Credible To Whom? The Organizational Politics of Credibility in International Relations

Don Casler*

March 29, 2021

Abstract

Why do foreign policy actors vary in how they conceive of their state’s credibility? How do bureaucratic or organizational imperatives affect policymakers’ concern for credibility, and in turn, their willingness to use force in cases of limited deterrence? While much previous research examines how decision makers assess others’ credibility, only recently have scholars questioned when and why leaders or their advisers prioritize their own state’s credibility. Building on classic scholarship in bureaucratic politics, I argue that organizational identity affects the dimensions of credibility that bureaucrats value, and ultimately, their policy advocacy around the use of force. Particular differences arise between military and diplomatic organizations; while military officials equate credibility with hard military capabilities, diplomats view credibility in terms of signaling reputation, or demonstrating reliability and resolve to external parties. In limited deterrence encounters, military officials confine their advice on the use of force to what can be achieved given current capabilities, while diplomats exhibit a higher willingness to use force as a signal of a strong commitment. I test these propositions using text analysis of archival records from two collections of U.S. national security policy documents and two case studies of American decision making during the early Cold War period. I demonstrate that credibility concerns affect the balance of hawkishness in advice that diplomats and military officials deliver to leaders as a function of organizational socialization.

Keywords: credibility, reputation, signaling, civil-military relations, bureaucratic politics

Word count: 13,679

*Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, Columbia University. I am grateful to David Arceneaux, Allison Carnegie, Austin Carson, Tom Christensen, Ricky Clark, Erik Gartzke, Michael Goldfien, Jeff Friedman, Raymond Hicks, Alex Kirss, Josh Kertzer, Kendrick Kuo, Robert Jervis, Alex Lin, Ariel Petrovics, Abby Post, Daryl Press, Robert Ralston, Laura Resnick Samotin, Jack Snyder, Benjamin Valentino, Alan Van Beek, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and participants at APSA 2020 and the Charles Koch Foundation IR working group for their thoughtful comments on this project. All remaining errors are my own.
“Greece is the test tube which the peoples of the whole world are watching in order to ascertain whether the determination of the Western powers to resist aggression equals that of international Communism to acquire new territory and new bases for further aggression...No amount of American funds and resources invested in the European recovery program can possibly save Europe if the peoples of that area become convinced that the United States, although willing to invest wealth, is not prepared, if it be found necessary, to resort to force in order to meet force.”


“This Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the dispatch of forces, token or in strength, to Greece would be militarily unsound.”

— Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of the Council (Souers), May 25, 1948. *FRUS 1948*, IV, 67.

“This raises a question which we have hashed over with the military boys time and time again. The purpose of sending forces to Greece would be to indicate a determination to clean up the situation in Greece and not effectively to conduct military operations if a shooting war started with Russia.”

— Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), June 1, 1948. *FRUS 1948*, IV, 71.

“[I]t was usually the military people who had to hold back the sporadic and truculent impulses of political people and diplomats who [did] not realize the consequences of aggressive action.”


Between summer 1947 and spring 1948, American officials actively debated whether to deploy U.S. combat troops to prevent a communist takeover of Greece. For all that the Marshall Plan was intended to shore postwar Europe up against further communist advances,¹ Truman administration officials were quite divided on the potential military dimensions of its implementation.² On one side, diplomatic officials, from Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson on down, consistently argued that the situation was a test of U.S. credibility, while

¹Jones (1955); Steil (2018).
pushing for a troop deployment to prevent Greece from becoming the first “domino” to fall. On the other side, military officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State George Marshall, acknowledged Greece’s strategic relevance to U.S. regional interests but repeatedly cited the lack of swing capability to intervene without either jeopardizing other commitments or engaging in domestic mobilization for war. In short, while diplomats saw in Greece the essential need to signal American credibility through the use of military power, military officials refused to sanction such a policy, which they viewed as an infeasible diversion of precious and limited resources. These dynamics prevented intervention from receiving much of a hearing at the White House, instead leading President Truman to leverage military aid and advisory capacity to build the Greek army into a capable fighting force.

In Greece, arguments about preserving credibility did not yield the deployment of U.S. ground troops. Yet credibility — or the perceived likelihood that an actor will follow through on its threats or promises — is commonly regarded as an essential currency in international relations. Foreign policy actors care about being perceived as credible because they believe it confers status and material benefits in bargaining situations. But beyond this basic insight, existing literature is mostly silent on how actors conceive of credibility or connect it with key policy questions such as the use of force. History certainly shows that the desire to maintain credibility has driven policymakers toward expansive means, whether in the Fashoda crisis or the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, disregard for credibility has engendered accusations of weakness or appeasement, as when President Obama declined to back up his “red line” threat regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Yet arguments about maintaining credibility do not always result in uniform support for firm policies; in fact, U.S.

---

7Dafoe, Renshorn and Huth (2014); Lupton (2020).
8With the notable exception of Yarhi-Milo (2018b).
9Snyder (1991); Logevall (1999).
national security officials were divided on this question prior to interventions in Lebanon, Bosnia, and Iraq — with military officials urging caution in the face of civilians’ willingness to run risks for credibility’s sake.\textsuperscript{11} To the extent that variation in concern for credibility affects the balance of policy advocacy that leaders receive, these patterns can constrain the leader’s decision environment.\textsuperscript{12} But if we want to understand who wins the tug-of-war between advisers, we first need to know why officials may tug in different directions in the first place.

Why do foreign policy actors vary in how they conceive of their state’s credibility? How do bureaucratic or organizational imperatives affect policymakers’ concern for credibility, and in turn, their willingness to use force in cases of limited deterrence?\textsuperscript{13} Prior research on credibility and the related topic of reputation does not provide an answer to these questions, concentrating instead on how decision makers appraise others’ credibility.\textsuperscript{14} The existing literature also focuses on how to manipulate perceptions of credibility as opposed to what role these perceptions play in diagnosing crises or how decision makers understand credibility to be at stake in the first place.\textsuperscript{15} Recent scholarship advances individual-level explanations for decision makers’ focus on credibility and reputation,\textsuperscript{16} yet substantial gaps remain regarding other possibly predictive factors such as bureaucratic politics, domestic affairs, or the external environment.

I examine this puzzle through an organizational lens. Building on classic scholarship in bureaucratic politics, I argue that organizational identity frames the dimensions of credibility that officials value, and ultimately, their policy advocacy around the use of force in

\textsuperscript{11}Feaver (2003); Evans and Potter (2019); Gvosdev, Blankshain and Cooper (2019).
\textsuperscript{12}Feaver and Gelpi (2004).
\textsuperscript{13}George and Smoke (1974, Ch. 2) distinguish cases of limited deterrence as those falling below the strategic (typically nuclear) level. I elaborate on this definition below.
\textsuperscript{14}Hopf (1994); Mercer (1996); Press (2005); Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015); Harvey and Mitton (2016); Jackson (2016); Crescenzi (2018).
\textsuperscript{15}Snyder and Diesing (1977).
\textsuperscript{16}Yarhi-Milo (2018b).
limited deterrence situations. Deterrence theory suggests that we can model credibility as a combination of capabilities, interests, and (reputation for) resolve. I amend this formula by replacing “(reputation for) resolve” with Jervis’s concept of signaling reputation, which encompasses the willingness to keep commitments, stand firm, and pay costs. I then posit that organizational socialization leads two ideal types of foreign policy advisers — diplomats and military officials — to focus on different aspects of this formula.

Diplomats conceive of credibility primarily in terms of interests and signaling reputation, with comparably less emphasis on capabilities. Diplomats see themselves as master statemen and keen analysts of international affairs. This self-image yields diplomats’ capacious sense of national interests and close attention to how others perceive the home country. The result is that diplomats regard credibility as an impressionistic asset to be preserved by demonstrating reliable partnership and resolute intentions before international audiences. This means that in cases of limited deterrence, diplomats will advocate for the use of force when they believe that their state’s interests and signaling reputation are at stake.

Military officials, meanwhile, conceive of credibility primarily in terms of interests and capabilities. Military officials see themselves as goal-oriented tacticians, charged with ensuring operational success on the battlefield. This self-image produces a narrow perspective on what constitutes the national interests and an expansive view of what capabilities are needed to defend it, with the credibility of threats and promises hinging on the actual capacity to carry them out. The result is that military officials regard credibility mostly as a function of military capabilities. This means that in cases of limited deterrence, military officials will advocate for the use of force only when they believe that their state’s interests are at stake.

17 Allison and Zelikow (1999); Halperin, Clapp and Kanter (2006). Like much of the literature on bureaucratic politics and foreign policy this project is U.S.-centric. However, I envision the theory as applying broadly in democracies with strong norms regarding civilian control of the military, where military officials serve primarily in an advisory rather than policymaking role regarding decisions to initiate force.


20 Murphy (1964); Simpson (1967); Schulzinger (1975); Schake (2012); Dobbins (2017).

21 Huntington (1957); Janowitz (1971); Posen (1984); Betts (1991); Kier (1997); Feaver (2003); Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Brooks (2020).
and that the capability to effect the desired outcome exists.

Thus, I argue that diplomatic and military officials diverge in their conceptions of national interest and the relative importance of signaling reputation versus capabilities, defining credibility differently and exhibiting differential willingness to advocate the use of force in cases of limited deterrence. This in turn affects the balance of policy advocacy that leaders receive, with military officials’ capability-based assessments often determining the relative hawkishness of the option set. I test these propositions through text analysis of two archival document collections and two comparative case studies of U.S. decision making during early Cold War limited deterrence encounters. Using insights from bureaucratic politics and civil-military relations, this paper offers new theory and evidence to a burgeoning literature on how adviser input shapes leaders’ choices.22

What Is Credibility? Why Might It Matter?

While we know that foreign policy actors care about their state’s credibility,23 previous research has not fully explored the sources of these concerns, their possible heterogeneity among advisers, or their impact on policy advocacy. However, existing literature offers several key points of departure for parsing central concepts and modeling inputs to credibility.

First, credibility is conceptually slippery. In principle, it signifies reliability, or the perceived likelihood that an actor will follow through on its threats or promises.24 This is different from reputation, or a belief about an actor’s persistent characteristics or past behavior, broadly defined.25 Theoretically, the latter contributes to the former; a state’s credibility equals its capabilities times its interests times its reputation for resolve.26 Therefore, credibility and reputation are related but not synonymous.27

In practice, credibility connotes some blend of “resolve, reliability, believability, and de-

---

22Brooks (2008); Recchia (2014); Saunders (2018); Golby, Feaver and Dropp (2018).
23Jervis and Snyder (1991); Kupchan (1994).
25Dafoe, Renshon and Huth (2014, 374). Also see Guisinger and Smith (2002); Gibler (2008); Tomz (2007); Walter (2009); Miller (2012); Peterson (2013).
cisiveness” while serving as code for one’s image and reputation.\textsuperscript{28} Accordingly, I argue for modeling credibility as a function of capabilities, interests, and \textit{signaling reputation}, or an actor’s “reputation for living up to its word, for usually doing as it says it will do.”\textsuperscript{29} This is because resolve, or the willingness to stand firm or pay costs in the face of pressure to back down,\textsuperscript{30} and reliability, especially with regard to keeping commitments, are closely correlated (though not identical). Maintaining commitments (i.e. by providing economic aid to an ally) often, but not always requires a willingness to bear costs (i.e. by defending that ally against military threats), meaning that resolve and reliability can both be components of credibility depending on the circumstances.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore, I broaden the concept of signaling reputation to subsume both resolve and reliability.

Second, how states and leaders calculate others’ credibility has been the subject of fierce debate. Several older studies indicate that policymakers do not routinely make attributions about other states or leaders based on their past record of keeping commitments.\textsuperscript{32} Yet newer research finds consistent effects of state A’s previous behavior on state B’s likely responses in subsequent interactions.\textsuperscript{33} The former perspective implies that officials are misguided in caring so dearly about how others interpret their previous behavior, while the latter — which comprises the literature’s emerging consensus\textsuperscript{34} — suggests that such concerns are entirely justified. This paper further shifts the focus from \textit{whether} credibility matters to \textit{when} and \textit{why} policymakers think it is important.

Third, we generally know that policymakers care about credibility because they believe that allies demand loyalty and thus see their commitments to other states as intrinsically connected\textsuperscript{35} even engaging in disputes proactively when their resolve is flagging and they

\textsuperscript{28}McMahon (1991, 455).
\textsuperscript{29}Monroe (2001, 305).
\textsuperscript{30}Kertzer (2016, 3); Lupton (2020, 2-3).
\textsuperscript{31}Jackson (2016, 17-18) similarly distinguishes between resolve and honesty. Also see Sartori (2005).
\textsuperscript{32}Hopf (1994); Mercer (1996); Press (2005).
\textsuperscript{33}Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015); Harvey and Mitton (2016); Jackson (2016); Lupton (2020).
\textsuperscript{34}Jervis, Yarhi-Milo and Casler (2021).
\textsuperscript{35}Schelling (1966); Henry (2020).
face multiple potential rivals. However, Yarhi-Milo (2018b) shows that individual leaders vary in their willingness to fight for reputation based on the extent to which they are “self-monitors,” or concerned with how others perceive them. This suggests that additional axes of heterogeneity may exist among officials in how they conceive of credibility. Yet conventional theories of signaling have not traditionally disaggregated the concept of credibility or theorized about the sources of concern therein below the state or leader level.

The Organizational Politics of Credibility

Taking organizations as the unit of analysis, I argue that bureaucratic socialization pushes policymakers to value different dimensions of credibility, and in turn, to advocate different policies related to the use of force. The core implication is that diplomats are more likely than military officials to support the use of force to maintain or build credibility, which then shapes the balance of advice that leaders receive. Contra standard theories of deterrence and signaling, I suggest that policymakers’ perspectives on credibility emerge via organizational identities.

