SUMMIT DIPLOMACY AND THE LOGIC OF PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Minseon Ku (ku.79@osu.edu)
The Ohio State University

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Abstract (198 words)

The international Relations (IR) literature on summitry has focused on the agentic role of leaders as negotiators, faces of their state, and foreign policy agents. Drawing on Erving Goffman's theory on self-presentations in everyday social interactions, social psychology, and critical security lens, I theorize summit diplomacy as a type of social action in international politics that follows a logic of performance in a two-step argument. First, guided by a presumed audience's gaze, states put on performances to convince audiences of some fostered impression through visible and visual staging of themselves as state persons with social relations. Second, I foreground the role of the domestic public as audiences who, based on their visual perception of media coverage that translates into security experience, can exercise agency to react to the meaning of the performance, posing a challenge to international performances. In particular, rapprochement summitry presents tensions for political elites as performers and a domestic public as an audience. Using the first-ever summits to take place officially between South Korea and Japan in 1983 and 1984 as an illustration, this paper concludes that summitry is a site of security contestation between political elites and a domestic audience over national ontological (in)security.

Keywords: Rapprochement, (De)securitization, Ontological Security, Summit Diplomacy, State Persons, Metaperception, International Performance, Visual politics

1. THE LOGIC OF PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Former US President Donald Trump's meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019 made headlines, spurring public debates on whether Trump was genuinely serious about negotiating North Korea's denuclearization or pursuing photo-ops. The literature in International Relations (IR) has helped advance our understanding that when leaders meet face to face the chance of mitigating inter-state conflict and competition improves because of humanization or reactions in our brains that help leaders read others' intentions.[1] As Trump himself boasted, he felt he could understand Kim Jong Un better after their first meeting in Singapore.[2]

Even if summits are "empty signifiers" of world politics that may not have any impact on adversarial relations or rivalry, the debate surrounding controversial summitry suggests that summits, or at least their visual representations, are doing something to observers, if not for leaders. Summit diplomacy was first initiated by Winston Churchill for leaders of adversaries to "parley." It was to be minimalistic in terms of ceremonies and rituals in case they distract leaders from understanding one another's intentions.[3] But with the advancement of media technology and air travel over the years, summitry today has become a public event that is easily accessible to the public via mass and social media. The act of doing negotiations with and meeting other leaders in public in terms of accepting exposure to media coverage, however, remains undertheorized in IR despite the growing popularity of summit-level diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, since the post-war years.

This paper introduces a theoretical approach to understanding and analyzing summit diplomacy in international politics that complement existing approaches such as face-to-face diplomacy and practice theory. Drawing on the sociology of social interactions, I transpose the micro-sociological concept of impression management developed by Erving Goffman to international politics.[4] Just as all social actors take part in "impression management" in their daily social interactions, states interact with other international political actors by performing impressions. Combining this with social psychology and critical security theories, I argue that summit diplomacy, or diplomacy conducted directly

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[1] Holmes 2013; Wheeler 2018; Wong 2016; Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012; Holmes and Wheeler 2020.
[2] "Trump and Kim in Quotes: From Bitter Rivalry to Unlikely Bromance," AlJazeera. February 28, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/28/trump-and-kim-in-quotes-from-bitter-rivalry-to-unlikely-bromance
[3] Watt 1963.
[4] Goffman 1959. My argument thus makes a move similar to that by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014) who applies Goffman's theory of stigma management in explaining the behavior of stigmatized states.

by heads of governments and states in public in the form of bilateral or multilateral meetings and state visits, is a type of social action that follows the logic of performance of impression-making and management. To do so, I theorize constitutively, rather than causally, summit diplomacy and its impression-making mechanism. Constitutive theorizing explains an outcome by conceptualizing it as the product of a structure's constitutive properties, rather than by identifying causal variables. Specifically, I theorize summit performance as an emergent outcome from a property of modern summitry – its publicness and audience orientation. By doing so, I am not claiming to make an argument about the motivation of states for pursuing summit diplomacy. Rather, by arguing that summit diplomacy is an international performance that generates an impression about states and their relations with one another by staging and acting and thus defining an international political situation, I am claiming that states can, or may, engage in summits for strategic reasons.

I examine a specific type of public and visual rapprochement: ceremonial summit-level diplomacy between adversaries. Rapprochement is the process of improving relations between enemies, including de-escalating tension and conflicts. Summits thematized around rapprochement are controversial since on the one hand they are constitutively public and therefore visible to non-performers as they receive heavy media coverage. On the other hand, ceremonial summits involve performing acts symbolizing mutual respect between states that make participating states seem "rational" in the international realm that risk leaders and their governments politically at home if their public is unprepared for reconciliation. For analytical purpose, I focus on domestic audience reactions primarily while recognizing that international audiences are exposed to summits via international media coverage and may react depending on their political relativity to the issue. I advance that rapprochement summitry is a single-stage performance that presents two tensions for political elites and a domestic audience respectively. First, political elites are limited by the single stage performance when putting on an international performance of rapprochement that satisfies both international and domestic audiences. In particular, a domestic public's contestation can negate the effects of the fostered impression of a "rational" state seeking rapprochement. Second, rapprochement summitry presents a dual reality for a domestic audience – one that idealizes relations between two adversaries, and the other that makes the performance an empty signifier. The tension between these two realities is contingent upon an audience, or a domestic public's impression, that a summit is a meeting between states and not two

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individuals, allowing them to attach a collective meaning which manifests as experiences of ontological (in)security. That is, the feeling of assurance that reconciliation is taking place between two collectives, and not as a performative act by leaders, can be a source of ontological security for the lay public that has had a shared (negative) experience with regards to the enemy. As such, security exists as performances and visual representations.

There are two steps to the argument. First, as a front stage performance, summits are portrayals of states as person actors and dramatizations of international relations guided by a presumed audience's gaze. As socially holistic practices, leaders and their administrations plan, often in coordination with their counterparts, summitry elements such as schedule and itinerary, activities, places of visits, and diplomatic gifts. Through diplomatic staging and props, a state reproduces itself visibly and visually as a state person, granting itself not only human traits, but also to convince domestic audiences as the legitimate source of ontological security and international audiences as a sophisticated diplomatic actor.

Second, because a performance is a constitutively public process that requires audience appraisal to be a performance, I foreground audience perception of the performance to theorize that summitry is a site of political contestation over the meaning of a performance. An audience interprets two dimensions of the summit through their visual perception resting on the processes of identification and metaperception: first, whether the summit is a meeting between either two individuals or two states they can identify as, and second, the valence of relations between the two states based on how the enemy state views one's state. Because visual perception can easily translate to experiences,[5] an audience's experience of world politics and thus security is highly contingent on their exposure to, and their impressions of visuals of international political performances.[6] Security is broadly construed to include both physical and ontological securities as they are not only hard to disentangle, but more importantly, it helps explain why security processes, such as rapprochement, are accepted (or not) under certain conditions by publics when applying the theory of (de)securitization.[7] The role of the state in a performance and its reproduction of the state person influences security as it frames or influences how the domestic public experience security, sometimes compelling the mass publics to react especially if the performance generates a collective mood of anxiety and fear.

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[5] Barry 2020.

[6] Experience is defined as direct personal participation, observation, knowledge, or contact. See Faizullaev 2006, 532.

[7] Rumelili 2015.

To illustrate the argument, I use the case study method to explore the South Korea-Japan summitry of 1983-4. While there were technically two summits, I treat this as a single case as the second summit was a reciprocation of the first. Relying on a single case limits the generalizability of the argument, but it provides an in-depth or a "thick" description of a summit allowing for a thorough analysis of its constitutive mechanism. These summits were the first ever between the two countries in their thousand-year history and the first since normalization in 1965. Given the bitter history surrounding colonialism and Japan's invasion and diplomatic normalization in 1965, the summits pose an interesting question on state elites' beliefs about the impact of the diplomatic visits on their populations. Because South Korea portrays itself as a victim of centuries of attempted invasion and ultimately annexation, the South Korean public has demonstrated more visible opposition to political attempts to improve bilateral relations. Therefore, I look primarily at South Korea's perspective toward the diplomatic staging of its aspirational positive relations with Japan. Relying on original diplomatic archives to infer the state elites' reasoning and newspaper columns and op-eds to infer South Koreans' impressions of the summits, I show that the South Korean public was overall skeptical and indifferent to the reconciliatory overtures performed by the elites in Seoul and Tokyo.

