of the three who did not even feign objectivity, all but one of the forty-eight references to the party were negative.

Domrin spoke strongly against the Russian Democracy Act in U.S. law, which he described as absurd. He criticized the decision to devote funds and time to support a candidate determined by Washington to be a “true” Democrat. Domrin likened this to the Russian government deciding that filmmaker Michael Moore was a “true” Democrat and funding his (and his party’s) political campaign, training him and his staff, hiring campaigners, and inviting him to Russia to give talks…and paying him $70,000 to do it.

Domrin admitted that foreign influence and the influx of foreign capital has a strong effect on Russian elections, but that it is clear that many foreign governments do not fully understand the dynamics of the Russian voting public and are surprised when their well-trained and well-financed candidates do poorly. He said that when these foreign governments are disappointed with the outcome of the election, they become critical of the entire Russian democracy. Domrin joked that Colin Powell had accused Russia of not maintaining a balance of power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; Domrin explained that unlike the American constitution, the Russian constitution does not call for such a balance of power.

Rather, the system situates power in a super-president. Domrin explained that this system was adopted during the reign of Boris Yeltsin, who was strongly supported by the United States. Now that the nation is led by a man with weaker ties to Washington, the U.S. government is critical of the system, he said.

Domrin said that Western governments need to rationally and fairly analyze the Russian system before condemning it; he said that the Russian economy is stronger under Vladimir Putin that is under Yeltsin. He said that the world needs to understand and respect the views of the Russian people, who may disagree with U.S. views, but are genuinely supportive of democracy in their homeland.

Alexander N. Domrin is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law (Moscow), a research and legislation-drafting division of the Russian federal government.
The Columbus chapter of the United Nations Association hosted an intercollegiate forum, which asked students to debate the relevance of the United Nations system in the twenty-first century.

For two days, delegates from UNA chapters at universities throughout Ohio and neighboring states discussed various aspects of the UN system, including the relevance of security council, the role of NGOs, the World Trade Organization, health care and others.

The event began with a keynote address given by Gillian Sorensen, Assistant Secretary-General for External Relations in Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Samuel Brock, Deputy Director of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.

Sorensen argued that the U.N. remains relevant and that its programs extend beyond peacekeeping, which only accounts for twenty percent of its activities: it also supports disarmament, development, humanitarian relief, promoting human rights for women and children, spearheading environmental initiatives, and others.

The war in Iraq brought a lot attention to the United Nations. Sorensen said that the United States is a colossus that sometimes sends mixed messages to other nations about its commitment to international relationships, but that the U.S. simply cannot fight some problems by itself. Those issues that are truly global—like the environment and the spread of disease—need international cooperation, and the U.N. is well-positioned to deal with such issues.

She added that the United States is feared by other nations because of its military strength—and willingness to use it—but not always respected. Its power makes the U.S. a central part of the U.N., but its presence is not always welcomed. She said that many countries would prefer “true” leadership, which includes fulfilling its financial obligations.

Sorensen admitted the U.N cannot function without the United States, because it is idealistic to expect such an organization to do so much with so few resources, a situation that would be compounded by an American withdrawal.

Samuel Brock said that the U.S. is part of the world, and that it does not, as some have argued, shirk its international responsibilities. He lamented that the United States often does not get credit for the many international programs it supports without the U.N.

He said that the U.S. is not likely to fully commit to United Nations plans until some issues have been addressed: Washington would like to contribute its leadership and expertise, not just its money to initiatives, like the war against terror and others that are especially important to Americans.

Further, the U.S. would like to see a reform of the general assembly, including the creation of a “wise person’s” panel, an agenda for the assembly that would cluster similar issues together and help de-clutter an unmanageable workload, a more powerful leadership that could terminate ineffective or old agenda items, a focus on “results-based” management and budgeting, and a cessation of what Brock said was an excessive use of “emergency sessions.” He was confident that these reforms would allow the U.N. to be a more streamlined and effective organization whose success would speak for itself.

Brock said that making the U.N. a viable and capable group would inspire Washington to commit its resources, support, and energy.
Women in Development

2003-2004 OSU-WID Speakers

Mahnaz Afkhami
President of the Women’s Learning Partnership and former Minister of State for Women’s Affairs in Iran
“Politics of Participation: Women’s Leadership Training and Human Rights in Muslim Societies”

Maria Nuria De Cesaris
Venezuelan consultant and policy specialist

Rebecca Ribeiro-Ayeh Clarke
Harcourt Publishing, Oxford, UK
“Knowledge, Power, Publishing and Pioneering African Women”

Amy Lind
Independent Scholar and Consultant and a faculty associate at Arizona State University
“Neoliberal Paradoxes: Cultural Struggles Over Gender and Development in the Andes”

Ayesha Mei-Tje Thian Imam
Columbia University
“The Rights of Women in Muslim Communities under Customary, Religious and Secular Law in Nigeria.”

Caroline O.N. Moser
New School University/Overseas Development Institute
“Reflections on Building a Women’s Movement for Peace in Colombia”

Sangeeta Kamat
University of Massachusetts Amherst
“The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGOs in the Neoliberal Era.”

Sangita Koparde
Human Rights specialist and labor organizer.
“The Impact of the Quota System on Women’s Empowerment in Rural India”

Urvashi Butalia
Founder, Kali for Women, India
“Interrogating/Speaking Peace: Women in Conflict Situations in India”

Carmen Diana Deere
University of Massachusetts Amherst
“Liberalism and Married Women’s Property Rights in 19th Century Latin America”

Louise Fortmann
Rudy Grah Professor of Forestry and Sustainable Development at the University of California at Berkeley
“Widening the Analytical Circle: Gender, Property, Democracy and the Environment”

OSU Women in Development is a group of Ohio State University faculty, staff, undergraduate and graduate students, and Columbus residents interested in cutting-edge research, policy making, peace and security, and activism on gender issues in social and economic development and globalization.

A member of the international organization, the Association for Women’s Rights in Development, OSU-WID provides information on timely gender issues in development, organizing, jobs, internships, grants, publications, conferences, and other events.

Rapid global transformations affect people’s lives both politically and economically. OSU-WID provides a forum for discussing women’s contributions as agents of change and the situations in which women, their families and communities find themselves as a result of broader change processes.

OSU-WID sponsors events, often with other organizations, such as luncheon seminars, brown-bag discussions, films, workshops, get-togethers, and public events that highlight issues of women in development and gender differences. Coordinated by Cathy Rakowski, Associate Professor of Women’s Studies and Rural Sociology, OSU-WID sponsors events with a variety of co-sponsors, including the Mershon Center.
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Fighting Terrorism

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Stephen Walt focused on the global response to what he called American “primacy,” also called American hegemony or empire. He said political theories should consider that America is alone at the top of the superpower heap and analyze the ways in which other nations respond to that. He said he drew on a “theoretically eclectic” base of research to explore this situation.

Where many Americans see the United States as a benevolent leader who uses its power to fight for what is “true” or “just” or “right,” other states frequently see the United States as a bully whose action stirs a simmering pot of resentment. Walt quoted many of the world’s political and cultural elite, and showed polling data from a variety of countries that showed an unfavorable assessment of U.S. foreign policy.

Some states fear that, at any moment, Washington can turn its cross-hairs on them, which puts even U.S. allies on edge. Even those who can be fairly confident that they will remain in good U.S. favor still worry about a conflict of interest. Walt said that the sheer size of U.S. power means that Washington will likely get its way with little regard for its allies’ interests.