Deterrence Theory: A Starting Point and Scope Condition

Classic theories of deterrence stress how to signal and reinforce commitments, estimate opposing forces, and leverage fears of escalation to achieve desired policy ends. As George and Smoke (1974, 41-44, 64) argue, foreign policy actors may practice deterrence at both the strategic level (where the task involves preventing nuclear conflict) and in more limited cases (where the task involves fighting limited wars and/or conducing crisis diplomacy). Either way, the core requirements for success remain the same: formulating and communicating intent to the potential aggressor while acquiring and deploying relevant capabilities. Accordingly, when and why policymakers care about their state’s credibility should be a function of their capability to carry out a threat or promise, their level of interest in doing so, and their

---

37 For a broad overview, see Jervis (1989b).
past record of behavior concerning the commitment.\textsuperscript{38} Policymakers then ought to express greater concern for credibility in cases of misalignment between their commitments and their capability to or interest in carrying them out.\textsuperscript{39}

This rationalist logic assumes, however, that policymakers are not only certain of their own commitments and interests, but also reach similar conclusions when presented with the same information.\textsuperscript{40} That may be true in cases of strategic deterrence, where the goal is relatively simple (avoid nuclear annihilation) and only one type of capability is relevant (strategic nuclear forces). But in cases of limited deterrence, the goal of winning a limited conflict or preventing one from breaking out is not so straightforward to achieve, as the problems tend to be more complex, the relevant variables more difficult to measure, and the available means less restricted than at the strategic level. As a result, the relevant objectives, motives for pursuing them, appropriate policy levers, and tradeoffs between addressing the problem at hand and other competing priorities are open to interpretation — as in the Greek example referenced above. For some officials, the perceived requirements for limited deterrence lay more in demonstrating concern or communicating intentions than in possessing overwhelming military capabilities, while for others the opposite was true. This makes limited deterrence a compelling setting for studying how policymakers think about credibility and apply the concept to policy debates.\textsuperscript{41}

The often-ambiguous nature of limited deterrence encounters, and the degree to which they can engage contentious debates over national interests, suggests that policymakers need cues to sort out their positions on these thorny questions. This raises the prospect that policymakers may not exhibit the relatively uniform conception of credibility implied by deterrence theory.\textsuperscript{42} Here, I argue, is where the bureaucratic environment that policymakers inhabit intersects with and shapes their understanding of credibility.

\textsuperscript{38}Tang (2005).
\textsuperscript{39}Many thanks to Daryl Press for helpful discussions on this point.
\textsuperscript{40}Schelling (1966).
\textsuperscript{41}George and Smoke (1974, 49-53).
\textsuperscript{42}Wolfers (1952); Yarhi-Milo (2014).
The Role of Organizational Identity

Organizational identity shapes decision makers’ conceptions of credibility, and in turn, their policy advocacy around the use of force in cases of limited deterrence. Since policymakers often struggle to assess their own power, interests, and resolve, organizational identity provides cues for framing policy priorities and tradeoffs. Most foreign policy is crafted within highly institutionalized and boundedly rational bureaucracies whose standard operating procedures (SOPs) powerfully influence the search for, selection, evaluation of, and adaptation to incoming information, entrenching issue framings that dispose how institutions react to a given event. While some of these framings may be held broadly among a state’s leadership, where one sits within the bureaucratic structure affects the organization-specific norms and practices to which one is exposed. Indeed, organizational “essence” and SOPs are distinct across bureaucracies. Essence is an organization’s dominant view of what its missions and capabilities should be, while SOPs reflect the distilled learning experiences that organizations apply consistently across situations. If essence provides a shared intra-organizational frame of reference for structuring problems, then SOPs shape and constrain organizations’ cognition and action. I jointly operationalize these factors under the term “organizational identity” to capture the cultural and practical dimensions of bureaucratic socialization.

Where one sits then influences how one is socialized to frame problems, even prior to preference formation. By shaping bureaucrats’ priors, organizational identity has effects beyond the “game of small thrones” over turf and resources that often characterizes interagency pol-

---

43Goffman (1959); Bem (1972); Wilson (2004).
44Simon (1947); March (1958); Cyert (1963); Wilson (1989); Gavetti et al. (2012); Hudson (2014).
45For instance, Halperin, Clapp and Kanter (2006, 9) catalog a number of widely-held “shared images” among American officials during the Cold War, such as the idea that “Every nation that falls to communism increases the power of the communist bloc in its struggle with the free world.”
47Allison and Zelikow (1999). Critiques include Krasner (1972); Art (1973); Rosati (1981); Bendor and Hammond (1992); Welch (1992); Rhodes (1994).
49Vertzberger (1990, 194, 209).
itics, influencing how policymakers diagnose crises and understand credibility to be at stake in the first place.\textsuperscript{50} In other words, where bureaucrats sit determines the aspects of credibility they are socialized to prioritize, and in turn, their policy advocacy.\textsuperscript{51} I consider two bureaucratic ideal types — diplomatic officials and military officers — whose organizational identities exhibit socialization to different sets of norms, different conceptions of credibility, and accordingly, differential willingness to use force in limited deterrence encounters.\textsuperscript{52}

Diplomats’ conception of credibility derives from their wide range of duties: translating between the home government and the world; providing early warning of troubles and opportunities; building and fixing relationships; and integrating the military, economic, and intelligence tools of statecraft.\textsuperscript{53} Diplomats are socialized to be experts in communication, relationship management, and negotiation — whether because they are career civil servants steeped in the art of diplomacy or because they enter government from business or law, where such skills also receive special emphasis. As a result, their self-image is as the first line of defense against international strife,\textsuperscript{54} or the process-oriented analyst and reporter who keeps the home government informed, represents its interests, and cajoles others into doing what the home government wants. Securing others’ trust is essential for each of these objectives, making diplomats highly focused on the personal and behavioral dimensions of cultivating relationships.\textsuperscript{55} This means that diplomats constantly and keenly observe how the home government is perceived across a broad range of issues, events, and commitments, which they see as tightly interconnected.

The wide scope of diplomats’ core mission inculcates a broad definition of national interests and a capacious understanding of what the home government’s actions can indicate

\textsuperscript{50}Hudson (2014, 101); Posen (1984)
\textsuperscript{51}This is distinct from Schub (2019)’s argument about bureaucrats’ informational expertise. We address different outcome variables and reach different conclusions about heterogeneity in advisor input.
\textsuperscript{52}By diplomats, I refer to officials responsible for conducting their state’s foreign policy through employment at their government’s main international affairs agency. By military officers, I mean members of a state’s armed services who have attained officer rank. Hereafter, I use the words “officer” and “official” interchangeably.
\textsuperscript{53}Murphy (1964, 15, 31); Simpson (1967, 3); Burns (2019, 9).
\textsuperscript{54}Schulzinger (1975, 10).
\textsuperscript{55}Dobbins (2017, x).
to international audiences. Since their chief objective is to cultivate strong, durable impressions and relationships that will persist over anticipated future interactions, I argue that diplomats conceive of credibility primarily in terms of national interests and signaling reputation — in other words, as the *willingness* to keep commitments and bear costs.

Military officers’ conception of credibility stems from their military education, which limits the proper role of military force in foreign policy to traditional security goals such as protecting territory, geostrategic positions, and allies. This experience socializes military officials to be experts in managing violence through specialized training in military operations, tactics, and logistics. As a result, their self-image is as the goal-oriented technician, taking sober stock of a given task’s hard capability requirements. Because they are attentive to the nuts and bolts of military interventions as well as all that can go wrong in war, military officials hold a pessimistic professional viewpoint that typically demands maximum capabilities to address any contingency. This manifests in the military ethic of “conservative realism,” stressing the possession of ready forces to meet potential challenges and opposing the extension of commitments or issuance of threats unless the capacity to follow through exists.

The focused nature of military officials’ central mission means that they hold a narrow perspective on national interests and a capabilities-centric view of what can be accomplished in limited deterrence encounters. Since their chief objective is to ensure battlefield success, military officials’ are mainly concerned with the caliber of military leadership, forces, and weaponry; this makes them far more focused on how devoting resources in the moment could compromise other contingencies than on what inferences others might draw down the road from present behavior. Therefore, I argue that military officials conceive of credibility

---

56 Schake (2012, 8).
57 Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015).
58 Posen (1984, 46, 52); Brooks (2008, 3); Feaver (2003, 68).
59 Brooks (2020, 7).
60 Schake (2012, 40).
61 Huntington (1957, Ch. 3). For an alternative perspective, see Weeks (2014); White (2020).
primarily in terms of national interests and capabilities — in other words, as the capacity to keep commitments and bear costs. My first hypothesis follows:

**Hypothesis 1.** Diplomats conceive of credibility primarily in terms of national interests and signaling reputation, while military officers conceive of credibility primarily in terms of national interests and capabilities.

Table 1 summarizes the key dimensions of difference between diplomatic and military officials pertaining to their conceptions of credibility, building on work by Huth (1997, 75-76). As the table underscores, I do not claim that diplomats are wholly inattentive to capabilities or that military officials entirely disregard reputational concerns, but rather that these are not the main lenses through which each actor conceives of credibility. First, diplomats and military officials diverge in their definitions of national interests. I view this as a baseline condition that establishes each type’s average level of concern for credibility. Further distinctions determine the nature of these officials’ concerns, including beliefs about the interdependence of commitments and concern for the quality of military leadership, forces, and weaponry.

In turn, these differences affect diplomats’ and military officials’ levels of risk acceptance on the use of force, as depicted in Figure 1. Diplomats’ broad conception of national interests and strong beliefs about the interdependence of commitments make them highly attuned to fluctuations in others’ views of the home country’s perceived resolve or reliability, which they see as fungible across events and issues. Their default assumption is that the state’s signaling reputation needs constant maintenance, which can be accomplished through the exercise of military power. For this reason, they exhibit a high baseline willingness to use force in cases of limited deterrence. And because diplomats define national interests broadly, I suggest that their willingness to use force approximates the topmost curve in the left plot.

Meanwhile, military officials’ narrow perspective on national interests and capabilities-centric view of foreign policy means that they are not inclined to advocate the use or show

---

63 Schulzinger (1975, 141); Betts (1991, 36).
Table 1: Implications of the Theoretical Argument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Diplomats Credibility = Interests · Signaling Reputation</th>
<th>Military Officers Credibility = Interests · Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of national interests</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs about interdependence of commitments</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Qualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for quality of military leadership, forces, and weapons</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk acceptance on use of force</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Diplomatic vs. Military Officials on Credibility and Use of Force

Diplomats: Signaling Reputation vs. Force

Military: Capabilities vs. Force

of force unless national interests are at stake and the capability to act is beyond question. Their orientation toward battlefield success means their willingness to use force tracks with
the available capacity to address all foreseeable contingencies. And even when there is a surfeit of capability, military officers may be unwilling to advocate for the use of force unless they deem national interests to be at stake. Hence the shape and placement of the lines on the right plot in Figure 1, where I expect that military officials’ willingness to use force will often approximate the bottommost curve. This yields my second hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2.** Following from their diverging conceptions of credibility, diplomats display a higher baseline willingness than military officers to use force in cases of limited deterrence.

To summarize, then, my theoretical contribution advances the causal logic illustrated below. In cases of limited deterrence, organizational identity affects policy advocacy related to the use of force through policymakers’ conceptions of credibility.

\[
\text{Organizational identity} \to \text{Conception of credibility} \to \text{Policy advocacy}
\]

**Why Does Organizational Identity Matter?**

Why does it matter if military officials and diplomats diverge in how they think about credibility? Even if presidents reign supreme in foreign affairs, even if presidents reign supreme in foreign affairs,\(^64\) advisers’ estimates still shape policy deliberations up to the ultimate choice;\(^65\) modeling this informational pipeline helps derive testable implications for the advice that leaders receive. To the extent that military officials mostly equate credibility with capability, their policy recommendations around the use of force will match what they deem militarily feasible.\(^66\) In the degree to which diplomats generally liken credibility to signaling reputation, their policy recommendations around the use of force will track with the perceived need to demonstrate reliability or resolve to external parties, wherein the military is just another instrument in the foreign policy toolkit.\(^67\) When these judgments collide in the policy process, they shape contours of leaders’ choices in cases of limited deterrence by influencing the relative hawkishness of the option set — that is, how biased these levers are toward the use of force.

---

\(^64\)Neustadt (1960); Saunders (2011).
\(^65\)Saunders (2017); Yarhi-Milo (2018).\(^b\)
\(^67\)Feaver and Gelpi (2004, 45-46).
I lay out four predictions in Figure 2. The extremes result from combinations on the off-diagonal — if diplomats (do not) believe that signaling reputation is at stake, and military officials (do not) possess the capability to act, a hawkish option set is the most (least) likely result and collective advocacy for the use of force is most (least) probable. The less extreme cases derive from the main diagonal, where military officials’ and diplomats’ perspectives and advocacy conflict. In the top left quadrant, where military officials are willing to use force given the possession of capabilities, but diplomats do not see as pressing a need to use force, I anticipate the second-most hawkish options because of the military’s support. In the bottom right quadrant, where diplomats are willing to use force but military officials are not, I expect the third-most hawkish options given that diplomats are likely to push for them even as military officers call for restraint. These implications extend the causal chain
detailed above as follows:

Organizational identity → Conception of credibility → Policy advocacy → Menu of options

Of course, the menu of options is only one factor in determining whether force will be used. Leaders themselves play critical roles in shaping military interventions, exhibit different dispositions to fight for reputation, and may wish to burnish others’ impressions of their resolve, especially early in their tenure. I do not argue that advisers always box leaders in, but rather that examining the balance of advice informs us about eventual choices. For example, President Ronald Reagan, encouraged by Secretary of State George Shultz, overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s objections in deploying U.S. troops to Lebanon in August 1982 — which eventually led to the death of 241 Marines in the October 1983 barracks bombing. By contrast, President Richard Nixon declined to retaliate against North Korea for shooting down an American surveillance plane in 1969 at least partly because the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the available military options as unlikely to achieve anything and too probable to provoke additional escalation. This prevented the United States from being drawn into another conflict in East Asia while it was already mired in Vietnam. Organizational identity matters, then, because it can bias the option set toward more or less expansive means. While the theory does not attempt to explain which types of advice leaders are most likely to act on, it does elucidate how advisers frame policies for leaders up to the point of decision, which is key for understanding what comes next.