The contributions of the paper are two-fold. First, it presents a different logic or rationality of social action in international politics by foregrounding the role of an audience in international politics. While the literature on audience cost has offered useful findings on how an audience reacts to cues, this paper highlights the context as well as diffused cues in the form of performance that is both cognitive and affective. Second, it offers an alternative understanding of rapprochement in world politics by conceptualizing it as a complex social process implicating ontological security at the collective level and political elites' strategic use of rapprochement as statecraft.

This paper proceeds as follows. It first reviews the literature that reduces summitry to leaders' agency, glossing over the structural aspect of diplomacy conditioned by the public-ness and audience's gaze. By introducing Goffman's concept of impression making and management to theorize an aspect of social action in international politics that suggests the traversing of public versus private social action to convince an audience of an impression, I then identify ways in which states and political elites stage and dramatize international relations. The audience's gaze toward international performances and in particular, their agency to watch and react to them make summitry a site of security

contestation as visual perceptions of performances is paramount to security experiences. I use South Korean public's impression of the 1983-4 rapprochement summitry with Japan to illustrate the potential and limitations of security performances. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that state elites' belief in the power of the summit to create breakthroughs in international conflicts or disputes is overblown because international political performances are conditioned by audiences whose agency is unpredictable.

2. SUMMITRY: FROM INTER-PERSONAL INTERACTIONS TO THEATRICALITY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Summitry, or face-to-face diplomacy conducted directly by heads of governments and states, is more than a "bundle of practices"[8] or negotiations between leaders. Existing literature on summit diplomacy in IR can be summarized broadly into treating leaders as individuals fully exercising their agency in affecting the outcome of their direct diplomacy. The first group of literature theorizes the efficacy of summit diplomacy as being grounded in a leader's agency, focusing on leaders' negotiations and bargaining,[9] or the socio-psychological mechanism of face-to-face meetings and its impact on interpersonal relations between leaders that help explain outcomes of a summit such as an agreement,[10] localizing summits to leader-level interactions. The second strand finds that visits made by leaders could produce a positive impact on the foreign public's perception of the visiting leader and their country, implying the power of diplomatic visits as soft power tools for a country.[11] Another explains that diplomatic visits by U.S. presidents may be driven by strategic or domestic political considerations.[12] These literatures, however, black box the specification of the mechanism that links a leader's public diplomatic activities to the publics' reactions and overlook the contexts of summitry. In particular, the question of what aspect of a leader's public diplomatic activities resonates (or not) with a domestic public or impacts domestic politics is left unanswered. After all, foreign policy and diplomacy is an extension of domestic politics as exemplified by the audience cost literature in IR.

I build my argument that international politics by nature is theatrical by revisiting the literature on the dramaturgy of politics. According to this literature, the political world exists by organizing itself as theater as political representatives mostly act for, and before an

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[8] Pouliot and Cornut 2015.
[9] Trager 2010: Rathbun 2014.
[10] Wheeler 2013; Wong 2016; Holmes 2013; Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2017
[11] Goldsmith et al 2021; Balmas 2018.
[12] Lebovic and Saunders 2016; Malis and Smith 2020; Ostrander and Rider 2019

audience who observes them. This is especially true in societies with highly integrated mass communications systems that force the world to be organized theatrically and performance becomes a requirement for any political activity. The political demand for politicians to represent means that *all* politics "contains the seeds of theater within it."[13] Politics is therefore similar to theater as it incorporates specific dramatic characteristics and provides a general framework to analyze the dramaturgical structure of political ideologies and the appeals of politicians by identifying dramaturgical techniques – personification, identification appeals, symbolism, catharsis, and suspense - through which political ideologies portray the world.[14] Similar to theatrical staging, politicians use symbols, media, and rhetoric to construct the "spectacle" of political reality to draw the audience's attention.[15] This works, because humans are inherently symbolic actors because social life functions through symbols, and humans have a basic need for symbols to make sense of the social order.[16]

The notion that international politics is performance is not novel. The view that international politics by nature is of performance has been put forth by Erik Ringmar, who argues that an international system is a "stage" on which actors perform the appropriate scripts by using the illustrations of three international systems – the Westphalian, the Qing dynasty, and Tokugawa Japan.[17] Raymond Cohen's influential book conceptualized summits as a non-verbal signaling mechanism that relies on multiple components ranging from sartorial elements to gestures to create an impact on audiences via media.[18] Day and Wedderburn argue that summit diplomacy operates according to "theatrical rationality" that blurs the boundary between foreign policy and symbolic politics.[19] Svendsen argues that increasingly there is an orientation toward public communication of international negotiations that challenge the boundary between domestic and international politics.[20] These works, however, overlook analytically an audience's perspective, restricting their performance analysis to the staging and the actors, defeating the very purpose of theorizing international politics as public performances.

3. THE LOGIC OF PERFORMANCE IN WORLD POLITICS

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[13] Borreca 1993, 68.
[14] Merelman 1969.
[15] Borreca 1993, 67.
[16] Edelman 1964.
[17] Ringmar 2012.
[18] Cohen 1987.
[19] Day and Wedderburn 2022.
[20] Svendsen 2022.

I introduce the logic of performance as a type of social action in international politics according to which all social actors are conditioned or guided by the presumed presence of an audience and their gaze. That is, what drives social action is its public-ness or visibility and hence its orientation toward convincing or persuading some audience because the action is presumed to be seen by some other social actors. Erving Goffman's concept of "impression management" is useful for thinking about summits via media coverage influencing the way states behave and what people think about international politics through their exposure to summits. In his theory of social interaction, all individuals are acting in their everyday interactions so that they strive towards presenting themselves as something, perhaps a role or a fostered impression. This is necessary because in social interactions, people seek information about others that are already possessed by them but not made immediately available to others. Such information helps determine the situation of the interaction, allowing people to know in advance what the expectations of others are so that they will know how to act to get the desired response from others.[21] When an individual presents themselves in front of others, however, there are only a few moments when they can provide others with information they can use to guide their action. For example, their true intentions and emotions cannot be read directly. To facilitate social interaction, individuals, therefore, must act so that they "intentionally or unintentionally" express themselves which in turn means that others will have to be "impressed" by them.[22]

As such, the expressiveness of a social actor involves two "radically different kinds of sign activity" – one is the expression that they "give," and the second is an expression that "give[s] off." The first is a more direct way of communication, involving the use of language or substitutes to convey information. It is the second type of expression, the "giving off" of an expression that is central to Goffman's theory of social interactions and the core argument of the paper that international politics as performance is an emergent process of performer-observer interaction. The giving off of an expression involves different types of action that others can treat as "symptomatic" of the actor, with "the expectation being that the action was performed for reasons *other* than the information conveyed in this way."[23] It is a more "theatrical" and "contextual" kind of expression that directs communication involving non-verbal ones.[24] It is therefore a performance made up of multiple components including the

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[21] Goffman 1959, 1.
[22] Goffman 1959, 2.
[23] Goffman 1959, 2. Italics added by the author.
[24] Goffman 1959, 4.

setting, gestures, appearance, and script.[25] Such activities comprise the "front" stage acting, and it helps define the situation for the observers. Front, in Goffman's words, is "the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance."[26]

In the international system, states communicate information about themselves in public in several ways, including signaling through audience and sink costs,[27] through international institutions,[28] and via face-to-face diplomacy[29] usually targeted at foreign political elites and governments. These communication channels speak directly to foreign governments, but much of these processes are also public channels thanks to mediation by either mass or social media. It is the expectation that there are social actors observing and interpreting public communication that compel states or any international political actor to try mobilizing and coordinating resources to put on their best image, or to give off an expression that will convey best their message in the least confusing way possible. The "front" stage staging is thus more symbolic than conventionally thought, as they are layered with meanings that accentuate the sociality of the international system.

The access to the front stage may vary depending on a state's power, position in the international system, and its interests. That is, not all states enjoy the same degree of access of front stage communication and its type, or possess sufficient and necessary political capital to deal with the backlash of its public action. This does mean that the "backstage" action in Goffman's formula, or the back region of behavior of social actors, offers a viable alternative to persuasive communication. Backstage action may be preferred because it relieves a state of the political costs accompanying a role, an identity or a fostered impression it wants to leave on their audience through public performances.[30] But under the logic of performance, there are political gains to be reaped because of the visibility (i.e. what state action is being performed and seen) and the visuality (i.e. how a state action is performed and seen) of international socio-political action.