Walt said frustrations about policy are exacerbated by America’s history of hypocrisy: claiming to oppose nuclear testing and demanding that India and Pakistan stop theirs while the U.S. continues a long history of nuclear arms development and testing. Crying foul of the terrorist attack on 9/11, the Japanese reminded Washington of their own history of targeting civilians for political purposes in Hiroshima. This kind of making rules for others and violating them itself further alienates many from American support, according to Walt.

In light of criticism of U.S. policy, how do other states deal with the United States? He dismissed some balance-of-power theories, like bandwagoning. Increasingly, Walt said, groups are influencing American policy through the use of special interest groups. Citing the Israeli and Armenian lobbies as two organizations that effectively mobilize Americans and their sense of cultural loyalty to benefit other states, Walt said that by manipulating the way American policy is made, states are figuring out how to impact American foreign (and domestic) policies.

He identified other strategies nations can use to influence the United States despite their power differential. Balancing of power was an effective tool for France, Germany, and Russia, whose alliance on the U.N. Security Council prevented the United States from getting approval to invade Iraq. Asymmetric response can be effective in battles, something enemy armies are using to their advantage in Iraq: rather than confronting U.S. forces in open desert, where they have proven themselves to be effective, Iraqis have learned that America’s armed forces are more vulnerable when fighting in urban centers, for example. This strategy exploits U.S. vulnerabilities so that even if an opponent cannot beat the United States, it can increase the damage and costs the U.S. suffers.

Blackmail can be an effective strategy, Walt suggested, adding that both allies and enemies can use it to negotiate with Washington on a more level playing field. Passive resistance—just saying no, he called it—has proven effective for the Russians, who politely nod when Washington asks that they halt support of Iran’s nuclear arms program. Knowing that the U.S. will not actually do anything to them, Moscow simply says no to American requests.

To improve its image abroad, Walt concluded that the U.S. needs to have a more subtle foreign policy, be more generous with its vast coffers of the world’s wealth, keep U.S. borders open to foreign visitors and especially foreign students, and to increase its use of public diplomacy. More immediately, it needs to recognize that its foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically its relationship with Israel, has a direct impact on terrorism.

Stephen M. Walt is Academic Dean and Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University. He has authored numerous books, including The Origins of Alliances (1987), which received the 1988 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award from the Mershon Center.
Barry Posen's research looks at the European Union Security Plan (ESDP), which he said was an effort to conceive, plan, and carry out military planning in support of EU goals. He said that in the long-term, there is likely to be a unified military and security plan, but that it will be designed to allow for great flexibility for member states.

Posen said that a military component to the EU has been discussed for many years, but that their inability and the United State’s unwillingness to intervene in the Balkans was the impetus for the creation of a military policy. The process was accelerated after 9/11, when NATO’s offer of military support of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was rejected. After years of heavy-handedness in its foreign policy and the perception that Washington flaunted its power in offensive ways (Posen cited its refusal to share intelligence in NATO’s mission in Kosovo as an example), this rebuke offended many in the EU, who concluded that Washington neither wanted nor needed their help, and that European states were not important.

Posen said NATO is a factor because the ESDP is likely to complement the older organization and not replace it.

ESDP will be designed to support EU goals, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and crisis management responsibilities. On paper, it appears to be autonomous, but Posen said that in reality, NATO will still be the first tapped to respond to conflict. Only if NATO decided not to act would an EU military group get involved. He added that the current ESDP plan does not explicitly call for the creation of an army, although it is implicit for many. NATO would remain the classic defense unit and have first “rights of refusal,” said Posen.

Council of the EU and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), are senior diplomats who are excellent scholars and understand that ESDP must fit into larger, global security policies. Despite this, Posen identified several potential problems with the current plan.

He said the people who would be identified to be part of an EU military unit are the same as those used by NATO and their own country’s units. Also, because NATO has first shot at any action, this diminishes the role that ESDP forces could play.

These shortfalls deny the EU an opportunity to create a first-class military, said Posen. While admittedly nowhere near the U.S military in strength or expenditures, European states are quite capable militarily, said Posen.

He thought it was effective to look at American power through the eyes of EU member states, because it helps to explain why they are approaching ESDP as they are. Posen said that according to offensive realist theories, the U.S. can be expected to use its power, and with great disparities in strength, it need not fear coalition strength.

The EU can respond to this by bandwagoning, and Posen predicted that a tempered form of this will result. He does not foresee a situation where the EU member states wholly reject NATO or their alliance with Washington, but he anticipates and uncomfortable bandwagoning among EU states that allow them to “keep their options open.” He says that this will likely take place over a long period of time, because history has shown that the EU moves slowly and methodically. He added that according to polls, many in Europe seek a unified foreign policy before a security or military policy.

Barry R. Posen is Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and part of its Security Studies Program. He is author of Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks and The Sources of Military Doctrine.
Robert Wescott, who was a senior economic advisor to President Clinton, argued that economic factors are as important, if not more important, than military planning when devising a comprehensive security plan to combat terrorism. He said the strength of the U.S. economy is frequently overlooked, but he thought a strong economy and effective economic policy were instrumental in making America secure.

Wescott said that strong economic policy results in a strong economy, which, at its most basic, allows a nation to buy what it needs. Further, a strong economy allows companies to focus on research and development, affording gains in all kinds of technology and gains in “soft power.”

Wescott said that strong economic policy puts Washington in a powerful position to model good fiscal management and assist other nations in improving their own fiscal positions. He argued that global poverty and the “clash of civilizations” between rich and poor nations has a powerful impact on security. He said the areas that have been identified as terrorist trouble spots, like Pakistan and Indonesia, are regions plagued by devastating poverty. With high rates of unemployment in all age groups, especially for youth, these countries are particularly fertile for anti-western sentiments and violent extremism.

A strong U.S. economy also lessens Washington’s reliance on foreign capital. When American economic strength is controlled by international investment, it makes it less secure overall, said Wescott.

One of the most oft-cited vulnerabilities to the U.S. economy is its dependence on foreign oil. When oil prices go up, the U.S. industrial economy slows down. Because Washington has little formal control over the price of oil, a large segment of the U.S. economy rests on the power of other countries and OPEC. Wescott advocated a more rational energy policy that recognizes the connections between American intervention in oil-rich companies and the negative effect that has on industrial productivity and the overall U.S. economy.

He also called for change in international economic policy, saying that the United States has been carrying the bulk of a weak world economy for over ten years, which puts a severe drain on domestic resources. By advocating rational international economic reform that allows other nations to strengthen their own economic growth, it benefits all nations. He also said that Washington needed to be smarter in using its economic influence in institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Wescott said that, both politically and economically, U.S. leaders need to be more aware of diplomacy as a tool for change. By becoming a state that leads by example and assists other countries to achieve their own economic success, the world becomes more stable.

The current budget deficit is a “train wreck,” said Wescott, and reckless federal spending creates a deficit that weakens the country, making it more vulnerable. A vulnerable state is not a secure state, and when the United States suffers from a weakened economy, it makes it more difficult to fight issues like terrorism, Wescott concluded.

Robert Wescott was Special Assistant to the President for International Economics at the National Economic Council (NEC) under President Bill Clinton, where he helped develop policies on a wide range of international economic and financial issues.
William Quandt analyzed the Bush Administration’s policies toward the Middle East and the long-term implications for U.S. security.

Quandt said that the administration is doing something quite interesting which reflects their perceptions of Arab culture. 9/11 drew worldwide attention to the Middle East and Bush’s response produced an important change in U.S.-Arab relations.

