On April 6, we hosted an interdisciplinary Mershon Monday conversation about one of the most pressing issues in the sphere of security studies: the shifting landscape of technology and innovation. Our three panelists, Xiaodong Zhang, Liliana Gil, and Felix Chang, offered insights on this topic, drawing on varied fields of research and experiences.

Zhang began his presentation by bringing our attention to the history and legacy of Ralph Mershon, whose bequest enabled the foundation of the Mershon Center. Zhang highlighted Mershon, an OSU graduate whose company became instrumental in the production of electrolytic capacitors, as an exemplar of leadership in innovation—a field critical to national security. Prior to globalization in the 1990s, Zhang argued, the United States was a leader in all three stages of technological development: 0–1, the start-up phase of building an invention from scratch; 1–10, wherein manufacturing is scaled; and 10–100, when production processes are solidified. According to Zhang, while the United States still leads in the 0–1 stage, its dominance in the other stages has diminished. In his view, this is exacerbated by several weaknesses in investment allocation, including insufficient support for projects in the 1–10 and 10-100 stages. He concluded by suggesting that national security can benefit from a more comprehensive, strategic approach to investing in technological innovation and production.

Liliana Gil shared insights from her ethnographic research on technology and improvisation in Brazil. Gil invited Mershoners to see “technology” not just as devices, but as socially and politically embedded practices, including skills, protocols, and institutions through which security and insecurity are produced in everyday life. Here, technology and international security are not just about defense and control, but also relate to concrete practices that build technological capacities from the ground-up. Gil’s research reveals how national narratives, especially the myth of Brazilians’ “natural improvisation,” actively shape innovation agendas and interventions on the ground. Her key example was São Paulo’s network of public fabrication labs, which provide free access to tools and training (from coding to design) across the city, including marginalized neighborhoods, and link technological capacity to dignity, livelihoods, and human security. Gil also cautioned against techno-optimism, noting that development promises built on skills training are being disrupted as AI changes what constitutes coding and digital work. She concluded by arguing that real technological sovereignty is not just access, but the ability to adapt, reproduce, and sustain technologies locally. 

Chang’s presentation focused on how seemingly technical, back-office financial infrastructures (the behind-the-scenes systems and processes that handle record-keeping and the processing of trades) function as critical arenas for international security and economic competition. He examined the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), a payment network authorized by China to process international transactions. Chang detailed how the transition from traditional, paper-based clearing and settlement processes (the multifaceted steps of verifying, finalizing, and transferring funds for a transaction) to digital platforms has created highly efficient pathways for cross-border transactions. This technological shift, Chang argued, is vital to the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB), offering an alternative payment network capable of bypassing U.S. dollar-denominated sanctions and increasing the use of Chinese currency in global markets. Ultimately, Chang showed how the architecture of digital payment systems is deeply intertwined with broader struggles for global financial dominance.

The discussion following the presentations explored further aspects of technology and security, including the prospects of international technology cooperation, the narratives attached to the pursuit of technological dominance, and the ways middle powers navigate the technological aspects of great power competition. Ultimately, the panelists highlighted how the future of technology and security will be shaped not merely by innovation alone, but by how new developments are embedded, organized, scaled, and narrativized among diverse national and international actors.

By Helen Murphey, Julia Marino and Nicholas Nyachega