Alternative Explanations and Mechanisms

While my theory is grounded in organizational identity, other plausible explanations and mechanisms also deserve attention. Explanations at other levels of analysis could comprise the balance of power or threat in the international system. Mechanisms within the bu-

---

68 Saunders (2011).
69 Yarhi-Milo (2018b).
70 Lupton (2020).
71 Evans and Potter (2019, 18-20).
72 Jackson (2016, 76).
reaucratic politics paradigm might include the role of organizational interests in disposing policymakers’ issue framings and advocacy.

First, the structure of the international system may shape policymakers’ conceptions of their state’s credibility and corresponding willingness to use force. This explanation flows from the standard version of deterrence theory outlined above, in which structural variables like capabilities and interests loom large. If a limited deterrence encounter draws policymakers’ attention to an unfavorable balance of power or threat, this may raise concerns about the credibility of their state’s commitments. But under bipolarity, for example, scholars have suggested that these concerns should be constant and uniform among policymakers, as any dispute involving at least one of the poles automatically becomes a test of will and prompts invocations of the domino theory. Therefore, system-level approaches would not anticipate organizationally-grounded variation in policymakers’ conception of their state’s credibility, instead predicting their views as a homogeneous function of capabilities, interests, and reputation for resolve.

A corollary of the power or threat distribution is the balance of nuclear capabilities. Under conditions of nuclear parity and mutually assured destruction, a nuclear strike invites societal ruin. This makes nuclear threats less believable, heightens policymakers’ focus on credibility, and increases the perceived importance of conventional forces. Conversely, when the nuclear balance favors one side, a nuclear strike by the more powerful state is more plausible, so policymakers in that state that enjoys greater capability should be less focused on credibility. Again, however, the implication is that structural conditions should inculcate similar views about credibility among all policymakers, in contrast to my organizational approach. I explore these structural alternatives in both empirical sections below.

Second, an organizational interests perspective fits the bureaucratic politics paradigm,
but not my theory of organizational identity per se. Military and diplomatic officials might have different policy preferences in cases of limited deterrence based on their organization’s pursuit of turf and influence at the expense of other bureaucratic actors. Diplomats would always prefer options involving negotiations to leverage their skillset in communication, relationship management, and bargaining. Military officials would always prefer solutions involving the use of force to privilege their expertise in managing violence. Each might still conceptualize credibility as my theory suggests, but believe that their organizationally-preferred solution is the best way to preserve it while garnering additional resources and responsibilities. I use the case studies below to probe this alternative.

The Organizational Semantics of Credibility

Having laid out the theoretical setup, I begin my empirical analysis by examining patterns in use of the term “credibility” by U.S. diplomats and military officials via two document collections, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and Declassified Documents Online (DDO). These collections provide key sources of evidence because of their organizational and temporal scope — they not only comprise a wealth of data from various U.S. national security policy organs, but also cover much of the post-World War II period, thereby spanning many cases of limited deterrence to which my theory could potentially apply. In studying U.S. policymakers during the Cold War, I am also choosing a challenging case for my theory. If structural factors made credibility concerns as pervasive and uniform as scholars have suggested, then finding evidence that organizational perspectives influenced the nature of these concerns would provide important validation for the theory.

To test my first hypothesis, I use natural language processing methods, which are well-suited to exploring organization-level patterns in policymakers’ use of language. I employ

---

76 Here, I do not consider whether bureaucrats self-select into particular roles based on their personal preferences, as evidence from Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Woodruff, Kelty and Segal (2006); Dempsey (2009); Krebs and Ralston (2020) suggests that this is not the case.
77 Posen (1984); Allison and Zelikow (1999).
78 For additional discussion, see Appendix 1.
80 Katagiri and Min (2019).
keyness testing, structural topic modeling (STM), and word embeddings in combination with close reading of individual texts to enable structured, group-wise comparisons via document-level metadata.\footnote{For additional discussion, see Appendix 2.} First, keyness captures differential associations of words between sets of documents by identifying terms that are conspicuously common or rare in a target group compared to a reference group.\footnote{This generates a chi-squared value that is signed positively (negatively) if the observed number of occurrences for a given term in the target group exceeds (is less than) that in the reference group; \url{https://quanteda.io/reference/textstat_keyness.html}.} This allows me to examine which words most distinguish diplomats from military officials when they talk about credibility. I anticipate that the most characteristic words among military officials will concern capabilities, while the most distinctive words for diplomats will pertain to signaling reputation.

Second, STM provides a systematic means to parse patterns of speech at great scale and depth of dimensionality while minimizing potential bias in hand-coding. I use STM to identify clusters of words, or topics, that pertain more strongly to diplomatic or military officials when they discuss credibility as well as topics on which they overlap, allowing me to illustrate similarities and differences in terms and phrases that each type uses.\footnote{Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003); Roberts et al. (2014).} In this analysis, I follow standard preprocessing procedures before tuning the model parameters, estimating the topics, and labeling them through close reading of the 5-10 highest probability documents associated with each.\footnote{Denny and Spirling (2018). I lowercase and stem all words and remove punctuation, stopwords, numbers, and terms that appear in less than 5 percent or more than 95 percent of documents. Model diagnostics provided in Figures A2-A5 display how I chose the number of topics to fit (via the \texttt{searchK} command in \texttt{stm}) and which model runs to use in the analysis based on maximization of semantic coherence and exclusivity (via the \texttt{plotModels} command). For FRUS, I fit 9 topics and use model run \#1 and for DDO, I fit 7 topics and use model run \#4.} Here, I also expect that across topics, diplomats’ and military officials’ discussion of credibility should match a focus on signaling reputation and capabilities, respectively.

Third, word embeddings use the local surroundings of a given term in-text to infer syntactic and semantic relationships between concepts.\footnote{Mikolov et al. (2013)} I leverage embeddings to better understand credibility’s nearest semantic neighbors among diplomatic and military officials.
Embeddings start from the premise that we can “know a word by the company it keeps”\(^{86}\) in other words, by modeling the relative space between a chosen keyword and its nearest neighbors.\(^{87}\) The substantively interpretable output from an embedding model is a measure of cosine similarity between the term of interest and other words in the corpus. Recent methodological advances allow researchers to model these semantic relationships as a function of document-level covariates.\(^{88}\) In applying this technique, I anticipate that credibility’s nearest neighbors among diplomats will pertain to signaling reputation while those among military officials will relate to capabilities.

I begin by gathering relevant texts from FRUS and DDO using a regular expression search for the term “credibility.”\(^{89}\) This yields a sample of 1,156 FRUS records and 2,217 DDO records.\(^{90}\) I then use metadata fields associated with each corpus to separate out documents created by diplomatic or military officials.\(^{91}\) Where the relevant metadata is not present, or if a document contains meeting minutes or memoranda of conversation, I supplement with hand-coding by identifying which type of official is speaking about credibility. I consider records from the State Department (Joint Chiefs of Staff or Defense Department) to represent the diplomatic (military) point of view.\(^{92}\) This exercise produces 517 FRUS records and 958 DDO records that are in scope for analysis.\(^{93}\)

The keyness results in Figure 3 are consistent with my first hypothesis, demonstrating

\(^{86}\)Firth (1957).
\(^{87}\)Harris (1970).
\(^{88}\)Rodriguez, Spirling and Stewart (2021).
\(^{89}\)I focus on credibility, and not related words like reputation, resolve, or reliability, because the latter have multiple meanings, whereas credibility means something specific to policymakers. I also assume that this meaning does not change over time. I acknowledge that these are limitations of the study.
\(^{90}\)I collect all data via \url{http://history-lab.org} and the Columbia University Libraries. These documents comprise 0.55 and 1.89 percent of each corpus, respectively.
\(^{91}\)I use the “Source” field in FRUS and the “Publisher” field in DDO.
\(^{92}\)In the main analysis, I only include Defense Department documents if they were created by military officials rather than department civilians, as the latter are not explicitly part of the theory. However, in Appendices 8-9, I show that the results do not change when I include DoD civilians. I exclude documents from other agencies because they are not part of the theory, but future research might consider, for instance, whether intelligence officials speak even differently than diplomats and military officials.
\(^{93}\)Within FRUS, 478 documents come from diplomats and 39 from military officials. The latter number rises to 72 with department civilians included. Within DDO, 904 documents come from diplomats and 54 from military officials. The latter number rises to 112 with department civilians included.
substantial differences in the top words that diplomats and military officials use when dis-
cussing credibility.\textsuperscript{94} My theory argues that diplomats’ focus on reporting and analysis of
international affairs makes them most attentive to the dimensions of credibility that pertain
to signaling reputation. Since diplomats are chiefly responsible for collecting information
on events in other states and on how foreign governments view the home country, it makes
sense that their most distinctive words in relation to credibility are those that relay the
contents of conversations about or involving foreign officials (“U.S.,” “said,” “secretary,” “for-
eign”, “government”). The other top words refer to human rights, an issue on which U.S.
diplomats commonly draw inferences about American credibility or that of others regarding
commitments to protect individual freedoms. This is an area where diplomats assess not
just foreign governments’ behavior, but also the perceived reliability of U.S. international
leadership on the issue — particularly during and after the domestic tumult of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{95}

By contrast, my theory suggests that military officials’ focus on fighting
and winning wars makes them highly sensitive to the dimensions of credibility that relate
to military capabilities. Since military officials are mainly responsible for the strategic and
operational aspects of combat, it is logical that their most characteristic words in relation
to credibility are those that concern military strategy and the components of using force
(“strategic,” “forces,” “military,” “capability,” “war,” “nuclear”). Additionally, other terms
reference specific entities whose credibility military officials assess through the lens of their
operational capabilities, including the Republic of Vietnam, or RVN (whose fighting strength
is of substantial concern to military officials during the Vietnam War), and the Yemen Arab
Republic, or YAR (whose Egyptian-backed troops meet forces aligned with U.S. partners

\textsuperscript{94} The length of each horizontal bar scores how over- or under-present a given word is in the target
(diplomatic) relative to the reference group (military); words that appear in the top half of the plots are
over-present (under-present) in diplomatic (military) documents, and vice versa for the bottom half of the
plots.

\textsuperscript{95} Borstelmann (2012); Keys (2014). Substantively similar results for DDO appear in Figure A7. Here,
the terms such as “economic” and “africa” refer to economic relations with developing countries (wherein
diplomats express concern with the credibility of American aid commitments; Sargent (2015)), while terms
like “israel” and “negotiations” refer to Middle Eastern affairs (wherein diplomats worry about being perceived
as a credible mediator between the Arabs and Israelis; Kissinger (1979)).
Saudi Arabia and Jordan during the Yemeni civil war in the 1960s). Keyness testing therefore suggests that diplomatic and military officials refer to credibility using words that pertain to signaling reputation and capabilities, respectively, providing initial evidence in line with my first hypothesis.

---

\textsuperscript{96} Gelb and Betts (1979); Orkaby (2014). Similarly, for DDO, top terms such as “minuteman,” “air,” and “radar” pertain to the weapons and supporting systems (e.g. Minuteman nuclear missiles and air and radar assets) that were as essential ingredients of deterrent credibility, especially the capacity to target and deliver an atomic strike.
The STM results in Figure 4 then deepen our understanding of how diplomats and military officials think about credibility, confirming that diplomats do so in terms of signaling reputation while military officials do so in terms of capability. The topics that are unique to and shared by diplomats and military officials when they discuss credibility elucidate these differences, suggesting that structural explanations for how policymakers conceive of credibility are missing an important factor: organizational identity.

Movement from left to right in Figure 4 indicates how the prevalence of various topics
shifts as the underlying document sample changes from military to diplomatic records, while the point estimates that are (not) bounded away from zero denote (a lack of) statistically significant differences in topical prevalence between these document pools. Diplomats are more likely than military officials to talk about credibility in the context of Foreign Aid, Middle Eastern Affairs, and Public Affairs, while military officials are more likely than diplomats to discuss credibility in the context of Vietnam and Force Posture. Both sets of officials are equally likely to talk about credibility with regard to On-the-Ground Reporting, Treaties and Negotiations, and Grand Strategy.

Within and across these topics, what do diplomats mean when they invoke credibility? Tables A1 and A2 contain representative quotes from the FRUS documents most closely associated with each topic, furnishing evidence that diplomats’ references to credibility apply principally to cultivating an international image of reliable partnership. Regarding Foreign Aid, diplomats see U.S. credibility at stake over its commitments to help its allies manage world oil prices, to provide development loans through international financial institutions, and to refrain from exporting arms to countries with poor records of adherence to international human rights standards. On Middle Eastern Affairs, diplomats view U.S. credibility as an index of its regional influence relative to the Soviet Union and as asset to be managed with parties on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but especially with King Hussein of Jordan and other perceived moderates in the Arab world. These examples suggest that diplomats conceive of credibility as a quality to be obtained or preserved through process-oriented actions, such as aiding allies or mediating regional disputes, that show willingness to take costly steps in service of commitments.

---

97 Figure A6 contains the full list of topic labels and highest probability word stems.  
98 I interpret the “Kissinger-NSC” topic as a residual effect of how often the former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State talked about credibility while he held these roles. I do not treat this topic as substantively meaningful.  
99 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d175  
100 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v02/d145  
101 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d427  
102 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d275  
103 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d222; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d359
Similarly, what do military officials mean when they talk about credibility? These references to credibility pertain to the ability to meet deterrence-related goals. On Vietnam (and the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia), military officials assess the credibility of deterrence as a function of American capacity to meet immediate communist threats, such as in Laos\(^{104}\) and Korea,\(^{105}\) while remaining prepared for other regional contingencies or general war. Though military officials understand the American commitment to South Vietnam as symbolic of its determination to prevent communist expansion, they still interpret their primary goal as defending the RVN on the battlefield and invalidating the communists’ “wars of national liberation” as a viable concept of military operations.\(^{106}\) Regarding Force Posture, military officials view credibility as a matter of relative military power, typically with reference to the Soviet Union. They conceptualize deterrence of a Soviet conventional attack on Europe as resting on the U.S.’s ability to employ strategic nuclear forces;\(^{107}\) military officials also interpret the potential withdrawal of U.S. forces from bases in Greece and Turkey\(^{108}\) and the expansion of Soviet military basing in Somalia\(^{109}\) through the lens of how a shifting balance of capabilities would affect the credibility of deterrence. These examples suggest that military officials view credibility as grounded in the relative (military) capacity to meet challenges and respond to threats in service of their overall goal: ensuring battlefield victory.