States and other actors are therefore almost always performing for some audience, while also communicating directly. In the contemporary age of globalization and

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[25] Goffman 1959, 22.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Fearon 1997.

[28] Thompson 2006; Mitzen 2005.

[29] Wong 2016.

[30] Goffman 1959. See for example, Carson's (2015) theory on covert military action in international politics.

digitalization, diplomacy has evolved to become a diffused public communication method employed by states, most of its messages do not have a targeted audience. The audience's gaze toward the performance is what gives recognition to an actor's presence and existence at the very least, if not, an impression of the actor and the situation.

Staging and Reproducing State-as-Person

Because all indirect expressions through performances accentuate certain aspects of a social world while concealing others, summitry performances help states express its ontology or existence as a state using different performance components: leaders, summitry itinerary and objects, media control, and cooperating with other states. The effect of this holistic performance is that it helps others "see" states and their social relations and place in the world by reproducing visibly and visually an aspect of world politics that are usually treated as given or taken for granted and without which the world can seem disorderly. I illuminate the (re)production of states as persons, which helps audiences identify with state actions and behavior that have implications for them. That is, by perceiving states as persons with person-like traits together with the audience's socialization with and internalization of Westphalian principles of state autonomy, equality, state monopoly of certain domestic instruments, and the legitimacy of a representative, an audience of a summit can make the mental leap from our everyday experiences to "see" states existing and thus providing a sense of stability and order.[31] Of the different human traits, a state's social relations with other international political actors underlie lay people's feeling of being ontologically (and hence, physically) secure. Negative relations, for example, can contribute to feelings of fear and anxiety in relation to the enemy. Summitry performances thus help construct the audience's impression of a state by not only defining the relation and the situation, but by making these seem real through visual and textual reproduction of summits via media coverage.

A summit, including that involving just two states, is a complex process involving international and domestic actors and resources. Besides setting the agenda, determining talking points of leaders and high-level officials, and drafting communiques or statements which make up the tip of the summitry "iceberg," states usually mobilize both internal and external resources to ensure that international performances go well. Each step in the

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[31] Faizullaev 2007, 538-39; Ku and Mitzen 2022.

process of summit preparation is an effort made by states to produce not only the best possible image of themselves but to also produce the states visually and even materially or physically. States carefully plan and coordinate for the successful pulling off of an impression-making performance of states through leader's practices, diplomatic activities, media control, and collaboration with foreign governments. These are not exhaustive, but they touch on key components of social performance that cannot be reduced to a single component:[32] actors, acting, power relations and structure, and framing audience perception. As such, diplomatic practices, or acting out of the system is important (a la Pouliot[33]), but the importance of the audience in constituting and even influencing the practices should not be overlooked. That is, all social action is social and relational because the staging of a social performance of an impression is put together with an audience in mind. And to embed a certain impression involves theatricalizing abstract concepts like states and foreign relations through material and embodied objects and subjects.

A. *Leaders as Performers*

Leaders and their interactions form a core component of a summit and often are the key factors for why negotiations are successful or not.[34] Leaders also take part in more formalized practices of diplomacy rituals such as a handshake that can make or break inter-state relations.[35] The symbolic role and power of a leader as the sovereign head of a state or a government means that they are not only representing the state but also embodying (i.e. giving the idea of a state a concrete form) and even personifying (representing the abstraction of a state as a person) it.[36] Along with their effective authority to make foreign policy decisions, the symbolic meaning of a leader gives summit diplomacy a state-centered meaning. As such, how leaders present themselves and are presented at summits is important when staging performances of state impressions. In this sense, leaders not only represent their states but are *presenting* their states through their embodied practices at summits. In the same vein, how leaders interact with other leaders and the society or the culture of the state of visit can be perceived as reflecting inter-state relations. States therefore not only draft speeches and statements to be made at the site of a summit through careful word choice, but they also plan the visual products of a leader's diplomatic activities by directing camera angles, directing what gestures a leader should make, advising how a

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[32] Alexander 2004.
[33] Pouliot 2008
[34] Wheeler 2013; Holmes 2013; Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012.
[35] Wong 2020.
[36] McGraw and Dolan 2007.

leader should interact with foreign leaders, instructing how a leader should hold utensils or walk down the aircraft, etc. Such staging may present conflicts of interests or even beliefs as Leaders as agentic individuals may feel conflicted about their role in performing a particular impression of their state, especially in front of their enemy.

B. *Summitry Activities and Diplomatic Objects as Scenario and Props*

Most accounts of leader-level diplomatic activities in IR have yet to analyze the line-up of activities a leader, sometimes with their counterparts, partake in during a ceremonial diplomatic visit. Because bilateral summits in the form of visits are usually rituals symbolizing bilateral relations and their international political context, the activities also help convey an impression that either one or both states wish to create. Some of these activities are routinized or repeated over several summits, especially if they symbolize a unique feature of bilateral relations, thereby accentuating it. Leaders and summitry activities are also aided by other symbolic and cultural items to produce or reify impressions of states. The placement of flags, diplomatic gifts, props, the food menu at official dinners, and even color schemes of leaders' attires, are all intentionally selected to reflect and capture part of, if not all, a state's expression of itself, whether that be international status or cultural identity.[37]

C. *Media control as Story Framing*

States control how the summit is framed by controlling media coverage. According to Goffman, since performances are aimed at emphasizing certain matters while concealing others, controlling the media translates to controlling people's "contact" with the performance.[38] Contrary to common beliefs that the media could act as the "Fourth Estate" independently, summit diplomacy is structured in such a way that the state monopolizes press access to the events. This is especially true for countries like the US where domestic media and its coverage of US foreign policy form a hierarchical cascading network with the US administration possessing the greatest power in the framing of foreign policy news.[39] The press pool zone at a summit is also tightly controlled by the administration for security and political reasons and thus the images produced by the media are already premeditated to an extent.[40] In other words, summit diplomacy justifies state control of media, thereby

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[37] Danielson and Hedling 2021; Matwick and Matwick 2020; Demir and Alper 2021; Neumann 2021.
[38] Goffman 1959, 67.
[39] Entman 2008.
[40] However, beside producing images and visuals, the media also retains the freedom to frame a summit by adding analyses to their coverage.

making it relatively easy for political elites to produce foreign policy discourse. Media control is not limited to controlling the access to information news networks and journalists obtain from the executive branch but extends to controlling how the summit is framed by journalists and TV networks and their access to presidential activities. For the Nixon administration, the preference for TV networks over newspaper journalists because of the latter's tendency to portray Nixon negatively illustrates how leaders and governments exercise their power to influence the framing or the content of media coverage.

D. *Collaborating with Other States as Joint Production*

A state cannot give off the expression it wants to convey without the aid of other countries, especially its summitry counterpart. Unlike the relatively stiffer substances concerning bilateral relations that can be thorny issues between two countries, summitry logistics facilitate inter-state cooperation since it is usually in the interest of both states that they pull off a successful performance. Advance teams, usually under-analyzed and under-recognized by both scholars and the media, work hard to lay the ground for a perfect summit performance by negotiating and cooperating with their counterparts who may be the enemy if the summit involves adversaries.

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Summitry is one of the many locales for practicing, perceiving, and experiencing states as persons. Other locales include international organizations and institutions, where states perform to be recognized as an entity with agency,[41] and media representations ascribe conflicts and war to states.[42] Summitry performances reproduce states as person-like entities by providing observers an idea of a state's existence as an entity socialized into the Westphalian system of sovereign states and making its social personality seem "real" by producing the state visibly, physically, ideationally, and socially.

By providing the site of political legitimation for an individual, a state and the individual co-constitute a state, giving it existence that makes it comprehensible and visible to people. The visibility of a state leader at a summitry and the ritualistic display of state flags also shows the existence of the state as an autonomous equal entity with agency.[43] At least in the public's eyes, the leader's presence at a summit and their decision-making may

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[41] Wille 2019

[42] Rojo 1995.