The prior fifty years was fairly consistent, said Quandt. After the end of the Cold War, during the first Bush and the Clinton Administrations, the policies could be described as a “pragmatic internationalism” and selective engagement: force was used in Kuwait but in a multilateral context. Clinton largely maintained the same policy in the Middle East, and after he took office, he kept several high-ranking administrators and diplomats from the first Bush administration, including Dennis Ross.

These traditional policies led to reasonably stable oil prices and a modest U.S. presence in the region.

In contrast, the current Bush administration’s policies have resulted in large fluctuations in oil prices, a vastly more expensive military engagement, and the loss of a large number of U.S. lives.

Quandt said this shift resulted from several factors, including the President’s personality. Unlike his father, the current president has shown little interest in international affairs and he also has very strong and generally conservative convictions—especially when it concerns international law, which he thinks should not constrain American action. Quandt added that Bush demonstrated a strong streak of self-righteousness and delegated important decisions to his staff.

That staff, while diverse, tends to be led by hardened neoconservatives, said Quandt. Colin Powell, though a moderate who is quite popular with the State Department, is often overruled by those, like Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, who fear radical Islam, are staunchly pro-Israel, and believe in “clash of civilization” theories, leading them to promote Wilsonian themes. Quandt said their biases became clear during the early days of the administration.

Quandt said it will be impossible to know for many years whether forced regime change in Iraq was a good or bad idea, but he described the war as a “war of choice,” one that played on the fear that Saddam Hussein might one day develop weapons of mass destruction. It had little support or precedent in international law and has yielded a situation in which a post-war Iraq may actually be more pro-Islamic than pro-American. Quandt thought that Bush had no grand strategy, little planning for the long-term success of the country or the region, and few expectations about costs and consequences.

Quandt was weary of what he saw as a grand plan to remake the entire Middle East, especially when designed by those who are biased against the idea that Islam and Democracy are reconcilable and are willing to sacrifice both regional and global partnerships, yet not deal with the critical underlying problems in the Middle East.

William Quandt is the Edward Stettinius Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia.
For those who study the United States’ role in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, Ambassador Dennis Ross is a familiar name: for over twelve years he played a key role in negotiations between the two groups.

He called for the resumption of peace talks, which Ross said stalled as soon as Bush took office. The sudden stop, which Ross joked happened on January 19, 2000 (the day before Bush was sworn in as president), interrupted what he saw as a real movement toward peace and left a legacy of pain, distrust and anger that may be difficult to undo.

When Ariel Sharon offered a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza Strip settlements, Ross saw it as an incomplete offer. He said it accomplishes little unless it can be part of a package that requires concessions of the Palestinians and provides them with tools and conditions that will afford success as an independent state. He saw a lost opportunity in the Bush Administration’s refusal to take Sharon’s offer as part of a peace process.

Ross suggested the refusal to get involved stems from Bush’s wholesale rejection of anything from the Clinton Administration (including Ross himself, who had worked under both Clinton and the first President Bush). He added that the administration seems to falsely believe that if total peace cannot be achieved, there is nothing to be done. Ross disagreed, and he believed that progress in the talks during the Clinton years prevented the full-scale intifada which rages now.

The Bush Administration’s “Roadmap,” is unlikely to be effective said Ross, who described it as a shallow attempt to bring Arabs and Europeans on board with his view of peace for the region: it included fifty-two paragraphs of obligations, but no detail about how Israel or Palestine were supposed to fulfill those obligations.

Ross was critical of Arafat, who he said failed to agree to peace when very favorable terms were offered. Ross concluded Arafat cannot make peace but that does not mean that negotiations with Palestinians are impossible. He felt the United States should use unilateral Israeli moves to garner Palestinian cooperation and that it was essential for Washington to strengthen the herd of more moderate Palestinian leaders rather than playing into the hands of Hamas and violent organizations which is what he feared withdrawal in the face of terror did.

Ambassador Dennis Ross was key in the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians for over twelve years. He is currently Director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of The Missing Peace (Farrar Strauss & Giroux, 2004).
According to Rand Beers, the U.S. government missed some important strategic initiatives in Afghanistan, which may make reconstruction extremely difficult.

Beers said Al Qaeda—a powerful, non-state actor with numerous small groups spread throughout several countries—proved difficult to fight with conventional tactics. Despite this, the action taken in Afghanistan was swift, effective, and a successful, coordinated effort of armies from many different countries, said Beers. He described it as the best strategy to fight terrorism.

Unfortunately, it was also rife with problems that may make it difficult for coalition troops to extract themselves, and Beers identified several reasons why resolution may prove problematic. Reconstruction efforts have been poorly coordinated among participating states and military planners seriously underestimated the enduring power of Afghan warlords and the resurgence of the poppy crop as the only viable means for economic security in that nation. Beers agreed with critics who feared that a loss of interest in Afghanistan and a focus on Iraq may result in a further erosion of security in the region. Not only would that jeopardize U.S. troops still in Afghanistan, it will create the same post-war climate that spawned the Taliban and allowed for the growth of Al Qaeda.

When the War in Iraq began, Washington ill-advisedly did not plan adequately for the chaos that followed, nor did it anticipate the problems it would face in building a new state.

As in Afghanistan, said Beers, the United States failed to design a realistic training program for a military organization that could manage the dangers of rebuilding after a war. He said that the Bush administration underestimated the time, training, and support an Iraqi army would need, making it difficult for American troops to extract themselves from the area.

Beers considered the military action in Afghanistan to be a success, in part because it was resolved quickly and involved international troops, but the Bush administration points to Afghanistan's slow recovery as justification for unilateral intervention. Beers acknowledged that international initiatives complicate military action, but he disagreed with Bush who allowed these complications to justify acting more unilaterally.

Beers argued that this go-it-alone approach had weakened Washington’s authority in the United Nations and alienated Washington’s important and long-standing European allies and other friends around the world.

Beers said that turf wars in Washington, domestic economic unrest, and the Iraq insurgency are all contributing to the United States’ inability to effectively rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, he said, Bush’s decision to unilaterally invade Iraq makes international cooperation in its reconstruction unlikely, so Washington must go it alone.

Rand Beers served on the National Security Council for four administrations, serving as Senior Director for Intelligence Programs and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Combating Terrorism in 2002-2003. He is also Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
Daniel Benjamin argued that the United States must improve its understanding of terrorism in order to safeguard U.S. security. He believed that since 9/11, Washington has led a largely successful tactical assault against terrorism, but that it has been largely unsuccessful in strategic initiatives.

The captures of high-level Al Qaeda operatives like Ramsey Youssef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed have proven that Washington can successfully merge its intelligence and police forces. The United States has successfully led the charge that arrested or killed over three thousand operatives, including between one- and two-thirds of their leaders, said Benjamin. Intelligence and early intervention have subverted other plots.

But, he cautioned, with each arrest, the United States is forced to confront the true nature of Al Qaeda, discovering that there are more cells than previously thought. Intelligence has also revealed that members of other established terrorist groups frequently train with Al Qaeda, making it difficult to get a true picture of the group’s reach.

Misunderstanding the nature of the organization complicates the government’s ability to fight it, he said. While many people believe that Washington’s strategy works and thwarts planned attacks, Benjamin pointed out that devastating acts like the World Trade Center take years to plan, so there is little way of knowing when another large-scale attack is being planned until the plot is unearthed. Attacks in Riyadh and Bali indicate that Al Qaeda is still very much active.