Though these results highlight a discrepancy in how diplomats and military officials conceive of credibility, additional evidence is necessary to establish that these differences are not a simple function of organizational specialization. In other words, given their diverging organizational remits, diplomats and military officials might encounter credibility in the context of substantively different topics, but do not understand the term any differently. I explore this possibility by analyzing the topics that do not exhibit differences in prevalence between the underlying groups of documents, thereby testing what diplomatic and military

\(^{104}\) [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d134](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d134)
\(^{105}\) [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d146](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d146)
\(^{106}\) [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d130](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d130)
\(^{107}\) [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d129](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d129)
\(^{108}\) [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d121](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d121)
\(^{109}\) [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/d155](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/d155)
officials mean when they invoke credibility under the same broad issue. 

For these topics, however, the differences that the theory identifies do not drop away. For instance, under Treaties and Negotiations, diplomats focus on preserving credibility by signaling consistent positions in public commitments and statements, whether in the context of international economic agreements, at the United Nations, or the return of the Panama Canal to Panama. Yet when military officials refer to credibility on this topic, they concentrate on capability-centric dimensions of the problem at hand — whether in terms of how military capabilities could contribute to a favorable resolution of peace negotiations in Korea or Vietnam, or in how arms control negotiations could contravene capability advantages that the military currently enjoys.

Similarly, in discussing Grand Strategy, diplomats frame credibility as a function of sustaining or developing military and/or economic relationships with countries outside of the direct Western orbit. In practice, this means that diplomats see U.S. credibility as tied up in matters such as the Philippines’ success or failure as a democracy, in the U.S.’s willingness to provide military and economic assistance to India, and in its communicated interest in entertaining some degree of detente with Cuba. In contrast, on this same topic, military officials cast credibility as deriving from the U.S.’s ability to respond to regional contingencies in Europe and the Middle East. Further, they view the relative credibility of the Soviet deterrent as lacking in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split and the USSR’s failure to match Western military power. And finally, military officials characterize deterrence as “a

\footnote{I do not examine the “On-the-Ground Reporting” topic in detail because it concerns diplomats’ assessments of political credibility among foreign politicians and governments versus military officials’ assessments of information gathered through military operations.}

\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve03/d67}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d340}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v29/d3}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54p1/d236}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d198}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d236}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d373}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d201}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11p1/d471}
\footnote{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d43}
state of mind brought about by a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction...a function of obvious capability and known determination to employ it when necessary.”

Thus, while military officials do not discount the importance of will in addition to capability, they chiefly concern themselves with assessing and building the latter in relation to credibility.

The evidence from the overlapping topics in FRUS therefore points to persistent differences in how diplomats and military officials conceive of credibility, backing up the inferences drawn from the topics that distinguish these ideal types. As a final test, Figure 5 presents the embeddings model, which contrasts credibility’s nearest neighbors among diplomats and military officials as a function of each word’s cosine similarity ratio with credibility. The further any given term deviates from 1, on either side of the central dotted line, the more distinctive it is of either diplomatic or military officials. Terms denoted with a circle (triangle) are more characteristic of diplomatic (military) officials, while those marked with a square are shared between the two groups. The embeddings results crystallize the key difference between diplomats and military officials’ conception of credibility: for the former, “willingness” is among the top nearest neighbors, while for the latter, the equivalent terms are “deterrent” and “capability.”

To summarize, then, the above analyses underscore a key divergence in how diplomatic and military officials conceive of credibility: signaling reputation versus military capabilities. I find that diplomats refer to credibility as the willingness to incur costs in service of a commitment, while military officials define it as the capacity to follow through when needed, validating my first hypothesis. With support for my first hypothesis in hand, I now turn to two brief case studies that explore the wider implications of the theory.

---

122 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d188

123 To ensure that these results are not idiosyncratic to FRUS, I perform the same analysis using documents from DDO. Reassuringly, however, the overall pattern of topics, direction of effects, and organization-level differences remain consistent even after substituting in a different corpus. See Appendices 4.8.

124 An equivalent plot for DDO showing similar results appears in Figure . The y-axis ranks terms by the magnitude of their deviation from 1. The x-axis plots their actual deviation. The stars indicate terms that are significantly more characteristic of one group than the other. See Rodriguez, Spirling and Stewart (2021).
Organizational Identity in Historical Perspective

To flesh out underlying mechanisms and test my second hypothesis, I perform process tracing on two U.S. limited deterrence encounters — Berlin (1948) and Dien Bien Phu (1954). I choose these examples for several reasons: first, to hold system polarity and the nuclear
balance roughly constant across cases; second, to assess the alternative mechanism regarding organizational interests; and third, to address the concern that policymakers' assumptions about credibility were often baked into the conventional wisdom and thus remained unarticulated.\footnote{Appendix 9 elaborates on my case selection strategy. Appendix 10 contains summaries of two additional cases, Greece (1947-48) and the Taiwan Straits (1954-55), that provide further support for my theoretical expectations.} By choosing cases that fall closely on either side of the Korean War, I leverage the massive increase in U.S. capabilities resulting from NSC-68 and the Korean War as a discontinuity in American strategy,\footnote{Gaddis (1982).} allowing me to explore how diplomats and military officials first advanced arguments about credibility while the conventional wisdom was being established.

Process tracing helps confirm whether military and diplomatic officials conceive of credibility differently and what policies they advocate as a result while facilitating comparison with alternative theories and mechanisms within and across cases. If officials display similar concern for credibility and advocate similar policies across cases, this would favor explanations based on polarity, threat, or the nuclear balance. If diplomats and military officials express differential concern for credibility across cases, but advocate policies that increase their turf or influence, this would bolster the organizational interests alternative. Consistent with my argument about organizational identity, however, I find that while diplomats consistently fretted over resolve and reliability and advocated for the use of force, military officials framed problems in terms of capabilities and only advocated force when they believed such capacity was available. The evidence demonstrates that organizational identity can explain patterns of policy advocacy in cases of limited deterrence through its effect on officials’ conceptions of credibility.

**Berlin (1948)**

Few locations better symbolized the Cold War than Berlin.\footnote{Schick (1971); Trachtenberg (1999).} Yet as the Soviets blockaded the city in June 1948, U.S. officials disputed whether it was worth risking allied resources
or general war to retain Berlin’s Western zones. Before the city became a symbol of Western resolve, military officials questioned the feasibility and wisdom of holding an outpost deep within Soviet-occupied Germany, advocating for outright withdrawal and against the dispatch of an armed convoy to probe Soviet intentions. The urge to withdraw, however, met consistent pushback from diplomats, who routinely pressed for a more muscular response to Soviet pressure to forestall the loss of signaling reputation they associated with leaving Berlin. Officials’ conceptions of credibility were hardly uniform in the way that structural explanations would predict, while their resulting policy advocacy was consistently at odds with their putative organizational interests. The balance of advice yielded policy options that were not especially hawkish.

Diplomats saw Berlin as a symbol of American resolve and reliability as early as December 1947, warning that withdrawing from the city would entail “a great loss to US prestige in Central Europe.” Robert Murphy, the State Department’s chief political adviser in Germany, fretted over “the strength of determination in Washington to maintain the position” and characterized a potential withdrawal as “the Munich of 1948.” James Douglas, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, averred that the U.S. could only deter the Soviets in Germany “by a real show of resolution” involving “solidarity and irresistible force.” General Lucius Clay, the American military governor of Germany, pledged to stay in Berlin because the American presence was “essential to our prestige.”

Once the blockade began on June 24th, Clay and his diplomatic compatriots repeatedly pressed for sending an armed convoy into city (a plan for which Clay had neither the troops

---

128 Harrington (2012, 47).
130 FRUS 1947, II, 362.
131 FRUS 1948, II, 533.
132 FRUS 1948, II, 559.
133 FRUS 1948, II, 536.
134 Despite his title, Clay was no average military man. After attending West Point, he became an engineer and administrator, serving during World War II in the State Department’s Office of War Mobilization rather than in a combat role (Harrington 2012, 30-31, 58-59). Historians have described Clay as a “striking exception to the [Huntingtonian] ideal-type of a cautious and apolitical professional soldier” (Shlaim 1983, 103). Therefore, I categorize Clay as diplomat rather than a military official.
nor the blessing of Pentagon planners). Lest the U.S. admit that it lacked the will to enforce its surface access rights, Clay and Murphy made their case directly to the National Security Council on July 22nd. Even though the NSC resolved to attempt negotiations with Stalin — an outcome that diplomats ought to have preferred according to their organizational interests — these officials continued to recommend a forceful response and remained willing to run significant risks in sustaining the airlift. Murphy subsequently questioned why nobody on the NSC mentioned the U.S.’s growing supply of nuclear bombs and lamented that he should have resigned over the major Soviet downgrading of “American determination and capability” for not having met force with force. When the Army categorized the concentration of U.S. air transport fleet on the airlift mission as “militarily unwise,” Clay dismissed their judgment on the grounds that the West’s stake in Berlin outweighed such considerations. And when negotiations with Stalin collapsed in September, Foy Kohler, chargé at the embassy in Moscow, expressed hope (rather than dismay) that U.S. military leaders in Berlin would “now feel themselves released from former restraints.” In diplomats’ view, there could be no turning back from the U.S.’s numerous firm statements indicating that “we will not get out of Berlin.”

Yet military officials were not prepared to meet the Soviets with force in Berlin. Postwar demobilization had dramatically curtailed effective combat power, greatly restricting military officials’ estimates of what was possible — a reality they did not attempt to rectify by lobbying for more resources. Rather, the Joint Chiefs emphasized the military’s overextension, admonishing that commitments were not aligned with capabilities. When Clay proposed the convoy, General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, quashed it immediately. Bradley knew that if any shooting started, 6,500 Western soldiers would be

---

135 FRUS 1948, II, 577.  
136 Harrington (2012, 128-29).  
137 Murphy (1964, 316-17).  
138 Harrington (2012, 238).  
139 FRUS 1948, II, 670.  
140 FRUS 1948, II, 693.  
squaring off against 18,000 Soviet troops. Like Bradley, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall and Army Plans & Operations Director Lieutenant General Alfred Wedemeyer were infantry officers during World War II. Their shared assessment was that Berlin could not be defended in a military confrontation.\textsuperscript{142} And if the goal was to avoid war, they argued, then the risks of staying in Berlin absent the capability to fight and win were too great: the United States had only limited interests at stake; prestige was not the coin of the realm; and withdrawal would harm but not torpedo the broader Western cause.\textsuperscript{143}

Instead, military officials focused on the dearth of U.S. capability and argued that the impact of withdrawal could be minimized by demonstrating that the United States would stand firm where capabilities permitted.\textsuperscript{144} The chiefs opposed the convoy in their formal opinion on July 22nd “in view of the risk of war involved and the inadequacy of United States preparation for global conflict.”\textsuperscript{145} For his part, Secretary of State George Marshall treated the convoy as a last resort, saw the airlift’s effect on warfighting capacity as a major concern, and understood that the U.S.’s conventional forces were vastly outgunned.\textsuperscript{146} This made him reluctant to forcefully break the blockade, even if the entire European project hinged on defending Berlin as an outpost.\textsuperscript{147} Mutual opposition from Marshall and the chiefs limited the hawkishness of policy options on Berlin, constraining Truman from ever seriously entertaining the blockade despite Clay and Murphy’s late July plea.\textsuperscript{139}

To summarize, the Berlin case demonstrates military and diplomatic officials’ diverging notions of credibility and resulting policy advocacy. Officials’ conceptions of credibility follow organizationally-grounded logics, confirming the theory’s observable implications: diplomats’ beliefs about interdependence manifest in their concern for potential damage to U.S. signaling reputation in Europe and elsewhere, while military officials’ attention to the quality of

\textsuperscript{142}Shlaim (1983, 214).
\textsuperscript{143}Harrington (2012, 82-84).
\textsuperscript{144}Harrington (2012, 128-130).
\textsuperscript{145}FRUS 1948, II, 591; Harrington (2012, 135-36).
\textsuperscript{146}Since Marshall was a career military man, I code him as a military official rather than a diplomat.
\textsuperscript{147}Harrington (2012, 238); Shlaim (1983, 185-86); FRUS 1948, II, 583.
\textsuperscript{139}Harrington (2012).
military leadership, forces, and weapons is clear in their refusal to sanction actions for which capabilities were unavailable. This evidence counters the system-level explanation that expects all policymakers to draw similar inferences about credibility based variables like power and threat. My findings are also at odds with a story about organizational interests. Neither did diplomats seize the chance to raise their influence by emphasizing negotiations, nor did military officials embrace the opportunity to increase their resources and autonomy by endorsing military operations. While the dearth of capability yielded relatively dovish policy options, I now examine whether Korea-related changes in U.S. posture shifted patterns of policy advocacy.

**Dien Bien Phu (1954)**

By contrast, when France requested American intervention at Dien Bien Phu in April 1954, military and diplomatic officials nearly took the bait. Diplomats once again argued that American resolve and reliability were on the line, while military officials delivered split opinions based on diverging assessments of American capabilities. Given the favorable balance of capabilities that the U.S. enjoyed in the region, a structural explanation would not anticipate substantial credibility concerns — yet some officials saw U.S. military superiority as precisely the reason to act in the name of credibility. However, military and diplomatic officials still framed intervention in terms of capability versus will, respectively. Though some military officials’ policy advocacy reflected an organizational interest in defending turf and influence, diplomats again avoided negotiations. On net, my theory of organizational identity explains patterns of policy advocacy in this case, which flirted with some very hawkish options.