[43] Krickel-Choi 2022, 9; Faizullaev 2013, 98

not appear coerced or practiced at the expense of the leader's and more crucially the state's interests, giving off the impression that the state exists somehow tangibly through its physical embodiment by an individual and by material objects such as flags and state names on placards. Summitry performances also reproduce a state as a person by imbuing it with ideational identity. This is best observed through multilateral summits such as G7/8, NATO, and G20 that legitimize a particular ideology and the hierarchical order. This is true even for bilateral summits. The ideology and structure of the international order is projected onto the valence of inter-state relations. Friendly states may meet bilaterally to (re)affirm the international order and its ideology by stating them in joint communique and statements; summitry between foes is structured by the ideology of the international system.[44]

Part of being a state person and to be seen as one also involves states emphasizing and dramatizing subjectively their relations with other international entities through summit diplomacy. The indirect expression through performances, though vague, gives information to observers, such as the definition of the interaction and situation as well as the ontological status of a state as a person.[45] The resort to dramatizing one's activity comes from the basic need to incorporate signs that dramatize and hence highlight and portrays things that otherwise might go unnoticed by others.[46] Political spectacles capture the attention of an audience who are otherwise mostly oblivious to international affairs, or even largely unpoliticized when it comes to foreign affairs, which can be a source of frustration for politicians and political groups.[47] To dramatize through spectacles, however, is to take political action, the effect of which is captured through people's impression of the state and its social relations performed through theatricality.

Audience's Visual Perception of States

Any performance requires an audience, whether that be an actual or presumed presence, to be appraised as a performance. The constitutive publicness of summits is what makes summits more than meetings or ceremonies for and by leaders. The outcome of a summit alone does not dictate its significance. Instead, a summit can derive its social meaning from audiences' interpretations and reactions. In other words, an audience of an international performance can exercise agency, posing a potent force in international politics by observing

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[44] For example, Adler-Nissen 2014.
[45] Goffman 1959.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Edelman 1988, 35.

and interpreting a performance.

The concept of political spectatorship from Political Theory is instructive for establishing the link between international politics as performance and an audience. The potential of audiences to give meaning to, and change the meaning of a summit is suggested by Sandey Fitzgerald, who conceptualize citizens or lay publics as political "spectators" that possess the power to "turn any action into a performance" simply by watching it, and the power to understand and experience a performance in ways not intended by the performer, and finally, to "see things that are not there," or to "appropriate the observed" for their own purposes.[48] That is, the gaze of an audience can (dis)empower an action into something that becomes visible or invisible, with visibility interacting with an audience whether they are consciously placing their gaze or not.[49]

The constitutive publicness of summit diplomacy aided by media coverage makes it a visual experience for an audience, who, if they chose to, have access to mediated contact with the performance through visual and textual representations in media. Theories of visual perception and visual cognition in visual communication studies suggest that visuals are readily absorbed or processed by the brain, and what we see becomes what we are depending on the type of media and visuals.[50] For example, the more life-like visuals are, the more easily they are processed by the brain, although this does not always translate to people's beliefs that the visuals are reality. The (mediated) visibility of political events can therefore evolve into visual experiences for audiences, who consciously or unconsciously, take the visible to be part of their social reality.

The political socialization with the visible (and the invisible) is aided by two processes: identification and metaperception. Identification is a process where an audience comes to view their political destinies as associated with the summit or the leader.[51] It involves both cognitive and affective processes. The cognitive process of identification through personification, which refers to a process of perceiving something as having human traits, helps an audience to grasp abstract ideas and concepts like state and world politics.[52] Identification is also affective. Political symbols and ritualized performances evoke and

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[48] Fitzgerald 2016, 143.
[49] In this sense, I follow Merleau-Ponty's (1968) notion of visibility and invisibility that is void of consciousness.
[50] Barry 2020; Grabe 2020.
[51] Merelman 1969, 223.
[52] McGraw and Dolan 2007.

mobilize emotions in observers,[53] and in diplomatic performances, symbols of the state can also instill a sense of national attachment and affection among the citizens.[54] Identifying with performance thus functions as a "link" between an audience and a performance by enabling the audience to experience indirectly what the state, embodied in a leader, (i.e. the actor) is experiencing.

Metaperception refers to one's perception of what others think about oneself. In world politics, it concerns what people of other countries think of one's country. Examples include an American drawing inferences about the US based on public opinion polls conducted in other countries asking them what they think of the US, or what their foreign policy preferences are with regards to the US. While such polls may not reflect other countries' perceptions of the US, Americans may draw on such information to form or change their perceptions toward those other countries.[55] In international performances, the reproduction of the other states as state persons is therefore important. That is, an audience must be able to "see" the performance of a foreign leader as that representing the foreign state's and not the leader's personal intentions in order to be convinced that the performance is one of genuine-ness by the state, and not the individual leader.

An audience's interaction with the visuals of a performance in the form of identification and metaperception is in part supported by the social psychology literature on intergroup contact which suggests that mediated contact in the form of watching media portrayals of outgroup members can influence ingroup attitudes toward outgroups.[56] The implication of the findings in this literature is that the role of the leaders representing the groups and performing the contact is important. To this, I add the importance of performing the state in facilitating an audience's identification with an international political performance which relies on performers and staging productions to generate the stable production of the state, the state system, and the (diplomatic) norms that hold the system together to produce a sense of order.

The uncertainty of audience impression and interpretation should be highlighted to emphasize the uncertainty posed by summitry in world politics. The uncertainty with leaders' personal interactions and impression-reading is acknowledged by Hall and Yarhi-

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[53] Sears 2001.
[54] Faizullaev 2013, 111.
[55] O'Brien et al. 2018.
[56] Joyce and Harwood 2014.

Milo.[57] The same goes for the wider audience of summitry performances not only because of the variability of audiences, but also the influence that an audience group might have on other audiences.[58] To say that summitry has an effect X in world politics thus overlooks the complexity of the constitutive mechanism of summitry. This paper is therefore tasked at not only retracing but also imagining the domestic dimension of summitry performances by highlighting the overall visual effect and the visible of world politics to an audience that have been marginalized in the existing literature on summit diplomacy.

4. RAPPROCHEMENT SUMMITRY AS A SITE OF SECURITY AND CONTESTATION

International politics as a performance presents tensions and challenges for both the performers, usually political elites, and the audience, usually the mass public. For performers, the complexity of the presumed audiences in terms of their variability, connectedness, and overall unpredictability in their interpretations of a performance and their reactions poses a significant challenge for putting on a convincing act of some intended impression. That is, the presumed audience's gaze and interpretation plays a crucial, yet ambiguous role in guiding a state's public social action, causing political elites to cautiously cast their predictions about the outcomes of a summitry performance of an intended impression. For the audience, a performance is not only about an impression but about the reflection or projection of a political reality in which the state as person is expected to function as a buffer against political uncertainties and precarities of international politics. These are all further complicated by rapprochement politics that implicates cognitive and affective processes of security, which I argue, manifests as collective or public mood.

Rapprochement with an enemy is a complex process involving not only policy change but a societal shift in the discursive production about the enemy. In IR scholarship, rapprochement is often overlooked despite the failure of reconciliation being correlated with international conflicts.[59] Rapprochement or reconciliation has been also analytically framed as a process about combat fighting to an end,[60] marginalizing the role of a domestic public and their experiences of conflicts and wars. The audience cost literature analyzes public opinion in different phases of conflict, but the audience experience of security, conflict, and

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[57] Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012.
[58] Taylor 2021; Malacarne 2021.
[59] Fehrs 2016.
[60] E.g. Goemans 2000.

war is black boxed into preferences about foreign policy. In contrast, I argue that conflict de-escalation and rapprochement is a type of political performance that is aimed at convincing audiences to believe the genuine-ness of reconciliation. This is because adversarial relations are not rooted in mere combat fighting but is a social process that affects the society as well as the lay public. A war is a social process and a physical and emotional experience, found not only in individuals but collectively in a society and culture.[61] This means that successful rapprochement has to provide people with assurances of physical and ontological security needs, such as psychological healing, or at least a rhetorical promise of it so that rapprochement at the summit level is not seen as "leaving those who really matter behind."