Al Qaeda is difficult to fight not only because its cells are difficult to identify, but because it is also an ideology. Benjamin explained that the group’s beliefs are not mainstream Islam, but that the ideology is built on beliefs that resonate with traditional and extremist Muslims.

Benjamin said that research has indicated a feeling among many Muslims that they are increasingly isolated. Recent studies indicate that while the people of Muslim nations once hated the U.S. government but admired its people, that is no longer the case: he said they increasingly fear an attack by the United States, afraid that Washington seeks to exploit them and corrupt Islam. Al Qaeda exploits this fear, making extreme viewpoints seem less extreme.

He added that it is difficult to see how far such an ideology can be pushed when it is coupled with the type of violence it advocates, but the abysmal employment rates and economy in many Muslim nations create a fertile ground for extremist groups, who can exploit social conditions, especially among the underemployed youth, said Benjamin.

He concluded there is no quick fix for this kind of challenge. The United States must shore up strategic foreign policy to deal with radical Islam, which he thinks will continue to spread rapidly unless it is managed by diplomacy. He cautioned against the Bush administration’s plan to use an occupied Iraq as “an example,” because Benjamin thought it will likely continue to be viewed as a militarily-weak American puppet regime and delegitimize American action in the region.

Daniel Benjamin is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is co-author, with Steven Simon, of The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002).
Economist Walter Enders recently used time-series analysis to study global terrorism. He wanted to know how 9/11 fit into the series of international terrorism. He said the findings are, perhaps, surprising, because they indicated that the attacks in the United States and the resulting War on Terror actually did not change international political terrorism all that much.

The direct effects of September 11 were obvious, said Enders: thousands of deaths, an increase in spending on homeland security, and proof that it is possible to achieve massive devastation without weapons of mass destruction. Despite its significant economic and psychological effect, however, that day was one part of ongoing terrorism and it did not fundamentally change the course of terrorist attacks. While it was highly-publicized, sophisticated and deadly, the course of overall terrorism was not changed dramatically.

Enders devised a method to study all terrorist attacks in relation to one another. He said transnational terrorism happens almost every day in some part of the world, although there is typically one “spectacular” incident each year. He and his colleagues input a long series of events, coding for variables such as time and location, number of deaths, and the type of event. They were typically unable to include information about who was responsible for attacks because frequently no one takes responsibility.

Although in time-series analysis, 9/11 indicates only an anomalous spike in deaths and sophistication in a longer series of similar and smaller events, when it is prejudged as a break date, Enders found that complicated attacks like hijackings or kidnappings have actually fallen as a proportion of attacks and that logistically simple, but deadly, incidences of bombings have increased.

Enders said that most terrorist attacks involved “old technology.” Around 50% involve bombs, and the other are more complicated attacks that use older techniques like hijacking airplanes, kidnappings, taking hostages, letter bombs, etc. Changes in terrorist technique often result from improvements in technology. He explained that after the implementation of airport metal detectors, terrorists were less likely to hijack planes and more likely to kidnap people. In this case, better technology caused a shift from one logistically complicated technique to another, which is not the case after 9/11. Despite the complexity of that attack, most terrorism since has been logistically simple.

Walter Enders is Bidgood Chair of Economics and Finance at the University of Alabama.
Carlyle Thayer was concerned that general misunderstandings of global terrorism may lead to underestimating the complexity of potential threats. He said that terrorism existed prior to 9/11, but many were not concerned. After that date, they wanted to know how terrorism of that scale could possibly happen. The American public, in particular, craved information to explain who was responsible, and why. Explaining terrorism is quite complicated, said Thayer.

The information that emerged and the way it has been presented by the media had a profound effect on the way people discuss terrorism today, said Thayer: many believe that every religiously fanatical terror group is connected to Al Qaeda. In reality, however, he argued that there are several disparate groups that have little or no connection to Al Qaeda, and these groups may be equally as or more dangerous.

This way of thinking about terrorism has caused some regional specialists, like Thayer, to talk about “old” and “new” terrorism. The latter probes at length to find supposed connections: groups that were once thought to be independent in their motivations, ideology and politics are now thought to be part of a new, international network of violence. He blames this, in part, on the media’s general dislike of complicated international relationships.

Thayer said that the many definitions of terrorism have also made it even more difficult to discuss this already complicated subject: the U.N.’s definition differs from the FBI’s definition, which is different than the way the President or the State Department characterizes political terrorism.

He also said that people have downplayed the differing motivations for terrorist groups. Thayer said that those seeking to understand terror groups in Southeast Asia must realize that for some organizations, violence and militancy resulted from a history of religious oppression as a religious minority. For example, the Muslim Abu Sayyaf operates in the predominantly Christian Philippines, and Thayer said that the foundations of Jemmah Islamia can be traced back to a debate over the creation of a secular or non-secular state. Some groups fight for religion, others for politics, some for both.

Thayer thought that the largest global terror threat will be the militant Islamic groups in Indonesia. The operations in Afghanistan destroyed the center of Al Qaeda, which forced its operatives to flee. He thought that some fighters may simply follow the action and not necessarily the ideology, and he anticipated that some of Al Qaeda’s fighters headed to Indonesia.

Carlyle Thayer is Professor of Politics at Australian Defence Force Academy.

Professor of Political Science R. William Liddle introduced Carlyle Thayer (r) at his Mershon Center talk.
Mel Goodman said that the United States just experienced the worst intelligence failure in American history and misguided military unilateralism which he feared set a dangerous precedent. He said that in just a few years, the Bush administration has done serious damage to the strategic diplomatic and military authority the United States has acquired over the past several decades.

War in Iraq resulted in part from what he called “horrible intelligence.” Goodman explained that the successes in Afghanistan arose from good intelligence shared among several countries. He said that intelligence, in general, can only provide a complete picture when it comes from a variety of sources, including other nations. Unilateral action makes it impossible to get all the “pieces,” so it is then impossible to see the “whole picture.” Military action that results from incomplete understanding of a situation is folly, said Goodman, and likely to result in situations like present-day Iraq. He added that the U.S. is especially bad at seeing its own weaknesses, which makes U.S. success even more reliant on intelligence gathered by others in a multilateral campaign.

Goodman explained that it is clear at this point that the decision to invade Iraq was the result of faulty intelligence, both on the part of the CIA and the White House. He said that President Bush deliberately misled the American people when he chose to focus on the worst possible scenarios to justify military action. He said Bush’s blind ambition to go to war meant that his State of the Union address, in which he suggested that Saddam Hussein had attempted to obtain uranium from Nigeria, was designed to arouse fear in the American people and get popular support for an invasion of Iraq. Three high-ranking officials had already told the White House that this allegation was untrue, a fact Goodman said the White House chose to ignore.

He also took issue with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice’s inflammatory use of mushroom cloud imagery during her public addresses and Vice President Dick Cheney’s reliance on his own personal foreign policy staff who seem to espouse a “faith-based foreign policy,” supported by “true believers” a philosophy Goodman said was dangerous.

Goodman advocated a return to “policies that work:” including containment and most importantly, strong multilateralism. He explained that military power cannot fight weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of nuclear arms, or terrorism. Only shared intelligence and diplomacy can fight these twenty-first century threats.