Diplomats consistently backed a larger American role in Indochina to support France as an ally, mirroring their stance on Berlin. They sought to bolster American signaling reputation by forswearing efforts to negotiate with the Viet Minh and entertaining the use of

---

149 Logevall (2012); Prados (2014).
150 Prados (2014, Location 213).
nuclear weapons to spare the French garrison. When John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State in 1953, he was already a seasoned diplomat who believed that failing to check communist expansion would confirm the United States’ irresolution and unreliability in the eyes of other nations.\textsuperscript{151} Dulles and his staff — including State Department counselor Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson, and Director of Policy Planning Robert Bowie — routinely pressed the NSC to consider more forceful measures in Indochina while vigorously lobbying the French against a negotiated settlement and challenging the Joint Chiefs on their initial categorization of Southeast Asia as critical to U.S. security interests but not worth the commitment of ground forces.\textsuperscript{152}

To maintain American signaling reputation, diplomats sought to internationalize the conflict in spring 1954 through a U.S.-led coalition including the UK, France, Australia, Thailand, and the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{153} But rather than appeal to the UN, as the British encouraged, Dulles and his staff preferred to threaten “disastrous retaliation” against China to compel a halt in PRC assistance to the Viet Minh.\textsuperscript{154} Sitting passively by, Dulles argued, ran the risk of showing the PRC that adventurism in Southeast Asia would not face consequences, especially since “the atomic balance, which is now advantageous to us, might decline over the next four years.”\textsuperscript{155} Dulles was conscious of the nuclear balance insofar as he viewed these capabilities as a tool to be wielded for signaling purposes, and he may even have made a secret offer to French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault of two American atomic bombs for use at the besieged garrison — a potentially dramatic escalation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{156} In sum, diplomats thought U.S. credibility was on the line at Dien Bien Phu and preferred to make a stand militarily rather than accept a negotiated settlement.

In comparison, military officials’ willingness to intervene in Indochina moved in sync

\textsuperscript{151}Gaddis (1982, 103).
\textsuperscript{152}FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, 327; 332; 544; 700; Prados (2014, Location 615, 1832).
\textsuperscript{153}Logevall (2012, Location 7868).
\textsuperscript{154}Prados (2014, Location 2207).
\textsuperscript{155}FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, 679.
\textsuperscript{156}Prados (2014, Location 3646); Logevall (2016).
with their assessment of American military capabilities. Military officials were skeptical of deploying force to support the French prior to the armistice in Korea and the arrival of new personnel at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These developments shifted the chiefs’ balance of advocacy based on what was possible from a capabilities perspective, but did not yield uniform preferences for the use of force — even though a battlefield success would arguably have increased the military’s prestige and influence following the unsatisfying stalemate in Korea. On the one hand, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Arthur Radford brought the can-do perspective of a naval aviator to the role and supported taking advantage of U.S. aerial and naval superiority while the balance of power relative to communist forces remained favorable. Radford repeatedly argued for American intervention in Indochina during the first six months of 1954, suggesting that a U.S. airstrike at Dien Bien Phu could save the French.

On the other hand, not all of the chiefs thought that the U.S. had the capability to intervene. Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway posited that an airstrike would raise the risk of general war without decisively affecting the overall military picture because the U.S. lacked the ground forces to interdict Viet Minh supply lines. And while one could argue that Ridgway’s stance reflected his vocal frustration with how Eisenhower-era force posture hurt the Army’s bureaucratic interests, the other chiefs also framed the problem in terms of capabilities, while differing in their estimates of what those capabilities could accomplish. Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining was a qualified “yes”, citing the efficacy of tactical bombardment. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert Carney hedged; though the U.S. had an interest in averting the loss of Indochina, the chiefs had to examine whether current U.S. capabilities could really improve France’s tactical position. Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel Shepherd concurred with Ridgway: intervention would

---

157 Prados (2014, Location 314); FRUS 1952-1954, XII, 2, 3, 12; XIII, 170, 332.
158 Prados (2014, Location 1770-1784); Logevall (2012, Location 7763).
159 FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, 499.
160 Prados (2014, Location 2173); FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, 666; 669.
161 Logevall (2012, Location 7945).
162 Feaver (2003, 130-131).
be unprofitable without ground forces to cut enemy supply lines.\textsuperscript{163}

These differences persisted as the debate over intervention continued. Radford embraced an early April Pentagon study which concluded that three tactical nuclear weapons could wipe out Viet Minh forces.\textsuperscript{164} Here we observe some convergence between Dulles and Radford’s views, but according to different logics: while Radford stressed the U.S.’s \textit{capacity} to act, Dulles focused on what inferences others might draw if the U.S. did not evince greater \textit{willingness} to get involved. By contrast, Ridgway put his anti-intervention case to Eisenhower directly on both April 5th and June 10th, painting any military action as a dangerous strategic diversion of limited resources to a non-decisive theater.\textsuperscript{165} This convinced Twining to side with Ridgway and led President Eisenhower to finally take intervention off the table. The military’s capability assessments were once again critical in shaping the hawkishness of the policy options up for debate — this time, via conflicting judgments that maintained armed action as a live option well after the fall of the French garrison in early May.\textsuperscript{166}

In sum, at Dien Bien Phu, diplomats and military officials again display differing conceptions of credibility that are in line with the theory’s expectations. But due to the new availability of military capacity to intervene, military officials exhibit far greater willingness to act than in Berlin. This results in much more hawkish policy options, namely a potential intervention in force on behalf of the French. The evidence weighs against the structural explanations for how these officials conceive of credibility and advocate policy, as differences envisioned by my theory persist. Organizational interests play a more prominent but still limited role: diplomats displayed no propensity to engage in negotiations, though some military officials (Ridgway, in particular) may have advocated policy on the basis of how it would affect their specific branch of the armed services. Yet each of the Joint Chiefs ultimately fell back on capability-based assessments, as the theory predicts.

\textsuperscript{163}FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, Documents 682-685.
\textsuperscript{164}Logevall (2016); Prados (2014, Location 4566).
\textsuperscript{165}FRUS 1952-1954, XIII, 710.
\textsuperscript{166}Prados (2014, Location 4805, 4821).
Conclusion

In Berlin as at Dien Bien Phu, diplomats strove to maintain the U.S.'s signaling reputation by demonstrating, through American military power, that it would pay costs and run risks on behalf of its allies. But only at Dien Bien Phu were some military officials willing to support hawkish policies, principally due to their assessment of available capabilities; in Berlin, they viewed similar moves as imprudent given limited forces-in-being and the potential for escalation. The military's advocacy was key in both limiting the hawkishness of the options that President Truman received and enabling a more serious debate about escalation under President Eisenhower.

In this paper, I argue that in cases of limited deterrence, patterns of advocacy among diplomats and military officials stem from organizational socialization toward diverging views of credibility, contra theories from other levels of analysis. There is no single logic governing how policymakers think about credibility, countering explanations grounded purely in the balance of power or capabilities. Nor do pure bureaucratic interests adequately predict the patterns that I observe. My case study findings also validate several of the theory's observable implications: diplomats (military officials) take a broad (narrow) view of national interests, see strong (qualified) interdependence among commitments, express moderate (high) concern for the quality of military assets, and accordingly, exhibit high (low) risk acceptance regarding the use of force. Together with the text analysis, these results offer strong support for both of my hypotheses.

One takeaway from this analysis is that military officials' advocacy can constrain diplomats' more extreme policy preferences when it comes to the use of force, tamping down the level of hawkishness in options that leaders receive. Military officials effectively put the kibosh on the use of ground troops, and armed intervention more generally, in both examples considered here. This is reassuring to the degree that it may prevent more hawkish (and possibly strategically unwise) policies from being enacted. Yet it is also problematic if these dynamics lead military officials to shirk or slow-walk their civilian counterparts' preferred
policies. Indeed, canonical theories of civil-military relations would find that possibility troubling,\textsuperscript{167} suggesting that further parsing of these interactions is an important area for future research.

At the same time, however, military officials may be perfectly willing to support the use of force if they possess the capabilities to enable such action. And if diplomats have a relatively high baseline willingness to act in the name of credibility, as my theory suggests, then this could feed overly militarized policy responses to deterrence challenges — as observed in the United States since the middle of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{168} With a diplomatic corps attuned to the preservation of resolve and reliability, and a military establishment endowed with substantial military capabilities, my theory would expect frequent joint advocacy on the use force to emanate from both ideal type organizations. While leaders can and do disagree with their advisers’ recommendations, my theory could explain why the option set in cases of limited deterrence may still often be biased toward the use of force.

References


\textsuperscript{167} Huntington (1957); Clausewitz (1976).

\textsuperscript{168} Schake (2012).


Logevall, Fredrik. 2016. “"We might give them a few." Did the US offer to drop atom bombs at Dien Bien Phu?”. URL: https://thebulletin.org/2016/02/we-might-give-them-a-few-did-the-us-offer-to-drop-atom-bombs-at-dien-bien-phu/


URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1310.4546


URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12269828


Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2014. *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations*. Princeton University Press.


Supplemental Appendix for Credible To Whom? The Organizational Politics of Credibility in International Relations

March 29, 2021

*Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, Columbia University. I am grateful to David Arceneaux, Allison Carnegie, Austin Carson, Tom Christensen, Ricky Clark, Erik Gartzke, Michael Goldfien, Jeff Friedman, Raymond Hicks, Alex Kirss, Josh Kertzer, Kendrick Kuo, Robert Jervis, Alex Lin, Ariel Petrovics, Abby Post, Daryl Press, Robert Ralston, Laura Resnick Samotin, Jack Snyder, Benjamin Valentino, Alan Van Beek, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and participants at APSA 2020 and the Charles Koch Foundation IR working group for their thoughtful comments on this project. All remaining errors are my own.
Contents

1 Why These Document Collections?

2 Why NLP?

3 Keyness Results

4 Topic Modeling Diagnostics

5 Topic Model Labels

6 Analysis of DDO Topics

7 Example Documents by Topic

8 Additional Topic Model Robustness

9 DDO Embeddings

10 Case Selection Strategy

11 Additional Case Study Evidence
   11.1 Greece (1947-48) .................................................................
   11.2 Taiwan Straits (1954-55) .......................................................
1 Why These Document Collections?

Before delving into the specifics of the underlying methods, it is important to describe the records to be analyzed and my rationale for selecting these particular document collections. I choose to focus on FRUS and DDO for two main reasons, as described in the previous chapter. The first is the organizational scope of each collection, which includes thousands of internal and external communications produced by several U.S. national security policymaking organs such as the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State, and National Security Council. Since my theory addresses how diplomats and military officers conceive of credibility, gathering documents that originate with both ideal types of policymakers is a prerequisite for evaluating the validity of my hypothesis. FRUS and DDO not only allow me to do this, but have also long been regarded as key sources of evidence for scholars of international politics and diplomatic history, as the documents therein range from inter- and intradepartmental memoranda to meeting minutes and transcripts involving both American and foreign officials.¹ Both collections are therefore among the best available sources for examining different bureaucratic actors’ privately held views on topics of interest for this project, as they are more likely to indicate decision makers’ honest opinions and policy positions than statements or speeches intended for public consumption.²

The second reason for analyzing both of these collections is their temporal coverage. Since FRUS and DDO cover much of the period between 1945 and the end of the Cold War, they not only span many cases of limited deterrence to which my theory could potentially apply, but also capture decades of decision makers’ everyday parlance in thinking, writing, and arguing about various foreign policy issues. Each of these features is important for my study, in large part because while limited deterrence encounters involving crisis diplomacy are the events we tend to remember, the majority of foreign policy officials conduct their business under far less constrained circumstances that do not involve such elevated time and risk pressures.³ Indeed, most members of the diplomatic and military officer corps are likely to learn about their duties and receive socialization to professional norms in a non-crisis environment, which in turn suggests that understanding how these policymakers conceive of credibility over longer stretches of time (that may still be punctuated by crises) is critical for grasping how they process information and structure choices. Importantly, my use of FRUS and DDO allows me to canvass the historical record for diplomats’ and military officers’ discussions of credibility without imposing any ex ante restrictions on the events or issues to be considered, which offers improved breadth over recent NLP-oriented studies that have only examined one high-profile case, like the Cuban Missile Crisis, in depth.⁴ This allows me to explore the extent to which these officials speak about credibility and behave differently when the stakes are low versus high.

However, one potential limitation in relying on FRUS is its status as an official history published by the State Department, meaning that it is a curated and potentially biased record. For starters, in collating thousands of documents for each volume, the department’s historians must necessarily leave some out. Furthermore, key documents may either be

---

¹McAllister et al. (2015).
²For more on each collection, see http://history-lab.org/frus and http://history-lab.org/ddo.
³Sargent (2015); Goldgeier and Saunders (2017).
⁴Katagiri and Min (2019).
published with redactions or remain classified entirely. Redactions generally do not prevent substantive interpretation of documents, as they often just conceal sensitive information such as intelligence sources or methods. But if FRUS systematically omits certain types of documents (whether due to space limitations or continued classification), this would be concerning for researchers. It is difficult to assess the scale of the potential problem. On the one hand, the U.S. government responded to a very public controversy over declassification of records related to the 1954 intervention in Guatemala by mandating a review of such documents after 30 years.\(^5\) On the other hand, recent commentary suggests that the slowing pace of declassification has hindered production of recent FRUS volumes.\(^6\)

This is where the availability of DDO is critical, as it allows me to assess the robustness of my findings against a second corpus created via a different data-generating process. The records contained in DDO are not curated for release in the same manner as FRUS, where a team of official historians selects what they believe to be historically important and thematically coherent documents for inclusion in volumes that are typically bounded by presidential administrations. By constrast, DDO tends to hold documents whose initial publication on the standard 30-year clock was delayed due to continued classification but later occurred in response to a Freedom of Information Act request or a data release from a presidential library. Therefore, while FRUS and DDO may contain some of the same records, there is not significant overlap between the collections because DDO tends to comprise documents that were classified either secret or top secret and therefore held information considered to be seriously or exceptionally damaging to national security if it were made public.\(^7\) While this does not make DDO any more random a collection than FRUS, it should provide a good sense of how decision makers discussed credibility in relation to highly sensitive topics and situations. As I demonstrate below, the results of the analysis do not differ widely regardless of whether I use FRUS or DDO as the underlying corpus, which should minimize concern that any biases baked into FRUS are distorting my findings.