(De)securitization theory provides a useful framework for thinking about the potential challenges of rapprochement.[62] As both a cognitive and affective process, an audience's perception and impression of the summit performance with an enemy manifest as a collective or public mood concerning security of both physical and ontological dimensions, leading to an audience accepting, rejecting, contesting, or acting indifferent to it. That is, despite being rooted in individual experiences, summit diplomacy in its mediated form becomes a societal-wide event and a security experience particularly if the summit is critical to a state's security. Impressions of summitry visuals translate into security mood or general attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about the enemy through "super mirrors" which are macro-level mirror neurons generated through society-wide visual representations on media.[63]

For political elites, a rapprochement performance entails pleasing two different crowds that may have conflicting interests. On the one hand, rapprochement may be called for by allies and security partners. On the other hand, rapprochement as envisioned by international politics as being rational, may not be welcomed by the domestic public that finds its grievances and animosity toward an adversary unresolved by the reconciliatory gesture. In other words, state elites face the so-called "two-level game"[64] problem in rapprochement that is fundamentally rooted in diplomatic processes but complicated by the domestic audience's feeling of (in)security vis-à-vis the (former) enemy in question. This is especially so since rapprochement is usually a tough political process that may be expedited by the presence of state leaders and their face-to-face interactions. While leaders may hasten

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[61] Sylvester 2012.
[62] Waever 1995.
[63] Barry 2020, 22.
[64] Putnam 1988.

the decision-making process, potentially helping to create breakthroughs in stalled negotiations, summits can produce profound political effects by personalizing foreign policy and essentializing discourse on world politics, leaving little room for democratizing foreign policy discourses within a polity. One possible consequence of the monopolization of discursive production of foreign policy and security is that it essentializes political discourses that render certain state actions as necessary and justifiable under the name of sovereignty.[65] Put differently, because summitry entails mobilization and expenditure of a significant amount of state resources, the state, and its political elites become the producers of knowledge on foreign policy, with the possibility of hyper-personalization of foreign policy and diplomacy by a leader. Diplomatic representation in the form of summits thus may result in outcomes where leaders or political elites "finalize events, systematize signification, reinforce absolutes, and determine relations between humans,"[66] thus dominating interpretations with implications for both domestic and international politics. Internally, this means greater consolidation or centralization of foreign policy decision-making power by the leader by essentializing the need for a leader to act and respond to security crises or threats to state sovereignty, thus closing off other political options to protect the state.[67] Internationally, the binding of foreign policy tendency to a leader and its administration increases the likelihood of other states "pausing" their pursuit of cooperation or negotiation with democracies until there is a change in leadership unless there are bottom-up initiatives.[68]

The processes of identification and metaperception by an audience are both contingent on the role of the state in performing itself, or more specifically, the stable reproduction of state as a person. The stable reproduction of the state person through summitry performance facilitates people to "see" and "experience" their state as well as the enemy state's treatment of one's state as they are able to identify the practices of leaders as those of states, rather than of individuals.[69] The practices and their mediated visuals thus function as type of speech act[70] or what I call "act-act," whereby the state person and the relations come into being through impression-making and impression-perceiving.[71] When it

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[65] Constantinou 1998.
[66] Constantinou 1998, 31.
[67] Waever 1995; Ish-Shalom 2015.
[68] For example, see Leeds and Mattes 2022.
[69] Mercer 2014.
[70] Austin 1962.
[71] Similar to Butler's (1988) performativity theory.

comes to rapprochement, metaperception also plays a role in whether the domestic public of country A thinks the performance of rapprochement is one of virtuosity by inferring from the reaction or impression the domestic public of country B has regarding the performance. Here, metaperceptions such as status and valence play a role in influencing reconciliation between groups.[72]

At the same time, the accentuation and dramatization of world politics using summitry can also create a sense of liminality, defined as a condition of ambiguity that is in between and betwixt socially established categories.[73] This ambiguity could be temporal as well, forcing an audience to reconcile with their individual or collective memory about the enemy at issue. This is because by its performative nature, summits convey state elites' version of world politics through dramatization that may be incoherent with political reality and memory as experienced by the audience especially in relation with the enemy in question. The primary aim of a performance may also have nothing to do with a said summit agenda thus leaving an unintended impression.

Summits therefore can seem orderly and disorderly at the same time as it stages side-by-side what seems real with what seems fake. This is especially true for ceremonial summits between adversaries, where diplomatic gestures and activities like official luncheons or dinners bring together leaders of adversarial countries, causing skepticism about people's impression of the intentions of the enemy. Such activities are ritualistic, along with other gestures like a simple handshake and photo-ops because, on the one hand, they follow a prescribed order or social expectations of summit-level meetings[74] and therefore may seem void of any substantial meaning from an observer's perspective.[75] On the other hand, the theatrics and ritualistic dimensions of a summit by themselves may be interpreted by actors, performers, and the audiences as being essential to governing of the conduct of world politics,[76] and in rapprochement, managing adversarial relations. Without the ritualistic performances, a feeling of disarray may ensue, further exposing the fiction of the state in anchoring people's sense of ontological security.[77]

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[72] Tropp, Mazziotta and Wright 2016, 467. Here, I follow the definition of status as used by social psychologists where a group of "higher" status refers to a group that has been internationally valued, dominant, and/or historically advantaged. Valence refers to whether the metaperception is positive or negative.
[73] Turner 1995.
[74] Baele and Balzacq 2022
[75] Cf. Wong 2021.
[76] Death 2011, 6.
[77] Ku and Mitzen 2022.

Contingent on how adversarial states are reproduced and perceived through one or more of these processes, the domestic public as audiences and political spectators can choose to accept, contest, reject, or be indifferent to, or ignore international performances of rapprochement. An audience's impression of a summit performance as that between two individuals rather than two states can manifest as public or collective mood that have implications for rapprochement. Performances that seem fake or that seem to breach the leader-state person linkage and thereby seem insincere can trigger ontological insecurity in the form of anxiety with respect to the state as a buffer against uncertainty posed by the enemy. This is because the mood is linked to the ontological condition of an individual, linking an individual to the world. From the public mood of anxiety activated by a failed performance of state persons emerges securitizing or preserving political subjectivity at the collective level because moods are contagious and public mood orients social actors to think and feel similarly.[78] High levels of collective insecurity and thus anxiety can compel audiences to react in more observable and even bodily ways, including in collectives, such as demonstrations and rallies to "counter-perform" elite-centered summitry performances.[79] Not all audiences can afford the luxury to reject or contest reconciliation since the concept of spectatorship applies primarily to democracies where politics is constantly under contestation between different social actors or groups.[80] Indifference to the performance can also result due to "rhetorical entrapment" where strong media control and framing by the political leadership manipulates public mood and public opinion ahead of a controversial summit with an enemy, deterring any potential contestation or rejection of reconciliatory moves.

Seen this way, by its performance nature, a summit becomes a site of political contestation about the performance of a state and its relations among the performers and different audiences through "wrong" impressions. That is, an audience may react to the sense of insecurity based on their perceived impressions of the presentation of the state and its relations with other international political actors. Contestation could entail what summitry does to the idea of a state as one's home.[81] It may also involve contesting a summitry performance and its meaning, such as that pertaining to the leader and their credibility or legitimacy, the international status of the state, and its ideological position in

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[78] Gellwitzki 2022.
[79] Ku 2022.
[80] Green 2010; Fitzgerald 2016.
[81] Ku 2022.

the international order. In the case of rapprochement, the failure of performance of rapprochement to persuade that the states are "there" thereby exposing the fiction of a state unveils the weak leader-state person linkage, manifesting in among the audiences as an erosion of feeling of ontologically secure vis-à-vis the enemy as well as the domestic elites performing the impression. Security thus exists as performances.

5. CONTESTING THE PERFORMANCE OF RAPPROCHEMENT: 1983-4 SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN SUMMITS

To illustrate that states stage performances of rapprochement using a summit with an enemy to make an impression and to show what a domestic public think of it, I look at the case of the South Korea-Japan summitry in 1983 and 1984. I interpret diplomatic archives, analyzing discursively to understand Seoul's reasoning and belief about the effects of the summit on domestic and world politics, or the "backstage" behavior, and the "front stage" performance. I then analyze newspaper archives as though I were an audience to the summitry as presented in newspapers, to analyze the South Korean public's impression of and reaction to the performance of rapprochement, including how the newspapers presented the pictures and headlines of the two summits.

South Korea's Theatrical Rationality and Performance Tensions

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit to Seoul in January 1983 was the first official visit made by a Japanese prime minister in the history of bilateral relations. South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan reciprocated the visit by visiting Tokyo in September 1984, a first by a Korean leader in the history of bilateral relations, making these two visits historic. This series of summitry was also historic as it involved Japan's public apology as well as public recognition at the summit level that history must never repeat. Despite being successful in terms of producing a joint statement as well as South Korea getting an apology from Japanese emperor Hirohito, the South Korean public was skeptical towards the performance of rapprochement and indifferent at best.