Goodman also supported a reformation of the U.S. intelligence community, saying that one person—the director of the CIA—cannot effectively lead the entire operation. He suggested that the CIA be divided into two separate entities, disentangling operations from intelligence. Most importantly, he said, the U.S. intelligence community must be protected from Washington politics. He explained that Harry Truman located the CIA in Virginia because he felt that intelligence should be gathered and analyzed by people insulated and somewhat distant from the political and highly polemicized scene of Washington.

Mel Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and a former CIA analyst.
James Gilmore

Americans and Homeland Security

James Gilmore, head of the Gilmore Commission, has been studying terrorism and the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction since 1998. His message was that Americans need to do two things: have a plan, and not panic.

The commission began studying terrorism in 1998, when it was rarely in the minds of most Americans. Because there was little pressure on the group to focus their query in a specific way, they simply asked “what was the threat of terrorism for the United States?” They concluded it was unlikely that the United States would be attacked by weapons of mass destruction, because such weapons are difficult to obtain and bring into the country. The commission concluded that the United States would not be immune to terrorism; a traditional terrorist attack—hijacking of a plane or train, a bomb, etc.—was probable.

They decided the country was in need of a national strategy, one that combined the capabilities of federal, state, and local governments. He said that such unified cooperation is a foreign concept in Washington D.C., and despite repeated recommendations, it still does not exist.

The commission was alarmed to discover huge communication gaps in Washington. The National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were all independently amassing information about illicit activity, but not sharing their findings with other offices, which made Gilmore skeptical that a unified plan would be possible.

The commission had determined that local agencies would need to be the most prepared to deal with the fallout from a terrorist attack. They focused on strategies for preparing the health care community to deal with a large-scale attack, for changing the policies that govern border crossing into the United States, for protecting communications infrastructure from a cyberattack, and for designing policy that would use the military power in a civilian role. The final report was sent to the printer the first week of September 2001, and was to be presented to congressional committees in November. 9/11 made this commission’s findings eerily accurate.

After the attacks, the Gilmore Commission shifted from hypothetical situations to designing strategies for this “new world.” Gilmore said they tried to determine who would lead a counterterrorism office in the United States. The FBI was, for some, a logical choice. But for others, including Gilmore, the FBI was primarily a law enforcement agency, not an intelligence management agency.

They also attempted to identify levels of preparedness. They sought to determine the point at which the country is as prepared as it can be, when the country can have a sense of “normalcy,” and in a post-9/11 world, what that is. The government should also work with private technology, especially utility infrastructure, said Gilmore.

He argued that Washington still needs to do more work. He expressed concern about civil liberties, saying there is not an inverse relationship between freedom and security, which he said puts the power in the hands of the terrorists: they know that any attack can restrict democratic freedoms. He said Washington needs to harness some of its technological might and strong problem-solving abilities to come up with a strategy to merge freedom and security.

He said the United States cannot panic. The government must design an effective strategy to deal with any future attacks and follow it. The best design will maintain the U.S. as a secure nation, but not compromise the civil liberties of its citizens.

James Gilmore III is a former Governor of Virginia and Chairman of the Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the “Gilmore Commission.” He was invited to give a talk by Ohio State’s Program of International and Homeland Security.
The Mershon Center hosted several guest speakers from the policy world to discuss Washington’s policy toward the people being detained as part of the War on Terror:


March 2, 2004: **Daniel Dell’Orto**, U.S. Dept. of Defense Deputy Counsel

**Calvin Lederer**, Dept. of Homeland Security, Deputy Judge Advocate General, United States Coast Guard

March 11, 2004: **John Altenburg**, Appointing Authority on Military Commissions, Office of the Appointing Authority

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**Mark Jacobson**, who worked on the policies for Guantanamo Bay, nicknamed Gitmo, at the Department of Defense prior to spending a year at the Mershon Center, discussed some of the most complex aspects of writing policies for dealing with soldiers captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. He emphasized the men held at Gitmo are the “worst of the worst,” those fighters who were highly skilled or highly knowledgeable about Al Qaeda’s activities: they include Osama Bin Laden’s driver, explosives experts, and other men whose skills make them functionally important to the terrorist network.

He described the decision to treat them not as Prisoners of War, but rather as “enemy combatants” as one of the most controversial but necessary decisions he and other policymakers had to discuss. Because many of those fighting in Afghanistan were fighting on behalf of Al Qaeda and therefore not part of a state-sponsored army, Jacobson said they were not entitled to the same rights as official Prisoners of War, but that the Bush Administration insisted they be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention anyway.

Jacobson said the policy for enemy combatants should be a catalyst for changes in international law, arguing that the legal community should be committed to updating laws to deal with non-state threats like Al Qaeda.

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**John Altenburg** came to the Mershon Center shortly after being named as the person to guide the military tribunals dealing with the people held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and to direct the military commissions dealing with detainee issues in Iraq. He described some of the challenges and opportunities he foresaw in the position. His initial goal was to bring the public into the process, because he said that much of the criticism directed at GTMO’s policies resulted from the public not understanding how and why the process was progressing as it did. Another goal for him was to bring the policies as much in line with international law as possible. He said that it is important to recognize that detaining non-state actors like Al Qaeda operatives poses unique challenges because there is no precedent in international law, but he planned to draw on existing laws as a primary guide.

He said pragmatism would guide him in this process, as it has in his long career with the JAG corps. Altenburg explained the complex history of the tribunal process, from its earliest days based on the 16th-century British Articles of War, through the highly publicized hearings after World War II, to the present system, which works closely with the civilian criminal justice process. Although soldiers can be tried in either criminal or military courts for legal violations (depending on the specifics of the crime), Altenburg said that JAG attorneys are well trained to navigate such a complicated system and work with civilian attorneys to negotiate the most appropriate process. The experiences they have working with a variety of people in sometimes complicated legal situations will be valuable during the tribunals as the JAG corps both prosecutes and defends the men being held at Guantanamo Bay.
Walter Slocombe gave this year’s Joseph J. Kruzel Memorial Lecture. He had recently returned from Iraq where he was the senior advisor for security sector and defense affairs to the Coalition Provisional Authority when he came to Mershon and discussed the challenges of security in Iraq.

He said that war itself remains controversial and the practical issue was how to meet the challenges of converting opportunities into reality for Iraq. He emphasized that a stable, self-governing system is the goal for the country, but that its stability is equally important for the United States and the rest of the world.

Slocombe described the four tasks that he and his colleagues focused on while implementing security policy: services for the population, an improved economic situation, a legitimate and representative government, and adequate security. He emphasized that the first three are essential for the last.

He said that the United States has been able to repair damage that was caused by the war itself, but that greater challenges arose during attempts to repair decades of neglect and abuse under Saddam Hussein.

Slocombe said politically and culturally, the nation is divided and confused about how politics in Iraq can, or will, work. This was further complicated by certain groups actively opposing the political process and continued volatility in the area. Political progress requires a massive reeducation of a public that is highly suspicious of government, he said. The ideas negotiated in the Iraqi constitution were both highly contested by opponents to political change and challenged by those for whom a politically-neutral, non-corrupt, non-brutal leadership is a foreign concept.

The economy is a central concern, said Slocombe, because the former system was corrupt and overly centralized. He was optimistic about the future of Iraq’s economy, however: the land is fertile, largely arable, and there is abundant water. The people are highly educated and enterprising and there is an effective food distribution system and vibrant retail sector. This must be improved since they “can’t live on oil alone.”

Slocombe said Iraq’s best resource is not oil, but its people. On the whole, most Iraqis believe that Saddam’s overthrow was necessary and good for the country; they are more optimistic about where their nation is headed than Americans are. Many Iraqis have already experienced a rapid return to normal life, which they think will continue to improve.