2 Why NLP?

Having provided an overview of the textual data and the logic behind my approach, I turn to a discussion of the methodology used in this chapter. Natural language processing has become an increasingly important and popular tool for political science research as a means to investigate patterns political actors’ speech and writing.\(^8\) Scholars of international relations have begun to mine the archives, armed with new tools that allow them to tackle essential issues in international security through a significant expansion in the scope and scale of primary source documents that can be reviewed through computer-assisted text analysis.\(^9\) Building on this work, I probe for variation in how decision makers conceive of credibility, using a method that is well-suited to exploring organization-level patterns in policymakers’ use of language.

Keyness testing is useful for comparing the words that most distinguish diplomats and

\(^5\)McAllister et al. (2015); Schub (2019).
\(^8\)For example, see Catalinac (2015); Kim (2017).
\(^9\)Katagiri and Min (2019).
military officers when they talk about credibility. This is because keyness captures differential associations of words between sets of documents by identifying terms that are conspicuously common or rare in a target group compared to a reference group.\(^{10}\) In practice, this means that keyness tells us what words are most and least characteristic of one group of documents that share some underlying feature or trait (such as being created by diplomatic officials) relative to another group that share other some feature or trait (such as originating with military officials). For my purposes, then, keyness identifies the terms that best separate these policymakers when they talk about credibility. The theory would anticipate that the most distinctive words for diplomats pertain to signaling reputation, while the most characteristic words among military officials concern capabilities. If keyness testing bears out these expectations, this result would provide some initial evidence that is consistent with my first hypothesis. However, if no such differences emerge, this would favor the system-level alternatives outlined in the previous chapter, wherein a relatively uniform logic governs policymakers’ conception of credibility.

Structural topic modeling is helpful in contrasting the broad subjects that diplomats and military officers raise when they discuss credibility. This method uses unsupervised learning to map the underlying text as semantically interpretable clusters of words called “topics,” whose prevalence among subgroups of documents can be modeled as a function of document-level metadata.\(^{11}\) In practice, this means that STM results can not only show what topics are present in a given document collection (across all records selected for inclusion), but also how the distribution of those topics varies according to other document-level information that may be available (such as whether the document originated with a diplomat or military officer). For my purposes, then, STM illustrates the topics that pertain more strongly to diplomatic or military officials when they discuss credibility as well as the topics on which they overlap. The theory would expect that for either type of topic, diplomats’ and military officials’ discussion of credibility should match a focus on signaling reputation or capabilities, respectively. If the STM results match this prediction, this would provide confidence in the validity of my first hypothesis.

\(^{10}\)This generates a chi-squared value that is signed positively (negatively) if the observed number of occurrences for a given term in the target group exceeds (is less than) that in the reference group; https://quanteda.io/reference/textstat_keyness.html.

\(^{11}\)Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003); Roberts et al. (2014).
3 Keyness Results

Figure A1: Keyness in DDO

- countries
- confidential
- said
- economic
- foreign
- government
- negotiations
- israel
- africa
- state
- atomic
- target
- staff
- ctbt
- fy
- radar
- air
- chiefs
- data
- minuteman

Diplomatic
Military

chi2

-2000
-1000
0
4 Topic Modeling Diagnostics

Figure A2: Topic Fitting in FRUS

Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics

Held-Out Likelihood

Residuals

Semantic Coherence

Lower Bound
Figure A3: Model Runs in FRUS

[Graph showing model runs with axes labeled Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity, with four distinct marker clusters labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4.]
Figure A4: Topic Fitting in DDO

Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics
Figure A5: Model Runs in DDO
## 5 Topic Model Labels

Figure A6: **Topic Labels in FRUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic Model Labels</th>
<th>Labels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Aid</strong></td>
<td>u., right, human, africa, polici, african, countri, south, option, govern, action, assist, support, intern, congress, saudi, us, state, sale, secur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vietnam</strong></td>
<td>forc, militari, action, oper, us, south, north, vietnam, u., vietnames, communist, state, unit, support, lao, area, govern, defens, air, viet–nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Eastern Affairs</strong></td>
<td>said, secretari, us, presid, minist, israel, point, posit, time, talk, arab, ask, problem, question, now, ambassador, situat, soviet, say, meet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force Posture</strong></td>
<td>soviet, forc, nuclear, weapon, capabl, us, militari, strateg, defens, nato, war, use, state, limit, missil, alli, europ, ussr, attack, unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Affairs</strong></td>
<td>sup, href, depart, state, inform, file, foreign, document, polici, report, presid, propos, telegram, nation, meet, us, central, see, may, archiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On-the-Ground Reporting</strong></td>
<td>govern, program, american, public, polit, iran, report, offici, peopl, one, present, offic, state, general, item, support, also, iranian, parti, effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treaties and Negotiations</strong></td>
<td>u., negoti, agreement, issu, treati, un, state, propos, resolut, question, posit, secur, unit, accept, discuss, taiwan, general, meet, normal, possibl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Strategy</strong></td>
<td>us, polici, countri, nation, develop, interest, econom, world, relat, communist, militari, continu, polit, power, china, can, influenc, increas, relationship, aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kissinger–NSC</strong></td>
<td>mr, item, kissing, can, secretari, think, go, get, want, presid, dr, one, problem, say, question, now, sup, know, thing, general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Analysis of DDO Topics

Several aspects of the DDO results bolster my organizationally-grounded conception of how diplomats and military officials think about credibility. First, a similar mix of topics arises as in FRUS, including foreign aid, Vietnam, force posture, and Middle Eastern affairs.
Second, the same subjects appear as significantly more prevalent in diplomatic versus military documents. Diplomats are again more likely than military officials to discuss credibility under the headings of foreign aid and Middle Eastern affairs (as well as with respect to communist influence), while military officials are also more likely than diplomats to discuss credibility in the context of force posture. Third, the key differences relative to the FRUS analysis, as I elaborate below, are that military officials are not more likely than diplomats to talk about credibility in the context of Vietnam, but are more likely than diplomats to do so with respect to NATO.

A closer examination of the Vietnam topic in the DDO results exemplifies the diverging conceptions of credibility that my theory isolates. For diplomats, credibility comes from demonstrating a willingness to incur costs in service of a commitment, or in other words, by backing up a threat to use force with an actual deployment of troops.\(^\text{12}\) The adversary’s credibility is similarly a function of their demonstrated willingness to follow through on threats via the use of force.\(^\text{13}\) Meanwhile, any unilateral concessions (such as, in this example, halting bombing of North Vietnam) undertaken without reciprocal action from the adversary would be unacceptable, as these would detract from the credibility of one’s negotiating position.\(^\text{14}\)

For military officials, however, credibility stems from the capability to perform on the battlefield. As an example, U.S. theater commanders in Vietnam did not view the International Control Commission (ICC) as a credible regulator of North Vietnamese infiltration into the demilitarized zone because it had not demonstrated the capability to do more than publicize that such infiltration was occurring.\(^\text{15}\) And though military officials are hardly ignorant of considerations of such as prestige and resolve, they equate these qualities with the capacity to fight effectively and deny the opponent victory as opposed to just a willingness to pay costs.\(^\text{16}\) Particularly where national interests are concerned, military officials want to be sure that their capability to meet related threats is beyond question.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{12}\) Alternatives to air attacks on North Vietnam: proposals for the use of U.S. ground forces in support of diplomacy in Vietnam; n.d.
\(^\text{14}\) Report on peace negotiations; November 2, 1965.
\(^\text{15}\) Admiral Sharp comments on policing of the DMZ; September 20, 1966.
\(^\text{16}\) Memorandum for Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk from General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; June 1, 1967.
\(^\text{17}\) Analysis of U.S. involvement; June 1, 1968.
Figure A8: Topics in DDO
7 Example Documents by Topic