A sense of rivalry or a desire for revenge prevailed among South Korean bureaucrats during the 1984 summit preparation as well over the humiliation Koreans had to endure because of Japan. That Seoul believed international politics is based on a logic of performance was apparent from the titles of the summit prep plans that gave away South Korea's nationalist rivalry mindset. "Plan Turtle Ship" (1983) and "Plan Mugunghwa" (1984) both symbolize South Korea's historical and spiritual defeat over Japan. The desire to

humiliate Japan in return was reflected in the earlier drafts of the plan on diplomatic gifts to Hirohito and Nakasone as proposed in the internal documents dated June 1984. The Hideyoshi Invasion of Korea or Imjin War (1592-1598), a large-scale conflict involving 500,000 combatants from China, Korea, and Japan who fought in Korea, caused widespread destruction in Korea and a long-term impact on East Asia as a result of the removal of Korean technology and skilled laborers to Japan.[82] Proposing gifting Hirohito and Nakasone replicas of tea ware made by these Korean potters as diplomatic gifts was an interesting choice[83] as it would send a clear message to the emperor and Japan. Later drafts of the plan dated July 24th changed the gifts to something less controversial.[84]

Yet, Seoul's (and to an extent, Tokyo's) plan was to pull off a successful performance that will be met with positive reviews about Chun and South Korea. In particular, Seoul wanted to create desirable impressions of South Korea and Chun Doo-hwan as a world leader. It was hoped that the "theatrical rationality"[85] on which the summit rests would generate domestic and international political effects benefiting South Korea in terms of national security interests.

Relations had soured following the June 1982 diplomatic dispute over Japanese history textbooks that described Japan's colonialism as "advancing." However, with Nakasone coming into power in November and the secret reaching of an economic aid/loan deal in December, the two leaders agreed in late December to meet. Seoul directed the publicizing of Nakasone's sudden visit by framing it because of Chun's "political and diplomatic competence" given that Seoul was Nakasone's first destination before Washington DC.[86] Such framing portrayed Chun as a diligent leader and negotiator, as the PR instructions were to highlight that the economic aid/loan deal was close to being finalized when in truth it was already closed. Together with Chun's recent visits to the US, the ASEAN countries, and Africa, Japan seemingly prioritizing Seoul over Washington DC indicated South Korea's new international status.[87]

Performing South Korea's Regional Security Persona through Rapprochement

The 1984 summit in Tokyo especially had to do with the North Korean threat and South

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[82] "Aftermath of the East Asian War of 1592-1598" https://aftermath.uab.cat/
[83] "Interim Report on Plan Mugunghwa 84.6" V.2 file 118.
[84] "Report on Plan Mugunghwa for Prime Minister 1984.7.25. " V.2 File 277.
[85] Death 2011, 2.
[86] "Overview of Korea-Japan Summit Meeting Plan," 1983.1.4 page 10, File 96
[87] "Overview of Korea-Japan Summit Meeting Plan," 1983.1.4 page 11, File 97.

Korea's as well as Chun's status competition with North Korea and Kim Il Sung. Seoul had noticed that Kim refrained from criticizing Japan (which was his routinized diplomatic repertoire) during his visit to the Soviet Union earlier in 1984, feeding into suspicion about a possible détente between Japan and North Korea. Chun's visit thus entailed a competitive performance of spectacles as he and Seoul did not want to lose in the game of international image-making where other regional leaders were participating in face-to-face diplomacy. South Korea's sense of insecurity from its perception that it was losing to North Korea extended to military and economic realms, which pushed it to pursue reconciliation with Japan to not only achieve security assurance from Japan but to also surpass North Korea economically by improving its trade deficit with Japan and securing technology knowledge-sharing. Rapprochement with its former colonizer, therefore, offered an opportunity for Seoul to grab the world's attention.

Chun's own image was also at the center of South Korea's rivalry with North Korea. Kim Il Sung's 1984 East Europe tour had sown an impression globally that Kim was savvier in international diplomacy than Chun. To appeal to Korean residents in Japan who tend to lean towards supporting North Korea, and the Japanese public, Seoul had considered public diplomacy stunts to leave a favorable impression on the Japanese public. One of them was to capture Chun playing "go" or "baduk" with former Japanese prime minister Fukuda for about 5 to 10 minutes. This would portray Chun as a down-to-earth person and leave a positive impression in Japan where many played *go*.[88] North Koreans, including those ethnic Koreans in Japan who are part of the North Korean-state-sponsored association of ethnic Koreans in Japan (Jochongryun), were targeted in his addresses and his image-making and made to feel included.[89] The inclusion of South Korea's demand for better treatment by the Japanese government toward Koreans in Japan (who were treated as second-class citizens) as a summit agenda was another way to make Chun and South Korea the more attractive Korea to the "zainichis" (or Korean ethnic residents in Japan).

That an official diplomatic visit made by the leader of a less friendly country could unintentionally worsen bilateral relations was hinted in the planning. Seoul had wanted to pick the right timing so that Chun will be welcomed with enthusiasm. To do so, Seoul made plans to test the reaction of various groups in Japan in advance and to influence the Japanese

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[88] "Current Situation on Executing Plan Mugunghwa 1984. 7. 16." Ministry of Foreign Affairs. V.2 File 231.
[89] "For Reference, Plan Mugunghwa 1984. 6" V.1 File 98.

newspapers to cover the visit positively.[90] It also requested Japanese foreign minister Abe to create a welcoming atmosphere during Chun's visit by minimizing Japan's contact with North Korea, offering a sincere response to the 1982 textbook issue, and finally surveilling the anti-Korea movement to generate a welcoming atmosphere.[91] This was also important for Tokyo, which wanted the summit to take place in a favorable domestic political environment so that it would be seen as successful. Independent of South Korea's requests, Japan had also put to create a conducive atmosphere in preparation for a possible visit by Chun since early 1984, perhaps in anticipation of opposition from the socialist and communist parties.[92]

Geared towards the South Korean public was to ensure that rapprochement looked genuine. One of the Chun government's objectives of the summit was to reset bilateral relations by clearing up historical issues through Hirohito's apology which will hopefully change South Koreans' perception of Japan. More importantly, the summit was aimed at changing South Koreans' perception of Japan as more than a former colonizer, but to sow in them a more realistic perception that it is the world's second-largest economy and a member of the liberal West camp that shares many common values with South Korea as well as South Korea's closest friendly state.[93] The summitry performance was thus targeted at the South Korean public to dissipate their negative feelings toward the Japanese people.[94]

Given such an ambitious aim, there were many political risks involved surrounding the emperor's apology and Japan's performance. Preparation meetings between South Korea and Japan illustrate states agreeing to disagree on segments of their performance because of their respective national interests or domestic politics. Japan could not guarantee that it can meet South Korea's expectations concerning remarks on the 1982 textbook dispute. It nonetheless promised South Korea that it will cooperate when it comes to handling the press and media regarding the issue.[95] Getting Hirohito to make the "right" performance of apology as expected by Koreans would also prove to be a major challenge for Chun and Seoul. South Korea had asked Japan in May that Hirohito express regret over the unhappy history using "strong language" in light of South Koreans' feelings to persuade South

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[90] "(Draft) 84.1.12" V1. File 24.
[91] "Plan Mugunghwa (Preparation Situation and Measures)84. 6. 30" V.2, file 138.
[92] Untitled, V. 2. File 146-7.
[93] "The Significance of the President's Visit to Japan" V.2 File 134.
[94] "The Objectives of President Chun's Visit to Japan and Meeting with the Emperor" July 11 1984. V.1. File 164.
[95] "Notes of Meeting," 1984 May 14. V.1 File 61.