The future will most certainly require resolve, patience, and economic and human expenditures, which Slocombe thought will be supported by the United States but even more by Iraq. He said that making the whole system work—and he thinks it will work—will be the key to effective security.

Walter Slocombe is recently retired after seven years as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense. He was also Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Director of U.S. Department of Defense Task Force on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning, U.S. Department of Defense.

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**Joseph J. Kruzel**

Dr. Joseph Kruzel served as a member of the Mershon Center’s senior faculty and as Associate Professor of Political Science from 1983 until his death in 1995. He was a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and held Master and Doctoral degrees from Harvard University. Professor Kruzel was killed in Sarajevo, Bosnia, while serving an appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs.
Peter Feaver and his colleagues recently completed polls that study public tolerance for casualties and its relationship to presidential approval ratings. They found that conventional wisdom about public opinion and wartime fatalities does not completely show how people’s perceptions about war deaths impact their views on government approval.

Feaver said the conventional wisdom suggests that the American public will only support military intervention abroad when there are few U.S. casualties. Feaver said that this basic assumption is still quite powerful in policy circles, and the belief that Americans will not tolerate casualties heavily influenced policy decisions in Mogadishu, Beirut, and Kosovo. Further, dictators like Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic have used this as a guiding principle in their own planning: they doubted U.S. resolve and saw a high casualty rate early in the conflict as a way to drive out American troops.

Feaver identified other factors that influence public attitudes toward war casualties, including consensus among elites, clarity of policy goals, and the likelihood of victory. He emphasized that the public is very much concerned about “what they’re fighting for.”

Feaver showed that polls about Iraq indicate a direct inverse relationship between casualties and presidential approval (although he cautioned that there are other factors likely influencing President Bush’s ratings, including the economy). The data indicates that in the early days, people were uncomfortable with the casualties but gradually became immune, until the end of combat and the beginning of the insurgency. At the point, people were increasingly disillusioned by the rising death toll.

The public also seemed divided over the justification of using military force in Iraq and concerned about the likelihood of success. Between the initial poll, conducted in October, 2003 and the second poll in March, 2004, more respondents called for a complete stop to U.S. operations (up nine points); 8% more were what Feaver described as “casualty phobic,” or willing to tolerate action but no further deaths. Twelve percent fewer people responded with a “window of support” (willing to tolerate over one thousand deaths); there was a 4% decline in respondents who supported military activity beyond 5,000 U.S. fatalities.

Feaver said that the key to interpreting data about public support in the face of casualties appears to be heavily reliant on stated goals of the mission and perceptions about success; the latter proved to be almost twice as important to respondents.

Feaver found that success was defined as the implementation of a Democratic government (30%), Iraqis having more “normal” lives (27%), or having greater security (21%). This included the restoration of infrastructure and services increased cooperation between Iraqis and Americans, and successful elections.

Peter Feaver, a former Mershon Center Post-Doctoral Fellow, is Alexander F. Hehmeyer Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University and Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. His most recent book is entitled Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton UP, 2004).
On May 11, 2004, the Mershon Center’s Mark Grimsley, Associate Professor of History and the College of Humanities’ Dean’s Student Advisory Panel convened a panel of experts to discuss the War in Iraq. The experts included Richard Herrmann, Director of the Mershon Center and Professor of Political Science; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Mershon Associate and William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law; and Sabra Webber, Professor of Near East Languages and Cultures, who shared her perspective on the cultural aspects of the conflict, to an audience of over 500 Ohio State students. The audience also benefited from the commentary of Salih Hameed, an Iraqi Fulbright Scholar who spent the year at Ohio State.

Richard Herrmann described the challenges of reconstructing Iraq after the end of the military campaign. He said that the United States proved its military strength but that history has proven that building peace after invasion is much more complicated.

He identified three options for the transition from war to peace. The first option would be for the United States to only technically relinquish control by the July 1 deadline but maintain primary control and not remove troops. This option lacks legitimacy, confirms Iraqis worst fears about American motivations, and would be very expensive for the United States, both economically and in terms of likely casualties.

The second option, supported by many Iraqis, would be to pull out entirely. Herrmann said this is unlikely because the risk of civil war is large. Further, many would see such a move as a U.S. retreat, which could incite more violence and terror as other nations seek a U.S. withdrawal from the entire Middle East and use terrorism to attack American interests.

The United States could also seek assistance from the international community. This would be challenging, said Herrmann, because of Washington’s decision to invade Iraq without their consent, an affront to many former allies on the U.N. Security Council.

Because it did not get Security Council authorization, the Bush Administration resorted to legal maneuvering that cobbled together resolutions from ten years, said Mary Ellen O’Connell, who looked at the legal component of the conflict. While eleven of fifteen nations on the Security Council wanted to continue with weapons inspections in Iraq, the Bush Administration chose instead to proceed according to its own agenda.

In many ways it has failed, said O’Connell. She explained that the Geneva Convention and U.N. regulations are very specific about the responsibilities of occupying powers, including protecting national treasures, maintaining order, and protecting the dignity of people under its control.

Many in the audience were concerned about the latter, in light of the recently-publicized prison abuse scandal. She spoke out against the horrific treatment of prisoners and emphasized that such policies are not the norm in the U.S armed forces and are prohibited by international law. O’Connell thought the abuse resulted, in part, from an underestimation of the troops needed to fulfill the U.S.’s duties in protecting Iraq after the end of the war. She remarked that it took an “underwhelming force to create overwhelming problems” in Iraq, and that the ideal way to begin solving some of the problems the United States created, it must start respecting international law.

Sabra Webber called for Americans to better understand the religious and historical legacy of Iraq. She said that until people begin to understand Arab culture, it will be impossible to understand the important role clerics can play and how to develop effective policy for the future of Iraq.
Recent polls indicate the attitudes of European citizens and American citizens are so at odds that it is unlikely they can be reconciled. According to Pierangelo Isernia, this is not actually accurate: he and his colleagues have discovered that there was a difference in degree, but that most Americans and Europeans agreed about the issues most important in international relations and also agreed on ways to address global conflicts.

For example, when asked about perceived threats, international terrorism and instability in Iraq were at the top of every country’s list; economic competition and political turmoil in Russia were at the bottom. More Americans thought international terrorism was a critical threat than did Europeans, but all agreed that it was a top priority.

Isernia explained that questions about terrorism proved rhetorically challenging. The language used in the European test was slightly different (threats were described as “extremely important” or “not important”) than that used in the United States (where threats were described as “critical” or “not important”). Also, European respondents, on the whole, divided threats into traditional (i.e. armed conflict) and political. For the American participants, there was more variance and less clarity about the categorization of threats. He said this resulted from a greater variance of political awareness among American participants.

The survey showed the greatest disparities in questions related to the use of force. While most, as a whole, agreed that economic power was more important than military force, questions about when the use of military force was appropriate proved divisive.

Isernia divided respondents into four categories: Pragmatists, who viewed both Soft Power (like economic strength) and Hard Power (military strength) as equally important, Hawks, who valued only Hard Power, Doves, who valued only Soft Power, and Isolationists, who valued neither. The last group was only a small minority, said Isernia. He concluded that there are more Hawks in the United States than in European states: based on their responses, 65% of the American public could be considered Hawks. 10% would be described as Doves, and 22% as Pragmatists. In Europe, the responses indicated that 42% of the public are Doves and 43% are Pragmatists. Isernia said that this may be because of the political nature of Europe and the influence of the European Union, which requires a coalition of support for action. He added that for Doves, legitimacy of action and approval from an international coalition, like the United Nations Security Council, was especially important.