Table A1: Representative FRUS Quotes By Topic, Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“Internationally, the United States would fulfill what is viewed by our allies to be an important Bonn Summit commitment. Failure by the United States to honor this commitment, together with Japan’s failure to implement fully their summit commitments, may be used by others, especially West Germany, as an excuse to back away from some of their own already-implemented commitments. Our failure would also have an adverse effect on U.S. credibility regarding future commitments.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“I believe that to preserve our credibility in the IPFs, we need to be able to demonstrate that the only difference in our attitude to their loans and to bilateral programs has to do with the kinds of loans brought forward.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“A statutory U.S. arms export ban also applies to Chile. To certify Chile, the law requires both Chilean cooperation on the Letelier/Moffitt murders and significant human rights progress. Chilean certification is not now feasible given the lack of positive developments on either issue, and our investigation of military exports from the U.S. to Chile in violation of our laws. In light of Chile’s poor performance, its certification would undermine our credibility and thus Congressional support for our Central America policy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“The RVN is a politico-military keystone in Southeast Asia and is symbolic of US determination in Asia—As Berlin is to Europe—to prevent communist expansion. The United States is committed to the defense of the RVN in order to assist a free people to remain free. In addition to the freedom of the RVN, US national prestige, credibility, and honor with respect to world-wide pledges, and declared national policy are at stake. Further, it is incumbent upon the United States at this stage to consolidate and extend the implementation of the political and military commitment.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Continuing evidence crop up in both North Korean actions and statements that Kim Il Sung may be suffering from serious miscalculation as to U.S. capacity to react in Korea at same time war continues in Vietnam. This contains seeds of real danger if credibility of U.S. deterrent against overt action remains in doubt.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Credibility in the US deterrent is waning. The challenge has been made in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev has indicated Berlin may be next. If we take a stand on Laos, we can not, of course, avert the potential dangers of escalation. Nevertheless, the probability of escalation into a war of nuclear exchange with the USSR over Laos is less than would be the case with a more direct confrontation with the Soviets over Berlin. Taking a firm political and military position on Laos could serve to enhance credibility in US determination to use its military force wherever needed to protect its interests. Such a course of action need not unhinge our general war posture to a significant degree.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“I came away feeling somewhat encouraged by my meeting with King Hussein Tuesday. He listened more seriously once the ‘I’ve heard this all before’ smile on his face. His reply to our key question as to what circumstances the King required to feel justified in bringing Jordan into the negotiations did not go beyond what he has told us before, but he did agree to reflect further on the questions. In short, we have a whole host of the main elements of our ideas for bridging differences had effect of strengthening credibility in U.S. strategy and has assured some more time for the Sadat initiative as far as Jordan’s attitude is concerned.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“We would like to end this situation now, before myths take over and a new arms race becomes inevitable. However, while Arab moderates might well accept (and even be grateful for) any imposed solution of the problem on which we and the Soviets could agree, the Soviets have made it clear to us that they will not sacrifice their credibility in Arab eyes. We recognize that the Arab moderates are probably the prime Soviet target in this crisis. To a considerable extent, so do the moderates themselves.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Posture</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“The present and anticipated future Soviet facilities in Berbera will provide the means for enhancing the capabilities and credibility of Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft operating in the Indian Ocean area. We believe, however, that the facilities expansion activity does not presage a greatly expanded, continuous Soviet Indian Ocean military presence in the near future.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Posture</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“U.S. withdrawal from facilities in Greece and Turkey would... Cause other countries to question the credibility of U.S. commitments.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“To establish an independent Voice of America would aggravate the present tendency of Voice of America to act outside established policy: An independent Voice of America would make difficult effective guidance by the Department. I am not persuaded that VOA would gain in credibility through organizational independence—a contention of the Stanton report and Senator Percy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“I intend to do all that I can to help bring into being a new organization that has credibility in this country and abroad. I look forward to your help and advice in the crucial period ahead.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“The issue of VOA, with its tripartite mission of supporting American foreign policy, depicting American life and culture, and broadcasting the news, turns on the question of credibility. The Stanton Panel does not assert that VOA lacks credibility, but implies as much in recommending that its credibility would be enhanced by separation from USIA. The issue depends on a matter of judgment as to whether VOA is deficient in credibility, and whether giving it greater independence will produce a better result.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-the-Ground Reporting</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“These trends all indicate that the already wide gulf between the students and the universities is becoming even larger and the government’s credibility with the students is very low.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-the-Ground Reporting</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“The admission by the GON of a clearcut defeat for the first time in a clash on September 9 (I 6 870 0960 75), rather than having the (presumably) intended effect of improving credibility, merely confirmed for many what they had been whispering about for many weeks.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-the-Ground Reporting</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“The charge by Greek Govt that its northern neighbors were supporting guerrilla warfare in Greece was directed jointly against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Evidence submitted, however, related primarily to Yugoslav intervention in this regard and only to a lesser degree to that of Albania and Bulgaria. Although liaison representatives repeatedly denied these charges and attacked credibility of witnesses who testified in their support little direct evidence was brought forward [to] disprove them.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table A2: Representative FRUS Quotes By Topic, Part 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>&quot;Vet Long propaganda still seems to have more credibility with the people, on this point, than does the information campaign on our side. This can still be reversed, but time is running out.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties and Negotiations</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;While this can work to our advantage, the Delegation should also bear in mind that overemphasizing the possibility that mineral exploitation may commence soon could strengthen positions in favor of moratoria and provide incentives for support of other measures to control the timing of commercial activities, possibly including delay in the adoption of a resources regime. The point could also lose its credibility over time if such activities do not occur when the expectations we might create suggest they should.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>&quot;The horizons of the average U.S. advisor, except for those very near the top, are limited with regard to the tails of direct observation. It is essential to the maintenance of US credibility and minimal entry to the Indian military that the following be continued: (A) MAP training at current levels with credibility of National Government witnesses.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;It is essential to the maintenance of our credibility and minimal entry to the Indian military that the following be continued: (A) MAP training at current levels with credibility of National Government witnesses.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;The approach to the Soviet Government would be used as a strong propaganda ploy by them. They claim, with credibility, that the UNC openly admits its inability to secure an armistice through military means, and must turn to the good offices of the Soviet Union to solve its problems.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;While Panama probably overemphasizes the value of international support at the negotiating table, a breakdown of the negotiations would gravely burden our policies throughout this Hemisphere, where the talks are generally viewed in policy terms as a test of U.S. credibility. Conversely, an absolute failure on our part, more important commercially than it is to the United States. Those countries are supportive of a Canal treaty that will insure continuous effective operation and defense of the Canal.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;One of the reasons for achieving a negotiating threshold, the United States/RVN/Royal Laotian Government (RLG) must not lose it at the conference table. Unnecessarily protracted negotiations caused by communist stalling or intransigence would be a basis for increased military pressures against the DRV, Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh. Appropriate U.S./RVN/RLG military posture and actions must be maintained to assure that the communists are aware of the credibility of both the US/RVN/RLG power and resolve.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>&quot;Our approach to the Soviet Government would be used as a strong propaganda ploy by them. They claim, with credibility, that the UNC openly admits its inability to secure an armistice through military means, and must turn to the good offices of the Soviet Union to solve its problems.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;There is nothing that is of any practical significance. In the military regard an out of the question. In the economic regard a minor success. The point could also lose its credibility over time if such activities do not occur when the expectations we might create suggest they should.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;Dr. Kissinger: If our tactical air in Europe is highly vulnerable, but it can also be moved quickly, why is it necessary to keep tactical aircraft in Europe? If we pull a division out, it would have tremendous political significance. If we pull an air wing out, it might sell an advantage. A promise to put the air wing back, if necessary, has credibility since it would be for the purpose of protecting our own forces. Since the Europeans are most concerned about ground forces, the withdrawal of an air wing with a promise to return it could be placed in a different political context.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissinger-NIC</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;Mr. Kissinger: We can say these are the questions we see. We are having some difficulty making up our minds on some things. This can enhance our credibility when we say we want to consult with them.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissinger-NIC</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;A successful Saudi military action in South Yemen would be a defeat for the PDRY, a setback of some proportions for the USSR, and a significant gain in credibility for the United States (and Saudi Arabia). It would offset, and perhaps, otherwise, impressions current in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world that the friendship and support of the United States is of little practical value, and that the United States will not act in the face of Soviet-supported aggression.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissinger-NIC</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;The Team made a positive effort to achieve the proper balance between austerity and credibility in recommending a force capable of defending the Republic of Zaribah the Republic of Zaribah again other ill-defined external threat.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissinger-NIC</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;In this eventuality, UAR reaction, at least to the extent of attacking Saudi supply points, can be expected. With Hard Surface in place, the United States will be forced to respond militarily or risk loss of credibility of its military power, not only in the Middle East, but world-wide.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Quote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Posture</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>&quot;The existence of a Soviet AICBM system, if not matched by one in the U.S., could significantly reduce our deterrent power and perhaps more importantly the credibility of that deterrent in the eyes of our major allies, and even among some of our own citizens.&quot; — Review of Fiscal years 1961 and 1962 military programs and budgets; February 21, 1961.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Posture</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>&quot;The usefulness of these forces, as the credibility of U.S. military policy, depended on their readiness for action.&quot; — The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence 1951-1960; December 1, 1967.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;In a sense, Wills has to be seen to be believed. His soft-spoken and unassuming approach as well as his unwillingness to tell interviewers what he thought they might have wished to hear added to his credibility.&quot; — John Holdridge provides the text of a debriefing of U.S. citizen Morris Wills, who has spent eleven years in China; November 19, 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;Throw-away&quot; information is information that is no longer of any significant value to the KGB and/or information operations which are already being investigated by Western intelligence and in the KGB’s judgment, more is to be gained by having a dispatched agent ‘give them up’ and gain credibility than by waiting for their inevitable discovery.&quot; — Draft background data and a summary of interviews with defector and former Soviet Intelligence Agency agent Yuri Nosenko; n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;Time is of the essence since the longer Hersh’s allegations go uncountered, the more credibility they assume. Can we proceed?&quot; — Memo to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from L. Eagleburger and Robert McCloskey; September 24, 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>&quot;Even disregarding the above, based on the entire U.S. PW experience in South Vietnam and Cambodia, there was never a group of U.S. PWs this large. Concerning the possibility that individuals were collaborators, again, such a large group is outside the scope of credibility&quot; — Correlation and Evaluation of Select Intelligence Reports (April 1973-April 1975) Concerning the Presence of U.S. PWs in Cambodia; August 20, 1976.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>&quot;These by showing the contrast between words and made effective psychological virtually impossible for the Germans, while at the same time greatly increasing the credibility and effective of Soviet atrocity propaganda.&quot; — Planning for the Effective Use of Soviet Prisoners of War: Report; Intelligence and Evaluation Branch, Psychological Warfare; December 6, 1951.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>&quot;Information of bona fide ralliers probably merits more credibility in general than that provided by captives, as they had definite reasons for leaving the Communist ranks.&quot; — Study of morale of Viet Cong troops in South Vietnam; n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Influence</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;Here again the credibility to the tramps of U.S. power as a counterweight to Soviet power is likely to be an important factor affecting their resolve to engage in a struggle to maintain some independence.&quot; — Prospect of a neutral Iran outlined; June 5, 1961.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Influence</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;The larger threat of Russian aggression, which has served in some degree as a centrifugal force, has lost much of its credibility. It has existed so long without being fulfilled, and its fulfillment is so horrible to contemplate, that belief in its reality is numbed.&quot; — Report for Secretary of State Dean Rusk from Thomas L. Hughes; February 7, 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Influence</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;If Moscow perceives a weakening of U.S. will in the face of Syrian intransigence, the Soviets may be emboldened to challenge and confront U.S. credibility and prestige in other areas.&quot; — Paper regarding U.S. policy toward Syrian efforts to persuade Lebanon to avoid a Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement; n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;The more important ongoing negotiations in which the credibility of the U.S. initiatives is involved are the following: &quot; — The Development Security Facility of the IMF ...&quot; — International Economic Summit; October 23, 1975.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;How should the industrial countries reaffirm their shared commitment to abstain from trade restrictive actions? This commitment is currently embodied in the OECD Trade Pledge, originally adopted in 1974 and renewed unchanged in 1975 and 1976. The pledge has diminished credibility in part because it is not responsive to current economic problems ...&quot; — Strategy report in preparation for the international economic summit conference; March 22, 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>&quot;But even with the proposed Presidential override, we are concerned that such an approach could be viewed as an attempt by the US to impose these guidelines retroactively, to the detriment of our relations with a number of major allies and our overall credibility as a supplier.&quot; — DOS positions on nuclear policy report to President Ford; n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Quote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“Following upon initial GVN contact with the Front or the DRV, we communicate directly with Hanoi indicating that, while we are prepared to go along with negotiations, we reserve our position on the use of force against NVN in the future; we will retaliate for actions against us; and that, if nothing comes of negotiations, we will impose a basis that will involve new risks for the DRV. (Ground deployment lending increased credibility to last-mentioned threat).” — Alternatives to air attacks on North Vietnam: proposals for the use of U.S. ground forces in support of diplomacy in Vietnam; n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“Hanoi and Peiping would increase their threats to counterattacks and both would probably undertake force deployments designed to add to the credibility of these threats.” — Paper lists probable Communist reaction to U.S. military actions in Vietnam; November 23, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“Hanoi might well interpret such a U.S. position as a sign of U.S. weakness, as a willingness to enter negotiations at all costs with the objective of finding a way to get out. This view would gain credibility in that previously the U.S. had indicated that any further pause in the bombing of the North would depend on a cessation of infiltration and a sharp reduction in military activity and terrorism in the South.” — Report on peace negotiations; November 2, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Given the proven ineffectiveness of the ICC from a practical standpoint, and the limited and non-military gains resulting from merely publicizing NVN infiltration through the DMZ, I seriously question the value of supporting a plan for increased extension of ICC operations into that area. There is nothing in the past activity of this organization that lends credibility to its capability to effectively stem infiltration through the DMZ even if it was disposed to openly find the NVN guilty, which two thirds of its membership is not.” — Admiral Sharp comments on policing of the DMZ; September 20, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Also, it is estimated that US prestige will not decline appreciably if prompt military action is taken to bring the conflict to an early close. In the long term, US prestige would probably rise. The effect of signs of US irresolution on allies in Southeast Asia and other friendly countries threatened by communist insurgency could be most damaging to the credibility of US commitments.” — Memorandum for Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk from General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; June 1, 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Armed with these lessons learned, the US must in its national interest continue to pursue an ‘open’ East Asia and hence the difficult policy of preventing communist encroachment in SEA. The extent of US involvement in SEA makes this doubly crucial in a global sense since the very credibility of our ability to ‘contain’ is in question.” — Analysis of U.S. involvement; June 1, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“The Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the establishment of the NATO non-nuclear option, provided only that a tactical nuclear capability is retained for purposes of credibility, deterrence, and flexibility.” — Minutes of briefing by General Wheeler on issues related to proliferation; January 23, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Our force posture should be such as to permit us to respond to the whole range of the Soviet threat. In this connection, the credibility of the deterrent can be destroyed by emphasizing a policy that could be construed by the Soviets as permitting them to become involved, and then, if they decide the risks are too great, to disengage.” — General Norstad’s general comments on the Secretary of Defense’s answers to the ten questions; September 16, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>“Thus, the size and the credibility of the US contribution to the protection of NATO Europe would be reduced. On the other hand, Soviet offensive capabilities, though reduced numerically, would continue to present a serious threat to the United States and her European Allies.” — Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell D. Taylor for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; January 13, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>We have just been advised that King intends to remain in London until 14 May on assumption that he can take something tangible with him in form of UK arms package. Effort on US part to block UK-GOJ deal at this late stage in negotiations in our judgment will not enhance our credibility with either King or HMG. The extent of US involvement in SEA makes this doubly crucial in a global sense since the very credibility of our ability to ‘contain’ is in question.” — Analysis of U.S. involvement; June 1, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>“We do not want to get in position of having our credibility affected adversely with the Arabs by us getting out in front and insisting on an interpretation of March 10 formula which is contradicted by [Ambassador Gunnar] Jarring’s interpretation to the Arabs.” — Cable regarding Egypt’s denial of receiving a UN Middle East peace proposal from Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring; April 27, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>Main point that King emphasized was need for US to prevail on a genuine settlements freeze that included not only stopping construction of new settlements but also the thickening of existing settlements. He underlined Carter’s vacillation and ultimate failure on this issue which undercut credibility of CDAs from outset.” — Summary of a meeting between Jordanian King Hussein and Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes; August 23, 1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 Additional Topic Model Robustness

Figure A9: Topic Fitting in FRUS, Including DoD Civilians

Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics

Held-Out Likelihood

Residuals

Semantic Coherence

Lower Bound
Figure A10: Model Runs in FRUS, Including DoD Civilians
Figure A11: Topic Fitting in DDO, Including DoD Civilians
Figure A12: Model Runs in DDO, Including DoD Civilians
### Topic Labels in FRUS, Including DoD Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kissinger–NSC</td>
<td>mr, said, item, secretari, kissing, presid, can, go, get, think, want, say, one, problem, question, israel, ask, know, now, dr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties &amp; Negotiations</td>
<td>sup, href, negoti, agreement, meet, propos, document, posit, discuss, state, issu, see, presid, agre, point, new, time, possibl, make, accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>right, polici, human, state, depart, program, intern, countri, foreign, committe, inform, nation, issu, support, vote, unit, u., general, assist, public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>africa, countri, south, african, econom, saudi, develop, us, polici, increas, iran, import, interest, nation, year, oil, world, polit, program, price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Influence</td>
<td>u., militari, govern, action, polit, support, us, polici, may, continu, possibl, posit, public, relat, state, might, situat, assist, forc, time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Reporting</td>
<td>us, item, report, ambassador, telegram, govern, depart, file, inform, embassi, press, central, state, request, action, offici, indic, visit, nation, made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Posture</td>
<td>soviet, us, nuclear, forc, militari, state, weapon, unit, capabl, nato, alli, nation, europ, war, ussr, continu, union, strateg, general, use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>vietnam, south, militari, north, vietnames, forc, oper, lao, communist, us, enemi, gvn, war, viet–nam, thai, continu, area, support, polit, unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td>forc, defens, program, missil, attack, soviet, capabl, threat, cost, air, deploy, system, strateg, develop, requir, provid, limit, fy, u., sup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Security</td>
<td>u., china, chines, relat, polici, secur, normal, prc, taiwan, option, japan, issu, pakistan, india, defens, interest, japones, peke, treati, indian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A14: Topics in FRUS, Including DoD Civilians

Change in topical prevalence from military to diplomatic documents

Kissinger−NSC
Treaties & Negotiations
Public Affairs
Foreign Aid
Communist Influence
Political Reporting
Force Posture
Vietnam
Missile Defense
Asian Security

Change in topical prevalence from military to diplomatic documents
Figure A15: **Topic Labels in DDO, Including DoD Civilians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>europ, european, nato, us, german, french, secret, germani, polici, franc, western, forc, polit, de, foreign, alli, nuclear, state, allianc, west</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>us, u., state, israel, negoti, support, issu, arab, secur, r, polici, agreement, author, propos, action, posit, intern, continu, date, e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>south, vietnam, north, chines, china, us, communist, hanoi, vietnames, gvn, asia, negoti, forc, korea, viet−nam, lao, viet, continu, govern, drv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>develop, econom, countri, program, confiden, polici, govern, million, increas, polit, nation, aid, year, trade, africa, u., assist, import, foreign, intern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Influence</td>
<td>soviet, militari, war, forc, may, polit, ussr, union, power, can, east, cuba, arm, one, world, polici, even, might, like, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>report, inform, state, unit, oper, use, govern, u, offic, may, group, peopl, s, e, program, c, one, activ, time, plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Posture</td>
<td>nuclear, forc, weapon, capabl, defens, attack, strateg, nato, program, missil, use, deploy, us, system, air, u., limit, aircraft, requir, deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Security</td>
<td>secret, action, copi, top, lbj, librari, u., militari, possibl, us, might, communist, b, polit, effect, problem, c, use, can, make</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Reporting</td>
<td>said, presid, state, text, mr, illeg, secretari, meet, page, us, copi, minist, talk, one, point, question, confidenti, ambassador, discuss, amembassi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A16: Topics in DDO, Including DoD Civilians

- NATO
- Middle Eastern Affairs
- Vietnam
- Foreign Aid
- Communist Influence
- Information Operations
- Force Posture
- Asian Security
- Political Reporting

Change in topical prevalence from military to diplomatic documents
9 DDO Embeddings

Figure A17: Embeddings in DDO

- Diplomat • Military = shared

more Diplomat more Military

- deterrence
- importantly
- deterent
- capabilities
- our
- enhance
- usefulness
- reinforce
- enhance
- lessen
- undermine
- reinforce

- diminish
- diminish
- endanger
- impair
- undermine
- jeopardize
- solidity
- undermine

cosine similarity ratio
(Military/Diplomat)
10 Case Selection Strategy

Three considerations guide my choice of cases for my wider book project, of which this paper is a small part. The first is that by choosing instances of limited deterrence that fall narrowly before (Greece and Berlin) and after (Dien Bien Phu and the Taiwan Straits) the Korean War, I hold the polarity of the system and the balance of nuclear capabilities constant. While some other important shocks fall between the first two and last two cases — including Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the communists’ victory in the Chinese civil war — the system remained bipolar and the balance of U.S. nuclear superiority stayed substantial in this period.\(^{18}\) Thes factors should make relatively easy cases for both the structural explanations relative to my theory. From the system level, policymakers’ concern for credibility should have been persistent and uniform throughout this period. Observing organizational heterogeneity in how decision makers conceive of credibility would then be strong evidence for my theory.