Koreans of the utility behind Chun's visit to Tokyo to which Tokyo replied negative because of the Constitution prohibiting Hirohito from making political statements.[96]

At the same time, Seoul certainly felt that the South Korean public had been an obstacle to pragmatic cooperation with Japan in security, trade, and technology cooperation. They were certain that Hirohito's simple apology statement would not make the "sadness and damage" that Koreans experienced go away briefly even if it may lead to friendlier ties with Japan. His statement would be a means rather than an end to strengthening bilateral ties.[97] Ultimately, it was Nakasone who had the final decision on the wording of Hirohito's statement choosing the expression "unhappy past," "that should never be repeated," and adding the word "regret" (rather than "expressing remorse" as expected by Seoul).[98] Nakasone, however, added the expression "expressing remorse" in his own statement the next day, in the hope of performing faithfully to the tune of historic reconciliation.[99] For Japan, the summitry performance it had intended to put on was to open a new era of Japan-Korea relations that would give Japan a greater say over the Korean Peninsula affairs and in regional security. Nakasone's image was also considered. Japan had requested that Nakasone's three children join the unofficial lunch hosted by the prime minister. This performance could produce a positive image that both leaders share chemistry and create a family-man image for Nakasone.[100]

South Korean Public Mood

   a.   *South Korean Public Indifference, 1983*

Because the public's resentment towards the Chun regime was so strong in the latter half of 1981, the South Korean public chose to act indifferently towards both security threats from the North as well as Seoul's hosting of the Asian Games and the Olympics in 1986 and 1988 respectively.[101] As one scholar/observer commented, Koreans in 1982 seemed to be "a faceless crowd, determined not to blink an eye regardless of what kind of shocking incident takes place[,]"[102] describing that "popular mood" in Korea as "cynicism toward all things

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[96] "Guideline for Negotiating with Japan over Plan Mugunghwa 84. 5. 29" V.1 File 75.
[97] "The Objectives of President Chun's Visit to Japan and Meeting with the Emperor" July 11 1984. V.1. File 167.
[98] Choi 2019, 114.
[99] Choi 2019, 115.
[100] "Japan's Informal Requests and Measures Concerning the President's Visit to Tokyo 1984. 8.13" V.1, File 256.
[101] Korea Scope 1982, p. 33. Tim Shorrock's Personal Archives.
[102] Ibid.

and distrust of the Chun regime."[103] Because of an economic crisis, South Koreans in general seemed to be too preoccupied with livelihood and survival. The lack of avenues to express their opinions and communicate with the government could also explain the silence of protests in 1982. At the same time, however, South Koreans still took to the streets to protest against Japan's history textbook that watered down its aggression toward Korea. The government, in response to these protests, had to cancel its talks with Japan on economic cooperation.[104] A poll conducted in November and December 1981 among South Koreans showed that Japan was the second most "hated" country after North Korea. However, while 39 percent called Japan an unfavorable or not an ally, 38.5 percent said they considered Japan a useful or ordinary ally, suggesting South Koreans' mixed feelings toward Japan as a necessary but evil neighbor.[105]

Nakasone recounted South Koreans' warmth as he left the country, a contrast to when he first arrived. Elitist public opinion, comprising from scholars, columnists and journalists, however, was more skeptical. South Korean scholars expressed skepticism toward the economic deal as economic aid was Japan indirectly funding South Korea's military as Japan had been benefiting from South Korea's military capability. Op-eds and journalists expressed similar sobering views, noting the achievements such as the establishment of a hotline between the two leaders and the USD four billion economic aid deal as there were unresolved issues, such as the treatment of Korean diaspora in Japan, and the unspecified economic aid deal that may end up being cumbersome to future South Korean generations. Most importantly, the co-performance by Nakasone and Chun of the newfound friendship between Japan and South Korea did not seem to "fuse" with,[106] or be seen relatable to them. One opinion editorial viewed the outcome of the summit as superficial, pending both governments' efforts to follow up and implement the joint communique,[107] suggesting the recognition that the two countries' ties are more than about affirming commitment to better ties through summit-level meetings.

Chun and his government sought to leave an intended impression on the international community using summitry theatricality. To get a sense of international

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[103] Ibid.

[104] Ju-won Song, "Looking at South Korea through the history of the 1980s: the Black and White of 1980s South Korea," Official Blog of the National History Museum, December 24 2017, https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.naver?isHttpsRedirect=true&blogId=much_korea&logNo=221168172802

[105] :"Japan second most hated country," AP January 13, 1982.

[106] Alexander 2004.

[107] Op-Ed, "Toward a New Dimensions of Cooperation Era," Maeil Economic Newspaper, January 13 1983.

reactions, telegrams summarizing local media coverages of the summit were sent from South Korean embassies across the world to the foreign ministry. These telegrams included news reports containing details left out in the Korean newspapers, indicating the state's efforts to manipulate South Koreans' impression of the summitry. For example, some of the international coverages mentioned that a South Korean man had called the Japanese embassy threatening to kill Nakasone[108]. The South Korean dailies were also silent about the release of opposition leader Kim Dae-jung (who was kidnapped from Japan by South Korean authorities) by Chun in November 1982. Foreign media picked up on this, downplaying the foreign ministry and Chun's administration's framing that the summit was a result of South Korea's state capacity and Chun's diplomatic competency.

   b. *South Korean Impression of the 1984 Summit: Skepticism toward Japan's Sincerity*

When the visit was announced officially on July 7th, 1984, Korean newspapers ran big headlines and opinion editorials with a tone of hope for reconciliation, resolving trade imbalance, stabilizing the region, and overall, a future-oriented cooperative relationship. A small portion of related analyses and opinion editorials made demands out of the visit, such as Japan's reflection on history as a condition for cooperation.[109] There were also reports of arson incidents in the Japanese main party (LDP) building, and other buildings associated with South Korea in Japan allegedly related to the news of Chun's visit to Japan.[110] The news of the summit also surfaced what intuitively would have been more salient: whether Emperor Hirohito would apologize to South Korea.[111]

   Given the 1982 textbook controversy, strong anti-Japan sentiments were still lingering in 1984. The *Baltimore Sun* included an opinion poll conducted a week before the summit in which Japan overtook the Soviet Union as the second most unfavorable country in South Koreans' perspective.[112] Korean newspaper headlines generally portrayed the Tokyo visit as successful, as both sides had agreed to balance trade, transfer technology, and expand youth exchanges. The papers also highlighted the "friendly" atmosphere and relationship between Chun and prime minister Nakasone, conveying that Japan (including

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[108] "Report on Newspaper Coverage" January 13 1983, Folder V.3, File 141; "Threat casts pall over trip to S. Korea by Nakasone" Houston Post, January 11 1983. Folder V.3 File 255.
[109] Op-Ed, "Partnership Only With Japan's Repentance" Seoul Newspaper, 1984.7.12.
[110] "Attempted Arson at 5 Places" Dong-A Daily, 1984.7.17; "Japan LDP HQ and Korea-Japan Parliamentary Association Building, etc" Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1984.7.17.
[111] "Cabinet Accountable for Emperor's Officㅇian Action" Dong-A Daily, 1984.7.18; "Apology for Japan's Rule Also Unresolved with North Korea" Joongang Daily, 1984.7.19; "Controversy within Japan Politics Concerning Apology toward South Korea" Chosun Daily, 1984.7.25.
[112] Found in "USW-4558". 1984.9.11.

the media) was gradually changing its attitude toward South Korea.[113] Op-eds added greater reassurances to Korean readers that every step of the visit as broadcasted on television showed that Japan "gave its best diplomatic manners and best expression of sincerity."[114] Others chimed in to reaffirm that Japan was "sincere" in their hospitality towards Chun, including Japanese journalists who have a record of writing negatively about South Korea.[115] By also reporting on the Japanese media's representation of the emperor's remarks, the newspapers sowed an impression among South Koreans that the Japanese people supported or took seriously the apologetic remark. One report attempted to convey the pro-Korean "mood" among the Japanese public, citing the popularity of Korean music and rising sales of books on Korea.[116] To further enliven the "success" of the historic summit based on Hirohito's remarks, newspapers inserted colored photographs of the visit, such as the emperor reading his remarks and Chun sitting next to him, or the South Korea-Japan flags hung along Ginza in Tokyo.[117]

While public opinion polls on South Koreans' perceptions and attitudes toward Japan following the summit were not available, columns written by journalists and public figures/thinkers provide a glimpse into what could be a shared discourse among at least some South Koreans – that the basis of South Koreans' perception toward Japan is the nature of the Japanese people and their culture. *A columnist* interpreted the emperor's use of "yu gam" - which is translated into English as "regret" but has a shallower nuance than the English meaning - as a "diluted" apology.[118] He points out that the word "yu gam" originated from Japan that is usually not used as an apology to another person but is an internalist regret. A culture that is familiar with "begging for forgiveness" but had refused to apologize sincerely for the war and brutal colonial rule reaffirms South Koreans' skepticism toward reconciliation. The perception that Japanese culture, usually considered polite and in which apologetic expressions are commonly made, is the root of the problem and is a telltale sign of why South Korea's public mood will not sway easily even with a summit and Hirohito's remarks of "regret."