Overall, the British responses were most similar to the American responses. He said that according to his research, the biggest casualty of the war in Iraq was German-American relations.

In 2002, the German participants in the study were asked which was more important: their nation’s relationship with the European Union or with the United States. Although “both” was not an answer, the majority answered both. Just one year later, the Germans had made a decision, however. In 2003, 81% said Germany’s affiliation with the EU was more important.

Pierangelo Isernia is Professor of International Relations in the Department of History, Law, Political and Social Science at the University of Siena.
A former German Ambassador to the United States, Immo Stabreit offered a unique perspective on the relationship between the U.S. and Germany in the wake of what he called the “Iraq Imbroglio.”

He said that at the “beginning” of the war on terror—that is, after September 11—Germany was shocked to learn that their nation had been a “safe haven” for terrorists, the result of Germany’s relaxed attitude toward foreigners.

The world joined together to send troops into Afghanistan to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This included Germany and France, two of Washington’s most visible allies. When it came to Iraq, however, Stabreit said that the Bush administration made it impossible for these allies to condone an invasion: Washington failed to convince even their closest allies that there was any connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq or that war in Iraq was necessary. He said that foreign leaders were also suspicious when Washington waffled on the rationale for war in Iraq, changing their goals to suit the audience.

Stabreit conceded that part of Germany’s decision to stand aside during this war had to do with their own elections. It was his opinion that Gerhardt Schroeder knew his reelection chances were small, so he seized upon the German population’s opposition to war to attract voters.

The former ambassador was critical of the way Germany handled the debate over Iraq because he thought Germany did not consider the long-term consequences of jeopardizing its relationship with the United States.

Stabreit was not surprised that this “line in the sand” was drawn. He said that Europeans had long been frustrated by American perponderance in NATO, so after watching the way the U.S. exploited its strength in many international initiatives, Europeans did not feel motivated to cooperate when it came to Iraq.

Stabreit said that from his experience, a nation’s power is a combination of its military, economic and cultural influence: if the U.S. continues to approach international conflict alone, it will eventually damage its economic base, use up its military reserves, and diminish its cultural influence. Being a hegemonic power, he said, does not mean stepping on friends and allies. He argued that NATO could be strengthened and assist in the fight against terrorism.

Immo Stabreit is former German Ambassador to France and to the United States. He is also former Executive Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations.
Richard Crockatt examined the role of civilization and its impact on U.S. foreign policy against the backdrop of Samuel Huntington’s work on the “clash of civilizations.” Crockatt neither supported nor criticized Huntington’s controversial claims, but explored one of Huntington’s hypotheses: that in a post-Cold War world, culture, more than economics or ideology, will be the primary source of conflict. Crockatt thought that this was particularly true after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which resulted in an upswing of American pride.

He identified three claims made by those who invoked civilization as a driving force in cultural conflict. First, he said that increasingly, “civilization” is identified with America. He thinks some people think of the United States as a civilization unto itself, independent of Western civilization. It is thought to be exceptional, unique in its universalism and inclusiveness in of values, and contains elements of all of the world’s population.

Crockatt also thought that American “civilization-consciousness,” arises from the belief that Washington is “bound to lead.” He thought that because of its powerful military and economic interests, other nations expect the U.S. to lead; just as the U.S. government, at least under the current administration, feels motivated to lead the rest of the world. Crockatt emphasized that current polls and U.S. history show that there is a strong degree of ambivalence among the American public about U.S. intervention in overseas ventures, but that the Bush administrations foreign policy documents indicate the Washington’s leadership seems to be more inclined to intervene.

The third claim implicit in Crockatt’s understanding of “civilization consciousness” is that America is willing to accommodate a variety of cultures within its own definition of civilization—provided they align themselves with American principles. In this sense, he said, American “civilization” is both very inclusive and exclusive: it includes anyone of any culture who claims American views of freedom, democracy, and other ideals. Crockatt identified American Muslims as those who are both included and excluded: as Americans, they are included in the melting pot of U.S. culture, but because of current misperceptions about Islam, they are excluded from American society.

He said that it may seem that the first and third claims are contradictory: how can America be both unique and inclusive of all values? He thinks it is through the second claim, that America is in a unique position of international leadership. Through its sheer size and abilities, the United States can both claim its position as a unique culture that is inclusive, universal in its values, and welcomes those who are “on its side.”

Crockatt claimed that Huntington may have been correct in thinking that culture will increasingly be the root of conflict, and he thought that Anti-Americanism will be the response to an increase in patriotic zeal and civilization-consciousness in American culture.

Richard Crockatt is Deputy Dean of the School of English and American Studies at the University of Norwich, East Anglia and author of America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order.
Detlef Junker described what he called a “profound transatlantic crisis:” the remarkable shift in public opinion resulting from the United States’ invasion of Iraq. He said that there is an upswing in mistrust and hostility toward the Bush Administration and that the United States has lost its reputation as a benevolent hegemon and champion of freedom. People are shifting away from hatred of what the Bush Administration does and toward hatred of what America is.

Junker said that after 9/11, states all over the world—even Iran and the Palestinian Authority—condemned the attacks and offered support. This support eroded as soon as the Bush Administration began to broaden its net in the War on Terror to condemn other nations, like Iraq, that were not proven to have a link to al Qaeda.

He said that preemptive war decided on unilaterally has alienated Europeans, who are increasingly unwilling to live in a world where one superpower can, and will, invade sovereign nations at will. In general, they knew Saddam Hussein was a secular tyrant and few believed the assertion that he was religiously motivated to support religiously-based terrorism.

Today, the United States represents an “uncontrollable Goliath” to many Europeans, said Junker. Near-universal contempt for the Bush Administration in Europe makes it difficult for Europeans to understand the religious zeal of a “twice born-again” who seeks freedom in the name of God, Junker explained. He argued that negative public opinion compels many European governments to distance themselves from Washington, a situation that will likely affect international security for a long time because, as the current post-war situation in Iraq exemplifies, no contemporary world problem can be addressed without the support of an international cooperative.

Detlef Junker is Curt-Engelhorn-Stiftungsprofessor of American History at the University of Heidelberg and former director of the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C.
Sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim had recently been released from an Egyptian prison when he came to the Mershon Center to talk about the role of democracy in the Middle East. He thought a democratic government was possible in predominantly Muslim nations and, according to Ibrahim, these countries must be democratized.

He thought that it was not merely coincidental that the Arab world accounts for only seven percent of the world's population, but thirty-five percent of the world's violent conflicts. Given that the United States has been active in approximately ten of those conflicts, Ibrahim emphasized that this “surplus of violence and shortage of democracy” needs to be on the American agenda.

Ibrahim pointed out that the Middle East experienced representative government in the past. In 1798, the Middle East responded to a potential colonial threat by attempting to modernize their culture. They sent their best students to Europe to study arts and sciences, and these students eventually brought home with them a liberal ideology. This age also introduced democratic ideals to Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, for example, who experienced a “democracy of sorts,” and incorporated representative electoral politics, he said.

This age was not to last, however, and democracy began to dissolve in the wake of the second world war and the subsequent creation of the Israeli state. Coups in Syria, Iraq and Libya moved away from democracy, to what Ibrahim called a “radical populist legacy.”