The second goal in picking these cases is to assess the alternate bureaucratic politics mechanism regarding organizational interests. I accommodate this possibility by measuring military and diplomatic officials’ policy advocacy in each historical case against what a more standard bureaucratic politics account would predict. Given what we know about the impact of bureaucratic politics on similar types of crises, it would not be surprising for organizational parochialism to influence policy advocacy in cases of limited deterrence.\(^{19}\)

The third purpose for my case selection is to address a major concern about studying policymakers’ perspectives on credibility during the Cold War, which is that related assumptions were often baked into the conventional wisdom and thus remained unspoken.\(^{20}\) Looking at early Cold War cases minimizes this bias because in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the conventional wisdom was only just being established.\(^{21}\) I therefore pick cases on either side of the Korean War to understand how diplomats and military officials first advanced arguments about credibility while leveraging the massive increase in capabilities resulting from Korean operations as a potential discontinuity in these assessments.

11 Additional Case Study Evidence

11.1 Greece (1947-48)

American involvement in the Greek civil war resulted from the United Kingdom’s February 1947 decision to withdraw the 40,000 troops it had previously garrisoned there.\(^{22}\) From late summer 1947 to spring 1948, Britain’s retrenchment and the Greek government’s struggles to beat back a left-wing, Soviet-inspired resistance movement prompted clashes between U.S. diplomats and military officials over deploying U.S. combat troops to prevent a communist takeover.\(^{23}\) Diplomats framed the potential deployment in symbolic terms, arguing that a failure to act would signal the end of the Western commitment to Greece.\(^{24}\) Military officials, by contrast, saw Greece as an important strategic outpost, but cited a shortage of

\(^{18}\)See https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/.
\(^{19}\)Sagan (1993, 1994).
\(^{20}\)Joll (1968).
\(^{21}\)Larson (1985).
\(^{22}\)Jones (1955); Steil (2018, 21).
\(^{24}\)Jones (1997, 6).
capabilities in refusing to approve intervention. The evidence reveals differing conceptions of credibility, contra the system-level explanation; corresponding policy advocacy consistent with socialization rather than organizational interests; and relatively dovish policy options.

Diplomats consistently argued that Greece was a test of American resolve and reliability, advocating the use of force to prevent the country from falling to communism. Meanwhile, they placed low priority on concurrent negotiations with the Soviets at the United Nations over the integrity of Greece’s borders — the policy tool that arguably would have given the State Department greatest influence over the U.S.’s overall position. The State Department’s chain of command, including Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Director of Near East Affairs Loy Henderson, and Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, viewed Greece as part of a single barrier to Russian expansion and sought to prevent it from becoming the first “domino” to fall. In Henderson’s view, it was essential to maintain other nations’ “confidence in the United States and in their own ability to resist Soviet pressure.”

Instead of putting stock in the UN, diplomats repeatedly called for a deployment of U.S. ground troops in Greece to signal determination. Following a series of military setbacks for Greek forces in late 1947 and early 1948, Henderson claimed that Greece was the “test tube which the peoples of the whole world are watching” to ascertain Western determination to resist aggression, meaning that no amount of American resources could substitute for a willingness to meet force with force. Even after the introduction of American military aid and advice had begun to turn the tide in spring 1948, John Hickerson at European Affairs argued that sending forces to Greece would “indicate a determination to clean up the situation” and disparaged the Joint Chiefs’ view of such a move as militarily unsound. The consensus in Foggy Bottom was that the U.S. could not waver in demonstrating its commitment to assist Greece in maintaining its independence.

Military officials, by contrast, routinely met diplomats’ willingness to use force in Greece with a practical assessment of the required capabilities. While acknowledging Greece’s strategic relevance to U.S. regional interests, military officials repeatedly pointed out that the U.S. did not have the swing capability to intervene without either jeopardizing the ability to meet other commitments or engaging in some level of domestic mobilization — even though such operations would likely have increased the military’s autonomy and resources. Though the Joint Chiefs initially cited Greece’s strategic location as grounds for U.S. troops to replace the departing British in late 1947, they quickly realized that this was not feasible. The Air Force lacked sufficient lift capacity for troop transport, while Army intelligence

---

28 Wittner (1982, 63-64). Since Secretary of State George Marshall was a career military man, I code him as a military official rather than a diplomat.
29 FRUS 1947, V, 33.
30 FRUS 1947, V, 223.
32 FRUS 1948, IV, 67.
33 FRUS 1948, IV, 94.
34 Jones (1997, 15).
35 FRUS 1947, V, 269.
36 Jones (1997, 85-86)
concluded that while troops could serve as a useful deterrent, their deployment might also provoke full-scale war that was unwinnable given the Soviets’ local military superiority in the Balkans. Short of massive remobilization, which the chiefs did not advocate, the U.S. simply lacked the capability to act in Greece.\footnote{Jones (1997, 99).}

When the intervention issue surfaced again in winter 1948, the chiefs again questioned whether the partial mobilization for war that this would entail was advisable or necessary.\footnote{FRUS 1948, IV, 4.} Secretary Marshall pointed out that nobody sure about the purpose of a military expedition, the resources and logistics required, or whether the American people would be supportive.\footnote{Jones (1997, 132); FRUS 1948, IV, 12.}

And in top-secret testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during March 1948, he leaned on his previous military experience in advocating against the use of force. Instead of advocating for military resources, Marshall noted that he had resisted identical pressures as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to apply American power everywhere at once in favor of maximizing its limited strength. In May, the chiefs issued the assessment that so rankled Hickerson, arguing that the dispatch of forces to Greece, whether token or in strength, would be “militarily unsound.”\footnote{Unless U.S. forces could be appropriately backed up, wouldn’t be needed elsewhere, and wouldn’t cause escalation. FRUS 1948, IV, 67.}

These dynamics prevented the deployment of troops from receiving a real hearing at the White House, instead leading President Harry Truman to leverage American military aid and advisory capacity to build the Greek army into a capable fighting force.\footnote{Offner (2002, 206-207).}

As General Lauris Norstad later put it — underscoring differences in military and diplomatic socialization — “[I]t was usually the military people who had to hold back the sporadic and truculent impulses of political people and diplomats who [did] not realize the consequences of aggressive action.”\footnote{Jones (1997, 93-94).}

\section*{11.2 Taiwan Straits (1954-55)}

On the heels of the near-intervention at Dien Bien Phu, U.S. policymakers also weighed military operations to help Chiang Kai-shek’s government on Formosa (Taiwan) retain control of several offshore islands that represented the Chinese Nationalists’ last link to the mainland. After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seized several of the lesser offshore islands in June 1953, American officials began encouraging Nationalist forces to hold the the remaining outlying territories, while puzzling over how to cement a commitment to Taiwan without becoming directly entangled in the Chinese civil war — entertaining schemes ranging from a nuclear strike to an evacuation of the islands and a blockade of the Chinese coast.\footnote{Accinelli (1996, 123, 157, 222-23).}

Diplomatic officials argued that American credibility depended upon the islands remaining in Nationalist hands, while military officials were divided on the wisdom of holding the islands in relation to defending Formosa. The evidence suggests that focusing on the balance of power or capabilities misses an important piece of the story. Furthermore, there is little indication that pure bureaucratic interests played a significant role. My theory of organizational socialization again offers significant explanatory purchase in this case.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[37]Jones (1997, 99).
\item[38]FRUS 1948, IV, 4.
\item[39]Jones (1997, 132); FRUS 1948, IV, 12.
\item[40]Unless U.S. forces could be appropriately backed up, wouldn’t be needed elsewhere, and wouldn’t cause escalation. FRUS 1948, IV, 67.
\end{footnotes}
As in earlier cases, diplomats consistently approached the Formosa issue as one of signaling reliability and resolve. Dulles and his colleagues “believed there could be no doubts about U.S. resolve to act in a crisis.”

After the Chinese seized several lesser islands in June 1953, Ambassador Karl Rankin argued for extending the U.S.’s naval and air defense perimeter to include the offshore islands, whose retention was “psychologically important to defense of Formosa.” Dulles concurred, noting that even if the Joint Chiefs viewed the offshore islands as “not essential to the defense of Formosa,” their retention was “highly desirable,” lest their loss inflict “a severe political and psychological blow to the Chinese Government.” Though he feared serious damage to American prestige in Asia if the more militarily relevant islands were lost, Dulles also recognized potential danger in overcommitting prestige and military power. Yet he remained worried that China would misinterpret American refusal to match ground forces in Korea and Indochina if there were not a concurrent demonstration of U.S. willingness to use sea and air power in the region.

The PRC’s September shelling of Quemoy led Dulles to reiterate his support for defending the island regardless of the military rationale, while convincing Robertson of the need for a military response. Notably, though Dulles and colleagues pursued a secret plan with Britain and New Zealand for a ceasefire resolution at the UN, they were not legitimately interested in negotiating with the PRC. Instead of seeking negotiations, diplomats were prepared by early 1955 to publicly commit to defending the offshore islands to avoid “a bad effect on our prestige in the area” and sought to create a better public climate for the use of atomic weapons to defend Formosa. Dulles’s ultimate proposal to Chiang was an evacuation of troops and civilians from Quemoy and Matsu paired with a blockade of some 500 miles of the Chinese coast — in other words, an act of war against the PRC.

However, like in Indochina, military officials initially hesitated on armed intervention to protect Formosa — which the Joint Chiefs recognized as a strategic asset as early as 1948, but initially declined to defend based on a disparity between the nation’s military strength and its worldwide obligations. Only once American military capabilities freed up following the Korean armistice did military officials become more willing support Taiwan’s defense with U.S. forces. When this policy came up for debate in August 1954, Radford argued that the islands held “radar and other installations” that would facilitate the Seventh Fleet’s defensive task. After the PRC shelled Quemoy in September, a majority of the chiefs (Ridgway excluded) recommended allowing U.S. naval and air operations in defense

---

44 Tucker (2009, 16).
56 Accinelli (1996, 7-8).
57 FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, 256.
of selected offshore islands. Here I find the rare instance where the chiefs framed an issue in non-capability terms, arguing that while the islands were militarily “important but not essential” to Formosa’s defense, the overriding considerations were the psychological impact of the islands’ loss on Chiang’s troops and other Asian countries, in addition to the potential destruction of men and materiel positioned on the islands.\textsuperscript{58}

Yet the chiefs’ subsequent advocacy through fall 1954 and winter 1955 remained principally capabilities-centric. Diverging from the majority, Ridgway stressed that the islands were both vulnerable given local Chinese military advantages and unimportant for either defensive or offensive operations. The other chiefs (Carney, Twining, and Shepherd) thought there were tactical advantages to retaining the islands for blocking PRC approaches, cited the importance of morale among Nationalist forces, and deemed the islands’ defense as within current U.S. capabilities. Radford, by contrast, framed his comments in terms of the United States’ will as an ally and determination to resist the further spread of communism, while also critiquing Ridgway’s assumptions about how quickly the Chinese could mount operations against Quemoy and whether U.S. ground forces would be required.\textsuperscript{59} He later reiterated that the islands were “part of Gimo’s [Chiang’s] defense of Formosa” as “outposts and warning stations,” blocking two key port areas and preventing a secret force buildup by the PRC, and that even if they were not militarily consequential, their loss could foist an increased burden on the U.S. if Chiang’s government collapsed in response to a successful PRC attack.\textsuperscript{60}

Therefore, a majority of the chiefs agreed with Dulles’s assessment at the March 10th NSC meeting regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons. Radford argued that entire U.S. force posture had been built on this assumption since the U.S. lacked sufficient local air bases to attack China with conventional munitions.\textsuperscript{61} He would ultimately help Dulles and Robertson draft the evacuation-blockade plan as well as be charged by Eisenhower with delivering the proposal to Chiang in person, nearly leading to the implementation of a quite hawkish policy. This suggests that like his counterparts at the State Department, Radford was willing to escalate a potential dispute with the PRC over Taiwan into a military confrontation — which may only have been averted because Chiang did not agree to the plan.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{58}FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, 270. 
\textsuperscript{59}FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, 291. 
\textsuperscript{60}FRUS 1955-1957, II, 47. 
\textsuperscript{61}FRUS 1955-1957, II, 146. 
\textsuperscript{62}FRUS 1955-57, II, 219; Accinelli (1996, 228).