The situation on the ground in South Korea and Japan indicates media censorship by Seoul to prevent the "dampening" of the mood surrounding the historic occasion. South

[113] Op-Ed, "New Beginning in Korea-Japan Partnership" Maeil Economic Paper, 1984. 9.8.
[114] Op-Ed. "Perception of the Unhappy Past," Chosun Daily, 1984. 9.8
[115] Won Ha, "'The Tokyo Warmth' that No Other World Leader Felt," Chosun Daily, 11984.9.9.
[116] Young-su Shin, "Korea as Neighbor' Now Felt by Heart" Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1984.9.8.
[117] Bong-sub Lee, "Toward a Path of New Korea-Japan History," Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1984. 9.8.
[118] Gyu-tae Lee "Lee Gyu-tae's Corner: On Regret ("yugam")," Chosun Daily, 1984.9.8.

Korean embassies' summarized coverages reveal what was left out in the Korean daily newspapers - protests and demonstrations in South Korea and Japan over Chun's visit. Protests took place in Seoul and Tokyo in the days leading up to the summit, as reported by foreign papers, not only suggesting media censorship but also the heavy investment made by the state in monitoring and gauging international audiences' interest as well as what information they were getting. Some protests were fundamentally against the idea of reconciliation with Japan over colonization. The National Movement to Halt the Renewed Invasion of Japan called Chun's visit to Tokyo "pro-Japanese diplomacy"[119] Religious groups, mostly Christians, also opposed the visit for they saw improving ties as subjugating South Korea to Japan's influence again, calling for the Japanese emperor and Japanese government to apologize to Koreans.[120] College student activists called Chun's visit "traitorous," as it is not only "anti-ethnonationalist" but also because the visit would help sustain the corrupted military dictatorship under Chun.[121]

There was also a hint of the lack of preparedness by Koreans in accepting an apology that seemed to have been coordinated top-down.[122] A columnist wrote that the condition to successful reconciliation is Japan's warmth, because, "how could our 36 years of humiliation, looting, and bleeding be the same as their experience of those 36 years[?]"[123] That political reconciliation will not change South Koreans' perception was also supported by poll results in South Korea (as quoted in a *Seattle Times* article) which showed that Japan is the second most disliked country after North Korea and that South Koreans regarded the Japanese people as an "imperialistic, cunning people who will do anything in their self-interests."[124]

International media's reaction to the summit in terms of its accomplishment and outcome was generally lukewarm. In contrast to Korean media framing the summit as a hopeful one, international newspapers were less optimistic, citing unresolved problems such as technology transfer and the status of Koreans in Japan. The *Baltimore Sun,* for example, saw Chun's press conference on the second day of his visit as self-congratulatory for plucking his courage to visit Tokyo despite opposition within South Korea due to historical

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[119] "Join the ranks to save the nation! <Statement>!" Korea Communique, number 9. September 21, 1984. Archived at the Presbyterian Historical Society.
[120] Collection on Democratization Movement in the 1980s: Volume II, p. 280-287.
[121] "We Oppose President Chun's Traitorous Visit to Japan," Data Collection on Democratization Movement in the 1980s: Volume II, p. 278-279.
[122] Do-hyung Lee, "The Japanese Emperor's 'Words'," Chosun Daily, 1984.9.8.
[123] Sook-ja Sung "Would the Japanese People Know," Dong-A Daily, 1984.9.10.
[124] "Historic Tokyo visit is game for South Korean leader" The Seattle Times. 1984.9.5.

distrust between Japan and South Korea.[125]

The Forgotten Rapprochement

Despite the hefty political investment poured into summit preparations, the first-ever reconciliatory diplomacy at the highest level did not leave a lasting impression on the South Korean people. This may be due to leader-level factors. There were indications of increasing volatility within South Korea, at least from the latter half of 1984 onwards. Chun's visit to Tokyo in September 1984 sparked off weeks of protests and violent demonstrations by the opposition that include college students, labor activists, and Christian groups. These movements, not particularly directed at rapprochement, became more radical, as indicated by their language. Chun's rule was commonly referred to as "fascist-military rule," and opposition leaflets started associating South Korean generals in high positions in the Chun government with the Japanese Imperial Army.[126]

Japan's failure to sustain the spirit of rapprochement also contributed to negating any impression of reconciliation from South Korea's perspective. In 1985, Nakasone became the first post-war prime minister to state that he had visited Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the spirits of Japanese soldiers including convicted war criminals like Hideki Tojo, in his official capacity on August 15, which is commemorated in South Korea as liberation day.[127] South Korea's dailies expressed moderate discomfort with the visit, framing it as a failure of Nakasone's government to abide by Japan's Peace Constitution dictating the separation of state and religion. Some subsequently expressed greater discomfort, calling for forgiveness while not forgetting history.[128] The visit set off some of the biggest anti-Japan protest demonstrations in Beijing, but there were no visible reports of South Korean demonstrations over the visit or media reports. As a result of growing protests occurring daily, what grabbed the headlines in South Korean dailies as Nakasone paid the visit to Yasukuni Shrine instead was the reservation of the "Academic Stability Act" which aimed to ban student demonstrations.

Nakasone recalled that South Koreans waved goodbye to him at the airport following his visit, while Chun gave credit to his Tokyo visit for bridging his inter-personal

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[125] Cited in diplomatic telegraph. "USW-4558" 1984.11. V. 15 Media Coverage II, File 179.
[126] Tim Shorrock, "The Politics of the South Korean Democratic Oppositions," Draft. April 1985, p. 13.
[127] Clyde Haberman, "Nakasone, Giving In, Will Shun Shrine," The New York Times, October 10, 1985.
[128] Kang-hoon Lee "Let's Forgive But Not Forget," Kyunghwang Newspaper, 1985. 8.17.

relations with Nakasone.[129] The summit-level friendship, however, was not reflected in South Korea's public mood. That South Korea and Chun also failed to create a positive impression among international audiences especially South Korea's security allies (US, and Japan as quasi-ally) through the rapprochement summitry was palpable from US and Japan refusing Chun's requests in 1985 to endorse Chun or to isolate North Korea, which was a direct testament to the failure to leave an intended impression.[130]

6. CONCLUSION

Existing literature in IR on summitry highlights the agentic power of summits by focusing on leaders' interactions and the positive effects on foreign and domestic publics of foreign visits and trips. Conceptualizing summit diplomacy as an international performance demonstrates the holistic process of summitry as well as its complexity in terms of the impressions performed and perceived by different audiences. By foregrounding audience perception and reaction that can influence state actions, the logic of performance demonstrates states' concerns for how they are seen by others – foreign and domestic, governments and publics – and the resultant state action. This is because of the centrality of "self" in structuring not only the state but its relations with others and the social order. As the South Korea-Japan summitry case illustrates, the two governments' concerns surrounding the impression the summitry would leave had to do with strategic and security reasons that were less publicly known. At the same time, they had to manage their domestic publics' reactions that could undermine the public impression, that of genuine reconciliation, they were fomenting through the rapprochement summits. South Korean public was, however, skeptical, and indifferent at best, toward the performance of reconciliation by the two leaders, treating it as a political or inter-governmental level outcome. The lack of identification with the performance lies with the nature of the summit as a state elite-led and elite-centered production of foreign policy discourse through media representation which reproduces the power structure and marginalizes other discourse.

The lessons of South Korea-Japan summitry apply to other summitry involving leaders of adversarial or competitive dyads seeking to de-escalate diplomatic tensions or cultivate more positive relations. The 1972 US-China summitry in China did not resolve all bilateral issues, but it kick started a momentum for the two former enemies to commit to establishing diplomatic ties. The effects of the performative dimension of negotiations-

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[129] Chun 2017, 364; 372.
[130] "Reagan refused to support S. Korean constitution in 1985: dossier," The Korea Times. April 17, 2016. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/07/120_202730.html

centered summitry between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1980s reportedly contributed to public acceptance of détente in both countries.[131] The US-North Korea summitry of 2018-9 may not have brought about a direct breakthrough in denuclearization, but it allowed people to imagine the possibility of reaching a peace agreement, as North Korea and its leader Kim Jong Un put on a performance of an impression of their willingness to negotiate. It is such impressions or expressions that "give off" that allow for imagining of a different world politics that is worlds away from the reality. At the same time, the personalization of foreign policy and the discourse by a leader show that significant moments in world politics like rapprochement can be dismissed by the very political subjects who yearn for it. Only by leaving the impression that the "state" is there rather than an individual leader's "capability" can a summit performance be vicariously identified and thus, relatable from a domestic audience's perspective.

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