Ibrahim said that this kind of nationalist leadership was embarrassed by Israel's success in 1967, which further eroded confidence in representative government, opening the door for radical Islamist politicians to seize power. Ibrahim suspected that this resulted from frustration on the part of people who saw the failure of liberalism and populism and decided to give Islamism a try.

9/11 had ramifications throughout the Arab world. He said that many felt relief when U.S. armed forces eventually toppled the Taliban, but he added that the relief was a bittersweet ambivalence felt by many who disliked the Taliban, but resented that only an alien Western power could oust it. He said many Arabs (and Muslims, more broadly) once again, feared colonization.

Ibrahim was in prison at this time, and he said the terrorist attacks caused an uproar among Islamist prisoners, which he estimated to be about three-fifths of the prison population. When it was confirmed that Al Qaeda was behind the attacks, the Islamists became concerned about how this would affect their movement. They felt that the world was not hearing that their beliefs included democratic ideas about freedom. Ibrahim confirmed that their message was not being communicated to the West. Despite technically being held in solitary confinement, he was able to work with them to soften their rhetoric to more accurately reflect the values their groups wanted to promote, which eventually culminated in a meeting of Islamist and western leaders in Switzerland sponsored by the Canadian ambassador to Egypt. Many Islamists officially denounced violence and promoted democracy and freedom.

Ibrahim thought that democracy in the Middle East was not only possible, but inevitable. But, he cautioned, as Arab nations move in that direction, democracy will only be possible when the various political groups in the region—the Islamists, the liberals, and the secularists—are able to all embrace a new philosophy of governance.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim is director of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, Egypt.
For some scholars of the Middle East, democracy and Islam are fundamentally at odds; Mark Tessler, on the other hand, recently conducted surveys in the Middle East that suggest this theory is incorrect.

Tessler’s research indicated the majority of people in the Middle East want a combination of democracy and Islam. There are varying degrees of support for each, and Tessler explained what factors influence a person’s attitudes about Democracy and Islam. He found that the degree of religiosity within a community does not correlate to its support of democracy. The only positive correlation was between level of education and support of democracy, Tessler discovered.

Tessler was specifically interested in the variables that shape attitudes about democracy; he was intrigued not only by attitudes about the concept of democracy, but specifically its relationship to political Islam, whether or not they are interrelated, and what models of democracy are particularly appealing.

Tessler and his researchers found that throughout the Middle East, there is strong support for democracy. Most survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that democracy was good for their states. What they meant by “democracy” was a government that is accountable to the public, that serves the interests of its people, and a government that is held accountable for its policies and failures.

He found a greater divide when researchers asked about the role of political Islam and that attitudes about it varied across borders. For example, 80% of Egyptians responded that they thought religious leaders should also be political leaders. In Algeria, only 40% supported a strong link between politics and religion.

In his analysis of how personal piety affected ideas about democracy, Tessler adopted criteria that likened mosque attendance to piety. He admitted that this was imperfect in many ways, that religious piety does not directly correlate to mosque attendance, but his team felt it was significant enough to be used as a reasonable indicator. They found that support for democracy had little relationship to religiosity, that in general, strong support for democratic ideals was roughly the same across varying levels of mosque attendance.

The only significant correlation was between education and democracy and that in nations, like Turkey, that have a highly educated populace, democracy is strongly supported. Further, he discovered that the many facets of democracy includes those who sought certain aspects of a democratic leadership, such as political accountability, but not some of the more theoretical or idealistic values of a democratic system, such as freedom or liberty.

Tessler showed that most countries seek a system inclusive of both democracy and political Islam. In Egypt, 85%, sought a government that was strong in both political Islam and democracy; in Algeria, the majority wanted democracy alone. He also emphasized the importance of a nation’s political history as an important indicator of how the citizens envision democracy in their land. For example, Algerians combine some aspects of their experience as a French colony, their experience with a bloody war for independence, and their experience with socialism, capitalism, and failed democracy when they envision their ideal democratic system.

Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan. He also directs the Center for Political Studies, which is part of the university’s Institute for Social Research.
As a demographer, John Casterline forecasts the sociopolitical implications of demographic change and his current research focused on a political demography of the Arab region.

He said that political ambitions often drive demographic change, and that policies in many Arab countries have created societies with a sharp decline in infant mortality and a lowered birth rate. He attributes the change in fertility to the economy and political climate. Slowed growth in the oil industry means that families were able to afford fewer children and he suggested that political changes and government control over family planning in Arab societies has a stronger influence on fertility than in many other cultures.

Casterline identified a potential problem in a “youth bulge” that has resulted from improvements in infant mortality rates coupled with longer life expectencies. He described “youth bulge” as a mixed blessing in that it creates an infusion of young, energetic workers; however, society must absorb the challenges of educating them and providing work opportunities.

This may be difficult for many Arab societies, said Casterline. Declining mortality and longer lives mean lengthier coexistence between fathers and sons which he said stretch family economic resources. This makes it difficult for sons to marry, since Arab culture is very strict about the financial arrangements needed for marriage. Young Arab men are forced to wait longer to marry and later in life to have children and become heads of families with the power, prestige, and property it bestows. Casterline said the data indicates a generational imbalance that will likely pose significant challenges in the future and will greatly impact Arab culture and society.

John Casterline is a senior associate in the Policy Research Division of the Population Council in New York City.
Identity Formation in the Arab World

Identity Formation in the Arab World was a project organized by Edward Ziter, formerly Associate Professor of Theatre at Ohio State who is now on the faculty at New York University. It was a quarter-long program that examined identity formation in the Arab world within the performing and visual arts and it brought together theatre and film practitioners and theorists working in a range of Arab countries, as well as American scholars and artists whose work intersects issues of linguistic, cultural, and religious identity in the Middle East. In the Arab world, the performing arts play a key role in interpreting and shaping popular identities, describing the past, and imagining the future. Many film and theatre practitioners have presented daring examinations of the Arab/Israeli conflict, Arab modernization programs, human rights abuses, religious revivalism, even family law and gender relations.

Fate of a Cockroach

By Tewfik al Hakim
Directed by Naila Al-Atrash

Fate of a Cockroach combined riotously comic and dark political allegory with marital farce. In the juxtaposition of fantastic and realistic settings, Hakim created a searing indictment that extends from Egyptian leaders to the general populace. This production was directed by Syrian Naila Al-Atrash, one of the foremost female directors in the Arab world and guest artist at Ohio State this year.
Interventionist theatre, an emerging field within theatre studies, lets people living in conflict areas develop new collaborative work generated from their personal experience and workshops with theatre specialists. *The Last Enemy*, a documentary film that examines this process, was shown at the symposium and was discussed by Jim Mirrione (Creative Arts Team at NYU who participated in the film), Sami Metwasi (Palestinian actor in the film who has worked with ASHTAR and INAD) and Louay Assaf, an Iraqi puppeteer. Edward Ziter moderated.

The Atlas Group/Walid Ra’ad presents

**The Loudest Muttering is Over: Documents from The Atlas Group Archive**

The Atlas Group is an imaginary, non-profit research foundation, founded by Walid Ra’ad in 1999 in Beirut to explore the contemporary history of Lebanon and some of the unexamined dimensions of the Lebanese wars (1975-1991).

**Identity**

Created by Louay Assaf
Commissioned by the OSU Department of Theatre

Using traditional Arab shadow puppets and European rod puppets, this piece depicted an Arab intellectual’s search for a new identity that negotiates Arab history in a constantly changing world.
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